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THE

WORDS OF THE LORD JESUS.

BY

RUDOLF STIER,

DOCTOR OF THEOLOGY, CHIEF PASTOR AND SUPERINTENDENT OF ERKEUDITZ.

VOLUME SEVENTH.

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BY THE

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

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Ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου παραδίδοται εἰς τὸ σταυρωθῆναι.

Περίλυπος ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή μου ἕως θανάτου.

τετέλεσται.

PREFACE.

It has been found necessary, on account of its disproportionate bulk, to divide the last volume of the first edition of this work. The question may be asked, why I have not rather retrenched and curtailed it; and my reply is, that I did not think myself justified in dealing thus with a book which already belongs to the public, and has been blessed to the public good;—that the words of the Passion and the Resurrection demand the most careful and elaborate treatment, being of all our Lord's discourses the most weighty, the most profound, and the most unlimited in their consequences;—and, moreover, that they involve more than ordinary exposition of the historical narrative with which they are so wonderfully interwoven. As to the most diffuse of the treatises contained in these volumes—those on Baptism and the Lord's Supper—the necessity of our own times has required that they should be rather enlarged than compressed.

May the Lord open for this exposition of His word, based upon a penetrating contemplation of His life, a still more extended path of usefulness and blessing! May it especially be the means of convincing many that "the abstract principle of an authoritative Scripture," even without the strict obligations of confessions, can offer something positive enough for a genuine faith in Christ; and of proving to others that even a "more rigorous idea of inspiration" may be consistently and intelligently carried out into the details of interpretation, to the satisfaction of every reasonable mind.

We have heard lately many protests against both these things, with direct reference to this book. As to my work, it must continue to defend itself and assert its own claims; but I may be permitted, by way of preface, to say a few words in reply more especially to the review of Weizsacker in Reuter's Repertorium

(March 1854). I am thankful to this generally friendly critic for giving me this opportunity; and cannot deny that I feel more sympathy with *his* scientific freedom than with the ecclesiastical narrowness of my former critic Münchmeyer:—whose exhortations to submit myself to his so-called church were utterly lost upon me, but whose objections and misunderstandings have been referred to, wheresoever expedient, in this second edition. Weizsacker also adopts a fundamental position quite different from mine; and the consequence is much misapprehension and much stricture and condemnation which I must altogether repudiate. Not that I refuse to submit to correction: God knows how gladly I would learn from any one who should convince my judgment. My critic's review very closely and carefully pursues the first four volumes of the work; but I cannot of course trouble the public with specific reply to all his individual criticisms. After all, when each has said all that he has to say, the reader must judge and decide. As to the charge, which, with all its severity, is urged with brotherly kindness, that my book occasionally deals in sweeping condemnation of those who are otherwise minded, I can only say that every man has a right to use his literary prerogative according to his conviction; and certainly my critic has unsparingly used *his* in regard to my unworthy self. Let us take care to avoid such smooth courtliness as would imperil the sharp expression of our honest convictions! On the other hand, let us beware of being needlessly offended by every sharp expression of contrary judgment! My book will be found, however, to abound in conciliatory words which prove that, while I wage vehement warfare against everything that opposes my convictions, my blame is directed only against unbelief, half-belief, and the human element which violates my understanding of the divine Word: moreover, that I do not make *faith* in this word and the person of Christ unconditionally dependent upon individual apprehensions of individual truths, but recognise it everywhere as the faith of the heart, whatever form or direction it may take.

The remarks which I purpose to make upon Weizsacker's criticism may be advantageously limited to the four main points which lie at the foundation of all his objections and censures: to wit, that there is contradiction in my fundamental principles themselves—that I touch the subordinate historical problem unskil-

fully—that my harmonistic system is unscientific and forced—that, finally, the exegesis is far from giving the true and unprejudiced meaning.

The objection that there are contradictions, still unremoved, in my theory and system, is one to which every system in theology as well as in philosophy is exposed at the hands of every other system. The perpetual conflict of my exegesis with that of the predominant school has given me abundant incentive thoroughly to test my fundamental principles, in order to find out what might be wanting to their unity and consistency; but the most conscientious revision of the work for this second edition has detected nothing in them fundamentally contradictory. On the contrary, I have become more livingly conscious of the internal truth and harmony of my views; while only in a few places it has seemed prudent to render the *expression* a little plainer, and less open to misunderstanding. Would that the critic above-named had pointed out to me what those contradictions are, with the same diffuseness which he has expended upon individual questions of exegesis! I seek that information in vain throughout his Review, and am therefore referred to the "orthodox theology" of the Universities, which his criticism rests upon as a presupposed and unquestioned foundation.

The question of historical criticism and Harmony comes next; but it is primarily in my "tolerably rigid, though not mechanical idea of inspiration" that I am challenged to admit my self-contradiction. That *my* idea of inspiration—to use these words in passing, although it is not properly speaking mine—contradicts "the methods not only of *most* modern critics, but of the apologists also," is neither to be denied nor altered by me; the question is whether, as I have many times asserted and proved, these methods themselves are not to be charged with vagueness and inconsistency, if not with an utter want of any theory of inspiration whatever. Do I understand it to be a fundamental contradiction in me, that I would join the newer theology, against the old orthodoxy, in giving its full right to the human side, while the Divine is not forgotten and denied? My critic can scarcely mean this, for he himself reckons "the pervading reference of the word to the *Divine-human* person of Jesus" among the "excellencies" of the work. Yes, verily, the inspired word also claims

to be Divine-human in its character. To carry through this supreme fundamental principle consistently, without ever giving undue preponderance to the Divine or the human element, is the great problem of our limited knowledge and skill. It is a problem never to be fully solved; I aim at it everywhere, but think that neither myself nor any other expositor has ever fully reached it yet. But the principle in itself is no self-contradiction; it is the sole mediating principle of all contradictions.

The Excursus on Inspiration (on Matt. xxii. 34—46, Vol. iii.) "is so indistinct and contradictory that however anxious one may be to find a firm and definite principle, he must entirely fail." This "rough judgment" I must assent to, without the opportunity of defending myself against any more specific argument; so that I might justly reply that the indistinctness is chargeable to the critic's eye, and the want of firm and definite principle is only in the relation of my theory to his system or no-system! I have only further to declare that I cannot express myself more clearly and precisely than I have done there and elsewhere, upon the great miracle of Inspiration which our Lord's immoveable γέγραπται ascribes to the sacred Scriptures and every part of them. I have looked everywhere for specific refutation of my contradictions, but meet only vague and general censures. Yet not absolutely so, for Weizsacker gives me at least one specific hint: "The expression ἐν πνεύματι would rather support the opposite conclusion, than that there is an *inspiration* distinguished from *revelation*." But here I can only utter my simple protest, which rests upon plain and definite grounds; for here there is an essential difference of "views." As if ἐν πνεύματι—to abide by the text in hand—were connected as an epithet with the person of *David*, and did not belong rather to καλεῖ, to the word and expression of the Psalm; just as in Mark xii. 36 it belongs to εἶπεν, and in St Peter the φερόμενοι belongs to the ἐλάλησαν—they *spake* as they *were moved*—and as in Lu. xx. 42 the "*book of Psalms*" takes the place of "*in Spirit!*" As if we must form to ourselves the airy notion of a πνεῦμα of personal *revelatio* for the writers of the old Scriptures, whose entire personality, however, certainly did not live and walk and speak every word *in the Spirit*—instead of understanding the expression, sanctioned by Jesus, to apply to the *Scripture* and not to the persons,

according to the uncontested meaning of רוּחַ הַקֹּדֶשׁ as held in common by the Pharisees and our Lord! This was so plainly stated in the Excursus that I can do no more than repeat it. My New Testament exegesis is derived from the *Old* Testament; my theory of Inspiration rests upon that orthodox Judaism which was confirmed and established by our Lord and His apostles. That theology, on the other hand, which my critic represents, seeks its principle independently of this strict connection, without any respect to this Old Testament school of instruction for the New Testament; as long, therefore, as it declines to hold by the γραφή which originated there, it will never be able to free itself from its necessary opposition to the miracle of Inspiration as testified by Christ.

There is another hint given to me, but in the same tone of dogmatic counter-assertion. As it respects the *type* specifically, I am taught that "I should not have entered the lists for the *unknown* in itself, but for the *transformation* of the literal idea of the type into a conscious and designed typical form of speaking." This expression certainly gives me no model of clearness; for I am altogether in embarrassment how to understand it. My whole theory maintains most emphatically the consciousness and design of typical sayings; but it is the consciousness and design of the inspiring Spirit, and not always of the human writer: only thus can I reconcile the grammatical and historical sense of many passages with the prophetic meaning disclosed in them by the New Testament. That, without any necessity for transformation, is my notion of a *type*, which is therefore distinguished from a *prophecy* in the stricter sense. When the critic speaks of a "use" of the Old Testament in the New, and of a "*freer* use of the prophetic word by Jesus Himself," and terms the "authentic interpretation of Old Testament passages" by Christ and His apostles an "extreme view"—it is plain that he is in utter contradiction to my principle, and no less opposed, I believe, to Christ and His apostles. True consistency must always be extreme—mine, therefore, has nothing to fear. Where can there be found any other key which shall worthily and consistently open all these "uses" of the Old Testament in the New, but that rigorous doctrine of Inspiration, which in the conscious

and designed words of the Holy Ghost recognizes finally all type to be prophecy, and all prophecy to be typically mediated!

The critic charges me with "*most forced* exposition of Old Testament passages and sections of the prophets:" he terms the typical exposition of the eschatological discourse of our Lord "a psychological and christological impossibility, which contradicts itself at every step;" but these are dogmatic assertions from *his own* point of view simply, and the only reply is a recommendation to a thoroughly penetrating study of the Old Testament. But when it is alleged against me that I represent the Lord as ascribing to the Old Testament the full *doctrine* of immortality, it is merely a misunderstanding of my words; for it is expressly stated in Vol. iii. that the faith in a future life, which was necessarily involved in a faith in the living God, comes forward but seldom, and "never as a doctrine."

The critic almost *laments* "that the exegetical task was not the only one which the book aimed to accomplish, and that it should intrude so much into the *historical problem!*" This briefer objection may be met by a briefer reply. And that may be put in the self-answering question—Can a real exposition of the words of our Lord be imagined, which should leave out the historical problem, that is, not enter into the exposition and arrangement of the life and works of the Lord? Is there such a thing possible as a separation of the words from the narrative? The one almost everywhere illustrates the other; it sometimes happens that the word is to be understood only as the luminous centre of an entire transaction, and the transaction again only to be perfectly understood by the help of the word:—of this, the remainder of our work will give continual and decisive examples. Consequently, that a book such as mine should "aspire to give at the same time the materials for an Evangelical Harmony, as well as for a life of Jesus," is quite consistent with propriety; for the rightly understood *discourses* of Jesus *are* themselves by far the largest and most distinctive portion of these materials, without the thorough consideration of which, criticism, with all its apparatus of learning, is in continual danger of going astray. As to my furnishing these materials for the life of Jesus "by the way," and therefore unsatisfactorily, my

readers must decide; but I confess that I cannot understand the assertion. The critic bewails the labour of gathering from "scattered, occasional remarks" (what else could they be, occurring upon these several passages!) my views upon this and that part of evangelical history—but it should be remembered that the title is not "the Life of Jesus." but "His Discourses." The nature of the case required that these remarks, aiming to adjust the words to the narrative, should be fragmentary and occasional. To deal with occurrences as they are brought forward by the Lord's discourses, is certainly the only order that an exposition of these discourses could adopt; he who writes the life of Jesus must of course order and combine events differently. Would to God that he never did so prematurely, without having first considered these scattered data in the place assigned to them in the text of the Gospels, and in the light of the discourses with which they are inseparably connected! I could wish that whoever might use this book as furnishing materials to that end, would not seek simply *the author's* "views" or "fundamental principles," but observe carefully the data themselves, which, by his aid, have been pointed out and demonstrated. If, then, a different view suggests itself—which, unhappily, often occurs in spite of clear and concrete data, through the influence of preconceived principles—the reader is free, of course, to deal in his own way with what the author furnishes according to the light of his own best understanding.

This leads to the dissatisfaction of Weizsacker specifically with my *Harmony*. And, first, it is not true that in this department of my labour I am guided by an altogether different canon from that of inspiration, namely, the *historical*. No, both canons in their unity are my guide, the inspiration-canon having, indeed, the first authority, inasmuch as the historical must not contradict that:—my tenacity on this point is reproached even by the reviewer himself. The pre-eminent place which is accorded to St Matthew, St Luke yielding to him, if need be, as being a reporter at one remove, is rightly understood; but what are the arguments brought against this? They are brought from the new theology, and alleged without proof—though my book everywhere contends earnestly, perhaps too earnestly, with that theology, by diligent argument. My error is not "prefer-

ence" for St Matthew; all I do is to represent, as a *witness* against modern criticism, the immoveable fact that "St Matthew *is* actually an apostle and eyewitness, while St Luke *is* a witness only in the second degree." In this case, also, it was no more than right that the protest should have been more specific than a mere statement of the hostile attitude in which I stand to current views. Here it is impossible for me to admit the blank declaration that—according to a very miserable idea of Inspiration, not mine!—"Inspiration, as it regards anything in the gospels, can assuredly have no other meaning than this, that the historical truth of what is recorded is secured by it." Oh no, it must, in order that this may be the case in the fullest sense, certainly also secure the full truth of the words recorded as belonging to the matter recorded; *consequently*, neither the essential matter of these discourses, nor as far as they are essential their verbal expressions, can have been transposed, changed, worked up, or arranged by any "tradition." The transposition of the *verba ipsissima* is everywhere the *confirming* and *illustrative* work of the Holy Spirit Himself. *Consequently* we can admit no grouping of discourses gathered from various places, when the historically sure St Matthew simply records that "He opened His mouth" on this mountain; and, again, that "it came to pass when Jesus made an end of these words," &c. All this I have so often and so clearly said, that I can only repeat my own words.

To follow this out into its application to my individual expositions and analytical arrangements would be inappropriate here. But on the general question, I may remark that I do admit, not as under constraint but consciously and freely, the principle that a constituent element of the text may, in certain few cases, have been erroneously placed in the position it occupies. When the critic charges me with "fighting on behalf of a Harmonist idol," he proves that he has neglected to read *all* that I have said upon the subject. For he would have found it often and strongly maintained, that the order of time is not regarded by the Evangelists as the first point; that it is impossible for us to construct a perfect Harmony; and that I present my own as no more than an attempt, which may be compared to advantage with others. I fight not for this or any view of mine, as such; but for the fun-

damental principle that there is a fixed limit where the sacred letter of historically recording Scripture commands all arbitrary license to pause, and rejects all Harmonistic systems which would transgress it.

I find it very difficult, on the fourth and last point, which is however in reality the first and most important, to avoid expatiating in anti-criticism and exegetical disquisition. My respected critic declares it to be a doubtful question whether my explanation of the discourses themselves, with all frank admission of its excellencies, satisfies its design and furthers an "unprejudiced and true understanding" of the Lord's words. Now, this is what I have aimed at with a sincere intention, and I could have wished that at least to be conceded to me. Of course I can give only *my* apprehension of the word, and must leave every one to form his own. This is answer enough; but I may be permitted—not so much for my critic, as for the benefit of some of my readers—to add a few brief remarks. My inmost consciousness acquits me of the charge—strange charge for one whose emancipation from all authority is so strongly condemned by others—that I never, or but little, deviate "from the older traditional exposition and view of Scripture." I know of no absolute authority but the Scripture itself, as far as I can understand it; the traditional interpretation, old or new, has no fetters for me, save where the tradition of my exegesis approves itself to my mind. Even where that exegesis seems to be at one with the old tradition, a close inspection will very frequently at least detect something different and new. Have I not, on the other hand, everywhere received, acknowledged, and worked in, the new and most recent exposition, as far as I could honestly do so? I may be bold enough to assert that there is scarcely another exegete now living who with equally unprejudiced all-sidedness connects the old with the new. From all "painful seeking out of a deep meaning" I feel myself perfectly absolved;—if by this is meant a human and arbitrary pursuit of it, and not that commanded ἐρευνᾶν to which the finding is promised. If, as it respects many, this deeper penetration "sacrifices clearness"—yet only sometimes, and not throughout?—there are others who desire and cordially welcome the depth of exposition; and who know that in Divine truth, consequently in the Divine word too, there are

some things which cannot be so "clearly" presented to every one, as others may. As to the old and persistent complaint of the mingling of exegesis and application, I must vindicate this right for myself as a practical expositor, whose aim is to be helpful to the preacher, too often left unaided by other expositions; especially as my critic admits that the scientific element is not wanting. After admitting that I have some perception of "the living character of the word, with the depth and riches of its references to the life"—it is scarcely ingenuous to cavil about the uncertain boundary between exposition and application. Where the word itself leads the thoughtful meditation from some single utterance into the "general system of dogmatics"—and how often is this the case!—let it not be charged upon the expositor as a fault that he does the same, and traces the connection between the individual saying and the whole body of truth. He has scriptural justification for this; and no other interpretation of the word is at once scientific and theological. If there should be found, as is alleged, any such vacillation of exposition as hinders the simplicity of interpretation in any particular passage, I must crave excuse for it. It has been my desire rather to give too much than too little; though this is not of such frequent occurrence as the critic maintains. My "allegorising"—which has been set down as "trifling" by those who have no organ for it—springs not from any constraint put upon me by my adherence to old tradition; nor does my "assumption of a manifold meaning in the Word." This last principle was first commended to me by a reverend master of Scripture, who has brought to it much that is *new*; but my subsequent study of holy writ combined with the older tradition to confirm me in this fundamental principle of Hermeneutical science. If Weizsacker is at one with me in the "admission of an infinite meaning" in the Divine Word, he must certainly be brought to the conclusion that this infinite meaning can be unfolded and won only by seeking what is too often called the manifold sense of the Word, but what should be termed its *fulness of meaning*.

Thus I once more avow the position which I still continue to hold in relation to the objections of that Theology with which I can have no sympathy. May this avowal, demanded of me on the issue of a second edition of the present work, commend itself

to my readers of whatever bias! But may the Lord, in whose presence we all learn and commit our errors, give us His Spirit, who guides His people by degrees into all truth, and by that truth overcomes one after another His people's errors. He guides us into this truth by the path of life, if we walk in His word and bear witness out of its fulness for His kingdom:—not by the path of study alone; not by the path of science separated from the life, in which the schools too often walk, and too many, alas, engaged in the offices of the Church, walk with them.

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Pilate brings forward Barabbas in vain,	xxvii. 15—23	xv. 6—14	xxiii. 13—19	xviii. 38—40
His washing of his hands; first consenting judgment of Pilate,	xxvii. 24, 25	xv. 15	.....	.....
Scourging; second maltreatment and mockery, from the Gentiles,	xxvii. 26—30	xv. 16—19	.....	xix. 1—3
Ecce Homo; Pilate's second conversation with Jesus,	.....	.....	xxiii. 20, 21	xix. 4—11
Last attempt to release Him, final sentence and delivering up,	.....	.....	xxiii. 22—25	xix. 12—16
The leading out, Simon the Cyrenian,	xxvii. 31, 32	xv. 20, 21	xxiii. 26	xix. 16—17
Words to the daughters of Jerusalem,	.....	.....	xxiii. 27—31	.....
The potion rejected; *Crucifixion* with two malefactors	xxvii. 33, 34, 38	xv. 22, 23, 27, 28	xxiii. 32, 33	xix. 18
Nine o'clock in the morning. First word on the cross, Father forgive them!	.....	.....	xxiii. 34	.....
Parting of his raiment,	xxvii. 35 (36)	xv. 24 (25)	xxiii. 34	xix. 23, 24.

	ST MATTHEW.	ST MARK.	ST LUKE.	ST JOHN.
Superscription, mockery, blasphemy,	xxvii. 37, 39—44	xv. 26, 29—32	xxiii. 35—39	xix. 19—22
Second word on the cross: This day in Paradise,	.....	.....	xxiii. 40—43	.....
Third word on the cross: To Mary and John,	.....	.....	.....	xix. 25—27
Noon. Darkness three hours,	xxvii. 45	xv. 33	xxiii. 44—45	.....
Three o'clock in the afternoon. Fourth word on the cross: Eloi! Eloi!	xxvii. 46	xv. 34	.....	.....
Fifth word on the cross immediately following: I thirst,	.....	.....	.....	xix. 28
Mockery touching Elias, and final drinking,	xxvii. 47—49	xv. 35, 36	.....	xix. 29
Sixth and seventh words on the cross, closely connected: It is finished! Father, into Thine hands!	xxvii. 50	xv. 37	xxiii. 46	xix. 30
Rending of the Veil: Earthquake,	xxvii. 51—53	xv. 38	xxiii. 45	.....
Confession of the Centurion, sorrow of the people,	xxvii. 54	xv. 39	xxiii. 47, 48	.....
(Devout women present)	xxvii. 55, 56	xv. 40, 41	xxiii. 49.	xix. 25
The breaking of the legs; the piercing of His side,	.....	.....	.....	xix. 31—37
Request of the body; Interment,	xxvii. 57—60	xv. 42—46	xxiii. 50—54	xix. 38—42
The woman behold (and prepare *spices*),	xxvii. 61	xv. 47	xxiii. 55—56	.....
Sabbath. Watch and seal,	xxvii. 62—66	.....	.....	.....
Evening after the close of the Sabbath: purchase of *spices*,	.....	xvi. 1	.....	....
Sunday. Earthquake and *Resurrection*,	xxviii. 2—4	.....	.....	..... .
Magdalene comes first and returns,	xxviii. (1)	.....	... .	xx. 1, 2
The other women at the Sepulchre; the angels appear,	xxviii. 1, 5—8	xvi. 2—8	xxiv. 1—9	.....
Peter and John at the Sepulchre,	....	.....	xxiv. 12	xx. 3—10

	ST MATTHEW.	ST MARK.	ST LUKE.	ST JOHN.
Magdalene again at the Sepulchre; two angels; first Appearance of the Lord,	.....	xvi. 9	.....	xx. 11—17
His second Appearance: to the other women in the way,	xxviii. 9, 10	.....	.....	.....
The account given by Mary and the other women,	.....	xvi. 10, 11	xxiv. 10, 11	xx. 18
Report of the watch,	xxviii. 11—15	.....	.....	.....
His third and fourth Appearance: to Peter and the disciples going to Emmaus,	.....	xvi. 12—13	xxiv. 13—35	.....
His fifth Appearance: to the apostles without Thomas,	.....	xvi. 14	xxiv. 36—43	xx. 19—25
Eight days afterwards. His sixth Appearance: to the apostles with Thomas,	.....	xvi. 14	.....	xx. 26—29
(Many other signs for faith)	.....	.....	.....	xx. 30—31
Indefinite period later. His seventh Appearance: on the sea of Tiberias,	.....	.....	.....	xx. 1—22
His eighth Appearance: on the mountain in Galilee (to the five hundred?)	xxviii. 16—20	xvi. 15—18	.....	.....
Ten days before Pentecost: His last (and penultimate?) Appearance, (in Jerusalem and) on the Mount of Olives; His ascension,	.....	xvi. 19	xxiv. (44—44) xxiv. 50, 51 Acts i. 4—9	.....

THE WORDS OF THE PASSION.

MOST IMMEDIATE FORE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS PASSION.

(Matt. xxvi. 2.)

After many intimations to His disciples of His coming sufferings and death, beginning with Jno. ii. 19, iii. 14, and increasing in clearness down to the express and thrice-repeated declarations of Matt. xvi. 21, xvii. 22, xx. 18, *the Lord once more, two days before it comes to pass, announces what should befall Him.* This saying of Jesus, preserved by St Matthew alone, is the commencement of the history of the Passion.

The first Evangelist introduces it by a remarkable break in the connection, which impressively indicates the great beginning of the final catastrophe. *All these sayings*, ver. 1, is ordinarily referred only to chs. xxiv., xxv.; and, allowing that allusion to be included, it presents us with a highly significant contrast between the dread announcement of judgment which preceded, and the present announcement of His own humiliation. I will sit upon the throne of My glory, dispensing eternal woe and eternal life:—But now I give Myself up to be crucified![1] But if this were the case alone, it would appear that *after two days* was really spoken on the same day, Tuesday, or in the evening of it —but that, as we shall see, cannot be allowed. Moreover, the lofty words πάντας and ἐτέλεσεν point to a higher and more comprehensive meaning of this crisis of transition. The Lord had *closed all His words*—especially His public discourses before

[1] Comp. in Lange's biblischen Dichtungen: Contrasts from the Gospel of Matthew.

His enemies, but also the teaching and prophesying words which He spoke to the disciples[1]—when He went forward to the consummation of the final judgment. He now passes from the prophetic office to the Highpriestly[2]—for this reason, that the *discourses* themselves have not yet *fulfilled* anything. Such an impression must be produced in this place upon the mind of every simple and devout reader of the gospel (and for such it was written!); and every one who reads it with the church, or preaches from it to the church, must feel disposed, with Dräseke, to ask—"What were the words which He had finished?".

This Son of man, who testified of Himself as the Son of God, had given the sublimest and purest witness to the truth of God, in unison with a holy life and mighty wonders; and as the Saviour come into the world, He had uttered, moreover, the most urgent invitations to all convinced sinners to enter the kingdom of grace. "Never man *had spoken* like this man"—and as far as by word alone spiritual influence could be exerted upon man, should there not have been corresponding fruit of His working? But here it was effectually shown that for man's deliverance something more was wanting than *words*, albeit the perfect words of the eternal *Word;* that these could only work preparatorily, and that indeed (as the whole plan of St John's Gospel shows) in no other way than by *evoking that enmity* against God, which rejected and gave over to a shameful death His Son, the witness to the truth. Once more, in this same way that enmity was abolished, the curse was removed, and the way of the Spirit prepared into the hearts of reconciled men; so that He may now unfold the words of the Word down to the end of time, and carry them with power to human hearts. Thus not till after the *discourses* were finished, did the proper accomplishment and *fulfilment* of all come, in the facts of redeeming sufferings and death. And then the discourses become naturally and neces-

[1] For Jno. xiii.—xvii. has a perfectly distinct and peculiar character, belonging to the testimonies given during the Passion itself. Merely external considerations have induced us to exclude that whole section from the present volume, and to anticipate by placing it in its connection in St John's Gospel.

[2] As Grotius remarked: "the office of Teacher and Prophet being fulfilled, Christ enters upon the Priestly office."

sarily fewer and fewer, while the passion of the silent Lamb itself speaks forth all the more impressively its own meaning; not, however, that there are no accompanying and explanatory utterances, for even here the Evangelist, after the finishing of the discourses, proceeds to give some further words of Christ.

And here a very few words, containing apparently nothing new or of special moment, disclose to us as it were the scene of the Passion, before we come to the Last Supper and Gethsemane; they are generally passed over by expositors as mere repetition of previous predictions, and sometimes as if under suspicion of being spurious. But the repetition derives from the time and hour, and as connected with the narrative, the utmost significance, as the Holy Ghost in St Matthew gives us to understand. *God's counsel* and *Christ's obedience*—are its two critical points.

The former St Matthew indicates by the *Then* which he appends to the *It came to pass when.* The fruit of all our Lord's previous discourse and active energy is—the conclusive and final determination to put Him to death at all costs! But this counsel of men against God, although it had been foreseen from the beginning and permissively confirmed in the counsel of God, must nevertheless, as man's evil device, be in some sense brought to contempt. Before they say, "*Not* on the feast day!"[1] the Lord had foreannounced that *on the feast day* it should and it must come to pass; and this serene, sublime assurance, with which the Lord anticipates and meets the well-known design of His enemies, cannot be too deeply pondered and felt. As in the history of mankind generally, which is the struggle of man to be reconciled to God and reunited with Him, God's counsel and man's are perpetually striving *against* each other, so is it in this great centre and solution of human history, in the death of the God-man for the life of the world. *Another* purpose of man, devised in hell and suggested to Judas exasperated at Bethany (hence in ver. 14 another *Then* in conclusion), must bring it

[1] These words certainly show (if the New Testament is to have as much weight as the Talmud) that there was no *statute* against executions and processes at law during the feast. It cannot be proved that their *not* refers merely to the *taking*, and not also to the *killing* as soon as possible afterward.

about that what was to be done should be done, according to the word of Jesus, in opposition to the decree of the Sanhedrim. And the same Judas must hear with the rest what Jesus said *unto His disciples;* in order that he may know now at the commencement (as afterward ver. 24) that even as Satan's instrument he is no other than the executor of the Divine purpose. For we find not in St Matthew's account the slightest reason for doubting whether Judas was or was not present; on the contrary, we agree with Pfenninger's representation of the imaginary scene,—that the Lord expressly gathered the twelve around Him, in order that in their full assembly He might solemnly utter this declaration.

The *time* is measured to our Lord, even down to the day and the hour; and this, with every the slightest detail, He shows more and more clearly that He knows. His own simple word bears impressive witness to that which was generally hinted in Lu. xiii. 32, and most plainly declared in Lu. xxii. 53. Not one utterance of His lips which was yet to be spoken, should be restrained or suppressed; not until He had made a full end of *all His words*, had those days and hours come which the Gospels more and more definitely mark off, until they come to reckon from hour to hour. "*Ye know* that *after two days* is the feast of the passover."—The Lord thus begins with what was *known to every one*, but goes on immediately to add the *most concealed and hidden* purpose of God concerning *this* Passover. "The Jews were well aware of the day in their kalendar; but Christ would have them inscribe this, that God's Son was now to be the paschal Lamb." (Berl. Bib.) One might suppose, as the words stand, that the betrayal of the Son of man was as much part of what they knew, as the coming of the feast was; and certainly the apostles might be supposed to have at least a general knowledge of the former, having been so repeatedly forewarned of our Lord's sufferings and death. But they had never understood His words, all His former sayings were still hidden from them; the Lord knew this, and His *ye know* had no such comprehensive meaning. He rather gives a revelation, connecting the most known and the most secret things together:—As *ye* know that in two days will be the feast of the Passover, so *I know* and now tell you, that *in this Passover* I shall be crucified! *Is*

betrayed brings the future into the present, just like *is* the feast; and is to be explained by the celerity of the action, as Grotius says; Alford is wrong, therefore, in thinking that the separation of the latter clause from the former does violence to the construction, and would require to be introduced by *and then*. We doubt very much whether the Lord had "joined these two events (the Passover and His own sufferings) in His announcements to His disciples"—for there is no trace of this throughoutthe Gospels. He might, indeed, have connected His approaching sufferings with the journey to the feast, and the course of its proceedings; but this present indication of the day itself is something very different.

The Passover—*τὸ πάσχα*—must evidently denote the first day of the feast; not the first great day according to the usage which reckoned only the seven days after the עֶרֶב הַפֶּסַח, the evening of the Passover, but the (natural) day of the Jews' official eating of the paschal lamb:—the day on the evening of which *is* the Passover, and simultaneously (properly speaking, already before) the betrayal and crucifixion takes place. For in this coincidence of the typical day with the historical fulfilment of its meaning, lies the emphasis of the entire assurance[1]—in which the continuous *And* is the expression of a necessary consequence, just as on other occasions our Lord's *must*. The word, therefore, which spoke of *after two days* could not have been spoken so soon as the Tuesday, but on the Wednesday. And most important in this is the notification of the Divine counsel that the death of Christ should take place at the Passover:—not merely, that is, that many subordinate circumstances in it would concur to make the feast an appropriate time, but because of the signification of the day itself. The Lord's trial and judgment was to be conducted publicly in the presence of the multitudes of the

[1] See the remarks upon this contested point, John xiii., in Vol. vi. That *τὸ πάσχα γίνεται* here means the Friday after *His* eating the paschal lamb, appears to us certain;—the *being crucified*, with the final delivering up *to that end* to the *Gentiles*, must form the point of coincidence in the time. This general designation, according to the predominant custom, is open to no objection: it is as if He had said, The Passover of the Jews, my enemies. *In the other case* the emphasis would have to be placed upon the *delivering up*; but this would not agree with the relation of the killing to the slaying of the Lamb.

Dispersion then assembled in Jerusalem: He was not to fall under popular frenzy, like Stephen; nor be destroyed by arbitrary violence in secret, like the Baptist. Public proof was thereby to be given that the people were not instigated by Him as His dependents, as the false accusation ran—with whatever else of the same kind may be soberly thought of. But the distinctively critical point of the connection between the *time* of the feast and His being *betrayed* is this, that here where the Old Testament finds its consummation and end in the New, God's counsel itself *preserves the sanctified Old Testament times and seasons*, in fact *sanctifying them anew* in their New Testament meaning. Inasmuch as the Lord died at the Passover, and the Holy Ghost came down at the Pentecost, the *Passover* and the *Pentecost* are given and appointed by God himself as the central periods of the new Christian year, of a cycle of ecclesiastical festivals animated by the spirit of reality.[1] And this will modify, against spiritualist misapprehension, St Paul's doctrine in Rom. xiv. 5; Col. ii. 16, 17.

We have already, on Matt. xvii. 22, 23, shown in what sense we are to understand the *delivering up* or the betrayal; and why it is here the fact prominently mentioned. It is far from being enough to interpret it—delivered up, rejected by the *Jews* that the *Gentiles* may crucify Him; but as Judas the traitor had previously *given* Him up to the Jews, so it was the hand and counsel of *God* under which the counsel and will of these *men* betrayed and *delivered* him from one to another (Acts ii. 23 ἔκδοτον.) All proceeds to all appearance humanly and naturally, as if men did to Him whatsoever *they* listed (Matt. xvii. 12)—but it is not so, nevertheless. All is pure injustice and guilt from the highest crime of the betraying disciple down to the most venial acts of the crucifying soldiers—but in all this, and above it all, is the Father's good and gracious will. Therefore, before the Jews take counsel, and Judas comes to them, the Lord had already spoken these words. Finally, the crown of the Divine counsel is to be sought in εἰς τὸ σταυρωθῆναι—in order to be crucified—which needs not now

[1] O Abolisher of the law, who desiredst even to keep the Passover! See Tertull. in Ebrard vom Abendm. i. S. 289.

to be again specifically interpreted. Not beheaded, not stoned but *crucified:* a Gentile punishment, and yet the fulfilment of a Jewish type; the realising exhibition of all the mystery which lay in this hanging upon the wood of the curse—as going back to the forbidden tree. And the Son of God, as the Son of man, gives Himself up to this counsel of God, in conscious voluntary *obedience:*—this is the *second* critical point in His word, which in the mere announcement of what was coming expressed, with the utmost simplicity and lowliness, at the same time His own obedience—as if self-understood. This testimony to His own voluntary self-devotion was included in all his fore-announcements, but here most simply and impressively. The Lord does not say, The Son of man will deliver Himself up—although that also was true—but He speaks in a purely passive manner of His Passion. Nor does He *now* add any reference to a resurrection on the third day; He goes not beyond the *being crucified*, connecting this, however, straitly with the *being betrayed* by the εἰς τὸ, in order to intimate how swiftly the whole will pass through all the forms of judgment to the execution of the sentence. Swift in succession was the *taking and killing: in this* the counsel of the enemies was to hold good, still more than they thought. With all the calmness with which both voice and countenance of Jesus spoke, His words derived thence a tone of disquietude and even fearfulness, for the disciples: After two days, at the *Passover*, our Lord will be—*crucified!* The immediate result was scarcely other than what Pfenninger describes—a general stupefaction and silence; until their minds, altogether unfit to look into such darkness, gathered confidence again by turning from the subject.

PROVISION OF THE PASCHAL LAMB.

(Matt. xxvi. 18; Mark xiv. 13—15; Luke xxii. 8—12.)

As it respects the chronology, we must once more refer to the sixth volume, in the observations preliminary to ch. xiii. 7—20, *To the Holy Ghost* in the Evangelists (for this we must hold fast. despite the present fashion of speaking) all things were perfectly plain in the peculiar relations of the twofold paschal solemnity;

and the two great events retained their distinctive significance in regard to the typical time:—the Lord's Supper, as the most direct fulfilment of the type, was instituted on the legally correct day, while the crucifixion took place on the Jewish Passover day, which had now lost its validity and already become a mere shadow. Hence as Jesus in His previous announcement to a certain extent acknowledged this Passover of the Jews, so now on the other hand the spirit in the Evangelist speaks more precisely, since in St Matthew and St Mark the Thursday, on which Jesus with a certain number of the Jews, however small, ate the lamb, is rightly denominated the *first of the feast of unleavened bread.* It is not necessary (with the Peschito) to supply *the Jews* in St Mark's *when they killed the Passover*, and to explain it as intimating a universal *custom;* it should be understood thus—the first or preparatory day of the feast, in which *they*, that is, the *disciples*, were wont with their Lord to slay the Passover-lamb. On this supposition, St Luke's ἔδει—*must be killed*—has the emphasis upon it which we have already discovered; containing a *hint* where more precise information was not to be given—that something might remain to be sought and to be found in the scripture.

Suffice it that this *day came*, as St Luke expresses it, that is, it dawned; and during its morning or forenoon it was *necessary* that provision should be made for the legal celebration of the Passover. According to the two other Evangelists, the disciples *first* remind the Lord by a question as to the *where*, a critical matter; but we would not have this twofold authority so pressed *against* St Luke as to oppose their easy reconciliation. It seems more natural that the Lord himself should begin with words, now as ever graciously communicative, touching matters external, "Go and prepare *for us* the paschal lamb, that *we* may eat of it together!" (Luke xxii. 15.) I cannot understand, at least, Lange's notion of our Lord's design to wait until "the disciples, in their Jewish sense of propriety, should think the time come for thinking of the Passover." Their feeling of anxiety about the feast must have been kept somewhat in abeyance by the Lord's announcement of his coming death; that is, they were altogether confused as to *this present* Passover, not knowing how to understand its relation to what the Lord pre-

dicted. Certainly, there is no sense in that which many allege, "that they had quickly fallen into *externality* again;"—the commanded feast was neither for them nor for the Lord a matter merely external. But the Lord himself well knows that His enemies must leave Him time and opportunity for this holy meal (Ps. xxiii. 5)—He knows moreover what He will do at the feast, and in sublime self-possession He follows the announcement of His death by a direction concerning the customary festival. Even after His final severance from the people and the temple, He adheres still to the ancient ordinance; not merely for the sake of the institution of the Supper, but because He will be subject to the law down to the last. The disciples know now from His own lips, despite their own fears, that He will uninterruptedly, as aforetime, keep the feast; they know also, from past experience, on what day He will keep it; there remains only the anxious question—Where shall we keep it, in peace and security? Such would have been its meaning, even if they had spontaneously uttered it; but if it was only a *reply* to His first *go and prepare*, it has the tone of an objection, a slight remembrancer that it would not be advisable or possible to go "into the *city*" —from Bethany, where they then abode, into *Jerusalem*. At any rate, they say what they say in great obscurity as to the counsel of God; they have but little presentiment of the great importance and necessity of the last Passover: *They* would provide for *Him* to eat it—no more. But He, whose design was to make ready for them and for us all the Sacramental Feast of the New Covenant, speaks with all the fuller assurance, sublimely elevated above all their confusion.

We have already in Vol. iii. brought the sending for the ass into comparison with this provision for the Passover; the parallel is as obvious as it is instructive. In the former instance He would present Himself before the people of the Old Testament, and of the first calling, as the King Messiah;—in the present case He exhibits Himself to the disciples, and in them to the new church, as the true Paschal, sacrificial Lamb. It was His design not merely to reassure them beforehand in the institution of the Sacrament, and comfort them concerning His certain death; but to promise them, and by anticipation give them in it superabundant salvation and life. And if anywhere, it

was here appropriate, that the provision for it should be accompanied by evidence of His dignity, and testimony of His Divine authority. We would not say with Bengel (in his Germ. N.T. on Mark), "It was a deep humiliation that Christ ate the paschal lamb, like a common Israelite; therefore He lets His glory shine forth in the provision for it;" for the humiliation of His obedience was not always connected with *such* signs of His dignity, nor do we find anything similar in connection with those earlier Passovers, which the Scripture silently relates or assumes. But this *last* feast derived from the fore-announcement of Matt. xxvi. 2 an element of such anxiety, uncertainty, and fear *for the disciples*, that for their sake and *on that account* a testimony of the sublime security of the Lord was given.

Orthodox expositors should leave to such men as Gabler, Stolz, Paulus, and Kuinoel the supposition of a preconcerted arrangement with the householder in Jerusalem. Equally unworthy is such a notion in relation to the sending for the ass—as we have already shewn. Yet Braune, alas, speaks of a preconcerted sign—"Jesus had beforehand made this sure with the master of the house!" The altogether mysterious form δεῖνα —*such a man*—with the prediction of the meeting him under such circumstances, must have produced in the minds of the disciples a very different impression from—"I have arranged it thus already!" Rather did it mean, in a much higher sense,—All this has been appointed, nothing can fail, as I now predict to you! But another circumstance arises, as giving a reason for the form of the direction,—the keeping the place secret from the betrayer. There is some truth in the almost universal remark of the expositors, who make this design prominent; for our Lord's lowliness, as blended with His dignity, required that He, whom all things served, should observe the ordinary precautions of human prudence. The one, here as everywhere, qualifies the other, in a marvellous manner. Judas, who, on other occasions, took charge of the purchase and provision of all things, is not sent;[1] and then the commission, given in his presence, is expressed in so mysterious a manner, that He knows not before the

[1] Pfenninger's conceit that Judas had taken offence at the word spoken in Bethany, and given up the bag, because he was no longer trusted (!)—is refuted by Jno. xiii. 29.

time either the place or the *name*. And this made it manifest to him, the hypocritical enemy among the Apostles, that the Lord had likewise concealed disciples among His enemies in Jerusalem.[1]

St Matthew speaks indefinitely of "the disciples" as sent; St Mark notes "two of them;" St Luke, finally, names them, Peter and John, the two most eminent and confidential disciples, the same two who, at the Supper, sat one on each side of the Redeemer. The first Evangelist presents the Lord's word briefly, as preserved in the more general tradition, until the Holy Ghost took care for the addition of the supplementary detail which gave prominence to the main point. St Matthew and St Mark place first the significant and decisive "Go *into the city*," which was, indeed, included in the "*Go* and prepare" of St Luke. But if we read St Matthew, without comparing the others, it might appear as if the Lord had actually mentioned the name of the householder, which, however the Evangelist could not, or would not, repeat after Him.[2] But it is as impossible that he was ignorant of the name, as it is that he concealed it for the sake of not "compromising the man;"—surely after so long an interval this paschal hospitality could not be still reckoned to his disadvantage. It is better, therefore, to say that his πρὸς τὸν δεῖνα, "*such an one*," expresses concisely that which the others express more in detail; he thereby intimates that the Lord, without naming the man, *marked him out in some manner*. They were to say, *The Master saith* (in St Luke, more expressly, *Saith unto thee)*; and this describes the man as a disciple of Jesus, for the obedience which our Lord predicts takes it for granted that the receiver of the message would interpret those words—Our Master and thine![3] so that he would acknowledge the disciples at once, and recognise Him who sent them as his

[1] "As there was among His friends a secret enemy, so was there among His enemies a secret friend." Braune.

[2] For ὁ δεῖνα stands for the name, just as our N.N. Stolz translated "to the well-known man"—and certainly the Lord *might* have so used the expression—To a certain man, well-known to Me, whom I name not now, but will point out more specifically thus, &c. But this is a too mechanical combination of the several texts.

[3] Hence in the Heb. N.T. it is well translated רַבֵּינוּ.

Master and Teacher. The Master bids us tell thee—that is enough here, as in the parallel case, the sending for the ass—The Lord hath need of it. Thus does our Lord go on His way, everything ministering to His foreseen need; with childlike serenity and ease (as Lange says) providing for every earthly want. The stater in the fish's mouth is a remarkable parallel.

My time is at hand—this word in St Matthew does not refer to the time of the Passover, the period of which all Jews well *knew;* there might, indeed, be in it some such meaning as this—I keep it with those who keep it this day and not to-morrow—were it not that the words must have the same significant reference to His suffering and death which they have elsewhere. The Lord never has any other meaning than this, when He speaks of *His* time or hour—as we have seen on Jno. vii. 8, and elsewhere. *In this* Grotius is right, who reminds us of the *before I suffer*, Lu. xxii. 15; but his opinion that the Lord thus gives a reason why He was constrained to anticipate His Passover (to-morrow I shall be able no longer to eat it!), cannot be sustained, as we have seen before.[1] This presupposes a very near and confidential relation to the unknown man, since it is understood that he will know the meaning of *My time*, and be at once moved by it to provide the guest-chamber for our Lord's final Passover.[2] It is as if the Lord told him thus, what He had already disclosed to the disciples in Matt. xxvi. 2. *We* would observe one thing more; and that is, that the Lord here declares once more His willingness to encounter His death, terming the time appointed in the counsel of God *His* time.

What follows in St Matthew is a more compressed expression of the sense, and cannot be made verbally to agree with the more detailed account of the two other Evangelists; but the meaning is the same in all. In the *πρός σε—at thy house*—which comes first, it is shown to be an expression of love and a signal honour,

[1] So Neander: "Because the time of My departure from the world is nigh, I will *to-day* eat the Passover by anticipation!"

[2] Kahnis: "Thus He named to them a man whom He knew to be devoted to Himself, and acquainted with his coming departure." (Lehre vom Abendm. S. 5.) "Named to them," however, is inexact; it should be "described to them."

that the Lord should once more invite Himself to this man's house. In ποιεῖν τὸ πάσχα we hear the expression of a legal obedience, according to the customary formula (עָשָׂה פֶּסַח, Ex. xii. 48; Numb. ix. 4; Josh. v. 10.) And *with My disciples;* for they are His family, and thus He speaks as one Master of a house to another!

But now let us look closely at the prediction of the circumstances which the two other Evangelists add. Ebrard, with the ancients, says at once, "in virtue of His omniscience"—but we cannot agree with him; neither, however, can we, like Olshausen, deny the indication of a miraculous foreknowledge, or the worthiness of the end in such a miracle. As it respects the former, it must be undeniably plain to every simple reader that the Evangelists record the Lord's saying as uttered in supernatural foreknowledge, seeing afar, as it were, the course of the most fortuitous circumstances. The predicted meeting with a man bearing a pitcher of water, supposed to be a servant fetching it at the usual (or unusual?) time, thus indicated with the most exact specification of time and place,[1] is evidently a *sign* given in supreme authority to the unbelieving anxiety of the questioning disciples. And in this we have an answer to the second point. Jesus might have been, in His state of humiliation as the Son of man, no more omniscient than almighty or omnipresent; but the evangelical narrative so constantly attributes to Him a miraculous knowledge of earthly circumstances entirely transcending human sensible limitations, that it is ridiculous to enter into petty questioning, about this or that particular example. Further, we shrink from the most distant approximation to the old habit (which Strauss has carried to the highest point of extravagance), of inquiring into the "purpose" of every "miracle" which is introduced. One of our preachers says, with a good intention, "Jesus had here a reason for making use of His omniscience"—but we recognise neither the occasional making use of an otherwise restrained omniscience or omnipotence, nor His conscious reflection

[1] In St Luke, *Behold*, when ye are entered *into the city*—thus at the very entrance, so that the disciples had no need to think much which way to take. The verse is expressly described as κεράμιον, and then the water-carrier goes into the right house;—who can understand this otherwise than according to the words of the *Seer*, 1 Sam. x. 2—7, which we therefore brought into comparison already on Matt. xxi. 2?

upon the reason or usefulness of His acts. But that the Spirit dwelling in the Lord might elevate Him into the miraculous region of action or insight in the power and light of God, when it should be for His own dignity and the salvation of others,—we cannot but admit, and the present instance gives us an example. It was quite consistent that, in addition to this, the Lord should have a design—if such must be sought—to encourage and strengthen the weakness of His disciples' faith. We cannot understand how the excellent Olshausen could assert, first, that the disciples on this occasion betrayed no specific weakness of faith—for, apart from their habitual tendency, their question betrayed anxious care; and, secondly, that the actual sign would have had no special significance to them, familiar as they had been with so many more exalted miracles—for nothing could surpass the majesty of the testimony, "Behold, all has been provided for!" and, thirdly, that then it would have required to be added—There had been *no* preconcerted arrangement!! This last is the worst of all; for how could it ever have entered the minds of the disciples to think of a "concerted arrangement" on the part of Jesus with a water-carrier waiting for them at the entrance of the city, to guide them into the house? Why resort to all these bye-methods for the explanation of the provision for the feast, instead of accepting the statement of such a simple designation of the house and the host as was a sign to the disciples, while it excluded Judas from privity to this plan?

The question common to the two Evangelists—*Where is the guest-chamber, where,* &c.—would of itself, on this view, intimate that the prepared place, for which the disciples were to ask, was already *ready*, and could not fail them. Ye ask anxiously about the *where*—but I command you only to ask *where is it?* for it is already prepared! St Matthew's complementary expression—*I will keep the Passover with thee*—warrants us in regarding this question not as an allusion to anything preconcerted, but as a strongly expressed *announcement* of the Lord's coming. The reading which Lachm. leaves undecided in St Mark—τὸ κατάλυμά μου (Vulg. refectio mea)—appears to us an intensified gloss, the meaning of which is otherwise in the text. But this guest-chamber, κατάλυμα, is certainly not here a *public*

ξενοδοχεῖον, or inn, for such were not used at the time of the Passover;[1] nor is it, on the other hand, "room" merely;[2] but the word corresponds to the Heb. מָלוֹן, deversorium, hospitium, lodgment. "The Jews, not resident in Jerusalem, had at the time of the Passover the right to look for gratuitous lodgment and hospitality from the dwellers in the city."[3] "Unless I am mistaken, this is in the word *κατάλυμα*"—says Grotius. That the οἰκοδεσπότης of this house (mark this most precise definition!) was not to be asked first by the disciples—Wilt thou give up thy already prepared chamber to our Master and thine? but only to be required to *show* where it was, takes two things for granted: first, that he held it already prepared, in devout hospitality, for any guests whom God might send him; and, secondly, that to none would he more gladly surrender it than to Jesus, as soon as He should announce Himself as coming to it.

The upper room—ἀνάγαιον (more correctly, instead of ἀνώγεον)—is *probably* to be distinguished from the ὑπερῷον, or the proper עֲלִיָּה of the roof (although Hesychius makes them one); but the Lord thereby intimates its suitability for a more *retired* celebration of the feast. It is, moreover, *large;* not a mean place, but providing more than enough room for His little society;[4] and it is also even already *furnished*—ἐστρωμένον.[5] This last does not intimate anything like a "stately" arrangement; but only that everything *needful* was already provided there. On that account we cannot admit the additional ἕτοιμον of St Mark. This is a heaping together of too many predicates; an additional ἕτοιμον is either superfluous, *or* must intimate that the sweeping out of the leaven, or whatever else the ceremonial required, was

[1] This meaning of the word generally is uncertain, even in Lu. ii. 7.

[2] Or specifically a hall of eating, as 1 Sam. ix. 22 is referred to, where לִשְׁכָּה is translated *κατάλυμα*.

[3] Friedlieb, Archæol. der Leidensgesch., S. 50. This was an ancient custom; but the method there quoted, of indemnifying the man by the skin of the lamb and an earthen vessel, may be referred to a later period.

[4] In which circumstance the simplicity of our fathers saw a typical hint that many would in due time be summoned to the Supper of our Lord.

[5] The Lord speaks as if He saw the room before Him, just as it was!

already cared for by the host. But we think such regard to the minutest speciality too petty in our Lord's mouth at such a time. Von Gerlach's explanation—a room in which the *feast* was already provided—forgets that there would be then nothing left for the following *there make ready* (St Mark *for us.*) Thus de Wette says—There make ready (the repast.) We afterwards read—And they made ready the Passover. To this preparation belonged the purchase of the lamb, its slaughter[1] and roasting, the provision of the appointed and customary concomitants, &c. All this is included by the Lord, with dignified simplicity in the *prepare.*

The disciples went in perfect confidence that they should find all this; finding it all, they did as they were commanded. In solemn and silent order and reverence, with many deep ponderings, did Peter and John perfect all the preparation for the feast. But before we proceed to the prepared feast itself, let us once more pause and weigh well the announcement which the Lord here makes. According to Rev. iii. 20 we might discern in this a type *of the manner in which He would in future announce and invite Himself* in the case of souls already devoted to Him—that He may hold the true paschal feast in the prepared guest-chamber of their hearts. Yea, the experience of those who have to accomplish this mission, concurs further with these words—"Jesus often gives, even now, to His disciples signs by which we may know where to apply for and find places of entertainment for their Lord."

SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE FOR PREEMINENCE.

(Lu. xxii. 25—30.)

We may assume that St Luke received his accounts of this last meal at second or third hand; and hence there are indica-

[1] Probably in the temple; not, however, that the priests alone could do it. The ritual of *that time* is very uncertain as to particulars. Friedlieb's alternative (S. 47. note), that the lamb was slain at the appropriate time in the temple or not at all—that the Passover was celebrated by Christ with the Jews, or that it was no proper Passover,

tions of indefiniteness and inexactness, which are not to be found in the compressed exhibition of the essentials which St Matthew and even St Mark give.[1] In the record of this wonderful evening, the most prominent thing was the Sacrament, as occupying the first place in the tradition of the whole church; the feet-washing might be reserved,—as belonging rather to the circle of the Apostles, and as being an almost esoteric mystery in comparison with the relatively exoteric mystery of the Supper—until he came to whose pen it was given to record it. But there was much else both spoken and done *over this table;* and in the selection and arrangement of the several Evangelists, the Holy Ghost, who directed them all, shows us, as in a central example, in what way He has provided for us a sure and sufficing narrative, through the agency of the free and manifold gifts of men, which we again are to arrange according to our best discrimination. St Luke is distinguished among them as the critical investigator and diligent collector of things retained in living tradition. Hence, as we shall see, he furnishes many precious supplemental details of individual matters, from the Lord's desires in ver. 15, to the misunderstood words touching the sword; hence, however, we find, as we have already said, a certain appearance of compilation which sometimes seems to forsake the exact sequence of things.

This character of his record is stamped most plainly upon the Ἐγένετο δὲ *καὶ—And there was also*—a formula indefinite in itself, with which he introduces the contention among the disciples which occurred again on this evening. We might be astonished and incredulous as to the possibility of a *strife among*

need not therefore apply; and it must be considered that if an early celebration was recognised by many, it must necessarily have been recognised in the temple.

[1] We observe here, once for all, that this admission is by no means inconsistent with our constant denunciation of those by whose "unwarranted assumption of indefinite and inexact records the Scripture is constantly broken." There are limits plain enough to those who will see them. In particular, we cannot surrender the conviction that in the *first* Gospel Matthew the Apostle is the immediate reporter—despite that German criticism which seems to have exerted an evil influence on the English Alford. His condemnation of my severe dealing with other views, and his allegation of inconsistencies (on Matt. xxvi. 20), do not affect my honest convictions.

them at such a time, especially after reading what has preceded in St Luke; and this very formula, entering into our astonishment, takes away our doubt by the assurance of the actual *there was*. For the meaning of the *καί*, in close connection with the *strife*, is no other than this—*And even* on this evening, at this table (where the hand of the traitor was) there was, alas, an actual contention![1] Our doubt may be rendered stronger by its appearing to have been *after* the institution of the Supper—but, it is not so stated; for in St Luke's habit of transposition ἐγένετο may well be regarded as the later record of what had happened before. We are firmly convinced that such was his meaning; and agree with the latter part of this sentence of Olshausen: "St Luke's account is inexact in two points; creating the impression that Judas partook of the Supper with the rest, and also that the disciples fell into a contention after its institution." As it respects Judas' undoubted participation, we shall have more to say; and as it respects the latter, it does not impeach the credit of the reporter, who might say to us—Why is my ἐγένετο δὲ *καί* necessarily taken in strict order?

Neander deals far too boldly with Holy Scripture when he assumes that the thought of the feet-washing occasioned the error of placing the earlier contention of Matt. xx. in the evening of the Supper. We cannot but mourn over the fundamental principles which permit such a manner of reading what the Holy Spirit has written for the church; on their account we have preferred to pass over in comparative silence Neander's "Life of Jesus" in the earlier volumes—but we cannot refrain from openly expressing our condemnation here. The pious Wesley's error is of a different kind, and more venial—"It is highly probable (?) —this was the same dispute which is mentioned by St Matthew and St Mark, and consequently, *though it is related here*, it hap-

[1] The *among them* is further removed, and the emphasis should not be laid upon it, as Bengel does—"Not only the traitor, *but also the Eleven* troubled the Lord." Considering the words as following ver. 23, some such meaning as this might be found, "Those who now so humbly asked among themselves who should betray Him, *had been* asking among themselves who was the greatest! This parallel and antithesis may be indicated in the repetition of τὸ, τίς; not, however, that ver. 24 must necessarily have been subsequent *in time*, on that account.

pened some time before."[1] We think it impossible that St Luke's δὲ καί and ἐν αὐτοῖς can be reconciled with a narrative of events so far back! The same and much more may be said against that modified view which identifies the contest with that resulting from the request of Zebedee's sons, and makes the Lord simply revert to it at the table. (Grotius: "Christ is mindful of their former contention; and, going away, would give them precepts of love and humility founded upon it." Roos also approves of this, and even Allioli sends it forth to the Roman Catholic world.) Certainly, Christ would not have introduced such a reproof without an immediate occasion for it, and St Luke would not without it have written his ἐγένετο. Schleiermacher accepts it as a correct exposition of the *narrator*, that Christ spoke these words, belonging to the feet-washing, in reference to their *earlier* contests; the *compiler*, however, misunderstood it, supposed the contest to have occurred on the same evening, and so changed the expression. But this is of itself an admission that the present text bears no other sense.

It is certain then that this contention occurred on this evening.[2] But was it, as seems to be the case in the order of narrative, after the Supper? Those who so read (after that old uncritical manner, which, however, in its simplicity of faith, should be spoken of with respect), have in some cases taken no pains, in some taken great pains, to explain and reconcile this supposition. The swiftest way of evading the difficulty, is to refer the fact to a special temptation of Satan, then more than ordinarily busy; but even Satan's suggestions must be in harmony with psychology, and our psychology, at least, protests against the possibility of such a question as, Who is the greatest among us? immediately after—Lord is it I? or, Who among us can

[1] Comp. Sepp. to the same purpose (iii. 133), who confounds the whole in his Harmony, after a fearful sort. Braune also has made this section one with Matt. xx. and Mark x., though he speaks very indefinitely and confusedly about it.

[2] *In this* we agree with Alford, who well puts the reason for it; summing all up thus: "The diction is repeatedly allusive to their *then* employment: ἀνακείμενος—διατίθεμαι—ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν—ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ μοῦ—all these have reference to things present, or words spoken, during the meal." But not on that account *after* the Supper, as St Luke places it; this we gainsay on very important grounds.

do this?—Hence others have exhausted expedients to find in the circumstances and sayings of the meal some point of connection for it. The most improbable is that which connects it with ver. 23, and makes the questioning of the disciples turn to a protest, Certainly not I! and thence to their individual boasting of fidelity and nearness to the Master.[1] Pfenninger's is a very far-fetched expedient, who derives the intention from the previous prominence of John, and limits it to the question whether John or Peter was the *greater*.[2] So also when Rieger says: "There must be subordination, and it was apparently quite right that they should know whom to adhere to when their Lord and Master had gone, &c." For the disciples did not send their thought forward so calmly to the time of the Lord's departure, as to be already discussing their future precedence and dignity. Finally, it is altogether inappropriate to refer the occasion of the contention to the expressions of Jesus in vers. 16 and 18—as Hess does. Because the Lord "had spoken so definitively and confidently concerning the near establishment of the *kingdom*," (was ἕως ὅτου really *near!*)—this excitation of their inveterate notions of the temporal kingdom made them insensible for a time to every other consideration! We have only to reply that this is unimaginable and impossible. The question with them was not about dignity and precedence in a future kingdom, but about place, preeminence, and service at this meal in the immediate present. Τίς δοκεῖ εἶναι, that is, who should appear to have the preeminence, to be most considerable, and have the right of priority over the others; comp. οἱ δοκοῦντες ἄρχειν, Mark x. 42. Μείζων is not equivalent to μέγιστος; yet it is not as Bengel says—"Greater, as first, second, third, &c. The question was not about being the *greatest* solely." For we may compare Lu. ix.

[1] The Hirschberg Bible, and Richter's, and Brandt's all agree on this; the last, expressly contradicting the report of the three other Evangelists, (Matt. *exceeding sorrowful;* Mark, *they began to be sorrowful;* Jno., *doubting*), says—"every one began to repel the guilt, and vindicate his fidelity." In this the identity of Matt. xxvi. 22, with Lu. xxii. 23, is taken for granted, which we dispute; but, even according to our view (of which more by and by) such a connection, and such a transition from the *traitor* to—*which was the greater*, appears most unsuitable.

[2] This does not agree with the τίς αὐτῶν of St Luke.

46, where we have the same general expression concerning the preeminence of one over others.

This contest *before* the Supper finds its easy explanation, as generally in the solemn and formal arrangement of their community, which the institution of the Sacrament required, so particularly it may be in the uncertain *choice of their* places. The words of our Lord which compose the difference, form a plain parallel to the *feet-washing;* indeed ver. 27 can scarcely otherwise be understood than by referring to it the presentation of His own example. Compare with it Jno. xiii. 13—16, and the harmony will be immediately felt. Thus the third of the Evangelists seems to be already alluding to the more secret tradition of the feet-washing, which then St John made public. It is obvious, again, that *after* the Lord had washed the disciples' feet, any further contention among the disciples was impossible, and therefore that this took place when they first arranged themselves at the table;[1] but it is equally necessary to regard our Lord's *words* as spoken *after* the symbolical action, for they entirely harmonize with the discourses in St John, and might easily have been joined to it. They refer in ver. 27 to the *serving* of Him who had now once more *sat down* in their midst.

We have been somewhat diffuse in justifying the position which we give to the words which are to be expounded; the reader will not take this amiss, but attribute it to our anxiety to give good reasons wherever a *non liquet* is not satisfactory. If we now turn to the *words of our Lord Jesus* which compose this strife, they fall at once into three parts. First, He reminds the disciples, to their shame, of former sayings upon this matter, which He now almost literally repeats, vers. 25, 26. He then appeals, in transition, to His own example of humility, especially that which He had purposely just given, ver. 27. In conclusion He turns His discourse, partly to elevate them from their shame, and partly to deepen it, *to the high significance of the present crisis* —in which such a contention must appear to be most perverse. On the evening when the Saviour was to manifest Himself as the

[1] We cannot tolerate the idea of Von Gerlach and Ebrard, that the strife originated in the question who must perform the service of the feet-washing. We would, however, admit that the contest might have been the *occasion* of our Lord performing that act.

minister of their salvation, when He would in pure and perfect grace establish His kingdom, and make them heirs of all His gifts—they were foolishly contending about who should be *greater!* But because *grace* has chosen them, and brought them through to this hour, the διατίθεμαι is not revoked. The Lord looks back upon their previous fidelity, sincere though weak; and looks forward to the certainly prepared joy and honour of His kingdom. Thus the great crisis, in the greatness of which their petty contests about what they thought greatness are swallowed up, is denoted:—by the glance back to the whole time of their previous discipleship, ver. 28—by the prominence given to the present establishment of the covenant and testament, ver. 29—by the glance forward to the final and glorious consummation, ver. 30. (In which there is once more a repetition of Matt. xix. 28.)

Vers. 25, 26. The constantly outbreaking pride of the disciples must hear—and how often still!—the same constantly-repeated reproof: thrice had it been administered before, according to St Matthew—ch. xviii. 3, 4, xx. 25—27, xxiii. 11. The record of these passages is almost verbally the same as our present text, so that we may refer to it for the exposition of its fundamental thought. It only remains to say something about single expressions which are peculiar here, and then to exhibit the whole in the new light of its present connection. The title of honour and flattery, εὐεργέτης,[1] which was not peculiar to the third Egyptian Ptolemy but in general use, is perfectly suitable therefore to the *kings of the Gentiles.* And this word, moreover, had passed from the Greeks to the Jews; Jewish Ethnarchs (Simon, to wit) were so called; and the praise of Onias, 2 Macc. iv. 2, has some allusion to it, at least in the choice of the expression. Does the Lord, however, blame or forbid this *being called,* as such? Certainly not, as we have remarked upon St Matthew, for *kings* and *rulers* (ἐξουσιάζοντες, *here* not κατεξουσιάζειν and κατακυριεύειν, in an evil sense) there must be; and rank and authority must be preserved down to the master of the house who sits at table,

[1] See Grotius on Matt. xx. 25, and what he adduces on this passage from Philo, Josephus, &c.; also the collection in Wetstein. The name had come to be used in a lofty meaning for eminent persons, as the σωτὴρ καὶ εὐεργέτης applied to Caligula shows.

and has servants to serve him (ver. 27); consequently, *rulers* must be called what they are and must be, in order to the due adjustment of society in this world. Nothing more than this fact lies *primarily* in the *are called*, in as far as it is parallel with *they that exercise authority*. It is alas true that in fact a mere *being called* often is put instead of the true, internal, moral worthiness (Isa. xxxii. 5); this the Lord does not deny, when He now exhibits the humble form of His externally powerless kingdom, to its servants and subjects. In this view, the simple *are called* assumes the character of reproving irony: they would be called *great* and *greatest* without diligently attending to the practice of *benevolence* in their office and function.[1] Thus arises the meaning: καλοῦνται, they would be called, they arrogate this title to themselves; or as Grotius sets it forth still more strongly, "Christ signifies that such titles are often *affected* by those who in reality care more for themselves than for others' good. They see what is excellent (else they would not affect the name), but they neglect to act accordingly." We might observe, as lying not far from the range of our Lord's hints, that the best titles of honour are always those which remind the exalted of their duties; those which, to speak after the Hebrew manner, show that the נְגִידִים should be נְדִיבִים—which almost corresponds with the Greek εὐεργέται. Von Gerlach's notion is too rigorous: "In his evil aim to be like God, man would *rather* be *gracious* and *benevolent* than *righteous*, or a servant of others." For grace and benefaction are real and honourable obligations of the typical gods upon earth; and, on the other hand, *servus servorum* may be perverted into a title of the utmost pride.

Thus the οὐκ οὕτως—*not so*—does not touch the rank or the name in itself, but the whole state of the case as intimated in ver. 25. Without, in the region of heathenism, the great object is to *exercise lordship* and *authority*; and many an ἐξουσιάζων contents himself with no more than the *being called a benefactor*. But ye shall not be so; when *ye* bear rule and guide, and must needs receive the appropriate name—the empty name itself must never *please* you; but your *rule* should ever approve itself more and

[1] Aristot. Eth. viii. 13: βασιλεῖ πρὸς τοὺς βασιλευομένους φιλία ἐν ὑπεροχῇ εὐεργεσίας.

more in the spirit and power of *service*.[1] As the disciples' desire for distinction of rank "might take refuge in the universal appointment of gradation in the world," (as Rieger says), that is, makes that its pretext, it was necessary that the Lord should definitely lay down the *opposite* fundamental law of *His* kingdom. In placing *But ye* emphatically at the commencement, He acknowledges those whom He blames as His disciples and apostles, not at once rejecting them on account of their worldliness of mind. He is far from saying, with condemning severity —Do so if ye will! But then ye are no longer My disciples!

In *he that is great among you* and *he that is chief*—ἡγούμενος, a precedence is acknowledged and confirmed;[2] but its reality is to be striven for, deserved, and approved by an entire denial of any such distinction in thought and act. There must be among the disciples, in the Church of Christ, those who are relatively οἱ νεώτεροι, there must ever be ἡγούμενοι and διακονοῦντες, those who bear rule, and those who serve—when the Lord mentions these names, He at the same time confirms them; but a serving, humble love will put all ambition and pride far from *those who are greater*. The two clauses indicate the two degrees of our Lord's evangelical requirement. The former (and apparently also the latter) says—Let him that is great be and comport himself *as* he that is less: obviously, not that a Christian who is a king should lay aside his crown received from God, not that a Christian bishop, elder, or householder, should decline to use the prerogative and authority given him in his office; but he is to know himself and evidence to others, that *as a Christian*, before the Lord and in his brethren's service, he is not greater than those whom he serves while he rules them. But, secondly, and it is still more emphatically intimated by "as he *that doth serve*," Let him that is exalted be all the more anxious, on that account, both for his own safety and in service to others, to *condescend to acts of service*; and thus manifest His greatness by *acts of*

[1] This warning, reproving *Not so!* confutes the strange notion of Menken's that the quarrel was a contest of humility, *no man* willing to be the greatest! St Luke would not have called that φιλονεικία (ἅπαξ λεγ· in N. T.), nor have spoken of it just as in ch. ix. 46. Nor would the Lord's reply be suitable.

[2] As Molitor in Part IV. of his "Philosophie der Geschichte" does not forget to observe.

lowliness which maintain while they seem to renounce his dignity —according to the example which our Lord himself presented in his own person, as we shall see. The apostle afterward exhibited this most clearly, in 1 Pet. v. 3, 5. Such a ruler serves, and in fact is the genuine type of a servant; such a servant rules in the spirit and name of Christ, even without title. The self-exaltation which opposes this is cured only through self-humiliation in penitence, the perpetual principle of which for us disciples should be—*abasement* before the awful example of our most high Master. Or we might say, that our first repentance brings the former, the descent from our false elevation in a natural sense; while the example and effectual grace of Christ produces the latter, the positive zeal of active humble service.

Ver. 27. Gfrörer, going to one extreme, maintains that these words would have *no meaning*, apart from a reference to the symbolical feet-washing;[1] this is an error, but so also is that which goes to the other extreme, and takes διακονεῖν here merely in the general sense of Matt. xx. 28, as referring to the whole life of Christ. The expression *I am as he that serveth*, points, especially in its connection with ver. 26, to specific, external acts of condescension, in which the Lord had placed Himself on a level with His disciples. This is the sense in which the Lord spoke the word, and St Luke might well leave the matter open, with this *hint*, that something corresponding to this had been done by our Lord on the present occasion. The saying connects itself with household relations generally, and Luke xvii. 7, 8 may serve for an explanatory parallel. *He that sitteth* is the master of the house, who with perfect propriety places himself at the table, and is ministered to by his servants; the *question* to the disciples intimates that he as the *greater* might properly lay claim to this. The repetition in—*Is not he that sitteth at meat?* refers the application manifestly to Jesus himself; as if He had proceeded—Is it not true that I as your *pater familias* and the *Master of the house*, as I am now and ever, might have your

[1] This word is of course implied as the opposite—"the less;" without requiring us to ask whether age, dignity, or time of conversion be referred to. We may, with Grotius, compare 1 Tim. v. 1; and even Acts v. 6, though here probably the later usage supplied St Luke with the term, in the sense of קָטוֹן or צָעִיר.

service and nothing else? But the Lord had certainly, many times during His life, assumed the place and function of a servant; we might assume that this had been the case, and was well known, and that His appeal refers to all such acts collectively. But the emphatic *I am*, especially with *among you*, seems best to correspond with a reference to an example then and there given; and, having St John's narrative, we may thus explain our Lord's words:—Behold I sit now *in your midst*, in the seat of *pre-eminence* which for you is always *where I sit*[1]—being the same who as a servant washed your feet! Mark, however, how this *in the midst* seems to abolish precedence; and that (according to Bengel's subtle remark), the Lord speaks in the third person of Himself as the Master; but in the first person when He speaks of Himself as a servant.

Ver. 28. This reproach, coinciding with Jno. xiii. 13—17, put them to the deepest shame; and their condescending Master will again lift them up—before He proceeds afterward to inflict upon them a painless humiliation again, by overpowering them, despite the unworthiness they have shown, with the promise of the full grace and honour of His kingdom. The first *But ye* contained in itself a full acknowledgment of them; but it is followed by something still more emphatically consoling. It is not now the time for reproaches—He had been constrained to reprove them slightly—His whole purpose now is to bless His disciples and load His faithful ones with His gifts. Yes, His *faithful ones* they are, with all their infirmity and folly; else would He be now sitting thus in their midst, and they thus surrounding Him? He looks back upon the whole term of their pupilage and probation; they have been preserved in it until this day; and on the evening of His new covenant with His people, He can speak to them as He now speaks. The διαμένειν is certainly something less than ὑπομένειν, and was therefore well chosen by St Luke; this He can impute to them in His grace, though in a sense which excludes the hypocritical traitor. (So that St John's "*but not all*" is again to be understood.) And *in My temptations*: the constant use of this word in Scripture teaches us that this does not mean simply in His *rebus adversis*, His conflicts and

[1] So that you measure the degree of honour by proximity to Me!

perils, but during the tests of His fidelity, and temptations to decline from His work. This is a solitary and most weighty declaration of our Lord. himself, that His whole life had been even for Himself full of temptations, especially since that first temptation of the enemy, after which He entered upon His conflict with the wicked world, and called His disciples to be His companions in it. *My* temptations—thus humbly does He place Himself in the midst of the children of men, before He proceeds to apportion the kingdom and distribute the thrones; for He knows it well and they should know it, that for Him as for them the way to glory is the way of victorious fidelity. His temptations were already in some sense theirs also, even as we all under the discipline of the Spirit are to be in all points tempted as He was. They had actually withstood the enmity and temptation of the world, they had not been offended in Him as others had who left Him; they could say in truth, Behold we have followed Thee! He graciously gives its full weight to this;[1] and thus elevates His weak but beloved disciples, knitting them firmly to Himself. On the other hand, He knew that the time of *their* temptations would not really come until His personal temptations were completed; yea, that in an hour close at hand, they would all forsake Him and flee; that at the outset of his second, decisive great temptation even His nearest disciples would not watch with Him one hour. When the power of darkness came upon the Shepherd, Satan would likewise scatter the sheep and sift them like wheat. But, as He afterwards assured Peter, His intercession and preserving care would interpose; consequently, the truth is that here in ver. 28 He already looks upon their entire probation; He regards the slight measure of their weak, preliminary fidelity as the *type* of their future fidelity, and speaks in *proleptic promise*, in *typical prophecy* of the future, even when literally speaking of the past. And this relation of the saying corresponds best with the significance of the evening of the Sacrament, in which the covenant was ratified for the whole

[1] In gentle and condescending sincerity, notwithstanding their weakness. The anonymous Leipzig critic (*Philosphotos Aletheias*, whose "diabolical subtilty" Sepp justly refers to) finds in this a *bitter and cutting irony*, as also in the following promise—*Ye* indeed shall sit upon thrones and be served, not serve like Me!!

time to come, and the testament of future grace and gift was sealed. Their *task*—to abide with Him—lay yet wholly in the future, but their calling thereto was now confirmed, and the full realisation of it *assured to them now* by anticipation.

Ver. 29. An orthodox exegesis should never have failed to observe how closely this carefully chosen διατίθεμαι—*I appoint*—is connected with the institution of the Sacrament, which is now about to be entered upon, and spoken of or fore-announced as if it were already transpiring. Διατίθεσθαι belongs of course to διαθήκη—see Acts iii. 25; Heb. viii. 10, ix. 16; and is used for כָּרַת בְּרִית Gen. xv. 18; Deut. vii. 2; Ps. lxxxix. 4, &c. But as, since the καινὴ διαθήκη of the Lord's Supper, this expression always suggests, in the New Testament phraseology, the concomitant idea of a legacy or testament, of a provision made firm by His death for the future inheritance of His disciples, so also this meaning must be regarded as already passing over into the corresponding διατίθεμαι of this text. It is, consequently, no mere "investing with"[1]—no mere "promising", or assuring, but, as Luther well expresses it, an actual *apportioning*, giving over, bequeathing in an institution,—in short, a testament. The "paciscor" of Beza and Flacius is also insufficient; Lange, however, says more accurately—"through an institution, the Sacrament." Olshausen remarks, with perfect propriety: "The comparison here with the transfer of dominion from the *Father* to the Son, directly leads to the idea of a κληρονομία, which the Lord again at His departure bequeathed to His own as a sacred legacy"—although this καθὼς διέθετό μοι is not the only proof of such a meaning in the word—it is involved in the expression itself, as used on the evening of the Supper. The objection of Grotius, that a testamentary investing or bestowment would not suit the Father's appointment to the Son—the opposite of Olshausen's remark—makes no difference in the argument; for the figure, even as it respects Jesus, is not to be pressed so far as to make Him die, and dying bequeath an inheritance, like dying men—but we shall see something more in the καθώς presently. First, it is safe

[1] As the Heb. N. T. inadequately translates נָתַתִּי; instead of which כָּרַתִּי might have been used, without בְּרִית, as in 2 Chron. vii. 18, Sept. διεθέμην.

and scriptural to say, that Christ gives us the kingdom and the power, even as He received from the Father—Rev. ii. 28 being a plain parallel; and, then, Christ's own portion is regarded in prophecy as being an inheritance coming to Him from God.

Theophylact construed *I appoint* immediately and only with *that ye may eat, &c.—as the Father hath appointed unto Me a kingdom,* being the intermediate clause. But the *kingdom* is the fundamental idea here, the object to which the minds of the disciples are pointed, as the exposition in ver. 30 shows. It is more important to leave, first, and in the transitional application, *βασιλείαν* without the article, the sense then being:—Your striving is for dominion and power, after the manner of the world; behold I give you *a kingdom,* an infinitely higher authority than the *kings of the Gentiles* have, no other than that which the Father hath given Me. I lift you up into *co-regents* with Me! As it is afterward—In My kingdom ye shall eat and drink and judge with Me. And all of them alike, without distinction in equal dignity, so that no envious contention could find place there:—Judas, the unfaithful one, however, was already excluded by ver. 28, similarly to Matt. xix. 28. This kingdom of the Lord is now for the present *over* and *within* all the kingdoms of the world—that kingdom, viz., in which, having become members of His body through the participation of His flesh and blood, His disciples in the power of His spirit and of His love serve while they rule. But *one day* it will alone remain, after the fall of all other thrones and dignities.

Let it not be overlooked that this *I appoint* in its first and general meaning applies to the whole congregation of believers, as they are represented by the apostles, the entire little flock of ch. xii. 32. Let us drive out, by a true homœopathy, all unholy ambition, by a sacred aspiration to *these* high things here promised by our Lord; for we cannot aim too loftily for the Spirit's power and the glory of heaven.[1] But we cannot too humbly ponder the truth, that the Son Himself in His humanity received the kingdom from the Father only on the terms of faithful obedience in suffering, and a preparatory self-renunciation. This is in fact the deep meaning of *καθώς—as My Father;* and this

[1] As Rieger's N. T. characteristically remarks. And Col. iii. 2 tells us in a good sense *τὰ ὑψηλὰ φρονεῖν.*

the holy Sacrament, instituted for our fellowship with Him in His *death* and life, testifies likewise, 2 Tim. ii. 11, 12. Again, we cannot with too much confidence of faith look at Him who here as our Forerunner, our king and our servant, the Beginner and Finisher of our faith, looks with steady composure through all His way of sufferings forward to His and to our *kingdom*—comp. vers. 16, 18. As *One that serveth* even unto death, He at the table where He must previously fore-announce the breaking of His body and the shedding of His blood, appoints that body and blood to be our future meat and drink, and distributes His crowns and thrones for time and for eternity.

Ver. 30. The thrones promised already, Matt. xix. 28, are here preceded or accompanied by an eating and drinking—How are these to be understood and harmonised? A superficial method of interpreting all into figures, finds here two marks of co-dominion —*honour*, the symbol of which is participation at the royal table, *power*, in the sharing of judgment. Whatever truth there may be in this, we cannot but feel that eating and drinking in itself must first signify *enjoyment* and *satisfaction*—the honour of being present at His table being added to that. Others distinguish thus—Now in the kingdom of grace, we are fed and given to drink by Him at His *table;* hereafter in the kingdom of glory, we shall sit and rule upon thrones. There is truth too in this, *so far as* it includes the kingdom of grace in the promise; but the *separation* between things promised alike for this kingdom and the other, seems to us to be wrong. Let us ask first, what that means—*at My table!* Here there is a slight and affectionate allusion to the circumstance that the Son of man, who had not where to lay His head, now sits with His disciples in the *guest-chamber* of a friendly host:—in opposition to this He speaks of *His own* table, which He is now preparing to arrange, the spiritual, royal table of grace, at which He himself is the master and host, the meat and the drink. The interpretation, therefore— —"Ye shall eat and drink what I also eat and drink, partake in the blessedness of my glory"—is tame, has no correspondence with the Supper, does not bring out the *I appoint*, and is altogether unworthy. The *eating and drinking* must primarily refer, as it regards the beginning and continuance of His kingdom, to the sacramental *eat* and *drink* which He is now on the point of

instituting for them, and therefore means something far more specific than the Jewish figurative social feast in the kingdom of heaven. Thus far the promise is universal, and embraces the whole time from the *I appoint unto you* onward. But then follows something higher, and evidently not vouchsafed to all; for the twelve tribes of Israel are here, as in Matt. xix., the New Testament and true people of God in their manifoldness and in their unity[1]—this last clause, consequently, applies specifically to the *apostles*. This is indicated in the change of the construction; καθίσεσθε being the right reading, καθίσησθε having been introduced, by those who marked not this critical point, for the sake of uniformity. In Matt. xix. *twelve* thrones were spoken of, notwithstanding the apostasy of Judas; the number is here, with evident design, omitted, although we know that it cannot be broken, and find it recurring in Rev. xxi. 12—14. These *apostolical thrones* contain, as our exposition must admit, a mystery of the future manifestation. The apostles indeed even now exercise dominion through the authority of their writings—but only certain of them, and it would be wrong to limit so massive a promise to a particular number of them. The "sitting upon thrones" is not spoken as if for children, who must have figures for every thing; but when once "the twelve apostles of the Lamb" (not "of Israel") "in the kingdom of reality rule over glorified humanity with Christ as spiritual powers"—the *thrones* also, according to the relations of the glorified state, will be real enough. Much may be asked upon this point, as, for example, by Bengel, Judicantes duodecim tribus—*singuline singulas?* In any case there remains something reserved in the background for the future of the glorified, revealed kingdom, for the glory of the *regeneration* (Matt. xix. 28), which is not yet clearly displayed to us; and we cannot but think that there is something similar contained in the former clause, which embraces the whole period of the gradual fulfilment of Christ's kingdom. But we do not pretend fully to understand how it will be with the *eating* and *drinking* of the *glorified*, when they shall no longer partake of

[1] "Formed according to the type of those twelve tribes"—we said before, and now add that probably in the rehabilitation of Israel there may be an actual reference to the twelve tribes; though the Gentile world introduced into it must be included of course in it.

Christ's body and blood, but sit down in the new world at the Lord's table, where He himself will again eat and drink with them. We can only point to the fact that according to Matt. xxvi. 29 *this* fruit of the vine will be drunk, by the Lord with us, *new* in His Father's kingdom.

INTRODUCTORY WORDS AT THE LORD'S PASSOVER.

(Lu. xxii. 15—18.)

The hour, the legal hour for the Passover, had come; the Lord and His twelve apostles with Him, have sat down. With this St Luke immediately connects the words introductory to the feast, and this is consistent with his peculiar selection of its proceedings; but it is obvious that the feet-washing, and all the words pertaining to it, must be interposed as having preceded. And it is equally certain that this introductory declaration must come *before* the *One of you shall betray Me!* The second portion of the words, vers. 17, 18, introduces a difficulty; since, according to the other Evangelists, Jesus spoke a similar word concerning the "no more *drinking*" at the conclusion, after the Sacrament. To many it seems in the highest degree improbable that Jesus should have repeated *such* a mysterious word; and, looking at the general freedom of St Luke as it respects time and order, they incline to think that he anticipated the second saying on account of the similarity of its thought. But the accompanying *cup*, unless St Luke adds this circumstance simply as an invention, allows us no alternative but to hold fast the historical truth of his account as we have it.

Ver. 15. All those who cling to the opinion that the time of the Passover was anticipated on this special occasion on account of circumstances, rest their cause mainly upon this verse (Grotius: "He gives a reason of the anticipation of the paschal meal;") but we cannot see how such a notion can be based upon the *desiring* of this passage, since it presupposes a necessity to wait for the true "hour" of *this Passover*. Moreover, the *must* of ver. 7 in this chapter expressly testifies against such a view. The fundamental idea and substance of this familiar and heart-

felt word of Jesus is its affecting expression of His *human feeling*. The whole life, indeed, of our Lord is that of the Godman, and His divine-human character becomes more and more wonderfully evident down to His death; yet His perfect and full humanity appears throughout. His heart is a human heart with all its sensibility, impulses, and emotions; with all the sympathies pertaining to this life in the body, so far as they belong to the sinless condition of earthly humanity. The remembrance of what He felt when below, with us and for us, remains with Him still in the unity of His divine-human personality, so that it may be said concerning the High Priest sitting upon the throne of God—*He is able to feel with us in our infirmities*, Heb. iv. 15.

The strength of the emotion which He here confidentially exhibits, is shown by the *desiring with desire*, which corresponds to the Hebrew intensification by means of the infin. abs. (נִכְסֹף נִכְסַפְתִּי),[1] comp. Gen. xxxi. 30; Numb. xi. 4 Sept. For what then did He so sorely long? Was it not for the sufferings which should redeem the world? Yes, verily, this desire was present to Him even in the midst of His perturbation at the contemplation of them; but it is not *of this* that He now speaks, the last *meal* is the specific object of His *desire*. First, inasmuch as this paschal feast was itself, and as such the pre-festival of His passion and death, and to be glorified to that end in the sacramental institution; but more especially, as the words plainly show, as it was to be the *farewell feast* of His love, the final enjoyment of His disciples' society before the separation. This latter is made prominent in the "*with you*," and "*before I suffer*," and finally in the declaration, I will *not any more* eat (and drink) thereof. That His resolute and straitened soul longed *with pain* for this festival, we admit, with Lange; but not that "what here chiefly moved His spirit was the anticipation of His victory and glory." The look forward to the fruit of His sufferings, even to its final consummation in the kingdom of God, follows afterward; but what moved His spirit first was the *suffering* and the *not any more*![2] Even for Him, endowed with human feeling, there is a

[1] And there is much force in his reference to the mournful desire with which on each Passover, year after year, He would look forward to the last.

[2] Which is very emphatically expressed by οὐκέτι οὐ μή.

painful *separation*, which must be consoled both for Him and His disciples by the consolations of farewell love—and thus divinely to sanctify the human was the deep desire of His heart. For, with all His anticipation of the transcendently compensating Future, He humanly clings to this life in the body, this confidential fellowship with His disciples upon earth, this lifetime never to return:—Even as, on the other hand, He humanly shrinks from His sufferings, and therefore seizes the final consolation of this *once more before I suffer. With you!* He says as the Father of the house to His children, with whom He is about to leave His testament; joyful that He has some who have continued with Him so long that He can see and address in them the future Church, the recompense of His griefs, (comp. Matt. xxvi. 18—with My disciples! spoken in the same meaning). Alas, even among them there is a Judas, and this will soon appear: for the present He seeks, as it were, to forget that, and to surrender Himself to the joy of His love.

This is the purely *human* side of our incarnate Lord's relation to this occasion, as *man* generally; but we must remember that the first words in the sentence were—*This Passover!* and upon this the emphasis must be placed. As an *Israelite* He had, with the best of His people, taken pure delight in all the statutes and ordinances appointed of God; in His obedience to them He had found a living, pure, and child-like joy, so that He might well declare the celebration of this festival *once more* to be an object of deep desire. But more than this: as the perfect Representative of the *longing spirit of Prophecy*, who looks through all these things into their deepest meaning, and perpetually longs for their *fulfilment;* and, further, as the Messiah and Son of God who is Himself and who brings that fulfilment, He had eaten every *Passover* from the beginning with the most internal realisation of its profound significance—but how much more momentous is this *last one* to His mind, when He thus speaks of it with deepest emphasis! Here, verily, may it be said with still more truth than was testified in 2 Chron. xxxv. 18—there was no Passover like to this kept in Israel; neither did any king of Israel ever keep such a Passover. Certainly, "the Priests, and Levites, and all Judah, and Israel that were present, and the inhabitants of Jerusalem" were not with Him; but the Lord, who is Himself

the lamb, keeps it with His disciples before His suffering, and founds for them at the end of the type the new and essential feast.[1] Thus at His farewell He pays all their due to human and to Israelite life; before He leaves the family and table fellowship, He consecrates it into a symbol of spiritual communion; when He the last time celebrates the shadowy rite He glorifies it into its fulfilling reality. And with this the word which now follows obviously and necessarily connects itself.

Ver. 16. The first word spoke of His immediately impending *sufferings*, and renewed in the disciples' hearts the terror of this oft-repeated word, the reality of which came more and more near; but the second word comforts them again, and speaks, as it were, by way of compensation, concerning the all-restoring future of the *kingdom of God*. Here for the first time the simple and absolute παθεῖν[2]: that was a hint at the outset, which said—I Myself am the Lamb! But now comes forthwith a clear and bright glance forward to the consummate, final *fulfilment* of that *typical* eating which was now celebrated for the last time. In this *be fulfilled*—πληρωθῇ[3]—the Lord gives in a certain sense the programme of a *new institution*, without the substitution of which the old might not be done away with; but He at the same time penetrates into the distant future, when He will again eat with His own. And ἐξ αὐτοῦ—thereof—is this again of the Passover? Many (as Schleiermacher) have referred it to *bread*, which would correspond with the cup, ver. 17; but this is no more than an inexact and gratuitous assumption. The words themselves as they stand must be understood to mean—of the *Passover*. This of course does not imply that Jesus would finally partake in any

[1] That *this* was the final scope of His desire, is proved by the sequel. That He instituted the Sacrament "from the impulse of the moment, without any predetermined plan"—needs no refutation; though Lindner lays too much stress upon the design of our Lord being the emphasis of His desire.

[2] Lu. ix. 22, xvii. 25, comp. Matt. xvi. 21, Mark viii. 31, *suffer many things*—Matt. xvii. 12, *suffer of them*—Lu. xxiv. 26, *suffer these things*—in Lu. xxiv. 46 comes forward again the simple and strong *suffer*, παθεῖν, involving the whole counsel of God. (For the οὕτως which precedes does not properly belong to it). Schulthess forgot this when he declared "the absolute πάσχειν to be a too modern gospel."

[3] Instead of which, a strange reading has an explanatory—καινὸν βρωθῇ.

such sense as we now partake of Him in the Sacrament; but the type of the Passover extends even beyond the Sacrament itself. *Until it be fulfilled* must be understood to mean—Until *it*, this Passover be fulfilled (not, indefinitely,—all that is to be fulfilled.) But, because the *kingdom of God* in the fullest, most absolute sense of the word, is the end and consummation of the entire Old Testament, all its types must still go forward, beyond their immediately corresponding ἀντίτυπος, into the blessedness and glory of the final fulfilment. To that the Lord now looks onward, comprehending all in one glance, while He is experiencing the deep sorrow of the "*Henceforth no more.*" This "joy in grief," this combination of the sadness of separation with the glad anticipation of a reunion to be provided for and pledged by that separation itself, constituted the attraction of this last meal, standing as it did between symbol and fulfilment; and it was for that reason our Lord so earnestly desired it.

The eating and drinking of the flesh and blood of Jesus, as it takes the place of the Passover in the kingdom of God now existing upon earth,—the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, that is—is its most obvious and direct *antitype*, but not its full πλήρωσις or *fulfilment*. "It had not its full realisation even in the essential blessings of grace which the New Covenant introduced." (Von Gerlach.) But the real and eternal antitype, to which Christ pointed, was "the *everlasting feast of the kingdom* for His glorified church, and the *anticipatory festival* our Lord was now about to establish in the Sacrament of the New Testament covenant."[1] For as yet we eat and drink of Him; but finally, as it is here (and Matt. xxvi. 29) said, He will eat and drink with us —in a different manner. How then are we to understand this? That feast of sparing or passing over, celebrated in Egypt, was, at the distant commencement of the typical economy, no other than *a feast of a redeemed and delivered people*—that was really intimated, though in an Old Testament and negative manner, in its name פֶּסַח. In the last and most realising fulfilment of this

[1] So Lange; but he spoils it by a far-fetched distinction between the eating and the drinking:—making the enjoyment of the heavenly manifestation *of Christ* correspond to the eating; and the manifestation of the glory *of the church*—for the *joy of its Lord*, especially—correspond to the cup of thanksgiving.

name, the identity of the repast to be enjoyed with the body of the Lamb through whose blood and death our redemption and deliverance comes, will disappear; and the new world will offer to glorified humanity, to the Head as well as to the members, a new feast, with new food and new drink, corresponding with that which was afterward appended to the original ceremony. For when not merely all the wicked are cast out like the Egyptians, and all the good *accepted and spared* like the Israelites; but also the whole fulness of God's gifts are poured out for the saints in the new creation, for "the *free* enjoyment and glory of the children of God"—then will Christ keep the *Passover* in the highest sense with His own, and eat with them as before but in a transcendently different sense.[1] He longed for the Passover of that evening; but His deep desire went forward to a perfected friendship and fellowship in the heavenly-earthly gratifications and joys of the kingdom of God. Until this last most blessed reunion and full reinstatement of fellowship, He takes farewell; looking forward through all intervening time, *just as* in St John He looks through His death and resurrection to His ascension into heaven and return to His people. It is not enough to say, with Tholuck (Hours of Christian devotion): "If the Head could thus long for consummate communion with His members, should not *they* long for consummate fellowship with each other and with their Head?" But we make bold to understand this ἕως ὅτου, as spoken by our Lord here in the flesh, to mean that He himself even in His glory retains a divine-human longing for the *consummation* of fellowship with His own, and for the eating and drinking with them in the kingdom of God at *that* table which He called *His own* in Lu. xxii. 30, when He spake in overwhelming majesty of their thrones by the side of His throne.

Vers. 17, 18. Whether the Lord,—after He had thus embraced in φαγεῖν τὸ πάσχα, eating *the Passover*, the full typical meaning of this feast of redemption, freedom, and victory,—included also the cup which belonged to it, and spoke the words with which St Luke proceeds; or whether *this* word is the same with that which is recorded afterward by St Matthew and St Mark,

[1] Compare the allegorising passages in Philo, concerning the ψυχικὸν πάσχα, which Grotius adduces.

is a question which must not be left undecided, for the *cup* which He receives in order to offer it round[1] was an integral part of the Passover ritual itself, and is to be distinguished from the Sacramental cup *after supper*, ver. 20. The other two Evangelists have a similar *saying* only, and that after the Sacrament. Consequently, it is not the *last* cup (as Von Gerlach thinks), after which as still belonging to the paschal meal, the Sacrament was instituted, but the *first* cup with which the meal was *commenced.* It is evident that our Lord in general observed all the ordinances and rites of the typical ceremony, giving it all its rights before it was abolished; however doubtful we may be as to the petty and multiplied observances which were introduced later. Those who desire may see all these described in the Commentators, especially in Friedlieb's "Archæology of the history of the Passion," where the whole series is described—the washing of the hands, the prayers or thanksgivings for the fruit of the vine and the fruit of the earth, the dipping into the dish, the eating, the distribution, the moving of the table, the questioning and the declaration, with "elevation" of the bitter herbs and the unleavened bread, the singing of psalms, the eating of the peace-offering and the paschal lamb itself to the last morsel, the four or even the five cups, each to be mingled and drunk at the prescribed place, from the first at the commencement to the last which was allowed. But Ben-Maimon's Commentary, and the statements of the Talmud, the Mishna, and Gemara, do not entirely agree in these points. Who, however, can suppose that all this was rigorously established so early as the time of our Lord? The Evangelists give us several hints which certainly coincide with many particulars of this ritual (as "the fruit of the vine," the song of praise, the distribution of the first cup of Benediction); but they do not mention the other cups, and we may conclude that the Lord did not observe every petty ordinance which was current at the time. We must remember that while, on the one hand, the Lord recognised such usages as were appended to the divine law with a sound meaning, He, on the other hand, designedly neglected the prescriptions of the Pharisees. Finally, the *transition* from the type to its fulfilment made a certain freedom appropriate;

[1] Δεξάμενος, other than λαβὼν afterward.

and we shall see that the new Institution, taking the place of the old one, commenced before it was fully ended.

What further may be said concerning the drinking of the great future, we will reserve for the saying which St Matthew and St Mark repeat more definitely at the close. It must, however, be observed, that *until the kingdom of God shall come*, refers to the consummate kingdom of glory, the same as in ver. 16. (Afterward, *My Father's kingdom.*) Thus we must not be misled, by the generality of the expression, into anticipating the term specified for this drinking again, and placing it in the forty days. It is also an idle question, whether the Lord did or did not drink of this cup which He gave to the disciples. The word itself decides nothing, even if the unsupported reading *ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν* is accepted; the saying "Take this, and *divide it among yourselves*" might be understood to mean, Divide it entirely, keep it *for yourselves alone—for* I shall drink no more with you. But it might also be regarded as testifying that He had already drunk, just as He certainly *ate with them the Passover*. For when Sepp understands ver. 16 to mean that He would not even this time eat the paschal lamb with them, he forgets the desire to *eat* it, expressed in ver. 15. If the cup which as the Master of the household He received, that He might mix it and hand it round, was the cup usually drunk at the beginning, He may be supposed to have drunk it according to custom, and then to have declared this to be the last act of His fellowship in drinking. For as the *eating*, which was now at hand, was not excluded but presupposed in the *Henceforth no more;* so now the general assurance, that He would no more drink *wine*, definitely connected as it is with *this cup*, must have a similar specific meaning, (and this of itself proves that with regard to the subsequent cups, He did not rigorously adhere to the usage.) Or the words must be understood, that the Lord for a special reason abstained from all *drinking* at *this* Passover. This is possible, but not probable; for it was the last celebration of His human and Israelite fellowship; as such it was the object of His desire, and His final refreshment—let all that has been said serve as an example of

[1] The reference to such in connexion with the feast of Tabernacles may be alluded to—Jno. vii. 37, and viii. 12.

the importance which should be attached to a careful consideration of all such words as these, in order to find their deeper meaning. The too common method is to pass superficially over the sense, and hasten to critical contention about lesser matters, instead of thoughtfully pondering every letter as it stands recorded.

FIRST INDICATION OF THE BETRAYER.

(Matt. xxvi. 21—25; Mark xiv. 18—21; [Lu. xxii. 22]; Jno. xiii. 21).

"I will eat this Passover *with you*"—thus had the Lord spoken at the beginning, with the same meaning and the same feeling with which He had said, in His message to that unknown one, to Him well known, in the city—"with My disciples!" Judas, nevertheless, was among them; and saddens this last Passover before His Passion, even more than he had saddened that feast of love in Bethany. Although the Lord would now refresh and strengthen His spirit in this final human and Israelite fellowship with His disciples—in whom He beheld the germ of the new church to be established for the earthly-heavenly, all-fulfilling kingdom of God—that end cannot be obtained, inasmuch as the sorrow of suffering and death, by which alone this new covenant can be ratified, presses more and more closely upon His soul. After the feet-washing and the accompanying sayings had repelled their *old* notions of His kingdom, after the sayings of Luke xxii. 15—18, which vibrated between the sorrow of separation and the joy of the final reunion—the lips of the disciples, waiting in anxious solemnity, were no more opened in any familiar words; even the Master kept silence for a space; and nothing remained but the silent observance of the paschal meal, celebrated in mysterious and appropriate twilight. Luke xxii. 17 defines, as far as we can understand, the beginning of its ritual; but it intimates at the same time that all its detail would not be observed, for the Lord makes an end for Himself with the first cup, *and as they were eating*—is St Matthew's opening of the scene which followed. And as they *sat and did eat*—is St

Mark's more definite language. Thus we have nothing here of the standing, according to the prescript of Ex. xii. 11 (which Aben Esra allows to have referred only to the first meal in Egypt.) They *sat* or reclined at the table, and—*ate*, almost in silence; but little, and that only what was absolutely necessary, was spoken; scarcely a word which belonged not to the ceremony.

In this position of the begun and proceeding meal, we hear that fearful word, which descends from the most distant future of glory to the deepest ignominy of the present, *One of you shall betray Me!*[1] While this refers back to the intimation long ago given in Jno. vi. 70, and was prepared for in Jno. xiii. 18, it is manifestly the *first* indication of the traitor during this *meal;* and it coincides historically, doubtless, with Jno. xiii. 21. How it is related to Jno. xiii. 22 we shall see; as far as the uncertainty which undeniably rests upon the insertion of the sacramental institution in St John's closely connected narration will admit. When we look closely at the Synoptical account, we find three distinctive sayings of our Lord:—A word of *sorrow* to humble the Eleven together with the One: a word of *solemn declaration,* which instructs, and at the same time vindicates them, while it is a preliminary condemnation for the traitor; finally, a most *sublimely fearful* word for the traitor alone, in which now for the first time the *judgment of his reprobation* is complete—even as the Lord has given Himself up to His own destiny to be betrayed by him. But here we only say, *for the first time*—because the final utterance follows in a second, and more intense expression (Jno. xiii. 27.)

Matt. xxvi. 21; Mark xiv. 18; Jno. xiii. 21. *He was troubled in spirit* (as Jno. xii. 27) indicates certainly a disturbed and painful emotion; and it is not without meaning that there is added—*and testified.* The former shows the motive of our Lord's utterance as it regards Himself, the latter as it regards the disciples; His own grief will not suffer Him to restrain it, while He speaks for a salutary *testimony* to them, as also to the future church which they represented. The disciples also were *exceeding sorrowful,* but their emotion is far from reaching the depth

[1] How often does the thought, and view, and word of the Lord bring into close conjunction the widest contrasts!

and strength of His *trouble in spirit.* The tribulation and suffering of our Lord is always and essentially a *sorrow of soul;* and in that domain where *the spirit* possesses, inhabits, and pervades with its energy the soul, and is consequently affected by it in return. Still more specifically is it everywhere as here a sorrow on account of *sin,* and even in its highest intensity a divine-human sorrow; for His spirit in the unity of the Eternal Spirit *knoweth* the abomination of sin, as it appears in God's sight; His soul *feels* it also, in this clear and full knowledge, even as men feel,—or rather, as no sinful man as such can feel it. Thus had He from the beginning already suffered much through sin; but now, the sin of men confronts Him in its direst, severest form, and is most bitter to Him, as exhibited in Judas. More severe and bitter was not in this sense even the conflict in Gethsemane and upon Golgotha—the *laying upon Him the iniquity of us all.* Here in His *Spirit,* most internally afflicted by sin, *that Passion* begins and has its root which issues through Judas (as we shall see) in His victoriously emerging from temptation:—in Gethsemane again His *soul* is included, upon Golgotha finally His *body,* soul, and spirit.[1] All the contradiction of frenzy and hatred, of hypocrisy and malice, of ingratitude and every other bad passion, which, distributed among individuals, had fallen upon or should fall upon Him—was condensed and consummated in this one sinner against Him, this unhappy traitor. He breaks in upon the narrowest circle of His won and beloved souls; He defiles and disgraces, in a sense, the apostolical foundation of His future church here at its very commencement; and brings to nought an election which had its origin in His love, by an actual though partial victory of hell! Thus, alas, this *son* of *perdition*—and this is His deepest grief—*compels* Him, even now when He would refresh His soul by nought else but love and blessing, when He was about to establish the seal and the pledge of an accomplished redemption and forgiveness of sins, to retain by anticipation the sin of one awful Exception, condemning him eternally. But we observed upon Jno. xiii., with reference to Mark iii. 5, that the Son of man could not otherwise manifest

[1] It is to be understood, as we have said, that His soul also suffered the sorrow of His spirit from the beginning; and the perturbation of His soul was strongly shared in by His body.

His *wrath* against evil than in connection with the *perturbation* of His sympathising, redeeming heart; here, however, we see that the converse of this proposition does not hold good—for Jesus is only troubled about Judas, without wrath. So far we can appropriate Tholuck's word, on St John: "It is not the feeling of provoked indignation which goes out toward the delinquent, but that of compassionate sorrow;" though we cannot adopt the words which follow, as applicable to the present conjuncture,—"which always seeks anew to produce in the perverted mind an influence of compunction." *This* was now over, as the *will betray* already testifies. Where there is *human* anger[1] in the Godman as the reaction of love, there is the hope of love which takes this method to accomplish its purpose; but where that is gone, the wrath of the Lamb also *for the present* ceases, and the love is turned into pure lamenting *suffering* of the sin. That the traitor had experienced no wrath beforehand from his Lord on whom he inflicted the deepest grief—is the cause of the wrath of God which now rests upon him, and which will fall upon him one day as the wrath of the Lamb, of that same Incarnate Judge of men who in Gethsemane still called him His friend.

Why then does the Lord utter that as a testimony which moves His spirit? The testimony as such applies indeed to the disciples; but not exclusively, as is generally thought, to shame and humble them, and excite their true repentance. In this utterance of the deepest feeling, there is *primarily* no consideration of the influence which it ought to and must exert upon others; but it is no other than a *lamentation* of the Troubled one, who pours out His complaint not merely before God, but also before man in a human manner. Assuredly, there is something of human "infirmity" also in it, and the Lord cannot restrain within Himself the sorrow of His soul, nor retain it within His spirit before God, but must speak of it before His own as afterward in Gethsemane. We must know for our own consolation and instruction that so it was with His spirit; and therefore He *bears this witness* to all times in His word—as it is also expressed in St John's ἐμαρτυρήσε—*He testified*. But

[1] Not, of course, in the sense of Jas. i. 20, which contrast of the human and the Divine has no application to the Godman.

then, there is another element which is never wanting in His self-testimony; the wisdom and love which regulate all His speaking and not keeping silence, approves itself decisively here as it does to the last, seeking always our salvation. And we justly said at the outset that this first word concerning the traitor had an especial reference to the others. The doom and woe of the traitor is intimated more plainly to himself in the second word, and most expressly in the third; but now the Eleven are to know and feel, as far as it lies in them, what the Lord knows and feels. They are to be fortified against the awful event, when it should take place, by the testimony to their Lord's fore-knowledge of it and submission to it—as we have seen on Jno. xiii. 19. But, finally—and *this* comes into special prominence *for us—they*, as being of the same sinful nature, and, even under grace capable of like sin, are to be humbled into deeper self-knowledge and penitence by seeing how profoundly the sin *of one among* them bows down their Lord. This is the just interpretation and application of the word which the church has always held fast. It views the Lord as in this word exhorting to contrition before He celebrates His sacrament; moving the disciples' hearts to humiliation before He institutes His holy Supper. And there is profound truth in the observation which has been made:—that St Paul derived from this *one among you* his impressive rule, *But let a man examine himself!*

It is indeed only *one*, who will commit this fearful sin; but it is still one *of them;* and what that means, we have sufficiently shown upon Jno. vi. 70. When *one* sins with fearful, yea the most fearful aggravation—the rest of us must not wholly acquit ourselves; the Lord's one word is most grievous to Him, to us full of shame and humiliation—one *among you!* Whatever differences there are between the several eleven disciples in disposition and feeling, the Lord embraces them all together, and in one with Judas; He still more emphatically and comprehensively refers its most evil fruit in the one, to the root of sin in all, when He afterward cries—Woe to *that man!* The sin of the One, most ripe for condemnation, is in a certain relation the common sin of humanity, a fruit which grew on that tree. Further: Is this Judas actually isolated and alone in his sin? Is he not rather the type and forerunner of many; found in the

discipleship and external fellowship of Jesus, as He was then? Hence his warning figure stands at the introduction of every celebration of the Sacrament—"In the night in which the Lord *was betrayed!*" The lesson taught by Judas may well intermingle its wholesome bitterness with all our Passion-devotions. Woe also to him who, otherwise than the beloved disciples, is disposed to reply—Such can I and will I never be! The proper reflection is—Am not I also a man, like this man of sin? Is not my human heart by nature likewise evil and unbelieving? Do I submit to reproof? Has the love of the Lord entrance in Me, and His truth? Am not I treacherous to Him in heart; am not I resting secure in external fellowship alone with Him and His; is there no Judas-way in me?

All this is not "homiletic application" and "edifying remark," learned readers, but actual exposition of the mind and feeling with which the Lord uttered this ἐξ ὑμῶν—one *of you* He adds now decisively—*will betray Me;* in which, as in the following words, the ὡρισμένον—appointed—begins already to appear. He speaks still in the Future, since Judas' offer already made to the Pharisees (παραδώσω) was not the consummated betrayal itself; but He speaks in the Future absolute, for the black counsel of Judas' heart stood fast, *his* heart was no more to be humbled and shamed—otherwise the Lord would not have thus spoken.

And they were exceedingly troubled, and began every man to say—*Lord is it I?* Judas is obviously not included, because the Spirit designs to give the Lord's word as preeminently directed to the Eleven, and their reply to it. Judas delayed till the last his similar question; the first influence of the word upon *him* is not recorded, but like the design of his heart throughout, is veiled in a night of fearful mystery. Lücke remarks on the apparent parallel, Lu. xxii. 23, quite correctly: "St Luke reports like St John;" but we accept this on a very different supposition from his, to wit, that they both relate another circumstance, the *second* indication of the traitor which took place after the Supper. For it is plain to all who will not break

[1] St Matt. ἕκαστος (another reading εἷς)—St Mark εἷς καθεῖς, not καθεῖς or κατα (καὶ εἶτα) εἷς, but instead of καθ' ἕνα, as in Jno. viii. 9, Rom. xii. 5. The second καὶ ἄλλος· Μήτι ἐγώ; in St Mark is probably an addition.

the Scripture by assuming incorrectness in the narrators, that on the first occasion the disciples say what they say *to Jesus*, the second time they speak *among themselves* (πρὸς ἑαυτούς, εἰς ἀλλήλους); the first time, each asks, *Is it I?* the second time, they inquire among themselves *which of them it was that should do this thing.* Lücke (with others) thinks it "scarcely credible," as recorded in St Matthew and St Mark, that each of the disciples asked aloud if it was himself:"—but it is literally so recorded in these Evangelists; and no man has a right to mix up with exposition his own notion of what is or is not credible. The simple and plain narrative has in various ways been most unexegetically dealt with. Some have thought that each put the question, but each with his own individual meaning; Olshausen supposes that Peter and John, in their more highly developed consciousness, would not ask—Is it I? but only—Who is it? (This gratuitous assertion rests upon the identification of the two questions and the two accounts). Others, as Ebrard, change the recorded question into "an anxious appeal"—It is *not I?*[1] On the other hand, Winer classes this question with *Μήτι* among those in which, according to the decision of the context, an affirmative answer must be supposed possible. We perfectly agree with him; and appeal to the feeling of every simple reader, and to the predominant, living tradition of the church. If the context allowed the assumption that some meant no more than, assuredly *not I?* we would rather join Nathanael with John, than Peter—and so on with all the rest. The emphasis of this most significant word would be lost; and the subsequent question of Judas, the affirmative answer to which our Lord's reply confirms, would be deprived of its similarity to the previous questions. Judas assuredly asked because he was constrained to do so, *because* and *in the same sense as* the others asked.

For our own part we regard that as *credible* in the highest degree which Matthew the apostle, one present at the transaction, plainly records; and, moreover, we can render it perfectly intelligible and probable to our own minds. The truth in the arbitrary addition to the narrative which we have just noticed is

[1] Many still speak, like Bahrdt of old, of the "great confusion" in which the astounded disciples knew not what they said.

this, that each one may have thought first of the others around him; but then, when he saw not the slightest ground for the supposition in the case of any other, he would naturally direct the inquiry to himself. Whom can I suppose to do this thing? Most fitly should I ask myself the question! Such is the course of true humbleness of mind in its pure simplicity in all similar cases. This preparation and reason for the startling question—*Is it I (no other than myself)?* the Evangelists have left unexpressed, but it is not the less obvious to every psychological reflection: they simply record the result which, in the swift succession of emotion which went round the circle, was not long in finding utterance. We are not to think of clear consciousness and calm pondering of what they say, on an occasion when their word was extorted, *enforced* from the disciples by the warning *spirit* of the word of Jesus, for a *typical* application in the future. We must not coldly discuss it in its antecedents and consequences, but take it as it stands—the uncalculated expression of the effect which the Lord's disclosure had upon their consciousness of sin. When they thus suddenly heard the Lord's earnest *one of you*, every one, even the most consciously sincere, must have thought himself for one moment capable of the most fearful sin.[1] This meaning alone gives a sufficing reason for the *exceeding sorrowful* of St Matthew, which is essentially different from the subsequent *doubting of whom He spake* in St John. After the more rigorous "Woe" pronounced upon the One, which must have given every innocent one to feel that this did not touch *his* conscience; yea, after the atoning "for you" of the Supper—their position and feeling with regard to it became different; and the uncertain anxious enquiry of every one as to which of the rest could do this, was *then* quite in keeping. The blending of the two situations and states of mind into one incident, is to be excused only by the fact that St John's gospel gives that

[1] Hiller's reflection therefore is beside the mark: "and if He named One, it was the thought of each that *that one might change his mind.*" For the *will betray* had been announced by *Verily, Verily.* Krummacher more correctly paraphrases the sense of the word (Passionsbuch S. 131): Yea, Lord, so corrupt is my heart that I am capable of any evil; and, if the wind of temptation blew that way, I might by possibility betray Thee, the Highest good, even as Thou hast said. Left unguarded to myself, I cannot stand."

theory an *apparent* sanction, unless his gospel be very carefully read and compared with the others. For certainly, just at this point, between vers. 21 and 22, or vers. 22 and 23 of ch. xiii., St John passes over the Supper, and inseparably joins what passed subsequently with the first word which gave occasion to it. But he wrote thus only that our investigation might be stimulated to careful arrangement of the whole.

It was necessary thus carefully to observe the word of the disciples, and assert its only true meaning; for this alone will enable us fully to understand the design of the preceding word of our Lord, as well as to trace the progress to what follows. When He expressed Himself in such a manner as to involve their whole circle *in a certain sense* in the guilt, His sole purpose —a purpose which most blessedly succeeded—was that the beloved disciples should be profoundly abased in the consciousness of their general, human capability of sin; and that they should be entirely divested of all wrathful, loveless, unjustified rejoicing in the sentence of condemnation pronounced upon a fellow man, the traitor who now went forth from their midst—in short, that they should be brought to such a state of mind as to put the question which they did put.[1] This question of the disciples, which was a perfect expression of individual sincerity, while it on that very account proclaimed all the more feelingly their deep sense of sinfulness, was to Him a consolation in the midst of His distress. He who so asks, judges himself fully, that he may not be judged, as to his part in the awful guilt, so far as it is a collective guilt; but he who can thus ask, has thereby cleared himself, and shown that *he cannot* be the one intended, nor fall under the terrific *woe*. And now, after this disburdening of His

[1] This and nothing else, as we think. Not specifically, as Lange prefers, in order that they might be led to repent of that spirit of carnal ambition which had so long troubled them, and which had nourished among them the serpent of treachery, and that traitor himself whom they had brought to Him!—There is no trace of this last in all the narrative; our Lord's *I have chosen*, Jno. vi. 70, is a strong protest against any such introduction of one apostle by others. That they trusted Judas and did not see through him, was in them a relative virtue, though springing from their sin; and the Lord was infinitely better satisfied with their *Is it I?* than He would have been with any unbecoming "Is it *he?*"

own heart and cleansing of the hearts of His disciples, Jesus is free to proceed with the second word, which with wonderful sublimity embraces the whole of this *Satanic sin of an apostle:* —which unites in itself a serene testimony of His own obedience to the counsel of God; an instructing assertion of the guilt which nevertheless was incurred; a most internal cry of anguish uttered by love which mourns over one who cannot be saved. This *second* word is, to wit, a declaration as to the self-sacrifice of the Son of man, and the doom of the man who betrayed Him; but, for the sake of the transitional *connection*, an answer to the apostles' question yet precedes, which however is no new answer, but only repeats and confirms the first.

Matt. xxvi. 23; Mark xiv. 20. The supposition that *this* answer of our Lord is the same which John xiii. 26, under another presentation and more specifically, records—is one of the most marvellous and perverse misunderstandings which have sprung from a lax notion of the so called inspiration of the Gospels—notwithstanding that it is the predominant opinion, and now almost traditionally accepted. We have shown upon St John, and now more emphatically repeat it, that we have in these two records two quite different occasions and words. Here the Eleven ask, each for himself, Is it I? There John at Peter's request put the question, Lord, who is it? Here Judas, like the others, dips with the Lord in the dish; but there the Lord dipped the sop, and gave it to Judas. If the word intimated a specific and instant dipping on the part of Judas, he must have been at once detected before the eyes of all;[1] consequently, the subsequent "woe to *that man*" must have pointed him out as if by name; consequently his *Is it I?* which followed afterward, must have shown senseless boldness in this detected and condemned man; and, lastly, the ignorance of the disciples as recorded in St John, vers. 27—29, becomes inexplicable—and an absolute contradiction between the two eye-witnesses must remain. All those subtile suppositions, therefore, which are

[1] For *this* answer to the question of all was not given softly by Jesus, and only to One! If he received the sop "before all eyes," and dipped his hand into the dish, he must have been pointed out and revealed to them all. The impossibility and contradiction of this is well put by Krummacher.

based upon his dipping in the confusion, with affected candour —and so forth—must be renounced, as confusing the scene. Ὁ ἐμβάψας—he that dippeth—in St Matthew is not, as De Wette's translation gives it, He that *hath* dipped (that is, just now); but it is aoristical, and equivalent to ἐμβαπτόμενος in St Mark.

The Lord does not and cannot intend to give a new and distinctive answer to the *Is it I?* of the several disciples. It was not necessary. The silent answer was *now*, after this cleansing of their heart, understood of itself—Not ye, My faithful ones, who have been with Me in My temptations, and whose are still the thrones; but *one* among you. Thus the Lord merely *repeats*, before He proceeds further, the former word in a more plainly intelligible form; using an expression which is parallel, on the one hand, with the earlier cited passage of the Psalms, Jno. xiii. 18, and, on the other, with the subsequent word which St Luke gives—the *hand* of the traitor is with Me *on the table*. Nothing can be clearer than this relation of the circumstances, if we will only abandon the attempt to make different accounts one, and assume such a *repetition* of similar transactions as the recurrence of this dark element in the meal rendered necessary. The "dipping in the dish" was by no means (as Lange maintains) "an *irregularity* which their *excitement* explains:" there is no ground for this, when we set the common meal plainly before our imagination. Henneberg is quite right in defending the general signification of the *dippeth with Me*—"one of My household, who daily eateth and drinketh with Me." Olshausen is altogether wrong when he asserts in opposition, that "this was applicable to all the disciples, and was therefore no answer at all"—for it was not to be an answer, but only a re-assertion of the *one among you*. St Mark gives us the plainest evidence of the identity of the two sayings; for in the second he has "one *of the twelve*," and adds to the first *one of you—which eateth with Me*. (And this we now first mention, because here its significance comes out.) Thus the Lord meant the first time—One of My *companions at table;* and the second time again—One, who eateth at My table, *like you twelve collectively*. The *number twelve*, still mentioned—we cannot but think of the throne lacking for one of the twelve tribes of Israel, Luke xxii. 30—designs to say that the Lord reckons the fallen one still, in *testimony* of

His previous election (Jno. vi. 70, *you twelve*), in order then to supplant him, comp. Acts i. 17. Thus the several passages of Scripture profoundly coincide in their one meaning.

The Lord's silence presupposes—No, not ye, who so *anxiously* ask! But *who* then? He declines any more definite intimation, and adheres to His first word. St Matthew's specific *the same* (*οὗτός*) *shall betray* does not constrain us to suppose here a direct indication of the man, for it does not outweigh the *one of the twelve* in St Mark; this *οὗτος*, rather, is spoken concerning that *one* in the same tone of lamentation and reproach as afterward *ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος*—*that* man. One *among you*:—in this there has been from the beginning a contrast with the remainder of the disciples, who were not so near and not in so *confidential a relation*. It is in correspondence with the word of the Psalm, "as it was written," that the especial *nearness of the twelve* is represented here as a *fellowship at the table*; it further shows, according to the meaning of that Psalm, the greatness of the guilt in which this trusted one becomes a traitor—thus preparing for the *woe*. Finally, the form of the expression, which makes the dipping into the dish a specific and most concrete designation, refers of course directly to the present paschal meal; for the declaration would run thus:—*That one* of the Twelve (he will soon be revealed in his act!) who, like the other Eleven, has been my habitual companion at the table *and is so this day*, who still for a while has the character of an apostle, is still shameless and eats with Me (My bread),—embitters to Me this farewell feast, enforces from Me this complaint and condemnation, &c. *Τὴν χεῖρα*—*the hand*—has the same most concrete vividness in St Matthew which the impious *hand* has in St Luke:—that hand which no protest of conscience could restrain.

Did Judas at this moment dip his hand into the dish, and thus make the generally proverbial word a specific sign *for himself*? If that be supposed, it must also be assumed that the disciples did not remark or understand the significance of the act. In such a case, this word would occupy a middle position between the altogether general reference which preceded, and the specific sign given to John; and, further, it might be thought that this connection would shew why Judas, thus partially marked out, asked also his question. But this coincidence of the immediate act

with the Lord's very general indication appears to us altogether unimaginable; the disciples' not perceiving it (and they might be supposed to have instantly looked at the dish, under a misapprehension) being in the highest degree improbable.—The definite article before τρυβλίον shows that there was not more than one dish at the table.[1]

Matt. xxvi. 24; Mark xiv. 21; (Luke xxii. 22.) We must firmly hold that St Luke does not introduce ver. 21 supplementarily, thus placing it incorrectly in the midst of the words of the sacramental institution; and it further seems *probable* to us that ver. 22 also was (in its simple reference to the contrast of the divine counsel and human guilt) thus repeated. Yet we admit that the historically correct *But, behold* may have led to the introduction of ver. 22 as related to it; and the expression being the same (in all but one word) we shall include it in the text here.—How Judas comes against Jesus, and Jesus endures his temptation, in it victoriously separating Himself from him—we see now exhibited before us in a spiritually decisive and internal process, before the betrayal itself is accomplished as an external act. We may regard this conflict of Jesus with the traitor among the Twelve as a *temptation* in regard to Himself; as even the beginning of the last, greater, and greatest temptation, in which His *Passion* consists. Now at the last Satan comes again to Him immediately, as in the desert; and even more directly near, though by the agency and in the form of man, his instrument. And here in Judas the sin of men is concentrated, or rather he is the concentrated *man of sin*; and in this, that He has to do with such an one, we mark the greatest temptation to the Holy One of God to depart from the rigorously defined path of His holiness. But the patient Endurer, when He suffers this, is only bruised on the heel by the heel of this Satan-man lifted up against Him; over him who would tread Him under his feet in his impious course, the self-sacrificing Redeemer

[1] Hence we cannot accept Bengel's strange view, that there was a nearer circle around the Lord, within the Twelve. (Judas *opposite*, as Peter and John one on each side? But this does not suit the manner in which they reclined.) Bengel (not in the Gnomon, but in the Germ. N. T.) thinks that "this at once exonerated a large proportion of the Twelve."

remains exalted in His unbroken victory. How this was consummated in the second conflict of this evening, we have seen already in Jno. xiii. 27; we now see it here the first time. That is, Jesus abides *exalted above Judas* not immediately as God, but in that emptied relation as the Son of man in which He was capable of temptation; He is and abides, in opposition to this man of sin, the faithful man in God, and recedes not from God's *purpose, righteousness,* and *love.* Thus we seize the three critical points of this utterance, and now proceed to exhibit them more clearly.

First: Jesus remains *exalted in the purpose and will of God* above the *wicked purpose* and *will* of Judas; for He can in His perfect and sure obedience, subordinate the suffering of this lot to the providential arrangements of His God and Father. He holds to the *as it is written,* or, as St Luke says afterward, *was determined;* for prophecy and predetermination are here one. The whole counsel of God is laid down in the Scripture; the plan of the history of the kingdom and the world, which shall stand fast in spite of the counsel of the heathen and the devices of the people. Ps. xxxiii. 10, 11. *Before God,* in the book of His mutually interacting omniscience and almightiness, all is written, down to the hair of the head which falleth not without Him:—but who knoweth the individual secret thoughts of His heart, before they are made manifest in act and history? *For us* it was enough, that that had been before announced in prophecy, which we must regard as the firm centre of all—the plan of redemption in Christ. In this "*The Son of man goeth!*" are wrapped up all those thoughts of peace and not of evil which the Most High has thought toward the children of men, to bring the good end which was expected by all who in the longing of penitence and faith waited for it. Jer. xxix. 11. Hence all the main crises of that wonder of all wonders, of the redeeming passion of Christ, were written down before; and the event signified by this emphatic *as*—the betrayal by one of His most intimate chosen ones—must have been recorded too, because and as it was ordained; and here also applies what the faith of the disciples, Acts ii. 23, iv. 28, could profoundly express. Nothing can break or disturb this predetermined counsel of God; all hell, and its power in humanity, is impotent against it, even as the

desperate malice of Judas fails to disturb the repose and confidence of our Lord. He abides sublimely elevated above his evil will, for he submits to his permitted deed as obedient to the good will of God, and goes on His plainly marked out way. Certainly, this is contained in the expression ὑπάγει, *goeth*, which here primarily indicates the process of death as such, just as in St John's discourses it comprehends the going through death to the Father. Expositors usually content themselves with making it only the separation from the body, departure from this life, as הלך *e.g.* Gen. xv. 2; Josh. xxiii. 14; Ps. xxxix. 14 (Sept. never ὑπάγειν)—but the inner meaning and connection constrains us here, as almost always in St John's ὑπάγειν, to include a voluntary submission in the independent, obedient going this way of death.[1] St Luke's πορεύεται for *goeth* is under the same condition; indeed, we might compare Jno. xiv. 2, 28 (where the πορεύεσθαι is distinguished from the mere going away by the blessed end of the way which is marked out) and interpret it more emphatically:—The Son of Man goeth His appointed, sure, and blessed way, He fulfilleth His course, comp. Lu. xiii. 33. This is so intimately connected with the matter itself, that it must approve its correctness.—It *must* be so, because it is written; not that this lays Me under constraint, I yield myself voluntarily and confidently to the counsel of God. Thus the holy resolution of Jesus' obedience abides exalted above the malicious purpose of Judas, even while He does not withstand it. *He knows* that even this, like all evil, will be turned to good, and that thus will be effected the saving of the world. Indeed, that which God designs for good, Judas designs for simple evil, but the thoughts of God remain firm and will have their course. Even this most terrific delinquency must serve the accomplishment of the eternal purpose of love, even when it is afterward carried out to its accomplishment:—just as even now the word concerning the traitor was turned into a blessing for the rest. This is here in its centre the same mystery of the divine government of all, which meets us a thousand times, a thousand times repeated, throughout its whole procedure; we cannot grasp the full meaning of what we say, when we speak of *Providence*, but

[1] In Josh. xxiii. 14, and still more plainly, 1 Kings ii. 2, something of the same self-devotement is involved.

the simplicity of our faith in the living God in thus speaking is amply justified. But that the holy Son of man thus simply subjects Himself to this Providence, when the greatness of this devilish wickedness might bring the temptation to doubt whether this also could have been foredetermined—is His first victory. He does not for one moment think—Could it be that I should suffer this from such an abandoned apostate? but abides in firm *faith* in the purpose of God, and in the *obedience* of this faith. And here serves Him the prop of *Scripture;* for all that was written of Him was also written *for Him*, to be the light of His feet, the lamp and justification of His way. We do no more now than point once more—after having spoken of it at large upon Jno. xiii. 18, and xvii. 12—to Christ's own exegesis, which finds the treachery of Judas in the Old Testament, and which no scientific criticism of our day can invalidate.

It is right before God that this should be; but not the less right before God that the wicked purpose should bear its guilt. Consequently, in the second place, Jesus abides also *exalted in God's righteousness* above the imputed, retained and *abiding guilt* of Judas. The transition to this thought cannot be better expressed than it is in the Hirschberg Bible: "However patiently I suffer this, however little God will hinder it, however certainly it was foreseen and foreannounced that I should be betrayed by My own disciple—yet, notwithstanding, fearful is the temporal and eternal woe which will fall upon him; since it was not the fore-announcement which caused him to commit this damning sin; but his own voluntary malignity, foreseen only by the all-knowing God, has driven him to this heart-breaking crime." A second temptation for the Son of man lay in this: He might have yielded—in opposition to the righteousness of God—to the false pity which should mourn over and excuse the "unhappy Judas," as being appointed to be the instrument of such a destiny. Into this temptation we, who know better, are still apt to fall:—not so the Lord, who abides firm in the testimony of the truth; and, even when He is in the deepest subjection to the most malignant wickedness, forgets not for a moment His position as the Judge over all evil and evil-doers.

Woe to that man! When the Lord thus calls him a man, He points once more, as we have said, to the general sin of man-

kind—which in this man of sin has only reached its full consummation; but the emphatic and exclusive ἐκείνῳ—*that* man—points to the individual character of this tremendous sin and guilt. By whom *the Son of man* is betrayed—such juxtaposition with such a man is the deepest humiliation of this name; what inexpressible condescension, to allow that He belongs to one humanity with this Judas, as one *of us*. We might be misled into regarding this as a mitigation of his guilt, as Judas did not after all violate and sin against the known Lord of Glory; but a profounder consideration will preserve us from that error, and leave the *woe* in all its rigour. There is ample independent reason why our Lord should here call Himself throughout the Son of man; but that Judas was not essentially ignorant as to the divine dignity of His master, and therefore did not as it were excusably sin, must be deduced from the irremediable doom of damnation which is so strongly pronounced upon Him.

The Lord does not say, Woe unto men, all sinners, by whose hand and counsel I must suffer and be crucified! But He makes *this* man prominent, who betrayed Him to others, for special judgment. Again, He cannot now say—Woe to that one of the twelve, or to *that Apostle* who has betrayed his Lord and Master! It is, however, still more rigorous when He brings to mind that he who had thus become a devil—is a man, for his sin at the same time in another sense transcends the measure of *ordinary* human sin. He was *born* as *man*, that is, as no more than sinful man; sinful, indeed, but *susceptible* of truth and love, and therefore of salvation—but now he has *become* incapable of salvation, in direct opposition to truth and love itself.[1] This solitary *woe* denounced upon one only head, in the profoundest patience, the sublimest tranquillity, the keenest grief, has a far heavier weight, consequently, than the other "woes" which had issued from the same lips; heavier than that of the seven and

[1] Thus we find, and we trust rightly, a different sense in the ἄνθρωπος here, from that which Krummacher finds, who regards it as involving "a rejecting tone"—"Judas has nothing more to do with the Redeemer! Jesus has no other name for him than the alien and cold one —*that man!*" We think of such passages as Matt. xii. 12; Mark ii. 27; Lu. ix. 56, and ask in wonder, How can the name "man" be on the lips of the Son of man and man's Saviour, a term of rejection and alienation?

eight-fold woes denounced upon the Scribes and Pharisees, which however were dictated by the *wrath of love;* heavier even than the "woe to *that man*" by the side of "woe to *the world*," Matt. xviii. 7, (where, moreover, there is as here a *necessity for it* which does not remove the guilt.)

For concerning this Judas alone the lips of truth say—It had been *good* for that man if he had *never been born!* Here Krummacher observes truly: "This inscription placed over the grave of His unhappy disciple by the Lord himself is the most fearful and affrighting utterance of the whole Bible," this word, taken in its literal rigour, closes eternally the door of hope; it precludes all thought of an ultimate salvation, for if there were a restoration of his soul in the distant revolutions of ages, it would be better for him to have been born:—this is so obvious, and has been so deeply felt from the beginning, that we need not spend many words in establishing it. The best argument for the irrevocableness of this sentence is found in the contrivances resorted to for its evasion: for instance, It had been better *for the Son of man* if Judas had never been born! This construction,[1] however plausible it may seem according to the letter, is in the highest degree artificial, and therefore to be rejected. It has seemed that καλὸν ἦν αὐτῷ must be referred still to Christ, as the περὶ αὐτοῦ before; partly, because *the Son of man* immediately precedes, partly because the conclusion with *that man* seems to bring in a new *subject.* But this gives to the words a meaning of self-seeking and weak lamentation which is utterly unworthy of Jesus, and never heard elsewhere; and which is, moreover, so entirely unsuitable to this place, that on that account, and in spite of grammatical appearances, there have been few who have ever hesitated to admit that this sentence must be the development and explanation of the woe previously uttered. We repeat what we said on another occasion:[2] "Such an exposition we can never assent to, because it involves such a

[1] Weber defends this, and it is so in the translation of van Ess. The excellent Feldhoff (Paragraphen Zur Geschichte) felt himself driven to this perversion, and thought that the simple connection would allow no other meaning! Thus may the best men err, when a foregone conclusion obscures the Scripture to them.

[2] Zwanzig biblische Predigten, Kempten bie Dannheimer, S. 257.

direct contrast with the previous *submission to the counsel of God* as is quite out of the question; still more, because—to our feeling at least—the utterance of a *woe* against His enemy because he had wrought Him harm is at this sacred crisis altogether unworthy of our Lord; while, on the other hand, it was worthy of Him that He should feel sorrow for the destruction of that enemy, who had wilfully plunged himself into ruin."[1] But we now strengthen those two feeble expressions, and maintain that it must be the feeling of *every man* who is not bent upon doing violence to his feeling, that such an exposition altogether deranges the true sense of the passage, and the entire relation of Jesus to Judas; that it is altogether contrary to the whole mind of our Lord generally, and at this conjuncture especially, when His sublime elevation above Judas must be manifested, that He should so far lower Himself as to succumb to such a lamentation over His own lot. We cannot understand how any man can tolerate the idea of such a thought in Jesus' spirit, of such a word on Jesus' lips, as—Had not Judas been born for Me, it would *for Me have been better*. For does not this border on that want of resignation to the destiny of life, which in man has said—Would that I had not been born!! And here too, at the table of the Supper, after the serene self-sacrificing words—The Son of man goeth, as it is written!—The reference of the *αὐτῷ* to the more distant subject instead of the more immediate, is sufficiently explained by this, that *this man* is the main object of the whole utterance, the *αὐτῷ* manifestly being only a repeated *ἐκείνῳ*;[2] and the same holds good for the explanation of the repeated *that man* which is thereby *emphatically* connected with the *been born*. Glassius observes that this repetition of the subject is according to the emphasis of the Hebrew, לְתוֹסֶפֶת הַבְּיאוּר, *ad augendam declarationem;* appealing to several Old Testament passages (Gen. ii. 19; xiii. 16; Ex. vii. 2, xxxv. 5; Josh. i. 2; Jer. xxxvii. 8; 2 Sam. vi. 4), and in the New Testament to Matt. xxvi. 24, and

[1] Lange: "He mourns over the eternity of this man; so much so that He forgets the sorrow which he had wrought for Himself."

[2] Not, therefore, according to a mediating exposition: It would be better to the Son of man; I should much rather that this unhappy man had never been born! The Lord expressly speaks not of Himself at all; but only of the condemnation of this man.

2 Cor. iv. 3, 4 (ἐν οἷς—τῶν ἀπίστων.) This emphasis in the indication of this man is a sufficient reason for the expression, is in fact the main thing in it; but with this may be connected what Bengel finds in the first ἐκείνῳ—illi, de quo ipso *etiam scriptum est.*[1]

Thus it remains that the Lord testifies—It would have been better for Judas never to have been born. But that is no more in His lips a soft and sentimental expression concerning the traitor, than it is a mere sentimental lamentation over Himself. Nor is its force to be evaded or explained away by decreeing that it is only a proverbial saying; for Jesus has no mere "manner of speech" in what He says, and if He uses proverbs He uses them as truth. It is primarily a prophecy:—It will befall this man to wish that he could undo his birth and annihilate his own existence. Lev. xxiii. 29, 30; Ecclus. xxiii. 14 (καὶ θελήσεις εἰ μὴ ἐγεννήθης.) But that which is here predicted is very different from the anguish and transitory despondency which made Job and Jeremiah curse the day of their birth; for the emphasis rests upon this, that Jesus does not merely predict a desire of Judas, but Himself by anticipation confirms and *utters* this καλὸν ἦν—*it were better.*

Here, consequently, we have in the second clause of this utterance the second mystery of the divine government, as it appears central in the centre of that government—the divine counsel, which orders all things beforehand, is not disturbed by the wicked purpose which arises; so also God's justice, which condemns the sinner, is not invaded or neutralised by the permissive appointment. All that which *comes to pass* stands under and depends upon the will of God. The energies of nature, without will and without organic power of their own, work all, down to the slightest, only according to the will of the Creator, immanent

[1] On the other hand, we cannot admit what Bengel has said upon the second *this man*—videri possit *prædicatum.* He corrects this *videri possit* by another subtile remark (probably too subtile)—*ille*, appellatio *jam ut remoti.* But Lange asserts that we must translate—Better that he had not been born *as that man.* This, however, is dangerous; since Judas would then appear to have been born the wretch he was, and his individual progressive guilt would be carried back to his birth. Instead of laying upon his own head his guilt, it would assume a predestination to it in the mysterious counsel which decided his destiny.

in His own creation. But in the personal creature invested with free will, in humanity, we must carefully distinguish between *occurrence* and *act*, between *effect* and *will*. Whatever comes to pass, as far as it is event and result, belongs to the divine direction, in which the Lord *turns* the thoughts of the people to such and such results, as His own thoughts will. Thus all must serve God; and thus Judas, who least of all understood the divine purpose of redemption, is an eminent instrument in its accomplishment; a man, *by means* of whom something takes place which was to take place, and as it was to take place. His purpose, nevertheless, meant it very differently when He became the betrayer of Jesus; and this his *act* as such falls therefore as certainly under the divine *imputation* as the *event* falls under the arrangements of divine *providence*. Here there is no room for excuse through predestination in the prescience. The event is so certainly defined, appointed, and interwoven with the great plan as subserving the great counsel of salvation (an ὡρισμένον), that the betrayal of Judas as an accomplished fact is already the foundation on which the sacramental institution is based;[1] but, at the same time, as an act this betrayal was so certainly voluntary, and independent of the will of God, that its guilt rests upon this man—certainly not born or created for damnation—unto eternal ruin. Ten thousand times does this interweaving of divine foresight and the imputation of guilt, this combination of necessity and freedom, the one not affecting the other, recur in history; indeed, the providential government of the world is the perpetual exhibition of this deep mystery.

And now, what is the *guilt* in which this traitor has involved himself? Most assuredly, he sinned as man against the Son of man; and without that dogmatic knowledge of His being the Son of God which the Spirit afterward gave; but this does not affect the question, for crime may be committed against God in man, with the same opposition to the truth which those manifested who crucified to themselves the Son of God afresh and put Him to shame. (Heb. vi. 6.) *God in man* had been so near and manifest to him in the person of this Son of man, that

[1] And probably the reason why our Lord in Luke xxii. 21 returns to it during the Supper, and testified that his guilt remained.

he cannot be regarded as having done evil *only* against the Son of man; that which the Lord says generally concerning the Jews in Jno. xv. 22—25 applies to him as an apostle in the highest degree. He resisted the truth as a hypocrite, love only hardened him, from a chosen and trusted one he becomes a traitor, and delivers his Lord and Master over to the enemies who sought His death—for that miserable earnest-money! He can hear the woe with which redeeming love bewails him, and yet daringly ask—*Is it I?* He can eat and drink that which the Lord presents as His body and blood for the forgiveness of sins—and then go away to accomplish his determined sin, to *do*, as the Lord had said, what he *wills* to do. Woe to *that man*—he was born a man, but he has ceased to be one, and has become a *devil*. His sin—that of man against man—is nevertheless in its kernel a participation in the presumptuous impiety of Satan against God. For, in the *holiness* of the Godman[1] there was nothing which might furnish excuse, as in the case of man's sinning against sinful man; his hatred of love thereby passes over the human limit into the devilish. He would betray his Lord, but he betrayed and sold *himself* to hell. In him Satan had his first victory over the power of the love of God in Christ; and the saying of Rom. v. 20 is reversed by a fearful exception to the rule—where grace was mighty, sin became mightier still. It avails not to apologise for him by referring to the delusion of his covetousness, as the handle by which Satan made him his instrument; the real handle was in the depth of his wicked heart. Nor does it affect the case, if it be supposed that Judas did not really expect the condemnation and death of Jesus—that would make his daring mockery of the person of the Holy One only the more wicked, and complicate still further the many-sided falseness of his iniquity. After all, the Lord's woe denounced upon Judas, such as we have it before our eyes, is decisive evidence of the abysmal wickedness of his mind and action, for with that alone would such a judgment accord. He assuredly is the only one who received his sentence in person before the last day; who was given over to destruction before the presentation of that sin-offering which saves so many from destruction.

[1] Which he himself afterward testified in shrinking and partial expression, though plainly enough, Matt. xxvii. 4.

It had been better *to him* never to have been born—to *this man!* Note that the Lord does not simply say—It had been *better;* for that would imply—before God better, and would border on that forbidden question, which invades the region of unexplained mystery—Why then did God permit him to be born? For the same reason, to obviate any resemblance of imputation on the original purity and guiltlessness of all creation, He cannot say—*Better* never to have been *created.* Mark, further, it is not—Better that he should be annihilated; for while the annihilation of an intelligent creature is abstractly possible to omnipotence, so that it may be regarded as a posibility for the lost, yet on the other hand it is impossible according to *justice.* Therefore the Lord's word avoids all liability to such application, and confirms in the *αὐτῷ* the eternal continuance of this condemned one, to whom it would be better never to have been. *It would be,* that is *to him,* as he will feel and wish eternally:—thus mourns His love, but goes no further; and His righteousness proclaims—He *was* born, and *has* become what he has become, through his own guilt! Let dogmatics and speculation see to it how they deal with this utterance which exegesis hands over to them. There are but two hints in addition which we have to give. The one is thus expressed by the Berl. Bible: "We must distinguish between God's work, our own, and the devil's. Neither of these affects the other—however much they interpenetrate each other—neither abolishes the other's full significance." The other is this: Mark how even the redeeming power of the blood of Christ finds its limit where the Satanic domain begins and penetrates the human; and that there is an actual abyss, on the edge of which all sinners walk, the end of that which had its beginning in the Fall, and into which all those must fall who give no entrance to redeeming grace.

But is this judgment of the Lord upon Judas—with all the majestic *calmness* of the eternal righteousness of God in which it is spoken, and in His humanity, according to the love of God incarnate in Him—a cold and rigorous judgment of a condemned enemy, bereft of all sympathy and feeling?[1] Far be it!

[1] To quote Krummacher once more—A strange and cold word which cast away this man?

Rather is it the most affecting and melting *lamentation of love*, which feels the woe as much as holiness requires or will admit. Therefore, in the third place, Jesus abides also *exalted in the love of God* over Judas' *eternal ruin*. If the second temptation, after the victory in the first (that is, after the *self-devotion* to God's will) would lead the Lord to a *weak and excusing* sentence, in misapprehension of the divine counsel, and so to a *false love*—so now the third temptation, after the second victory, would lead Him to a *severely rejecting* condemnation, in misapprehension of the divine righteousness as if it were divested of all love—and thus to *false justice*. From the time when Jesus *chose* this lost one, with the design to expend upon him the strength of His goodness, patience, and long-suffering, if he might be saved from the darkness that threatened him, down to the heart-piercing appeal at the kiss in Gethsemane—from the beginning to the end He had *loved* him, for the Father's sake and in the Father's name, who would have none to perish who have ever been born. If He who gives Himself to us in Christ as a Father is still, in the midst of redeeming grace, the Righteous Father (Jno. xvii. 25), so also His righteousness, which must let the deserved Woe have its full course, is inseparable from love; but this Father-love of God manifests itself in its human immeasurable condescension in the Son of man, who is the Son of God. In Him it gives its abundant witness that God willeth not the death of a sinner; and with all the more love, in proportion as the sin more wickedly resists. As the sin of men is Christ's grief generally, so specifically is here the unlimited sin of the traitor, and his consequent unbounded condemnation, and further, the necessity that He should testify of it:—the woe pronounced upon this man becomes the personal grief of His own Highpriestly heart as the Son of man, and "this man is a sorrow to him, back to his very birth"—(as Lange beautifully says.) Yes, verily, this is the inmost meaning of the last lamentation, in which we hear the last cry of a love which goes in sympathy with the lost one to the extremest limits of mercy, where he must be abandoned for ever. It *would be* better to him—*ah that* —it were other than it is! The Lord thus speaks because He has already entered within the range of the sacred Passion; and because it is now needful for the fulfilment of the divine counsel,

that in this last heavy temptation to *invade prematurely the wrath of judgment*, He should assert in its purity and integrity the power of forbearing love.[1] And he has asserted it here, in a manner so *reconciling* (according to every sense of the term), against and upon Judas, that every heart of His true disciples which might stumble at the eternal condemnation of the lost, must be strengthened and comforted by this original lamentation over it which the Son of God poured out.

But at this fundamental crisis is fore-shadowed what will and must recur in the history and final consummation of His church. When that second man of sin, potentiated into a whole race, when Antichrist and his hosts confront the final church of the saints, whose victory must be patience and faith, Christ's people will have nothing to do but follow the example of their Head and Captain—to abide patiently obedient, resting on the assurance that it was so written and appointed; to maintain the testimony of truth and righteousness to the damnation of the ungodly; but while doing so, to hold fast their *love* down to the final limit of God's patience, until the day of His wrath shall come. "Fury is not in me!" So, according to Isa. xxvii. 4, speaks God's vineyard, without a hedge of briars and thorns, to its enemies. "Fury is not in Me!" So spake Jesus, now at the first, the living Vine, the root and stem of the church. Thus did He endure, condemn, bewail, but not show wrath; in order that we may see in Him, the Son of man, how the love of God glories even against wrath, and even in judgment has its victory.

Matt. xxvi. 25. The word which we have already heard, though a cry of lamentation, might be regarded as a fearful word, on account of the *object* of its lamenting love—Better never to have been born; but this third word *Thou sayest it!* spoken to the traitor himself, may be regarded as simply *sublimely-awful*. St Matthew alone has preserved this, thus approving himself like St John an eye-witness; and in regard to this low-uttered

[1] This most critical point in this crisis of temptation is overlooked by Lange. He speaks of a sinking back into the *Old Testament* and legal wrath of zeal, and so forth—but this formed no element in the present temptation of Christ. The otherwise justifiable *wrath*, which as the meek sufferer He must now avoid, was manifestly in the future of His judicial office, not in the Old Testament past.

colloquy, more observing, so to speak, than he. For, when Jno. xiii. 28 records that *no man* at the table knew the meaning of the later and last word to Judas, it is obvious that as he excepts himself, so we may except Matthew too;—or it remains to suppose that John alone observed this prior word to Judas, and afterward communicated it to the apostles. We leave all this to the free judgment of the reader for adjustment; only stipulating that the trustworthiness of each evangelical narrative must be held unimpeachable.[1] For our own part, we repose confidently upon the absolute independence of the first gospel, and regard it as in the highest degree probable that St Matthew himself observed and heard what in ver. 25 he records to us with the same simplicity of an eye-witness which reigns everywhere else.

There has been found wanting in *St Mark* some hint as to the way in which Judas received this word of Jesus;[2] for the traitor cannot be included in ver. 19, on account of the *being sorrowful.* The reason is that he did not record what was not certainly known to him. But St Matthew gives us a brief but most pregnant intimation of the proud daring of the miserable man. The *Is it I?* of the others did not humble or agitate him, save that he had no spirit to join with them—*last* trace of a fear and concernment which was soon utterly to vanish. The terrific woe which now followed without restraint, sounds into his deaf ears without making any impression, or producing any terror. He remained cold and immovable, blind, deaf, and feelingless in his cherished purpose; or, rather, if we may dare to say so, strengthened in it by the decisive prediction of its accomplishment;—insensible to the thunders of judgment impending in the *woe,* and to the mercy which shone upon the cloud in the lamenting "*better would it be to him!*" H. Lōssel: "He breathed nothing but self though surrounded by the atmosphere of eternal love." Just as if he had not heard the sentence of woe, he acts as if it had never been spoken; and adds to the rest, with fearful desperation concealed under the

[1] Neander forgets this when (notwithstanding the sop reached to him) he regards the *low* question of Judas as an impossibility, on account of his distance, and then allows himself to say: "This is probably a foreign (that is, untrue) particular, the origin of which is explained by the true representation in St John."

[2] Although it is he who distinctively testifies—And they, the Twelve, drank *all* of the cup!

perfection of hypocrisy, *his own* delayed *Is it I?* Ebrard's solution seems to us altogether wrong; for he regards Judas as simply *lying*, and saying by the tone of his question—"I cannot be the person meant." The only correct explanation is, that he puts his question as much as possible like that of the others; a question which he had so asked as to wait for *no* as the answer, could scarcely have been answered by the affirmative, *Thou hast said.* The others are all still absorbed in thought, pondering the hard meaning of the word of Jesus just spoken; *on that account* they do not observe the question which Judas takes that opportunity of pronouncing half aloud. He intended it to be, as we have said, like theirs; but there is a difference which is hardly accidental. The others uttered in most humble submission the name *Κύριε, Lord*, which was the answer to their own question: that word does not pass the traitor's lips, but instead of it he uses the cold and ceremonious *Ῥαββί.*[1]

Let us mark well the contrast between these two, and feel as far as we may the wilful presumption of this question! In any other saint among the children of men it would have provoked only *anger*—if we may with reverence institute any such comparison. But no temptation to *wrath*, at other times most holy and right even in Him, but now forbidden, finds access to the soul of Jesus. How can we imagine it possible that any thing, that even he, whose everlasting punishment He now bewails, could move Him from the triumphant elevation of His thought and feeling. His answer to this question is like a flash from the bright heaven; but it is only the flash of absolute truth, uttered as the reply of silent majesty, and without the thunder of threatening or invective.[2] The Lord's wisdom and love still spares him by an answer as low in its love as his own; but the necessary, inevitable word is distinctly audible to him—*Thou sayest it*, or—*Thou hast said it (thyself)!* a form of affirmation similar to that afterwards used to Caiaphas, and at first meaning

[1] Bengel reminds us that we never read of Judas' calling Jesus Lord. That is plain enough as it regards the Scripture, but we can easily suppose him to have said *Lord* to Him whom he kissed at the end.

[2] His love will and His truth must expressly answer such an *Is it I?* as that of Judas, although it seems needless; to the *Is it I?* of the amazed guiltless ones who question their own innocence no answer is needful, for despite appearances the question is its own answer.

—Thou knowest it well, wherefore askest thou? So again—Ah that thou hadst not asked! Ah that I had not to answer! Ah that thou *wert* not such! and what else the mysterious emphasis of this word may evolve to thoughtful consideration. In such words as these definitive exposition ceases, and pondering reflection must take its place. Thus much we further indicate as its force to the feeling: Thou knowest it, I also—Yea, I look through thee, and canst thou still doubt it? Thou deceivest *Me* not—thou dost not *mislead* or *move* Me! Thou dost not shake Me from my submission to the decreed purpose of God, thou dost not make Me waver in My righteous condemnation of thy sin—but neither dost thou move me from My *love*—for thou mayest not and shall not even disturb my repose! The *Thou* which is directly given back intimates what is more strongly expressed afterward in St John's *what thou doest*—Thou *willest* it, and thy will, which hurries thee to ruin, and executed on Me will subserve redemption, will neither by Me nor My Father be resisted. (*Habeas tibi*—but in a tone more mournful than upbraiding.)

Woe, woe to the man, who thus questions the Lord, and must receive this answer! Such is the application with which the Spirit interlines, as it were, this text, for every reader.

After this interchange of these two words, which condense into one moment the awful collision between heaven and hell, we must suppose a short pause to have ensued—a pause of anxious silence or profound pondering while the paschal meal proceeds. And as they *were eating*—is St Matthew's new commencement, and all the three Evangelists introduce now the institution of the Sacrament. And to it, in all its immeasurable importance and inexhaustible depth of meaning, we now turn our attention.

INSTITUTION OF THE LORD'S SUPPER.

(Matt. xxvi. 26—28; Mar. xiv. 22, 24; Lu. xxii. 19, 20; 1 Cor. xi. 24, 25.)

The importance of these words, which are heard from age to age amid the most solemn of all the services of the Church,

consists primarily in this, that they appoint and establish *Sacrament*. The development of the idea expressed by this word must be resigned to dogmatic theology; we have only to observe, that this idea, and likewise the word which denotes it, belongs to the *ecclesiastical* development of doctrine, and is not found immediately in *Scripture;* but that it must be classed, nevertheless, among those things which the living tradition of the Spirit in the Church presupposed and assumed from the beginning, and without the recognition of which no exposition of Scripture can fully accomplish its purpose. We go further, and maintain that this *ecclesiastical* idea (in the purest and most legitimate sense of the word) has its root in the Scripture, or may be deduced from it as a necessary consequence; and especially, that here *at the institution of the Lord's Supper we are to seek its origin.* He who would ground dogmatic theology upon exposition, will not fail to exhibit the root of all sacramental doctrine in this historical event; he who would, with a truly unprejudiced spirit, expound from the depth of the words, as well as of the history with which they are connected, must necessarily at the very threshold, admit a proposition which will be a key to the interpretation, viz., *that the Lord here contemplated just such a sacramental solemnity as His Church celebrates.*[1]

It is very easy to hurry on with the observation that "the words of institution can contain no dogmatic mystery, for Christ was not a man of mysteries, and of dogmatic sentences."[2] On the contrary, it is perfectly plain, that the Man who is in His own person the mystery of all mysteries, speaks in the highest degree mysteriously concerning the eating and drinking of His body and of His blood; He connects with "Do this" in incontrovertible authority "This is," which necessarily exhibits a dogmatic ordinance as contained in the institution, and offered to our spiritual understanding for its development. Or are we at once to assume that "This is" *must* be interpreted in such a

[1] And in this we flatly contradict the position of Lutz (Bibl. Dogm. S. 445), that the full sacramental idea appears in the N. T. only in connection with the doctrine of Baptism, and not with the doctrine of the Supper.

[2] As we find it in a Pamphlet—Die in Preussen beabsichtigte Aufhebung der kirchlichen Union u. s. w. Hamb. 1841, S. 15.

manner as that *no* mystery or Sacrament shall arise out of it? But the very Person of Him who speaks forbids this, as we have said; so does the allusion to His doctrine in Jno. vi., concerning the eating and drinking of Himself; and finally and conclusively, *the connection between this institution and the Old Testament Passover.*

Here as everywhere it is shown that the New Testament cannot be rightly or adequately understood, unless justice is done to its connection with and derivation from the Old Testament. We have seen more and more plainly in the introductory words what importance the Lord attached to the Israelite Passover, and by what degrees He prepared His disciples to understand that at this last celebration of it a new institution would take its place, which should introduce its full realisation. After He had already in the feet-washing excited the thoughts of the disciples to discern in an *external transaction* a *symbol* of spiritual things, He speaks of His sufferings in such a manner as distinctly to indicate Himself to be the true Lamb, and then goes on at once to speak of a future *fulfilment* of the prophetic type. When in this connection He himself appoints another external ceremony for His people during the intermediate time (after His departure, and until His return to their fellowship), it follows—when we contemplate the entire Scripture, without a regard to the whole of which there can be no exposition of its individual sayings—that *this* ceremony must correspond with that former *typical* transaction as its *fulfilment*, and bring the *reality* which was shadowed out in it:—the *do this*, as well as *This is My body*, taking the place of the paschal ritual. For in this way we arrive at the foundation of the ecclesiastical dogmatic idea of the Sacrament, which, though not literally expressed in Scripture, is certainly *scriptural* as involved in the thing itself:—this external transaction, appointed by the Lord himself for the New Testament church, actually brings and communicates the grace and gift which was only promised in the mere rite of the Old Testament. It is thus most obvious, at the outset, that the Lord in the Supper contemplated such a mystery; and, proceeding from this, we discover the analogy of baptism likewise.

Yes verily: "In the secret silence of the little circle of His disciples the Redeemer established an insignificant act which

should attain to a world-wide interest." This is saying but little. In giving a morsel of bread to these Twelve, and delivering to them this farewell cup to drink—He regally appoints, and leaves behind Him as a testament, a miracle of His power and love which should extend through all ages to the end of time; the *most gracious mystery* of His internal union with His believing people, exhibited in a *most open testimony* thereof given to the world;—in short, all that we can say concerning the blessedness of the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper.

The Sacrament, in as far as it is an external transaction and has to do with earthly elements, takes up into itself at first the prophetic type; for while that was ordained of God for the sake of its fulfilment, it could not otherwise cease than as continuing in a changed and glorified form, one however of a strictly corresponding character. *Figure* and *similitude* therefore must obviously be retained even in the idea of Sacrament; for it is through *this* that the connection between earthly and heavenly things is exhibited. The polemic theology which refused altogether to admit any *significat* in the interpretation of types, proved its folly, first, by renouncing the living progression and transition from the Old Testament into the New, and then by denying the fundamental principle underlying the Sacrament—the *symbolical* relation between nature and spirit which pervades the whole world, and the Scripture which interprets it to us. The ancient church rightly termed the bread and wine in the Sacrament, *σύμβολα, ἀντίτυπα,*[1] even *τύποι, species.* Cyril of Jerusalem, while He discerns in them the body and blood of Christ, finds them there only *ἐν τύπῳ ἄρτου καὶ οἴνου,* which must be interpreted in the sense of *mera species* into transubstantiation. Calvin is doubtless right in his position—"First, bread and wine are signs—which *represent* to us the invisible aliment which we derive from the body and blood of Christ."

But the distinctive point in the Sacrament, as in the New Testament generally, is this, that in and with the figure the *reality* also is given. It is a very improper confusion of language by which men such as Ebrard, going far beyond Zwingle, and even inconsistent Lutherans, speak of the "*Sacraments*" of the

[1] See in Ebrard vom Abendm. I. 271.

Old Covenant, which could have had no existence according to the true idea of this term. (Heb. x. 1.) *We* have now the *signum efficax* or more properly *exhibitivum*. A mere "prophesying," or symbolising, of that which was accomplished once for all is certainly foreign to the New Testament, and its external rites appointed of God; even as in the Old Testament there could be only ordinances symbolical of the future reality. The living, essential centre of the New Covenant economy is the incarnate *Person* of Christ, the Redeemer himself; the middlepoint of His *redeeming work*, again, is His death; not, however, as death in itself, but as it is turned into *life*, and procures life for us. The *fruit and the influence* of this death which is our life, of this life which springs from death, is attained no otherwise than by the *self-communication of the Lord to us*, by which He who died for us implants Himself in us as living, or by which we partake of Him as our meat and drink. And as far as our partaking of salvation comes through the living, effectual presence of the whole glorified Christ, offered to the appropriation of simple faith, the Lord's Supper has a preeminent significance: giving a bodily presentation to the most spiritual truth, in harmony with the corporeity of the glorified Redeemer. It is *the* Sacrament of the New Testament *sensu potiori*; and as such the true realisation of that paschal sacrifice which was similarly placed at the very head or in the centre of the Old Testament.[1]

In the appointment of the *Passover* we have the first ordinance for Israel before the giving of the Law; and this annual festal commemoration of their calling, redemption, and pardon, was actually, as Bähr terms it, "Israel's birth-feast and life-feast." In the solemn prediction of their deliverance, Ex. vi., we read these words of declaration and promise:—I, the Lord, I *will* bring you out—I will rid you out of their bondage—I will redeem you—I will take you to Me for a people, and be your God! to which fourfold annunciation the four cups at the paschal meal were thought to have reference. Thus the Lord had heard the groaning of the children of Israel, and remembered His covenant; but *they* heard Him not for anguish of spirit, so that

[1] Therefore, also, the first instituted. But not, according to that opinion of Lindner, which has passed away without leaving any trace, that it was to be received before Baptism!

Moses objected—Behold, they have not hearkened unto Me. Nevertheless, that came to pass which the Lord had said; but only in and through the faith of Moses, whose faith contended for victory with Pharaoh's wrath, could the whole of Israel be led forth:—Israel finally heard this Moses, kept the Passover at his command,[1] and thus was saved. But Moses was in this partly the type of the true Author and Finisher of our faith; partly, according to Heb. iii. 5, a witness and prophet of those things which were to be spoken after, as fulfilment in the New Testament. But to what did he give testimony in the appointment of that first law for Israel, which at the same time contained the first and most comprehensive prophetic type? The Lord saves, spares, and accepts Israel; but, because Israel like Egypt had fallen into peril of the Destroyer, only through *blood*, the blood of the slaughtered *lamb*. Thus we have here the first legal *sacrifice* in that special divine economy which then had its commencement; and *this* lamb is the most general representative of all the sacrificial victims which were afterward slain. The sacred text speaks of it so often, not only by the (ambiguous) verb זבח, but under the express name of זֶבַח, (*e.g.* Ex. xii. 27 at the outset), that it ought to have been scarcely necessary for Kurtz to point to it, in opposition to the embarrassed Lutheran polemics of a former time. But it is not (as Kurtz thoughtlessly says) to be specifically classed among the זִבְחֵי־שְׁלָמִים or thank offerings; it is at the same time, primarily rather, a true *sin-offering* or *expiatory sacrifice*:—in fact, it embraces the two species of offering in one, in harmony with its fundamental character. The predominant view, which denies this, is certainly incorrect, though it is expressed with the utmost confidence, as for example by Lindner: "We now freely admit that the paschal lamb was no expiatory sacrifice." Ebrard, on the other hand, says, "The Israelites generally obtained a right to the covenant of grace, in circumcision; the Passover pointed to that which was the true character of the covenant of grace and salvation—*an atonement for actual death-deserving sin*." The προσχυσις του αἵματος—*the sprinkling of blood*—which belonged essentially to the Passover, is illustrated by the sprinkling with

[1] See Heb. xi. 27, and our exposition in the Hebräerbrief.

hyssop (Ps. li. 7), as purifying from sin; hence Aben-Esra, for example, calls this blood simply a כַּפָּרָה.

We agree with Baumgarten, who says upon Ex. xii. 13, "It is a false spiritualism, which Bähr should not have concurred in, when Bochart says, This sign was not given to God, but to the Hebrews, that they might be certified by it of their liberation. For the sign is properly for him who sees it and acts accordingly; but Jehovah seeth the blood, as He himself says, and not the Israelites, who sit in their houses." *And when I see the blood, I will pass over you*—in which words, as in all which pertain to this matter, it is plain that the paschal lamb had the virtue of a *propitiatory sacrifice*, with the same typical reference to a real, objective propitiation valid before God as the ground of redemption, which is exhibited in various ways throughout the whole of the Levitical economy.[1] Hence, and moreover, the wisdom of God shadowed forth in this paschal lamb many other things which had their realisation in Christ.[2] We may mention the prohibition to break the bones, and Jno. xix. 36—*these things were done that the Scriptures should be fulfilled;* and the separation of the lamb on the tenth day of the month, in preparation for the fourteenth, as Jesus on *that* day entered into Jerusalem as ἐνταφιασθείς, *for His burial*—and so forth.[3]

[1] Hengstenberg's views in the first edition of the Christology were erroneous, but he has since corrected them. Olshausen, on the other hand, properly maintains—that "the idea of *substitution* was evidently involved in the sprinkling of the blood upon the posts of the Israelites' dwellings, in order that the destroying angel might pass over, Ex. xii. 7. Hence it possessed a specific character entirely its own. That which was proper to the expiatory offering, and that which was proper to the thank-offering, alike entered into it; and it was this which made it so impressive a type of Christ's sacrifice.—The paschal lamb, as the *first* offering enjoined of God, combined in itself, as the germ of all the others, their collective peculiarities." This is better than what Lange says: "The proper Passover as a *feast of thank-offering* points back to a *propitiation already accomplished*, in which the sin-offering and the thank-offering were already presented." In this all-embracing type *they ate* of the *same* lamb which was at once a sin-offering and a thank-offering.

[2] Concerning which Rau, the opponent of all Typology, thus expressed himself: "I must confess that the evidence for the reality of this type had to my mind more plausibility than the evidence for any other. It made me, in fact, pause for a long time."

[3] See Bengel's Ordo temporum, ed. ii. p. 228. We do not shrink from continuing, with Meyer's Typik—"Yea, as the great sacrifice

Suffice it, that the paschal meal, and the whole *Passover-feast* which began with it, had a very deep and full prophetic meaning, which no one isolated point, extracted out of it, exhausts. It was not merely a "type of the gathering out of Christ's Church from the Gentiles and Jews;" but the whole feast had a very significant double character, derived from the connection between the sin and thank-offering which we have traced in it; its two characteristics being interchangeable, the one passing into the other. The remembrance of the propitiatory offering becomes a *feast of joy;* the joyous paschal feast of thanksgiving, on the other hand, has in it a *dread solemnity*, derived from the remembrance of sorrow, and even pointing to trouble coming in the future. As a feast of the *sparing, passing over*, פֶּסַח, it exhibited to the eyes of the people of Israel the Divine mercy, through which they had become and still were the people of God; but as a feast of *unleavened bread*, חַג הַמַּצּוֹת it was at the same time a remembrance of sorrow, and not merely of that affliction in slavery out of which the Lord had mercifully delivered them, but of another affliction also, which began on the day of their leaving Egypt and must continue throughout the whole course of their wanderings in the desert. The *bread of affliction*, לֶחֶם עֹנִי, Deut. xvi. 3, is interpreted by Bähr in a onesided manner, as the "bread which reminded them of Egypt and the misery which they had endured there, *but only as being eaten* after their full deliverance from that misery"—so that this חַג was by no means a solemnity of penitence and sorrow, but solely a *feast of joy*. (This latter idea is not necessarily contained in the word, for that includes sometimes even the day of atonement.) As the very significant appointment of the מְרֹרִים, the bitter herbs, was not merely, as a symbol of suffering survived, intended to remind them that according to Ex. i. 14, the Egyptians had made their lives bitter (such is the interpretation of Maimonides); so the very plain כִּי בְחִפָּזוֹן יָצָאתָ—thou camest forth in haste—does not mean to explain the bread of affliction to be the food eaten in Egypt. There the Israelites

was separated from the foundation of the world, so was He offered in death at the end of the fourth day of the world's history"

had eaten leavened bread; but when, sanctified to God, they were separated and purified from the Egyptian leaven, and by a *hasty flight* betook themselves to the way which led to the promised land—this unleavened bread was their confession that their full salvation demanded, *in the way to the good land*, hardship and self-denial still, with the continuance of affliction. As in Deut. viii. 3, we read—He humbled thee—וַיְעַנְּךָ—, and suffered thee to hunger (deprived of the bread of Egypt), and fed thee with *manna;* so that in this combination, in a certain sense, the unleavened bread coincides with the heavenly food for the people which was not savoury to the flesh. Hence we may with propriety adopt Meyer's words concerning the accompanying symbols of the paschal meal: "Figures, which point to sanctification from sin, swift departure from the land of uncleanness and distress, and the transitoriness of earthly life itself."

We have entered thus deeply, at the outset, into the meaning of the type, in order to prepare the reader's mind to anticipate, in how profound and many-sided a manner this type is glorified in the Christian Sacrament. The paschal institution dimly symbolised that wonderful admixture of sorrow and joy, death and life, grace and correction, which stamped its character upon the great evening of the Lord's Supper first, and which still adheres to the holy Sacrament as the solemnly joyous festival of our pilgrimage *between* our accomplished redemption and the possession of the inheritance of glory.[1] We bless God in it, while we abase ourselves; we abase ourselves, while we bless God. We partake of the life of Him who died for us—that we may die in and with Him in order to live. This is now "the birth-feast and the life-feast" of the *new* Israel. As in its institution, the circle of the Apostles was the paschal family representing the *church* which took its origin from the death of Christ; so, further, every little company of communicants (as among the Israelites every little number surrounding a paschal table) is a real and essential symbolical representation of the entire and complete Church, of *the many* who, partakers of His body and of His blood, become thereby His body.[2]

[1] "The fruit of the holy Supper—*the highest good in the vale of tears*"—as the Moravian hymn sings.

[2] Hence in Ex. xii. 6 *the whole assembly of the congregation* is de-

Finally: the cups of wine which were drunk—and which the Lord here *gave*—had infused, in the later ritual, a predominant element of joy and praise into the solemnity:—and we shall see that the Lord acknowledged and retained this (apart from its perversion); and continued it in the institution of the Supper as strictly harmonising with its predominant joy.

After this general preparatory glance, we approach the Scripture now lying before us; but it is still necessary to observe beforehand, in what way all is arranged with reference to the ritual of the Passover. It needs no proof that our Lord, as an Israelite and under the Law, observed all the prescriptions of God with respect to the Passover, before it was done away for ever by its consummation:—this was already intimated in the *I will keep the Passover* of St Matthew, and *to eat this Passover* in St Luke. And we have just said that He would do honour to every custom and ordinance which had been added with a good symbolical meaning. But it is no less obvious that He would not submit to every detail of the ceremonial, if it had already assumed the petty and frivolous character into which it degenerated in later times. The transition from the Old to the New, if it is to exhibit a living bond of union, appears to us to require that the ancient ritual should not be utterly abolished and done away before the new is introduced, but that it should melt into it and give place to its new authority by introducing it. This would suggest itself to every reasonable thinker, and it is justified by the text. It is impossible, indeed, to harmonize all the individual details, partly because the narrative does not record the whole and everything, and partly because the ordinances of that period are uncertain to us. In general, we may regard the table as arranged with all its appurtenances according to rule; this the Lord's *prepare* required, as St Matthew records its being accomplished. As it regards the first cup we have said enough already on St Luke. The expression γεννήμα τῆς ἀμπέλου, fruit of the vine, Luke xxii. 18, Matt. xxvi. 29, like the blessing or thanksgiving generally, corresponds precisely with the formula which have been handed down, for the bread or the

signedly thus vague: it stands for *every little company* around their Lamb, as for the *whole Church* in its typical as well as its real sense.

wine—&c. בָּרוּךְ אַתָּה—*Blessed art Thou, O God, our everlasting King, who hath brought forth from the earth its fruit—who hast created the fruit of the vine.* This do *in remembrance*—*εἰς ἀνάμνησιν*—seems to be in some sense an allusion to the fact that in the Passover there was a *remembrance* and a *shewing forth or proclamation* (הַגָּדָה, hence 1 Cor. xi. 26, *καταγγέλλετε*). Nor is it without probability that in *This is My body* there is something analogous to a customary *paschal formula.* Not, however (as has been polemically alleged), to the words concerning the unleavened bread—הא לחמא דעניא די אכלו אבתנא בארעא דמצרים—but to the strong and emphatic expression גּוּף which, following the ordinance of Moses in Ex. xii. 26, 27, was probably substituted for the זֶבַח־פֶּסַח הוּא:—the body of the Passover.[1] Thus this solemn word of our Lord Jesus gives assurance, as its first and direct meaning, that—the *paschal lamb* signified *Me*;[2] for He says at the new institution—Take and eat, This is *My* body! just as formerly it was said—This is the body of the *Passover.* (And quite parallel then—*My* blood of the *New* covenant! by which He testifies that the propitiatory blood of the old covenant was a type of His blood.) These allusions being admitted, the question has been asked whether the Lord first went through the whole ceremonial of the Passover with all its ancient formulæ, elevations, and announcements, in order then to *place in opposition to it* His own new institution—appending the Sacrament to the Passover, and not incorporating it with it; but we have already intimated our dissent from this. To us it seems a discordant thought, that the Lord should first complete the shadowy and typical ceremony—the interpretation of which must have been pressed throughout upon His spirit—"and then quite independently of the preceding solemnity, *once more* break the bread." We confidently believe that here, where the Old and New Testament institutions met in one, they must have passed into each other; consequently that the Lord uttered *His*

[1] In the Mishna we find the term of appellation גּוּפוֹ שֶׁל פֶּסַח; Paulus and Scheibel agree in thinking that *τὸ σῶμά μου* corresponds with this—and we must agree with them.

[2] I am *the Lamb of God*—testified now at the end, as the Baptist had testified in the beginning.

"This is!" *instead* of that customary one which would otherwise have been spoken.[1] And in this supposition we are confirmed by the record of St Luke and St Paul, according to which the cup was taken μετὰ τὸ δειπνῆσαι—*after supper—when He had supped.* Consequently, as we understand it, the word which now elevated the *bread* into the body of the sacrificial meal, belonged still to the paschal eating[2]—not so, however, what followed. With this it is in accordance, that the cup, which Jesus now gives them, was in the stead of the customary third cup, the כוס הַבְּרָכָה; for this did not follow until the lamb was wholly consumed, and no man might eat anything after it.[3] *After* the word concerning "the blood shed" no man drank even anything more; that which usually took place after the third cup was not observed, and the sublime discourses of our Lord took the place of the usual continuance of their companionship into the night.

So far, this might be, so to speak, the Old Testament frame which is in one sense the setting of the scene of this mystery, though in another sense it is a frame which cannot hold it. But now let us, in the light of the New Testament, approach more nearly and penetrate more deeply! And as believing Christians we behold there illustrated the *Incarnate glory of Jesus;* we behold His Divine-human glory in all the record of this evening. As such it is indistinguishably one; but we must in our contemplation discriminate, and rise from the human to the Divine. The Lord exhibits Himself *humanly* from the beginning in the deep and perfect sympathy of His human life, in His farewell love to His disciples, in His cry of lamentation over the lost one. This last calamity was His deepest sorrow at the meal which He had longed for with such deep desire; but His *Divine-human* love, which might be embittered but not exasperated, gets the victory over this. The hand of the traitor at the table hinders Him not from remaining faithful, and fulfilling *His* trust:—without any

[1] Comp. Hengstenberg in the Ev. Kirchenz. 1853. S. 143—in harmony with this.

[2] Matt. v. 26. Ἐσθιόντων δὲ αὐτῶν is not—When they had eaten; but *repeating* as in ver. 21. And this is important for the presence of the betrayer.

[3] We have nothing to do here with the heathen custom of drinking a general farewell cup after the tables were cleared, though it may be brought into comparison.

external exclusion of him who was internally shut out, He fulfils His promised διατίθεμαι ὑμῖν, establishes His covenant and the testament of redemption on the borders of life and death. Affectingly human is the—Forget me not; but with divine sublimity is added—I am still with you, and live in you! He holds out to them in the *Take! eat and drink!* His body and His life, His heart's blood, Himself as corporeally as spiritually, for the glorifying future. He gives Himself to all, even to the false one; and comforts His own heart by the thought of the *many* who will in after times partake of Him. But all this is abundantly developed in the *Divine-human* mystery of this ordained and promised eating and drinking, which rests upon the atoning *For you*, and consists in the distributing *This is!* which connects with the earthly element the highest gift of the heavenly life.

What then is this? My body and My blood! Here we are directly reminded of His discourse in Jno. vi., without reference to which no expositor should approach the words of institution. We must refer therefore, as far as we can avoid repetition, to all that was there said touching the literal meaning of the words concerning flesh and blood, and the true interpretation of Jno. vi. 51, 53, 63. If we must suppose that that critical time, when many were offended at His hard saying and turned back from Him while they remained, was deeply impressed upon the minds of the apostles—and who can doubt this?—if we must suppose them to have many times thought of the *eating and drinking* which was then so incomprehensibly demanded and promised—and does not that equally follow?—then must they at this time also have remembered it, when He *renewed the offence of the incomprehensible words with the most gracious and self-devoting love.* They could not but discern in His words a profound mystery to be disclosed in the future, and at the same time an unconditional command to His own *to do this*, connecting an internal and wonderful receiving with the external eating and drinking. *Consequently* the Lord must be understood by us as His disciples first understood Him; though with us as with them, the Spirit must bring the full understanding only after the actual receiving.[1]

[1] *Consequently*—to refer to this at once and do justice to all sides—

It is perfectly true, and accords with the words of Jesus concerning the new commandment of the new covenant, that this mysterious union with Him takes place in the *love* of living faith, and leads to the perfection of His own in this love. But we must not, however, say with Lange, (the hyperphysical, bodily-spiritual foundation of the mystery being thrust aside) that these words of Jesus concerning love in St John "are the light-figure of the Supper according to the Johannæan view." For it is far too little to say—"the most essential characteristic of the Supper being this, to bind the disciples together in love through the *exhibition* and *sealing* of the love of Christ—and therefore this was to be the *mark of distinction* (symbol = Sacrament?) of the disciples of Christ." We think that love is life, but life comes to us through the self-impartation of Him who is given for us and in us; and, further, this self-communication is sealed to us (and is not merely exhibited) as the *giving* to us His actual flesh and blood. Luther says well—Where the forgiveness of sins is there is also life and salvation; and we may with perfect propriety invert the sentence—Only where there is life in and from the living Saviour of the world, is there an abiding forgiveness of sins. In the *New Testament*, we repeat, no mere assurance and announcement of the "For you" is sufficient: that is still only the preparation instead of the fulfilling reality. There must be and there is a true and real "*In you.*"

This is what the Supper teaches us, this is the testimony of the *words of institution*, to which we are drawing more and more near. We are far, however, from asserting with an opponent of Calvin in Hamburg, "that there is in all the Scripture no passage which more plainly declares that the bread is His body!!" We would rather say with the profound and careful Petersen:[1]

the spiritualising of the Quakers, that is, their utter rejection of the Sacrament, is decidedly and altogether an error, as it understands here, as in John vi., the body or flesh and blood to be only the "heavenly seed" of the nature of Christ, "but not that body, or temple of Jesus Christ, which was born of the Virgin Mary, and in which He walked, lived, and suffered in the land of Judea." Barclay's Apology, Prop. xiii. He goes on to say: "The professors of Christianity, for want of a true spiritual understanding, have sought to tie this *Supper* of the Lord to that ceremony used by Christ before His death, of *breaking bread* and *drinking wine* with His disciples."

[1] The Doctrine of the Church, third book, S. 445.

"It is much to be lamented that men over-zealous for the Lutheran doctrine make so much stir about the words of institution. These words *may* contain the Lutheran dogma, but do not *of themselves* exegetically *constrain* its acceptance; and that doctrine is rather to be first derived from the *analogy* of the *whole* of Scripture[1] and of the whole faith, and *therefore* to be received as the genuine sense of the words of institution, notwithstanding that other methods of exposition *might* be found:—but this evangelically scientific method is too much lost sight of in the heat of argument and assertion." We are by no means insensible to the ecclesiastical and scientific importance of a sound understanding in these matters, as demonstrated by the contests and divisions of the church; but we would not forget the words of Luther, which are among the best which he wrote on the subject—"It is a great and marvellous thing to be a Christian, and God lays more stress on that than on the Sacrament. *For the Christian is not made for the sake of the Sacrament, but the Sacrament was instituted for the sake of the Christian*" We shall take the utmost pains to examine as ἀκριβῶς as is possible and fit, the words of institution; in order that we may rightly distinguish what they *cannot* say—what they *incontrovertibly* do say—what they *might* on the one side, but *also* what they might on the other, say, according to the point from which exposition views them. Here there is the freedom of a diverse acceptation, and liberty for every man to avow and testify for which view His entire system of faith and understanding of Scripture impels him to decide. We shall avail ourselves of this liberty; but lest we should fail perfectly to discriminate between a possible and a certain meaning of any of these words, we have only to remind our readers beforehand, that with all the exegete's striving after objectivity, the higher the object is the more surely will his exposition be more or less subjective.

And now *the words of institution.* There is, however, yet one preliminary question—*How did the Lord utter them?* which of the sayings which we read in the four records are the authentic

[1] We may be permitted to add—from the whole *connexion* in which the words were first spoken.

words of His mouth? We take it for granted that the reader has the four accounts in juxtaposition before him—that of St Paul to the Corinthians being included. We set out with the indisputable critical canon that omissions and abbreviations in each narrator are of no moment; and allow that addition contrary to the truth, every so-called extension and working up of the account, is objectionable in proportion to the importance and solemnity of the record thus dealt with. But this canon can be applied in all its rigour to the Gospels; with regard to the latter part of it we allege our faith in their full inspiration, and plead, further, the transcendent and incomparable importance of *these* sacred words. Only thus can we obtain a sure and comprehensive foundation for the combination of all the words which our Lord certainly spake. Every word, which any one may omit, but another records, must be accounted valid; and the whole runs thus:—*Take, eat,* THIS IS MY BODY, *which is given (broken) for you, Do this in remembrance of Me—Drink ye all of this, for this (this cup) is My blood, of the New Testament (the New Testament in My blood), which is shed for many (for you) for the remission of sins—This do ye, as oft as ye drink it, in remembrance of Me.* And here it is very observable that in "this is My body" all four are perfectly at one.[1]

But what of the *variations* of the same words? Did the Lord say—*given* for you (as St Luke has it), or—*broken* for you (as St Paul says afterward)? Did He say—This is My blood of the New Testament (as in the first two Evangelists), or—*The*

[1] Much may be said, and satisfactorily, as to the omission of this and that word by one, and its retention by another: but, in this matter, it is not wise to demand absolute certainty and seek to explain everything. Those who do so (as Scheibel) fall into great extravagancies. It is possible that the Græcising Luke might put εὐχαριστεῖν for εὐλογεῖν, though we shall give a different account. But who will believe that he omitted Λάβετε, φάγετε because it was a Hebraism, and better Greek to avoid the repetition of λάβετε in ver. 17? It has no more value than mere assertion, to say—that St Luke, more especially representing Jesus as the Saviour of sinners, was constrained to add "given for you," and *therefore also* "in remembrance of Me"—that St Matthew, keeping prominent the King of Israel, gives the *word of injunction* Πίετε—that St Luke's Græcism explains the paraphrastic character of the words touching the cup—and that the περὶ πολλῶν in St Matthew and St Mark is a mere Hebraism (רַבִּים for a great number!!).

New Testament in My blood (as St Luke and St Paul agree in saying)? Finally, did He say—shed *for many* (according to the first two) or—*for you* (according to St Luke)? It is hard to suppose at first that all these can historically accord. The old assumption of simple faith we find in Richter's Family Bible: "The Lord *probably* repeated several times the words of distribution, and in explaining His meaning used interchangeably one or the other form of expression." And in this Krummacher decisively concurs. We must needs admit that this is *possible;* but none of its advocates has gone beyond its "probability;" to us, however, any such repetition as this theory supposes, and especially any such *changing* of the expression, seems highly improbable at so solemn and important an institution. The Sacrament sinks thereby into something too much like a mere human, confidential communication. Pfenninger strives to make it more acceptable by representing the Lord as turning to the right hand and to the left, speaking the words on the side of John in one manner, and on the side of Peter in another. We have no contention with those who can thus satisfy themselves: it is a matter of feeling and taste. But far better than this solution, which places the variation in the original utterance of our Lord, is the theory which assumes a *later* variation of the expression in its liturgical use in the church. There are some who have said, If Moses (not without design) has slightly changed the text of the Decalogue in the Book of Deuteronomy, so also the free Spirit permitted a like deviation from the exact words of the Sacramental institution, the same sense being strictly preserved. Those who think so, would assign the highest historical authority to St Matthew, whom St Mark almost entirely follows: as, for instance, in the case of πολλῶν, instead of which the ὑμῶν might easily afterward have been substituted. For, supposing ὑμῶν to have been the original word—who would have dared to substitute πολλῶν?

But we are not content with this, and there is much higher ground to be taken. We read in the Synoptical tables of Sommer, in conformity with the prevalent view, upon St Luke —"this was probably the ecclesiastical, liturgical form in the Pauline congregations." Whatever truth there may be in this, it is altogether wrong to attribute whatever is peculiar in St

Luke to a subsequent *human* liturgical arrangement. Even if ὑμῶν might have taken the place of πολλῶν, surely the διδόμενον (—or κλώμενον—?) must have been spoken by our Lord; its addition, on any other supposition, would have been presumption. And so the *Do this* must, according to our feeling, have come from the Lord himself, especially when connected with the *in remembrance of Me*. Finally, the change between the words *blood* and *Testament* would never have been thought of by any, without the highest authority. We are therefore driven to an assumption which we are fully warranted by the Scripture in holding fast. The fact before us is, that in this solitary instance *St Paul* expressly quotes a *word of our Lord* which deviates from the Evangelists, and quotes it most definitively as the Lord's, in a connection which lays all the stress upon that circumstance. We cannot but ask for his authority for such a version of the Lord's sayings. Now, he anticipates that question, and assures us—*I received it from the Lord*. The reader who believes in the fact that revelations were ever vouchsafed to the Apostle, will be all the more firmly convinced the more he thinks of it, that here, on so important an occasion, when he is citing the words and acts of our Lord on that night, he cannot be referring to the intermediate tradition of mere eye-witnesses.[1] We cannot account, on that supposition, for this particular appeal, this *I* instead of *We*, and this emphatic *from the Lord;* the ἀπό of which we agree with Nitzsch in regarding as equally emphatic with the παρά which Schulthess finds wanting, because in connection with ἐγὼ γὰρ παρέλαβον, "*for I* received," it must be understood as standing *in contrast with* any mere human information, received at second or third hand—just as in Gal. i. 12.[2] The Apostle is certainly not appealing, in this specific matter of the Sacrament, to that one general revelation through which he was converted; for we cannot see the distinctive force, on that supposition, of such a strenuous and special reference to it. We say,

[1] Especially, if it should appear that this tradition was not the more correct!

[2] We agree with him, further, in what he goes on to say: "There might appear to follow from this, a similar relation to the *entire* history of Christ"—for it would have been almost unapostolical for one who was so mightily confirmed as equal with the Apostles to have been under the necessity of informing himself after the manner of St Luke.

therefore, with von Gerlach, that "he received it from the Lord in such a manner as the others had not received it, so that he could present it to the church as his own revelation with apostolical authority." And, with Olshausen, "Accordingly we have here *an authentic declaration from the Risen Lord himself as to the meaning of His Sacrament*, and the church has always regarded this passage, thus viewed, as the important New Testament explanation of the Lord's Supper." Hence this expositor, in his comment upon the Gospels, cites this Pauline passage as the *main text;* and we have shown our own opinion by placing the passage on a level with the Gospels in the text of our exposition.

By this *authentic explanation* from above of the meaning of the Sacrament to be celebrated in the church—which of course would fix for ever the liturgical form—the Lord did not pronounce the other records of what He spake upon earth to be spurious. He did no more than "give His authoritative decision as to the particular form of administering the Sacrament," which, moreover, may be regarded "as a combination and exposition of the actual words of Jesus, likewise." (Nitzsch.) He has confirmed the διδόμενον, *given*, and strengthened it by κλώμενον, *broken;* He has made the *New Testament* prominent; and added a *second* and most distinctively imperative *Do this*. Such a supplementary change is an incomparably more becoming supposition, than that of a variation at the time of the institution itself.

THE BREAD. St Matthew alone uses the article, τὸν ἄρτον,[1] and thereby defines it to have been the unleavened bread then present on the table; the other accounts, which have merely "bread" or "a bread," serve probably a twofold purpose thereby. They intimate, first, that *bread* simply as such was sufficient for an ordinance which was not bound to the paschal ceremony, which was not limited to Israel, and which had a far higher meaning than the mere continuation of the Old Testament rite.[2]

[1] We cannot acknowledge, with Tisch. and Lachm., the omission of the article to be *easily* explained on that account.

[2] The early church, therefore, (Acts ii. 46, in the daily celebration) used the common daily bread *(panis usitatus)*—until the Romish ordinances (Pope Alexander I. about 107) brought back in this the Old Testament.

And then, by the generalisation, which forsakes the historical style, they prepare for the observance of that mystery, in which even common earthly bread was so marvellously sanctified.

HE BLESSED IT—GAVE THANKS. Luther has "dankete," *gave thanks*, without distinction, for both the εὐλογήσας of the first two Evangelists, and the εὐχαριστήσας of St Luke and St Paul (and a var. reading in St Matt.) The two are in a certain sense one, and were expressed by the same word or prayer. The one idea sufficiently included the other, and to have put them one after the other would have been out of harmony with the sublimity of the style generally, and the unity of the whole act. There is, notwithstanding, a distinction; not, however, that the one is a more Hebrew, the other a more Greek, expression. Christ *gives thanks* to God for the food, but in this thanksgiving He *blesses* the food itself; and in this latter meaning, the εὐλογήσας—"and *blessed*"—refers, like *took*, *brake*, and *gave*, to the accusative *bread*. Both meanings are contained in the Hebrew בֵּרַךְ, and they pass into each other. In the account of the feeding of the five thousand, the first two Evangelists use εὐλογεῖν for the thanksgiving uttered with eyes lifted *to heaven*; St Luke, however, has εὐλογήσεν αὐτούς.[1] He blessed them, *the loaves*, comp. 1 Sam. ix. 13; St John, again, writes simply εὐχαριστήσας, but ascribes in ver. 23 a wonderful blessing to this *giving thanks*. But the distinction is clearly recognised in this identity; for St Paul, who is accustomed to distinguish the two words, in 1 Cor. x. 16 makes prominent in *which we bless* the consecrating virtue of the εὐλογία, the blessing, uttered over the cup. And that our Lord did not adhere *simply* and *fully* to the customary ritual prayer, although connecting His word and act with it, is plain from the new significance of this bread, the consecration of which required a new and free expression. The old form of prayer and thanksgiving referred merely to the bread of the earth; but the Lord contemplates and consecrates in His prayer Himself in this bread, the gift of heaven for the life of the world. Grotius: "And at this time and place, He poured out His

[1] Some Codd. have ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, but that is only a gloss. Consequently here and in the plain *which we bless* of 1 Cor. x. 16, there is ample refutation of Schulz' assertion—that the N. T. has no trace of the consecration or blessing of dead things.

thanksgivings, not for the old creation and its gifts alone, but also for the new creation for the sake of which He came into the world—for the redemption of the world, now contemplated as accomplished." He can *give thanks* by anticipation, for He beholds His body already broken like this bread; He gives Himself thus to His disciples for their life. But this thanksgiving uttered in the love of the Son of man in His humiliation, is the germ and beginning of the *blessing* of Divine miraculous power to be pronounced upon the bread of all communions—a blessing which should go beyond the first benediction of the Creator. There has been a foolish contention about the relation of the *blessing* and the *thanksgiving* (incorrectly considered as apart from and independent of each other), as to their *antecedence* and *consequence* respectively. Our opinion is just this. The former, with which the Lord commences, as connected with the sacred custom of the old feast, is certainly the simple though comprehensive thanksgiving for the earthly fruit, the bread; but He does not on this occasion limit Himself to that; He connects with it a thanksgiving *for the new creation, for redemption* (as Grotius said.) In the Spirit He gives Himself up to the Father, and for the Father's sake to men, while He himself thanks the Father for his own self-sacrifice. But such thanksgiving as this was, uttered with direct reference to the Sacrament now to be instituted, cannot but attach a *consecration* to the creature—bread—here exhibited, which would give its character to the *mystery* which it was the Redeemer's purpose to connect *in future* with this bread. Hereby not only was bread blessed anew (as in the former thanksgivings of Christ who ate it); but in particular the bread of the Supper was blessed to the end of time. What and how great that blessing is, we do not consider now; but the most frigid interpretation, of the most sober expositor who really believes in Him, must allow that a certain power of blessing was derived to the Sacramental elements from this *last* thanksgiving-prayer of our Lord. Meyer's exclusive declaration—"the blessing was not for the bread or the wine, but for the person who through their benediction was to be blessed"—is very questionable for this reason, that this first εὐχαριστεῖν and εὐλογεῖν actually concerned the bread and the wine, even as, in the analogy of lower things, there is a certain sanctification of our food through

our thanksgiving. Thus the *thanksgiving* for and over the bread effects a blessing of the bread, but the *blessing* is here all the more significant in proportion as the thanksgiving was more comprehensive and pertained to the highest objects. At this third, and concluding crisis, the Lord *gives thanks* for the blessing which He had prayed for and obtained from the Father.

All this lays the foundation for the profound sense in which the whole Sacrament has from the beginning been called the *Eucharist;* and for the sake of this we have entered so fully into the subject. While this name finally indicates the spiritual thank-offering which Christians, partaking of the Sacrament, offer in their consecration of themselves to God and Christ, it nevertheless took its rise (as we find in Irenæus and Justin) from the sanctification of earthly gifts of God by thanksgiving and their higher hallowed use. Bread and wine are regarded in the Sacrament as the first-fruits of the gift of nature presented to the Lord,—not without allusion to the fact that in the Passover, the beginning of the religious year coincided with the beginning of the harvest, the budding of new life in nature (the month אָבִיב.) So in the Lord's Supper "thanksgiving for the grace of creation and thanksgiving for the grace of redemption, concur;"[1] there is in it "a sanctification of earthly enjoyment into means of grace in the New Covenant." This last idea is presented in the daily commemoration of the earliest church; but we are not to press it so far as as to conclude that *every* eating of bread and drinking of wine may be made a sacramental participation of Christ—the seal and witness of His life-giving death. This extravagance was far from the Apostle's spirit when he said—As oft as ye eat of *this* bread.

For the Lord took *bread,* specifically, and elevated it into a

[1] As Von Gerlach says on St Matthew. Justin's words are: "That we may at once praise God for the creation of the world and all in it for man's sake, and for delivering us from all the evil into which we have sunk." With this the words of the ancient Latin Mass coincide —and they are not in themselves to be despised, for their deep though partial sense of truth puts to shame many of our *modern* Protestant Sacramental formularies. But the notion of the new English Apostles cannot be justified, who—in order to establish an oblation after the analogy of the Mass—teach that the Eucharistic thank-offering must, as the first part of the ceremony, precede the proper communion.

sacramental symbol of His body sacrificed and to be eaten; not, as might *appear* to be the case, the flesh or the body of the proper Passover:—and this for many reasons. First, for the sake of releasing the new from the old by a free change; the opposite might have had, to the Gentiles, a tincture of Judaism in it. Then, and connected therewith, for the sake of consecrating the most universal and simple nourishment of life, common almost in every land among all people, and thus making the heavenly *bread of life* appear as the *manna* prepared for all the world. Further, in order to obviate every carnal and grovelling notion touching *His* flesh, which might have been brought in some way into analogy with animal *flesh*. Finally, to make it manifest that there could be in it no repetition, or even continuance of the propitiatory offering; inasmuch as that is for ever reproduced only in the *fruit* of the seed that died (Jno. xii. 24), as a thank-offering. The eating of the lamb would have carried over the imperfect onesidedness of the typical animal offering into the New Testament, just as if it were the eating of the dead and sacrificed Christ as such; therefore, in the Supper of our Lord, the fruit of the earth, bread and wine, are instituted instead of the flesh of animals—the eating of which generally had been intermediately introduced only for fallen humanity, after his paradisaical state was forfeited. And thus is fulfilled the prognostication of the Jews—that when the Messiah should come as a Priest after the order of Melchizedec, all (typical animal) sacrifices should cease, and only the (thank) offering of *bread and wine* should remain. (See in Sepp. Th. iii. S. 410.)

AND BRAKE IT—ἔκλασε; this is the same in all the four, and must be of importance. To say that "the bread of that time required to be broken in order to be distributed, and that is all which is here signified," is foolish, thoughtless, and most dishonourable to the Sacramental idea. Why then is it so specifically mentioned, not merely here, but also in every reference to the Church's breaking bread? What then is the force of *the breaking of bread*, Acts ii. 42, and *the bread which we break*, 1 Cor. x. 16? Even in the paschal ritual the breaking of the bread had its specific place; the explanation was added in due time, that as the bread of affliction it might be eaten only in fragments, broken previously in an unwonted manner, and not

blessed till broken. Friedlieb,[1] at least, tells us so; and if such were the case, then the blessing of the bread in this Supper *before* the breaking would be a testimony, in opposition to that ordinance—that, in the New Covenant, our participation in the death of Christ, and in all the tribulation which to us also is appointed in our Christian probation, has been previously blessed from the beginning, springs solely from the blessing of God, and should be matter of thanksgiving beforehand. And with this is connected, in the advancing development of the meaning, the consideration of the "*liberality* of Christ, inviting us to the communion of all those good things which were to be obtained for us through His cross." (So Grotius, alluding to the fact that *breaking bread* in the O. T. means *to make others sharers of it,* Isa. lviii. 7; Lam. iv. 4, and in a similar sense *when I brake to the five thousand,* Mark viii. 19.) The Lord "breaks bread to us," when He devotes Himself to that end. Thus the ceremony itself, before He begins to speak and interpret its meaning, *says* as it were the same *Take, eat,* which was in Lu. xxii. 17, expressed by the *Divide it among yourselves;* but with this difference, that He does not give them to take the whole mass of the thing to be distributed. The *brake it,* therefore, in the final form given to the Apostle Paul, may therefore represent the omitted *and gave unto them.* But that form, as we shall see, teaches us in the alteration "*broken* for you," the profound symbolical meaning of this breaking, which the apostle describes as a custom adhering to the giving of the bread, just as he makes prominent the blessing in regard to the cup. And it is—which *we* break—for then one gave to another in the place of Christ (not necessarily one separated, and consecrated for that purpose.) But the omission of the breaking in the Lutheran communion (as the improper word *host,* which falls back into the Old Testament) must be mourned over and condemned, while we are speaking of the ceremony itself. The early contests about this did not concern a matter altogether indifferent; the Lutherans were in some error when they declared the *breaking of bread,* which is alike scriptural with the *benediction* and *consecration,* to be a merely *preparatory action, ministering to the distribution;* and

[1] Archäologie der Leidensgeschichte, S. 56. But we are not able to confirm it by our own appeal to his authorities.

thence deduced that it was indifferent whether the bread was divided into certain portions *before* or *during* the administration, and whether it was done by the minister of the church or by any other Christian.[1] On the other hand, the *Confessio Marchica* in Artt. xi.—xiii. protests against this, and maintains the inviolable importance of the breaking.

TAKE, EAT! Thus did the Lord assuredly speak His first plain word, which directly accompanied the breaking and distribution, while it laid the foundation for the immediate intimation as to *what* He appointed that they should take and eat therein. No stress is to be laid on the fact that φάγετε is uncertain in St Mark, and that in St Luke Λάβετε, φάγετε are altogether wanting, and even in St Paul almost certainly spurious. For, according to the first canon which we laid down, that is authentic which even one alone surely records—in this case it is the Apostle Matthew, or, if it so please, the first and most direct tradition.[2] Their omission by St Paul had certainly no design to take away these words, indispensable in the celebration, (and therefore inserted in his text from the liturgical form); but they are presupposed, and not specified, in order that he may come at once, and so much the more emphatically, to the *This is* and *This do ye*.[3] Moreover, it is evident, much more certainly here than in the previous *divide it among yourselves*, that the Lord could not join with them in eating and drinking of that which He, though only in anticipation, called His body and His blood.[4]

[1] So Rudelbach: "Wot that *we* must brake it, when partaking of the Lord's Supper, but that broken bread must always be used," (as if the entire loaf could be taken! Or is this in opposition to cutting the bread?) Kahnis says, "The breaking of the bread is its consecration to its sacramental character, perfectly parallel with the blessing of the cup."

[2] With those who do not allow this, and persist in regarding St Matthew's *take, eat*, as "for more reasons than one doubtful," we cannot now dispute. Their secret and real reason is doubtless a feeling that in the very first word the mystery of *this* taking and eating is intimated—see in Schulz, S. 268.

[3] Thus we would not express ourselves as Kahnis does (v. Abendm. S. 23), who seems almost not to reckon the taking and eating among the "essentials."

[4] Though some of the Fathers thought so. Chrys. He drank His own blood. Schultheiss derives it from Matt. xxvi. 29, and says that it belonged to the *grace* of the whole action that He in this feast of love should *first taste*.

It must be allowed, *first of all*, that both words naturally apply to *the bread*, and signify—λάβετε scil. manibus (et ore)—φάγετε scil. ore; *take, eat, with the bodily hands and mouth.* There are those who receive these words in so entirely common a sense that no exegesis can bring them further than the mere letter; but to all spiritual and more profound exposition it is matter of confident assurance that there is in them a symbolical meaning which must go beyond that. *With the intention to appoint something which was to be repeated in the future,* the Lord sees in these twelve all who should afterward receive, and to them He would say *that* and *how* they should "receive and eat." Still more: When He presently says of this bread that it is something else, we must take His whole word in its unity, and consequently refer this graciously proffering command itself also to His body. And thus it is, take and eat that which I give to you hereby—*what* ye shall presently know. Then we ask, Wherefore is it thus circumstantially twofold, since for the external meaning one of the two would seem to be enough? (For the mere appointing that every one should take the broken bread into his hand before he ate it with his mouth, is surely an inadequate reason, quite below the height of a *mystery* in which such externalities in themselves are indifferent matters.) But in the profounder sense this twofold saying has its meaning secured to it—and may be itself placed, for the present, in a twofold light. Either the *Take* intimates preparatorily the *modus spiritualis* of the *participatio corporis Christi quæ ore fit,* as testified in the *Eat,* thus giving this meaning for the Future—receive in faith what I give unto you, so shall ye eat not merely this bread, but My body; ye shall receive *it,* even as ye *eat* the bread.[1] Or, conversely, the *taking bread* might be the external eating (as μεταλαμβάνειν τροφῆς, Acts ii. 46, or λαβὼν ἄρτον, Acts xxvii. 35—according to this latter *our* λαμβάνειν is the correlative of the first λαβών of Jesus); but in the *eat* follows the more essential, *mystical* eating—thus giving this meaning, Receive with hand and mouth this bread, but *eat* something other than it, My body! It is obvious that the view which we bring with us to the under-

[1] Krummacher: In the *taking* there is a *summons,* in the *eating* a *promise* also. The *take* refers not merely to the hand, but much more to the *heart.* It demands susceptibility and appropriation in living faith.

standing of this is free to decide for itself, and that *here* already Calvin and Luther have occasion to separate; indeed, we may say preliminarily, that the one sense lays the emphasis upon the taking as *spirituâle*, the other upon the *eating* as *orale*. We of course incline, on account of the reference to John vi., where the Lord himself has laid such strong emphasis upon the *eating*, to regard Him as similarly speaking here—*Eat* herewith ἀληθῶς, receive as nourishment into yourselves *My body!* And inasmuch as this "eating" coincides with the eating of *bread*, and is here on that account so termed, are we to regard the "taking" as altogether one and the same, and are *both* to refer, as externally to the bread, so symbolically and internally to the body? We certainly think this conjunction of the two, after that former doubtful distinction, to be the true and certain sense of the words; and that the absence of *and* between them intimates itself that it is such.[1] But again, to what end is the emphasis of the twofold expression? The double word has its deep truth and meaning in this, that it is a *proffering* imperative, and presupposes in us something corresponding to it as such, without which it does not take effect. The receiving and partaking are thrown back ultimately upon our own will, as well as upon the Divine gift:—and this meaning, when all things are weighed, best approves itself exegetically. For, while a man can receive nothing except it be given him from above, it is equally certain that nothing can be given to him from above except the man *receive it*. What we mean corresponds with Olshausen's too partially developed thought. "In these words (*take, eat, drink*) the *receptivity* on the part of the disciples, who represent the Church, is brought out. Christ is the Distributor, who satisfies with Himself our spiritual *hunger and thirst*." And here we find in our Lord's lips, as soon as we apprehend them aright, the great condition which was found wanting in the *Solida Declaratio* "si credideritis."[2] For while the *taking to ourselves* comes

[1] Only that must be carefully observed, which Buddeus in the name of his church admits: Probe discrimen inter manducationem *oralem* et *naturalem* tenendum est. Etsi enim oralem manducationem adseramus atque propugnemus, naturalem tamen non admittimus.

[2] Ed. Rechenb., p. 732. Quia Christus *non* dixit: *si credideritis*, aut digni fueritis, tum in cœnâ sacrâ corpus et sanguinem meum præsentia

at last to our own decision, it is like all spiritual blessings mediated by our faith. Although His love and power declares in this word, most *gracious* as *it is* most *mysterious*,—Here am I; take Me; eat and drink Me; yet when He pronounces this most gracious *Take* and this most mysterious *Eat*, it is not here, any more than in the rest of Scripture, an enforcing, compulsory Imperative. Overlooking this, men have deduced from this centre-mystery the dogma, contradictory to nature,—Ye may, shall, and must eat My flesh, *nolentes volentes!*

Thus much upon the words with which the symbols are presented, in their anticipated connection with all the sequel; we now turn to the word of declaration, in which the mystery is solved only to be sealed again in its mysteriousness—*This is My body.*

THIS IS!—But first, that we may go step by step, the little word *This*, τοῦτο. The stress which Luther laid upon this, equally with the ἐστί, is well known, and for the most part amply justified—for it is essential. His scorn and mockery were pardonable at the commencement of the contest, when Carlstadt perverted this first little word into a negation of the entire character of the Sacrament. Perversion it certainly was to say that Christ in this τοῦτο pointed with His finger to His body; for σῶμα being neuter, and ἄρτος masculine, the τοῦτο must refer to the former and have nothing to do with the latter. Luther correctly pointed first to the fact that we naturally use the neuter when speaking of a thing which lies before us; and then, more convincingly still, brought against his opponent the parallel of the cup. "Tell me then, good Peter, to what the second *touto* refers, which follows immediately afterward. If the

habebitis; *sed potius ait: Accipite, edite ac bibite!* As if the latter did not necessarily imply the former. When it goes on, Verba Christi hoc volunt: sive dignus, sive indignus sis, habes hic in cœnâ Christi corpus et sanguinem—it is as much as to say, whether with or without faith, if thou literally eatest and drinkest the bread and the wine thou receivest Me, the fellowship of My death and life, My glorified corporeity! And, despite Jno. vi., without faith, eternal life! Guericke says that otherwise it should have been *Believe!* instead of *Take!* in order to obviate the thought that Judas partook of the body of the Lord. But did Judas have any benefit in *for the remission of sins*, which however cannot be separated from the *This is?*

second *this* must refer to Christ, and yet here expressly points to the cup (*τοῦτο τὸ ποτήριον*), does your faith call the blood of Christ or Christ himself the *cup?*" He unsparingly ridicules all such arbitrary interpretation: "Thus Christ would be made to say, Take, eat, for I say unto you *that here sits* My body, which is given for you;" and so forth.[1]

If anything is certain in regard to this matter it is the sober word of Bengel, which is faithful to the simple letter and has become classical—hoc quod vos sumere jubeo, *this which I command you to take*—in which, moreover, he designedly omits to say fully at once what is obvious in the text—sumere ac edere,[2] *to take and eat.* Guericke, not satisfied with Hengstenberg's almost Lutheran approval of this formula of Bengel, blames this in the latter; and thinks that he should have said more definitely and rigorously—quod vos sumere et *comedere* jubeo.[3] But, in opposition to the idea which lurks under this, we must maintain that there is good reason why our Lord does not say with the precision and absoluteness which is thought to be necessary—*οὗτος ὁ ἄρτος, this bread.* He not merely thereby obviated all misunderstanding, just as he explains the *second τοῦτο* not by This *wine*, but by This *cup*, of which more anon; but, moreover, He did not say what could not have been said with any intelligible meaning. His words preserve, with most measured simplicity, the line in which the earthly and heavenly agree in one, in a symbolical and real unity, without being however (which were impossible) *identical.*[4]

[1] Carlstadt introduced as analogical, "Thou art Peter, and on *this* rock (that is Myself)," an interpretation which unhappily his opponents admitted. But this exegesis is itself equally incorrect.

[2] So some of the Lutheran dogmatists maintain this *alone*—hoc, quod edere vos volo—hoc, quod vos bibere volo. They are right, but the question is now as to *what kind* of eating and drinking is meant in connection with and after the *taking.* Luther said, against Carlstadt: "If there be any meaning in words, it is plain that that is His body *which He holds out and bids them eat.*"

[3] Der Calvinismus Unionsvehikel und Kirchenkrücke? S. 31.

[4] Rodatz, indeed, thinks that if the Lord had uttered such a *contradictio in adjecto* as "this *bread* is My *body*," our human reason should bow before the Divine reason. But all thought would be at an end in faith like this; and we might ask why the Lord spoke anything at all to us in human language, the medium of thoughts which may be apprehended.

But now for the little word Is, the much contested *ΕΣΤΙ*. First of all, it is probable that in the Lord's language, in which subject and predicate are united without the expression of the copula, it had not existence. Scheibel indeed thinks that there would be an emphatic זֶה הוּא or even a mere הוּא, corresponding to it; but Meyer has shewn, in opposition to him, that the connection זֶה הוּא is unusual in the Old Testament, and that if anything it would be הוּא; but that nothing would be wanting, in any case, if even that were absent, as it exerts no direct influence upon the literal or figurative meaning." Such being the position of the question, either this *ἐστί* having been unexpressed by our Lord, or if expressed its meaning wavering between a copulative and substantive sense, exegesis must lay no stress upon it, but discover the interpretation by the help of the subject and predicate alone. The subject is *that which was given*,[1] which was to be taken and eaten; and is neither the Lord who handed it to them Himself, nor (as Zwingle quotes from Thomas and Scotus)—vos, qui hoc convivio interestis, *ye who are with Me in this feast!* But the *predicate* follows after more plainly.

My body. This is the *cardo rei*, the hinge of all. If the Lord when He thus offered to them the bread with, "Take and eat," spoke of His body, that is, of Himself bodily, as He was, incarnate and lived before them—let this be our starting point—He pointed at this *farewell meal* first of all to His whole past earthly fellowship with them, in which they had His body ever with them and near them; but He also pointed *by anticipation* to a future fellowship in which they should possess Him again, or rather still continue to possess Him—as He had said repeatedly. And more than that, for we must now connect this solemn formula with the *rite of the Passover*, of which we have already spoken. Most certainly, if we would translate back His words, He did not say בְּשָׂרִי, for then the Greek would have been *σάρξ μου*—and it is as little probable that He said גְּוִיָּתִי or even גֻּוִּי. Thus it is most probable that He used גּוּפִי or גּוּפִי שֶׁלִּי (accord-

[1] *Not* the bread as bread; for that two existing things should be identified by means of a copula, is not a necessity of logic. In this Ebrard is right, and Ströbel in his refutation of Rodatz, in the Luther. Zeits. 1848, iv., S. 758.

ing to the emphasis of the μοῦ standing first in St Paul), as they spoke of the גּוּף of the פֶּסַח. But it does not follow from this that He spoke only in figurative representation, as and because in the Old Testament formula it was said of the lamb—This *is* the Passover or the body of the Passover.[1] The typical reference, rather, modifies the meaning of the τοῦτο into this—*what I now offer to you*, that is, what I *appoint* therein and *establish* for *you* in the future to partake of, instead of the lamb. Bengel rightly says, before the words already quoted, "*This*, is opposed to the old shadows; and means, *ye have Myself*." We may therefore, for the elucidation of this meaning, invert the clause, so far as it contains in it this point—*My* body is, I Myself am your Paschal Lamb. But it is altogether wrong, and is refuted by the analogy of the words spoken with the cup, to maintain rashly that the Lord uttered His words merely in the sense of such a *transposition of the subject and predicate*.[2]

And, similarly, there is another inversion of the clause which an unbiassed consideration must reject. According to Schwenkfeld and those who followed him, the words must be understood *backward*:—My flesh is in truth a bread or a food—My body is *that which I now here offer to you*, that is, a *true* bread, and My blood is a real drink. And thus Christ is regarded as intending no more than to *teach* what His body and blood would be to us after His death, our meat and our drink; He *confirms* or *repeats* only (with an accompanying symbol to give it emphasis) what He had said already in Jno. vi. The τοῦτο becomes a τοιοῦτο—

[1] The persistent straining of the analogy with פֶּסַח הוּא לַיהוָה, as we find it in Ebrard after Zwingle, involves the fundamental error of misapprehending the *reality* of the New Testament *Sacrament* in opposition to the Old Testament symbolical act.

[2] Such is Schleiermacher's artificial turn given to the sentence. *This* bread, not the lamb, is henceforth *the Passover* which I institute, My גּוּף. So Thiess formerly, but H. Stephani shows it in its most meaningless form—"Jesus declares bread and wine to be the symbols of the New Covenant instead of the flesh and blood of the animal sacrifice." Ebrard, in like manner, though protesting against that: "This unleavened bread of the Passover (predicate!) is *My body* (subject!), which is to be broken for you; that is, My body broken for you is the true פֶּסַח—*I am the true Passover sacrifice*." But he has since retracted this.

this becomes *such*—and that as a predicate, moreover in a so-called spiritual sense, and this interpretation of His words is what the Lord Christ Himself taught! But the natural sense of the language rebels against such a perversion, while the τοῦτο τὸ ποτήριον afterwards utterly refutes it; and we have nothing to do but to accept, in wondering, humble inquiry, the undeniable fact, that the same Lord who did indeed once say—My body or flesh is meat, now inverts the words, and testifies while He presents bread to His disciples,—*That* (which ye here take and eat) is My body!

That He, moreover, asserts for the present and promises for the future a presence and a reception of His body, *only* after He had preceded it by a *Take, Eat;* and that thus the *this is* (be its meaning what it may) attains to its full reality only within the limits and under the conditions of the actual *enjoyment* already spoken of—is a remark which is very obvious, and which we make now preparatorily, in order that nothing *necessary* may be omitted. It is not first said, This is My body, Take and eat; but then first, when the taking and eating takes place, the wonderful "This is" follows in all its force. That is, as we are now prepared to think, *only where* faith truly, internally, and spiritually *takes* and *eats*. When the Papists act as if it was said, Behold it, exhibit it, and carry it round, adore it,—the voice of truth, however in vain to multitudes, must often proclaim to them what the convert Henhöffer so well expressed in his confession of faith—"Jesus cannot possibly, according to all our experience, have designed to establish this *tabernacle-Christ* and its honour; otherwise He would have contradicted Himself, would have subverted His own kingdom, and plucked down with one hand what He had set up or would set up with the other." The New Testament knows no institution of a magical spectacle to be wondered at, on the one hand, and no mechanical exhibition of empty symbols on the other. It would not, as the Romish Church which reached its perfection in the middle ages, did, "divert the view from the Saviour in heaven, to the *corpus Christi* in the hands of the priest." Firm and secure abides the sense, "*Here have ye* My body," which I give and appoint you to take and eat. But this "*ye have*" is as far from the possessing in our hand or upon the table a transformed wonder, as from the

empty figurative sense which others have applied to it. The Lord bequeaths to us His body and His blood, not to exhibit, carry about and adore—not merely to investigate, speculate, and dogmatise upon,—but to eat and drink. Thus sets out Luther's catechism.

The Lord says now body, and not flesh, as before in Capernaum. He spoke on the former occasion as *teaching* (John vi. 59) and laying the first foundation of His doctrine and testimony, taking pains to establish in the most definite manner the substantiality of the *flesh* as well as the blood; but here that is *presupposed*, and the actual giving being now the question, He adapts His expression to a twofold design:—to show forth the *unity* of His whole bodily person as one in itself, and that communication and participation of His whole body which leads to a similar unity with Himself and with one another.[1] The one refers to Himself, the other to us. For the former we appeal to the universal meaning of σῶμα (and *body* in all languages), even in its frequent figurative use—a whole, an organism complete in itself; for the latter we appeal to the fact that the Church of Christ is called His "body." The Apostle Paul himself in 1 Cor. x. 17 gives this interpretation by the Holy Ghost; laying emphasis upon the word *body*, and assigning it in its integrity to the Church. Olshausen deviates from this, and reduces the force of the word, when he says that the expression *body* was imperatively required *only* by the adjunct expressions *given* and *broken*. "The Redeemer thus likened the *entire* mass of the bread which He broke to His body. He did not, however, give to each the body, the σῶμα; but as he gave a part of the mass of bread, so He gave a part of the *body*, that is, *flesh*, σάρξ. According to the meaning of the whole, σάρξ might just as fitly have been used; but on account of the symbolical reference to his death, Jesus chose σῶμα, equivalent to גוף." Here we must oppose in both these sentences the onesidedness which fails to do justice to the *pregnant sense* of the symbol and the mystery. For, as certainly as on the one hand the individual κλάσμα, the portion of bread received by each, represented to him his portion in the grace and gift of

[1] Delitzsch: "To obviate the misunderstanding that he distributed His flesh in portions."

Christ; so certainly, on the other, does Christ in an equally true sense live, as the *whole* Christ, in each of those who are by such participation united with him.[1] Even in John vi. the *flesh* referred not so much to *particulas quasdam a singulis edendas*, as to the substance of the glorified flesh of the Son of man as a whole in its integrity. Yet, again, the *eat* refers immediately to the *body*, as it respects the individuals; and the objection of Schultheiss that σῶμα or body is never and nowhere the object of eating, altogether and wilfully forgets that the eating here in question is absolutely alone in its kind. The *one bread* is exhibited as the one body in the many who receive it;[2] and the μετέχειν of every individual is a *partaking of that one bread*. So far we proceed with the Apostle; but if we press the *figure* beyond the limits within which, as such, it presents the comparison, we go astray and fall into frivolities which are here, if anywhere, unbecoming. The comparison extends forward to the breaking of that bread, which however as a broken and distributed whole is still regarded in the τοῦτο as a whole in its integrity; but we cannot pursue it backward to the manner in which it became *one bread*, and press the figure in that direction.[3]

Nor of course can we accept the *subordinate* sense in which the body of bread represents the *church* gathered into one in Christ, as the only one:—This breaking, giving, taking, and eating, this entire procedure sets forth My body, *which is or which will be My church!* In this *hysteron* without a *proteron*

[1] In Olshausen we have the still more dubious explanation that according to his conviction, not the whole Christ, and as he died upon the cross, is partaken of in the supper, but an operation and influence from Him, and that as the "Redeemer glorified."

[2] This is the true *reduplicatio multiplicativa*, and not what Scholasticism falsely so called.

[3] And by this we reject the interpretation given in Chrys., Aug., and even in the liturgy of the Const. Ap., as it is adopted by Marheineke: to wit, that the bread is the produce of many grains of wheat (something like the words of Ignatius at his martyrdom), as the wine is the produce of many grapes. This, if carried out, brings us to a body of Christ which rises in and out of the Church, instead of a body *given* in and for us, and which could never have been the produce of many elements. And thus it would coincide with Zwingle's interpretation of 1 Cor. x. 16, which makes the Apostle say, "I mean not that the cup is the blood, or the bread is the body of Christ; but that *we* all, partakers of the one bread and cup, *are the blood and body of Christ.*"

where would be the strictly connected *given for you!* We must hold that the body, equally with the blood, must have a real signification; consequently it is neither *the body of the church*, nor the *figure of My body* (according to Oecolampadius who quotes and perverts Tertullian's *figura corporis mei.*) Consequently, it is simple folly to maintain "that σῶμα can in no case signify flesh, nor be paralleled with σάρξ;" and it is most wilful folly to maintain this *here*, where αἷμα strictly corresponds with the σάρξ καὶ αἷμα of John vi.

WHICH IS GIVEN FOR YOU. Thus is it first in St Luke, according to a doubtless genuine tradition. The omission in the first two Evangelists of this seemingly essential clause is only an apparent omission; for that offering up of His body which took place in the death that brake it can be, and must be, understood in τοῦτο τὸ σῶμά μού—this is *My* body—and the parallel in the *shed* afterwards abundantly confirms this. Not the less on that account, however, did the Lord speak plainly to obviate all misunderstanding, uttering for us at the institution the διδόμενον, given, and in His own subsequent explanation the κλώμενον, broken. There are those who are so insensible to the simple assurance of the mysterious words that they make the *broken* an argument for referring the *given* also rather to *this*—the bread—and thus infer that εἰς θάνατον, *unto death*, is not to be supplied.[1] But they gain nothing by this; the direct and plain words concerning the body are perverted or lost sight of by those who are obliged to confess, after all, that both senses (*this bread which is given* or *the body which is given*) are really the same at bottom, since the terms *given* and *shed* are used concerning the bread and the cup only as far as they are or represent the body and blood of Christ.

Thus the body is *given*, that is, devoted *unto death*. For the sake of brevity, we may refer those to whom it is necessary to what was said upon the δώσω of Jno. vi. 51—though that passage itself is quite sufficient. That which was there future is now come near; the night of betrayal, the anguish of death, the judgment which doomed Him, has already begun, so that what

[1] They then say that it is the same with the τοῦτο τὸ ποτήριον; that which was presented being the subject in both clauses. But that St Luke's τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐκχυνόμενον does not refer simply to the *cup*, is plain from the αἷμα ἐκχυνόμενον—of the other two Evangelists.

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was immediately impending might be spoken of as already present. Winer, accordingly, gives a better solution than the old *enallage temporis*, "which was now on the point of being given." This kind of expression, however, instead of the absolute Future, was strictly necessary: as giving at the time of the institution itself the strongest possible *assurance*, and as making the great fact *present again* at every future celebration. We well know how dimly the Apostles apprehended the fore-announced death of the Lord, down to the last: it is on that account that He gave them the most absolute assurance of that death as a present fact, in such a manner as to repress all doubt at least during that sacred hour; and it is on that account that He further gave the declaration concerning its *propitiatory* significance and power. (But not the "first and sole" such declaration, as Ebrard says; for see Jno. vi. 51, x. 12; Matt. xx. 28.) But, again, as the Lord is uttering a formula, we might almost say a formulary, for the future celebration of the supper, He cannot speak of it as a past transaction otherwise than as present. For a *symbol* must necessarily *presentiate;* and the Sacrament, which distributes its blessing and spiritual influence, abolishes all historical distinction of time. What Luther says of the blood, holds good of the body: "When we contemplate the historical act by which the forgiveness of sins was obtained, that had not taken place at the Sacrament; but now it has taken place, and is past. But when we regard the communication of forgiveness, *there is no notion of time;* it was a thing done from the foundation of the world.[1] Now, as the body and blood of Christ are necessary to all who have sinned, and are to be forgiven, it is for ever true that He *is always being given* for *them*. For, although the event has taken place, yet as long as its blessing is not dispensed to *me*, it is as if it were yet to take place as far as I am concerned." This ideal *presentation* of the event, which is contained in *is given*, and *is shed*, approves itself as a *reality*. And in this we have the ground of that *double sense* of those two words, in relation to our present reception, which Ebrard rejects.

However emphatically this Present might sound in their ears, the disciples could not have interpreted τοῦτό ἐστι of that body which at the same time sat living before them; but they

[1] Add—And goes on to the end of time.

must, on the other hand, have thought of the requirement and promise which he Had laid down in John vi. We infer therefore necessarily, that the actual participation of the body and blood of Christ was even then still in the future, and that it had its beginning at the time which Jno. vi. 62, 63, expressly specifies for that purpose. We cannot regard our Lord as intending to say anything which it was utterly out of the question that the disciples should understand; or to represent Himself as offering to them anything which their whole habit of thought would revolt against. We must therefore guard, both on the right and left, against error. We must not assert that, at this institution itself, the disciples actually ate and drank of the body and blood of Christ;[1] nor must we, on that account, deny the real participation in after times as contrary to the original sense of the words. The former error is inconsistent generally with all deeper views of the subject, and is refuted by the letter itself, since they could not have received the body *given* and the blood *poured out*, while the Lord was actually sitting before them and speaking to them.[2] In this case, the great weakness of the disciples, which continued after just as it was before, would be wholly inexplicable. But it has been constantly maintained, and with truth, that at the very institution of the Sacrament, the blindness and weakness of the other disciples (independently of Judas) was specially brought to light. But if that which they then ate and drank was actually to be the real and full sacrament of the body and blood of Christ, it would appear that it had no power even in its first celebration, but declared itself to be almost useless—and how could we expect great things from it now? All that the later Lutherans have said concerning the full import of the celebration of the Supper at the hour of its institution, appears to me to be a series of assertions which are inconceivable and self-contradictory.

[1] Most Lutherans think most indistinctly and inconsistently upon this subject, violating their own dogma of the heavenly-glorified character and presence of the corporeity of Christ. Christ "was then already glorified latently," they say, and Olshausen thus speaks of a glorification which becomes gradually consummate.

[2] Alford indeed observes: "The Passion had already begun; in fact the whole life on earth was this giving and breaking, consummated by His death." But we ask, Was there already any *shedding* of His *blood*?

If our Lord's *this is* had involved a bodily change of the substance, "there would be here a new Christ, and that a *dead* one created *by the side of the living*," as Lange says roughly but truly. But he is not equally right when he rejects all "substantial presence" from the words of institution, on the ground that Christ as still living *distributed* His body and His blood in the bread and wine to His disciples then present. He here falls into that other error, one which, however strange it is, has been received very generally with unthinking facility, and which Ebrard (ii. 781) has thus expressed as a necessary axiom: to wit, that it must be taken for granted that the institution can mean nothing more than it meant, or than took place, at the time of its institution. This leads him to a very remarkable statement of the case, "Their participation was not only brought to them in His presence, but His presence was their participation—He communicated to them His living breath, His living influence—they partook of Him together in His essential life,"—that is to say, though it is most opposite to the Lutheran doctrine, not in any sense a bodily participation!

O no! and again no! All this is not "*the* body which is broken—*the* blood which is shed." As certainly as our Lord did thus expressly speak, while yet their taking and eating of His body and His blood was not a thing possible, so certainly did the Lord speak the words of institution *for the future*, and promise, as in a general Present, what they and all His disciples should always receive when they should *do this*. The formula of distribution which did not really distribute must be regarded in the same light as that in which the salvation and deliverance of the people out of Egypt is regarded as already accomplished, at the institution of the Passover, Ex. xii. 27, xiii. 14, 15. And a still more decisive parallel we have in the words of John xx. 22, *Receive* the Holy Ghost!—a final symbolical expression, sealing to them a promise which could not be and was not fully granted to them until the glorification of our Lord after His ascension; see Jno. vii. 39 compared with ch. vi. 62, 63. Just as this final "Receive ye!" is here related, on the one side, to the reception of the Holy Ghost which did not follow till afterwards, and, on the other, to all the oft-repeated promises of the Holy Spirit which had preceded—so is it with this final word of promise

and institution, as connected with that *bodily impartation* of Christ which should take place when His body was glorified and had become *capable of communication*. And *this glorified corporeity itself* is, once more, something very different from that which many hypotheses have substituted for it. Richter, for example, thus strangely expresses himself: "Luther is right; we receive His true body and His true blood, *that is*, the living, heavenly part of His nature, which was sentient and operative, in the fibres and nerves of His (sometime!) body, and animated His pure and guiltless blood." And Hahn's "scriptural representation" is quite below the subject, whether viewed in relation to speculation in the light of revealed truth, or to the letter of the words of institution, when he says, "He gives the assurance that bread and wine now in this supper took the place of His body and blood; and that, as He had been previously with them in flesh and blood, so henceforth bread and wine should be the organic channel for His spiritual fellowship with His disciples." According to the Scripture (Jno. vi.), the Lord was to be in us and with us also in flesh and blood after His ascension, yea, then first truly so; His heavenly flesh and blood, pervaded by spirit, and which have become spirit and life, these are the true "mediating *organs*" of that fellowship which is as really bodily as spiritual; and the bread and the wine are the mediating *symbols* of this, in the second degree. Were there not for the Church of the Lord an actual reception of His flesh and blood provided, it *could have no life in itself*, it would be and never could be His *Church*, that is, His *body*. If this reception were not at the same time (not, indeed, exclusively, but especially) mediated by an external, earthly corporeal element, the Church of the New Testament would have no *sacrament*; its *worship* would therefore lack the real centre and exhibition of consummate fellowship, and the whole word of evangelical preaching upon earth (Matt. xxvi. 13) its conclusive *seal*. If the body and blood of the Lord were not for us, when we eat and drink, in the bread and wine, the *sacrament in the sacrament* would be wanting; and the seal of the word, instead of *confirming* its highest and most wonderful promise, would *retract* it, and send us back into the region of everlasting difference between flesh and spirit —leaving a chasm for ever unfilled between our corporeity (which,

however, is itself to be glorified in a resurrection) and the "spiritual fellowship" of the Head with His members. Schulthess, opposing the ἕνωσις, says that in Scripture *flesh* and *spirit* are the two most irreconcileable things—without recognising that victory of the spirit which reconciles the two by *glorifying* the flesh.

Christ is the High Priest of the coming good things (Heb. ix. 9, 11), the author and dispenser of all that which was future under the Old Testament economy of shadows, and not only so, of all that which, even to us, will be perfect only in the final glorifying and renovation of all things, although its reality begins within us from the time that the glorified comes to make His abode within us. He acted and spoke as the High Priest *designate* (to use Oetinger's expression) even upon earth, and in the land of death, when He said—This is my body which is given for you—thus it is My will to give it, and I will give it to you. He could not have instituted this mystery first at the time of its great fulfilment, for then must He have come again from heaven expressly for that purpose.[1] He could not and would not institute the supper after His resurrection, during that interval which drew nearer to His glorification and was in some sense an anticipation of it. For it was to retain its necessary connection with His own and the old economy's last Passover;—moreover, He would assure them by instituting it before His departure by death that *His presence with them* would be just as real as it had been before His resurrection,—and, finally, He thus obviated all *docetic* notions, such as would have easily attached themselves to a sacrament instituted during the forty days.[2]

How then, does He promise and give us in the Sacrament *His body*, as *dead* or as *living?* It is, indeed, the body given up to death for us; and the continuous presence of the power and energy of this death so works in us that we ever anew die with Him unto sin, in sacramental union with Him; nevertheless we know, and it needs no proof, that *this death* is life, and gives life, and becomes to us the *nourishment* of life simply. Were it not so there would

[1] Although in the revelation to Paul there was a confirmatory supplement added from heaven.

[2] Then He *was* latently or initiatorily glorified—not before His death.

remain only the appropriation of His justifying death through the "remembrance" of faith; there would be no living communication of the Christ, no longer dead but living, within us.[1] But while the διδόμενον assuredly brings forward the death into the present, and asserts the identity of the body which is given with that which died upon Golgotha; the ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, which is added, testifies that the same body is given as living, as the bread of life within us,—because *the eating* (as the very word necessarily implies) takes away the merely external sense of this "*for us*," elevates and interprets it into the "*in us*."

The BROKEN, finally, which the Lord's authentic exposition has substituted for given,[2] should by no means throw us back upon a onesided view of the dead body, but confirm to us the *double meaning* of the *given*, as being—for you *to death*, and thereby in you *to life*. For both these, not excepting the latter, must this κλώμενον, as pertaining to ἔκλασε, embrace. It is true that it, first, defines the breaking of the body, the dissolution of the organism, its (transitory) disruption as a *body* by death.[3] Guericke, for the sake of withstanding the "Union-Shibboleth" of bread-breaking, asserts that the body of Christ

[1] Breitenstein (letters to Marheineke, 1822) starts from the Syr. trans. פָּגַר, and renews all the old Zuinglianism of an appropriation simply of the crucified Lord, symbolized by eating. Meyer thoroughly well answered him (Bl. für höh. W. v. 136) that this would be a *half* Christ, and not, therefore, by any means the Christ whom we must have. There would be then no difference between the Jewish sacrifice and our Sacrament, save in the outward form, and in the circumstance that the former was offered in expectation, the latter celebrated in *remembrance*.

[2] For the omission of κλώμενον, as in Lachmann's text, cannot be approved, though Schulthess can appeal to Bengel on that side; the simple τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν is without meaning, and arose from the uncertainty between διδ. or κλ., as Nitzsch has said. But when he prefers διδόμενον, and asserts κλώμενον to be spurious, as having originated from 1 Cor. x. 16 or later notions of the breaking of the body, we cannot agree with him, but hold the latter with Schulz as doubtless genuine. The perversion of ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν into "which bread represents you," is ridiculously forced. Nitzsch still asserts, against me, that the κλώμενον is a reading "more than uncertain;" but I must hold to its genuineness, and say with Kahnis, that "the expression is much too concrete and original for any later hand to have been bold enough to insert it."

[3] Hence in some Codd. the gloss θρυπτόμενον.

generally was not broken at all; but what would the authentic expression here given then mean? We think at once of מְדֻכָּא, *bruised*, Isa. liii. 5, and דַּכָּאוֹ ver. 10 (comp. עַד־דַּכָּא Ps. xc. 3), which is more intense than מְחֹלָל—not merely pierced or wounded to the flowing of the blood, but bruised, crushed, broken to pieces as a living body; just as in Isa. xxxviii. 13 יְשַׁבֵּר כָּל־עַצְמוֹתַי, thou wilt break all my bones, is parallel with *make an end of Me;* and as in 1 Kings xiii. 28 (not so certainly Dan. viii. 25; Ezek. xxx. 8; Jer. xxii. 20) שָׁבַר to break occurs in the sense of *killing*. Even Zwingle allowed this, though he made it rather too general—frangi pro pati aut perire. Nitzsch's objection to the broken body we think altogether unfounded. But when the same *broken body* is afterward given as a σῶμα to be broken for their *food*, the other meaning which we alluded to above comes out—Christ breaks to us the bread, gives Himself to us as the nourishment of life. (The *tradetur* of the Vulg. may express this; and Ezek. xviii. 7, in allusion to Isa. lviii. 7, uses יִתֵּן for יִפְרֹס.) For our שָׁלוֹם, our restoration and perfect soundness, comes, according to Isa. liii., from the propitiatory מְדֻכָּא, our healing from His stripes—His blood poured out in death becomes the medicine of life to us. If this is *mystical* exegesis, it is the only one with which we can satisfy ourselves when dealing with the words of a mystery; every distorted and onesided view of this central sacrament, in which all lines converge to the unity of the death and life of Christ,[1] is unsatisfactory and misleading.

We may be permitted to recapitulate in Meyer's excellent words.[2] "The natural sense of the expression will allow at first this twofold meaning: Represent to yourselves by this My body and My blood, as they are sacrificed for you; and, Represent to yourselves by this My body and My blood, as they are essentially partaken of by you, or enter into you, and must enter into you, if ye would have immortal life, as I have already (Jno. vi.) said unto you. But, since no occasion and no means can be con-

[1] As in the Passover the sin-offering and thank-offering were blended typically.

[2] Blätter für höh. Wahrheit. xi. 226 ff.

ceived more effectual for the setting forth of this mystery in believers, than the celebration of that rite in which bread and wine were blessed and partaken of in devout remembrance of the Lord and His sacrificial death, *the third meaning must necessarily* be added:—Observe this bodily partaking of bread and wine, internally contemplating Me, and with a believing desire to be united to Me in spirit, soul, *and body,* to belong to Me through a new birth, to have Me as an indwelling Saviour, and to obtain through this My being within you a spiritual and eternal *life*:—observe this partaking of bread and wine as the fulfilment and sealing of this your wish itself; I give Myself herewith for you to eat and drink, just as I mysteriously spoke before, to the offence of many."

DO THIS! This is not a liturgical addition which had *dated back* the appointment of the then customary celebration to the Lord's mouth; but it is His own word, from which alone the celebration could have taken its rise. It was hardly—as Nitzsch suggests—added first after the resurrection. This second τοῦτο with ποιεῖτε is much plainer than the former with ἐστί; but it is important, nevertheless, to impress a definite idea of it upon our minds. Are we to understand, *do this* as *that which I now do,* and interpret it as meaning, Give ye my apostles one to another, and let all who follow you give to others the bread in My place, and with the words which I now use? Certainly not, for that which all believers, to whom long before the institution His flesh and blood had been promised, were to do, was said before, *Take, eat.* St Luke and St Paul, indeed, have not these words; and again St Matthew and St Mark have not the *Do this;* but this omission on both sides is plain proof that the expressions mutually correspond with and imply each other. Thus it rather means *do after this manner;* that which I now command you, this eating (and drinking) which I now elevate into a mysterious communion with Myself. Decisive evidence of this follows immediately in the addition—*as oft as ye drink.* That the disciples, when He should be no longer visibly present with them, but give them internally His broken body and shed blood, would externally give one to another the bread and the wine, was self-understood, and moreover in itself so indifferent a matter that in the ποιεῖν here appointed to the disciples the main matter of the Sacrament

must be regarded as meant. St Paul, in 1 Cor. xi. 26—29, does not otherwise explain it; four times after the ὁσάκις, as oft as, we find mentioned the eating of the bread and the drinking of the cup.[1] He appropriates it to the Corinthian Christians as well as to the apostles, to every "man who would belong to the Lord and His church (comp. Ex. xii. 48.)[2] In this New Testament sacrament, in the Old Testament type of which the whole community acted as priests, there can certainly be no room for exclusive prerogative of office and position.

Further (and as St Paul has shown, 1 Cor. 5—7), the *Do this* corresponds emphatically to the sense in which the Lord declared, as we have seen, *His* body to be the true Passover; consequently we may regard it as certain that it contains His commandment to let this festival take *the place of the paschal lamb* (as previously ποιῶ τὸ πάσχα; Schulthess in this is right —ποιεῖν, עָשָׂה, of festival acts.) Therefore, obviously as the Passover was observed for the memorial and setting forth of that deliverance and passing over, so now—In *My remembrance.* In *My*—that contains the substitution. In My *remembrance,* that is, in the future, when I am no longer thus with you; for what was then done needed no ἀνάμνησις for those who were present.

"Not in the days of His exaltation, but in the days of His humiliation, He laid this great injunction on believers; it was as the *request of a friend and not a commandment for servants* that He pronounced His last wish."[3] Very true, but what majesty of most sacred injunction is there in this almost intreating word of Him who is about to depart through suffering! *In remembrance of Me* has a tone at once of most affecting and condescending entreaty, as if a friend were saying—*Forget me not!* But as certainly as His own could not and would not ever *forget* Him,

[1] Although in ch. x. 16, he had presupposed that in connection with the *Do this* there was the *blessing* and *breaking,* just as at the institution the Lord had done.

[2] This remark, otherwise needless, is rendered necessary by the Romanist doctrine that "the institution of the holy Sacrament of Orders" was included in the "most holy sacrifice of the mass." "The last words, Do this, are a command to the apostles to celebrate the Sacrament from that time in His Church, and Jesus thereby consecrated them priests." Allioli.

[3] Nitzsch, Predigtsammlung von 1819. S 209.

as certainly as by the preaching of the gospel and the mighty testimony of the Spirit, what He had done would be announced throughout all the world in memorial of Him,—so certainly must something much higher be contained in this final request, which hides its dignity in a lowly form. The *memorial* must have yet another meaning, it was His design to establish in it a work of His own miraculous power, of which more anon; and the *Do this* is all the more assuredly no less than a most sacred *commandment*.[1] The devout Rambach, *e.g.*, says quite correctly in his Dogmatic Theology: "Christ instituted the Supper *in statu exinanitionis*, indeed, but not *in actu* exinanitionis; the institution of the Sacrament was a work of Divine authority and power, hence St Paul calls Christ in connection with it κύριος, *Lord*, most emphatically." Nevertheless, we must remark the humble and unostentatious form in which this work of power and wonder was wrapped up; and, moreover, the New Testament freedom which He permits even in connection with this undoubted command. On the one hand, although according to Jno. vi. faith through the operation of the Holy Ghost may, even without the bread and wine, be partaker of the same flesh and blood[2]—yet he now appoints and declares, that this participation should as a rule be bound to the participation of the bread and wine, even as the Spirit preeminently and ordinarily works through the word. On the other hand, again, He appoints with the utmost simplicity only the most essential matter to that end:—that the Church should possess this Sacrament is firmly settled, and the external essential is expressly defined in the *Do this;* but all else is left

[1] So that the Quakers are in most manifest error. Their inward light puts them to shame through the most unintelligent perversion of words, when they persist in denying the obligation of Christians to these "ceremonies." So we find in Robert Barclay: "And as for that expression of Luke, *Do this in remembrance of Me*, it will amount to no more than this, that being the last time that Christ did eat with His disciples, he desired them that in their eating and drinking they might have regard to him, and by the remembering of that opportunity be the more stirred up to follow Him diligently through sufferings and death," &c.

[2] Even in connection with the error which rejects the institution, if that does not spring from the heart's opposition to the Lord; for who would deny to many Quakers, who are so evidently and inwardly in Christ, this spiritual supper of the Lord?

undefined and free, as becomes the New Testament. It is to be taken for granted that the Spirit in the Church would take order for the salutary ceremonial of the service; but He himself gives beforehand no legal specification which should always and absolutely be binding. (This freedom and simplicity shines out conspicuously in contrast with the Old Testament prescriptions for the Passover.) What persons should in the future assume the dispensation in His stead, with what words, prayers, and rites the elements should be blessed and consecrated, and the devotion of believers be quickened, what relation *this* eating and drinking should sustain to other eating and drinking, yea, whether *this should be done* necessarily in a body or sometimes by individuals alone—on all these points there is no word and commandment. We regard it as conformable with the Lord's meaning, who would have all things done *decently and in order* (1 Cor. xiv. 40), that the appointed *stewards of God's mysteries* (1 Cor. iv. 1) should take the lead as in Christ's place, in the sacrament as well as in the word; but this exception in the universal priesthood is left free. Nothing seems to us more appropriate than to commence with the solemn repetition of the words of institution, and then to sanctify the eating and drinking to its sacramental character, yet (as no consecration is commanded in the *Do this*) all this addition to the Sacrament itself might possibly be inwardly completed, nor can we deny the validity of the Sacrament to those who silently partake with their believing minds directed to the words of the Lord. So with the public and common character of the breaking of one bread, and the drinking of all from one cup. For the freest spirituality pervades the *New Testament Do this!*

IN REMEMBRANCE OF ME. It has often been said that *this* word cannot contain the great essential matter of the institution, because *St Luke alone*, the more removed reporter, adds it, while in the "This is" all the accounts agree. There is some truth of course lying at the bottom of this, otherwise the *omission* in the other two Evangelists would be inexcusable, or not to be thought of;[1] but we are warned not to press this too far by the

[1] But according to Justin Apol. i. 66, the *ἀπομνημονεύματα τῶν ἀποστόλων* had also this first *τοῦτο ποιεῖτε εἰς τὴν ἀνάμνησιν μου.*

circumstance that the subsequent revelation to Paul gives prominence to this "remembrance" *twice*, and the Holy Spirit adds also an *explanation* of it through the apostle's teaching. This explanation is very different from the Zuinglian or the Rationalist view, according to which the Lord is merely said to have used such and such words, which might be self-understood. The condescending word certainly begins with what may be termed the simple *thinking upon* His person, His past connection with them, not excluding the affectionate remembrance of this last farewell meal, and that night of His betrayal which it would for ever make present to their minds. But, after all that the τοῦτό ἐστι has already said, who can content himself with understanding the ἀνάμνησις in such a bare superficial sense as utterly opposes that former word? He who does this, because he has no faith in a livingly present Saviour, working mysteriously upon and within us, and therefore turns one word of institution against another, has in reality no Sacrament at all, and deceives himself when he says that he brings the *Lord* to his remembrance. But he who with sincerity of heart and honesty of faith enters into this memorial of the Lord and His death, will find and experience in it all else that we have spoken of—even though his theoretical views and expressions may do injustice to the Sacrament as a whole.

We say first, with confidence, that the *remembrance* is not defined in the clause to be the substance, the essential matter of the *do this*, which points directly to the eating and drinking of the body and blood; but the appended εἰς indicates the original purpose, the accompanying disposition, the immediate influence, of the true enjoyment of doing this. If our exposition has been hitherto in any degree correct, we have already refuted the Socinians and others who would understand it *only* of an external eating, as a mnemonic rite,[1] but who understand neither what His remembrance is as spoken of by the Lord, nor what is His

[1] "Christ the Lord would have a remembrance and proclamation of the violent death, which He suffered for us, kept up in His Church through a solemn rite, to the glory of His own name." Schulthess has even instituted a comparison with the νεκύσια of the Greeks, the festivals in memory of the dead! And that in a very different sense from Theophylact's, whom he quotes.

body and blood. The error is not removed by laying the emphasis upon remembrance *of Me*, but by rightly understanding the *remembrance* itself. Already in the Old Testament it had a deeper and a real meaning: when the Lord spoke of the remembrance of His name, and appointed any rite or any place to be a memorial in which His name was recorded—there He actually would come to His people and bless them. (Ex. xx. 24.) Even then the living God was not in such sense absent that He was to be merely remembered—but what does the remembrance of Christ signify, the remembrance of that God-man who gives us inwardly His body and His blood! Are we to suppose the same Lord, who had so often testified to His disciples that He would be with them, among them, and within them in the time to come, to speak *here* of remembering Himself as an absent person who was no longer there and only an object of remembrance? He does not say ἐν τῇ ἐμῇ ἀναμνήσει—*in remembrance of Me—that* would signify the remembrance and devotion which the observance itself would bring with it, and which it already presupposed as the first impulse to the *doing this*. But He appoints and at the same time *promises*, that *through* this doing the remembrance should be strengthened, made more inward; that a remembrance or memorial of Himself should be wrought in real and living fellowship with Him. All thinking of the past is in a certain sense a making it present; but if He whom we think of remains absent and separated from us, *such* bringing the past back can only turn to an all the more bitter feeling of the separation: and can we suppose this to be intended here? Can the Lord be supposed to expect it of our weakness that *we* should rise *in faith*, through this remembrance, above the separation, into spiritual fellowship with Him? And can *this* be the decisive main element in this institution, which concentres in itself all the mighty blessings and influences of New Testament grace? "As it respects the Christ, who is with us to the end of the world, and in our midst when we are met in His name, all is not so much made to depend upon our weak energy of faith, as upon His mighty presence." (V. Meyer.) His word rather contains the real promise:—If ye do this in believing remembrance, then *will I remember you*, and come to you, and work *within you*, a true memorial of Me, that is, a more

than mere remembrance. "In ἀνάμνησις and ἀναμιμνήσκειν there lies not merely the passive idea of not forgetting, but the active idea of the revival of emotion, the renewal and bringing back again of something." This remark of Schulz is quite correct; but He does not go on to say *from whom* and by *what means* such living remembrance can come.

This is the subjective side of the word, but there is an objective side which inseparably belongs to it. Hence St Paul emphatically substitutes a wider expression: not, *ye remember* His death, but, *ye do show forth His death.* (With allusion to the הַגָּדָה, or proclamation in connection with the Passover.) And the Spirit within us teaches us to find even in this word an intimation, first of all, that we must in our hearts show Him to ourselves, or "enter with all our faculties and powers, and with the whole might of our will, into His death." But the fundamental meaning of that additional word goes further, and shows that our subjectively true remembrance, which becomes through our reception a living remembrance of our Lord—this ἀναμνήσις within us—must also speak and work *objectively* and *outwardly*, before the Church and the world. "Thus Jesus did not merely say that the communicants at the Supper should think of Him; but that the Supper should be an announcement and a memorial of His death *to all.*" (Scheibel.) Yes, verily, the life-imparting *death* of the *Lord* of glory, which should bring forth much fruit, was to be otherwise shown forth, and to have another kind of *memorial*, than any other death of one who had died. From the night of His betrayal onward to the great day when He will come again, His own proclaim,—as in their whole life derived from and spent in Him, so preeminently as often as they publicly and solemnly commemorate Him in the Sacrament,—*Life in His death.* They bear witness of it to each other and to the world. With the utmost power as worthy and sanctified communicants, such as He would have them be; but even the mere external celebration itself, when it is no more than that, is the continuous testimony and confession of the Church. Where preaching has ceased to proclaim the sin-offering for the world, the "*For you*" preserves the remembrance of His atoning work, and "*This is*" bears perceiving witness to a

service which should be and shall ever be the means of living communion with Him.[1] Finally, and more than this: The living preaching of the Gospel through the Holy Spirit finds its last and strongest seal first in the memorial of the communion. As it is the *first* object of the Sacrament to nourish and enkindle the remembrance of Christ beginning in us, as a disposition of mind accompanying its celebration; and as it is then its immediate effect to make this a *living* remembrance through union with him; so is it in fact in a certain sense the *last* and *highest* aim of the Sacrament for ever to proclaim to the world the death of the Lord which has exerted its power in ourselves. *Commemoratio* and *predicatio* become one in the power of Him, who testifies Himself to be present. Thus the *Sacrament* goes back into the *Word*, and becomes itself an intenser word as being its most impressive fulfilment; thus the communion, as it is the crown of worship within the Church, so also it is the seal also of the work of preaching which this Church carries on. We confidently think that this last is plainly contained in the absolute and objectively laid down εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν (instead of ὑμῖν εἰς ἀνάμνησιν ἐμὴν)—in order to *the* remembrance, not, *to you* for My remembrance. It is thereby declared that the Lord would make this appointment of what His disciples were *to do* a memorial to the world of His redeeming act—just as in its place the Old Testament type was.

LIKEWISE ALSO HE TOOK THE CUP. That is, the appointed and customary cup at the conclusion of the Passover. The absence of the article before ποτήριον in St Mark, according to another reading, has no other significance than what we have already remarked in connection with the ἄρτον. The emphatic and striking Ὡσάντως—likewise—of St Luke and St Paul, which infers a similar taking, thanksgiving, blessing and giving, testifies to the *indivisible* character of the Sacrament, as essentially one notwithstanding its twofold form. The double words

[1] As long, that is, as the words of Christ are spoken in the celebration of the Lord's Supper. Hufnagel of Frankfort, indeed, (liturg. Blätter. i. Band, vi. Samml.) preferred as the formula of distribution, "Partake of this bread! The spirit of devotion rest upon thee with its full blessing. Partake of a little wine! no virtue lies in it; that lies *in thee*, in the divine teaching, *and—in God*."

of institution, in connection with the bread and the cup, mutually confirm and illustrate each other:—he who would superficially or falsely interpret the one, is shown what is right by the other.[1] The Lord instituted the Sacrament under a twofold form; and v. Gerlach gives the most obvious and most superficial reason, in these simple words, "for He connected it with the twofold bodily need of man, food and drink;" and we have shown upon John vi. that there also hunger and thirst embraced all the necessities and all the desires of man in their utmost comprehensiveness. But to this there corresponds, as v. Gerlach admits, "a twofold nourishment and refreshment of the inner man, corresponding to those of the body;" and we then first understand this when we learn from the word in faith that Christ also is objectively presented to us in a twofold form, and gives himself to us that we may eat *and drink*. The bread is only His *body*; hence He must also give us His *blood* in the cup. When v. Gerlach places in the middle, "He would thereby point to the *separation* of the body from the blood poured out, *in His death*," we have nothing to object; for it is most evident that this separation does refer to the *death*, and consequently this is a testimony that He speaks of the same body which died. Delitzsch would satisfy the inquiry by saying that it is a gracious condescension to our weakness, to the end that He might exhibit plainly to our faith the twofold character of the gift; but we would ask all Lutherans, who do not regard the Sacrament simply as a condescension to our infirmity, but insist upon a reality in what is presented to their eyes—what is then *objectively* this *twofold character* of the gift? We must penetrate deeper into the mystery, and regard it as demonstrating the separation of the body and blood of Christ which continues even *after His death*; so that in the Sacrament, where He who died, nevertheless, gives Himself to us as the living, the same separation as it were continues. For this we may refer the reader to Jno. vi., and our exposition of it.[2] Finally, even this is not enough,

[1] Tertullian: In calicis mentione testamentum constituens sanguine suo obsignatum, substantiam corporis confirmavit. Nullius enim corporis sanguis potest esse, nisi carnis. In which more is said concerning the Supper than Ebrard finds in it.

[2] Though this overturns Ebrard's too confident remark, "No one would ever think of a glorified blood together with a glorified body."

but there is a twofold character in the *human nature* (which here appears only in its glorification) corresponding to the dualism of the flesh and blood, according to which the one indivisible glorified God-man nevertheless dwells and works in His Church in a twofold way. St Paul points to this, when in 1 Cor. xii. 13, after having spoken of the one *body* into which we are baptised, and which consists in the one spirit, He yet refers the εἰς ἓν πνεῦμα, into *one spirit* to the cup of the Sacrament, by the *we have drunk*. We shall say more concerning this, upon the Lord's requirement that all should drink of it.

It must not be overlooked, at the outset, in this transition from the eating to the drinking, that there is in the latter an *extension* of the fulfilling Sacrament beyond the limits of the Old Testament type. The Lord in adding the cup to His solemnity adheres to the later paschal ritual, because that corresponds with His design. He does not shrink from establishing the joyful, quickening, cheering character of His institution, by sanctifying God's gift of wine in connection with the bread[1]—and that notwithstanding the misuse of God's creature throughout the world.[2] But what a deep meaning, and what a necessary truth, was involved in this, we discern only when we *contrast* it with the Divine ordinance of the Old Testament, in which there was not, there could not be, any drinking of wine at the Passover, or at any sacrificial meal. The heathen drank wine at their sacrificial feasts; yea, they actually drank blood—to which not only Ezek. xxxix. 19, 20, in angry irony refers, but probably also Ps. xvi 4,[3] certainly Zech. ix. 7; but throughout the entire Levitical economy it is a forbidden abomination, to *drink the blood of atonement*.[4]

We are quite sure that not only St Paul, Heb. xii. 24, but also our Lord himself in the institution of the Sacrament, did so speak. The bloodlessness of the risen body is, as we shall see, attested as a fact.

[1] Like Melchizedek, otherwise than Mohammed.

[2] Comp. Krummacher's Passionsbuch, S. 91, and Hofmann W. u. E. II. 241. The latter even reminds us that wine was first given for the strengthening of man, after the flood.

[3] In the Psalmenkom. we too arbitrarily thought this far-fetched.

[4] Though only as following from the enactments that something else should be done with it, and from the analogy with the prohibition of eating the blood with the flesh:—but this is sufficiently decisive. The question is different in the case of those passages, Lev. iii. 17, vii. 26,

Such an ordinance as that now given by Christ himself was so entirely new, *violating* the law and differing from the type while in inmost reality fulfilling both, was so decisive a distinction between the old and the new covenants, that even thereby (as also, according to Heb. xiii. 11, 12, by another connected circumstance) the new church was separated from the old as impure. Certain it is that no one could have thought of such a thing as this if the Lord had not appointed it. That He appointed it, that He even only in a symbolical sense should have said, *Drink —My blood!* is in fact just such a contradiction to the Levitical law as Schulz refers to, in opposition to the literal sense of the words. "The *personal appropriation of the sacrifice* was very significantly in the typical economy only *partial;* eating the body of the animal was partaking of half:—and thus men stopped short in the recognition that the blood of goats, calves, and lambs could not give *life.*" Where *blood* is, there is also the life or the soul; and what will this circumstance (that *we* now drink the blood of an offering) say, but that we partake not now of a *dead sacrifice,* such as the Israelites ate, but of a *living,* the life and immortal communication of which was not attained to in the Old Covenant?" (v. Meyer.) Thus marvellously does the symbolism of the Sacrament turn from one side to the other; and he who does not apprehend its depth and pregnancy of meaning must be rendered incorrigible by his wilful determination to find but one. Scarcely has the blood *as shed* testified the certainty of the death of the body which was given and broken, when the blood *as drunk* assures us again that in this death is our *life.* Thus it is not merely, as Luther at one time thought,—Flesh is life, blood is death. Rather the reverse, as Clement saw in the blood the life, the spirit. Nor is the wine of joy *merely* (as Krummacher says) an ingredient of superabundance, but it is based upon a corresponding reality in the living Christ.

Our next question is now the requirement to *drink.* But before that, we have a parenthetical remark or two to make concerning the external element in the wine. It is well known that in Palestine red wine was the main growth, and as such served

xvii. 10; Deut. xii. 16, 23 (comp. Gen. ix. 4 and Acts xv. 20) which speak designedly only of "eating," to allow for the far-distant drinking in the New Testament.

best for a symbol of the blood; but of course it must be understood that this is not an essential point; for in the general notion of antiquity every juice of the grape was as it were the blood, life, and spirit of the noble fruit.[1] Sepp, who disports himself freely in all these figures, says very justly—"The ear (corn) is as it were the flesh of the earth, and the wine its blood." Tertullian calls the wine, sanguinis *vetus* figura. Another circumstantial is the customary mingling of the wine with water, which according to later sources had been prescribed in the Passover. Presuming that Christ had done so Himself, the first Christians (inconsistently more exact than in relation to the unleavened bread) acted accordingly in their ποτήριον ὕδατος καὶ κράματος, temperamentum calicis, *mixed cup*[2]; and they further applied to it a new and unjustifiable interpretation, such as we find in Cyprian (Ep. 63 ad Cæcil.)—the water being the people with whom Christ now united Himself, as the wine mingled itself inseparably with the water![3] Against this we must maintain that the custom alluded to is very uncertain, and that, even if the ritual of that day prescribed the mixing, it is in the highest degree probable that Christ did *not* mix the wine with water, in that as well as in *blessing* the bread before it was broken, differing significantly from the custom. For it appears to us that only the "pure juice of the vine" was worthy to become the symbol of the all-holy blood,[4] and that here there was provided for us, in the figure as in the reality, a feast of pure wine, in which there

[1] See on Jno. xv. Vol. vi.

[2] Concerning which, as well as the relation of the Roman and Greek churches to the question, further particulars must be sought elsewhere.

[3] Others found on it a symbol of the inseparable union between the Divinity and the humanity.

[4] Voltaire tauntingly referred to lands where no wine grows; and Schulthess is not ashamed to say that it was not the will of Jesus that where no vine grows it should be brought from far at great cost! We would not adopt Lindner's answer that in that case water would suffice; nor Martensen's, "It is necessary that bread and wine, or failing them whatever naturally takes their place, should be distributed and partaken of." Exceptions such as may be compared with 2 Chron. xxx. 18, 19 (rightly translated) being admitted, the rule for the Sacrament requires the obedient observance of the prescribed elements. Isolated and distant churches of Christ need never lack them, having fellowship with all Christendom; as the Moravian mission-stations in Greenland show.

was no water. (Isa. xxv. 6.) Otherwise, it might have been expected that (according to the analogy of the bread) the mixing of the cup would be recorded; hence Origen made this his prominent argument for deciding in favour of the unmixed cup, *ἄκρατον*.

DRINK YE ALL OF IT! As far as *drink* corresponds with the previous *eat*, all that was said on that applies here. But there must be some additional significance in the fact that *all* are bidden to drink of it expressly:—this must be taken for granted, for every *recorded* expression and circumstance must, as we have seen, have its emphasis of meaning. It is true that St Matthew alone records this requirement; but that he does so, as an apostle and eye-witness, and that St Mark instead of the injunction specifies that all did act accordingly, seems to make the matter more certain and more significant. We may first say, as Bengel remarks upon the *likewise*, that in the *drink ye* strongly emphasized after the *eat*, our Lord gives His testimony, "that we must not *separate* the two parts of the Supper, nor *confound* them; as if the bread should suffice without the cup, or the blood be regarded as already received with the body. The twofold and yet one institution must not be abridged or divided; and therefore the *πάντες* here spoken by our Lord was an anticipating denunciation of the denial of the cup,[1] uttered for all who should be content to submit themselves to *His* word alone. This testimony is so clear that even the *Concilium non-obstantiense* did not intend its *non-obstante* to have an exegetical force; but, rather, boldly avowed its deviation from the ordinance of Christ.[2] The prohibition of the cup to the laity is a very different matter from the eucharistia *intincta* which the early church permitted for special cases

[1] Calvin: "Thirdly, why did He say concerning the bread simply that they should eat, but of the cup that they should *all* drink? It was as if He had intended to protest beforehand against the cunning of Satan."

[2] "Or if one kind were sufficient, it should be, rather, the cup"—says Bengel speaking after the manner of men. Rome, to mask her denial of the cup, has resorted to interpolation in the words of institution; so that we find in the Mass at the consecration of the bread—accipite et manducate ex hoc omnes; while there is inserted, at the cup—*mysterium fidei*. And learned Catholics are not ashamed to say that those additions originated in a tradition of St Peter's.

(the bread saturated with the wine),—and cannot be regarded as other than an impious rending of the Sacrament; not but that the great patience and faithfulness of our Lord may supply that of which they are unjustifiably deprived to sincere communicants who know not their loss. There is a second thought which the profound Bengel here adds, in his Germ. New Test.: "It is not, Eat ye all. But after they all have eaten, it *is* said, Drink ye all. *The eating is left to our freedom*—but *after* our eating, the drinking is not so left." This says, once more, that no man must divide or halve. As far as this is true, it must appear that with regard to Judas, to whom the *take eat* could not possibly have been *commanded* at the beginning (hence not *eat ye all*, leaving him room to abstain in fear), inasmuch as he had eaten, he must also as his condemnation drink likewise. But this subtle observation must not be pressed too far, or it will soon verge on error. For, in another sense, it may be said inversely, that this requesting injunction upon all permits a greater freedom to all in the case of the cup than in the case of the bread. As the cup is handed round, and every one is permitted to drink of it as much or as little as he will, we find another aspect of the matter symbolized:—When the Lord has Himself given with His own hand the bread which represents our substantial, fundamental union with His body, He leaves it more to the determination of every individual, how much of the *life* of the Spirit which corresponds with the body of Christ he will appropriate to himself. But we cannot understand this until we penetrate deeper, and recognise what in its inmost truth is the body, and what is the blood, of our Lord. The remarks of v. Gerlach on Jno. vi. 53 seem to us so excellent, that we will let them speak for us. As the blood is the soul in the flesh, in the substance of the body, so according to him the drinking and eating have this twofold reference: "The spiritual, like the natural man, needs for his preservation as well the continual renewal of his substance, as the quickening and invigoration of that personal life of the soul which gives this general human substance a distinct personality. Jesus creates, through the partaking of His flesh, a new man in him; and, through His blood, the personal life of love; He gives him a *living personal part* in Himself." And again he says: "Those who withhold the cup from the laity rob them of their

personal free fellowship of life with Christ, and of their spiritual priesthood; they degrade them, as far as they can do it, to a general mass of Christian people who are to be directed and ruled by a few whole members of the Lord's body." This is not a wild imagination, but the full and deep meaning of the memorable *Drink ye all of this;* that is, Let every man take with *direct unqualified freedom* his *personal* part in the full pervasive power of My *life.*

This freedom, which at the same time is no other than a necessity that all who were presumptuous enough to eat unworthily, should proceed with the Sacrament, was alas a permission to Judas, and sealed his condemnation. The historical relation of the πάντες, and its typical meaning as a historical circumstance, is made prominent by St Mark, when, instead of narrating the injunction of our Lord, he says—*and they all drank* of it. Most expositors now traditionally set out by "taking it for granted that Christ's design was to remove Judas before He instituted the Supper;" but we must all the more urgently utter our protest, in the name of the Scripture which cannot be broken. Other occasions have required us already, especially on Jno. xiii., to declare ourselves on this question. St Luke's *behold the hand,* ch. xx. 21, will have yet to be considered; we now abide by the first firm testimony to the traitor's participation in the Sacrament. For this we may adduce a goodly *consensus patrum et doctorum ecclesiæ*—Cyprian, Origen, both Cyrils, Jerome, Augustine, Chrysostom, Theodoret, &c.; then Calvin, Bucer, Bullinger (in a specific treatise), and Lampe (yet more elaborately); remarkably enough more on the Reformed side, though of course Lutherans (such as Wieland, G. Meier) are not wanting. There is no force in what the moderns say (as Olshausen) that "the idea of the Sacrament renders it most probable that Judas did not partake of it," affirming with great boldness "that it would have been contrary to the love and compassion of the Lord, to suffer the traitor by partaking of the Supper to aggravate his guilt." After the utterance of the Woe there is nothing to be said of the aggravation of guilt; but it has not been contrary to the idea of the Sacrament, and as little contrary to the mercy of our Lord, that in all ages the most unworthy have found admission to it—and we should be rather inclined to sup-

pose that this would be typified at the original institution. The question is not, however, of our supposition, but of what the Scripture says. St Luke records a word of our Lord, which declares Him to behold the traitor at the table, after the words of institution. In Mark, ver. 17, the Lord comes *with the twelve —as they sat and did eat* is followed by words concerning the betrayer, present and eating with the rest; without the slightest hint of the departure of this one. Ver. 22 proceeds—as *they* did eat—He gave *to them*—they *all* drank of it.[1] Similarly in St Matthew the *as they were eating* of ver. 26 is a plain resumption of ver. 21 which was introduced by *the twelve;* consequently, *He gave to the disciples* in his account, and the Lord's *Drink ye all of it,* must be necessarily understood inclusively of Judas. We cannot conceive how, in spite of this, Lange can say, "But we may assume (though nothing is said of it) that he had gone away by this time"—comp. (l. Jesu iii. 331) his gratuitous interpolation, "The traitor now vanishes!" Equally incomprehensible is Olshausen's remark, that "the traitor's participation corresponds neither with the narrative of St Matthew and St Mark, nor with the idea of the sacred transaction." We hold with the Berlenb. Bible, which presses the resumption of ver. 26 from ver. 21: "For something had come between and the Evangelist now resumes. For Christ proceeds to the matter before Him without further hindrance or restraint on account of that which had intervened. And this teaches us no light lesson; as Christ gives not up the good because of the evil. We poor mortals make too much ado of anything evil coming between, and give up our Gospel work. But in Ps. xxiii. the table is spread, though enemies are in presence. Here we see in Jesus the right frame of mind: He lets not the unfaithfulness of Judas hinder Him in this work."

THIS IS MY BLOOD OF THE NEW TESTAMENT! So in St Matthew and St Mark alike, only that the former has an additional and strengthening γάρ, arising out of the *drink ye;* and sometimes the second τὸ is wanting in the Codd. (a matter, however, of no

[1] On which Glassius says rightly: These words were written *in anticipation.* For they had previously heard the command of Christ, Drink ye all of it; this is My blood, &c. Obeying this command they all drank of it.

import.) *This cup is the New Testament in My blood!* So St Luke and St Paul alike, only that the ἐστὶ is wanting in the former,[1] and in the latter ἐμῷ emphatically precedes αἵματι, just as previously it was τοῦτό μου ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα. It has been already observed that the first form probably gives us the words which our Lord used originally, and that in the other we have His own revealed and authentic explanation; it follows from this, that exposition must make both its text, but that it must primarily set out from the *New Testament* subsequently brought into prominence. And all the more, as concerning the second *this is*, the reality of the *blood*, and its relation to the wine, all that which was said upon the body and bread must be regarded as holding good.

Great and emphatic is this word—καινὴ διαθήκη—in this place! This new covenant is here *fore-announced* in its near-approaching instant establishment; and it is also *offered* for all futurity to every one who would be a fellow-partaker. But it is made, confirmed, and *instituted* (which idea of the διατίθεσθαι is unexpressed, but understood of itself in the διαθήκη); and that can be only by a *blood* which truly propitiates, in the blood of Jesus Christ himself. As "*My* body" was opposed in the sense of being its fulfilment, to the body of the typical paschal lamb, so now, in the extended meaning which the Sacrament introduces by the cup, the emphatic "*My* blood" takes the place of *all* blood of atonement which the *old covenant* exhibited:—hence it is καινη διαθήκη, and not merely καινὸν πάσχα. This latter indeed is included, in virtue of the parallel; but the Lord's meaning in this comprehensive expression is very full. First, that the blood of the paschal lamb (as we said above) had been a *comprehensive* type of the blood of atonement generally; then, that the entire old covenant really had its fundamental and central mediation in *blood*; further, that in this typical *without blood shedding no remission!* (Heb. ix. 22) there was a *truth*, on account of which it here follows *for the remission of sins*; finally, that this reality of the essential fulfilment of the prophetic typical economy has been brought and is imparted in *His* blood. Wherever in the Old Testament, or in Heathenism as the result of still extant

[1] Which, on the one hand, shows that the words were spoken δεικτικῶς, and, on the other, justifies our remark upon the ἐστί being originally unexpressed.

truth perverted into frightful delusion, the blood of sacrifice and propitiation flowed or still flows—the Lord brings the great fulfilment and says, *My* blood alone! In this most comprehensive sense the sacramental word speaks now to New Zealanders and Brahmins, as it spoke, according to the development of the Epistle to the Hebrews, to the Jews of that day.

But in an especial manner the Lord refers, in this decisive word, to two principal passages in the ancient Scripture, a historical at the commencement, a prophetical at the close. The historical is found in Ex. xxiv.; where, after the beginning of the institution of the Law upon Sinai, a *second* fundamental testimony concerning the blood of the covenant is added, upon the same mountain, to the first which the blood of the paschal lamb contained; and where we have the real and proper commencement of that sparing and reconciling covenant institution in Israel, which was now to find its great fulfilment in a new and better covenant which should embrace the world. Though before the establishment of a proper priesthood,[1] *burnt-offerings and thank-offerings* (perfectly comprehending all, as in the Passover) were presented; with their blood the altar, the book of the covenant (the commandments), and *the people themselves*, were sprinkled; and in a solemn declarative word (the meaning of which we learn in Heb. ix. 18—22), this blood is pronounced to be the *blood of the covenant.* It forces itself irresistibly upon our thoughts, when we contemplate the direct reference of the new covenant to the old as it is here concentrated, that our Lord designedly alludes to this saying in Ex. xxiv. 8.[2] Even then already the blood was present at least in its type, and a fellowship with it was indicated by the sprinkling; but now its real presence in the Sacrament far transcends the typical symbol, and the fellowship becomes a sprinkling of the inner man—a drinking. Moses there *pointing externally* said, הִנֵּה דַם־הַבְּרִית, Sept. ἰδοὺ τὸ αἷμα τῆς διαθήκης, Behold the blood of the covenant; but St Paul in the epistle to the Hebrews substitutes a τοῦτο—*this is*—for the

[1] Hence young men of the children of Israel officiate; that is, not, as Onkelos and Jonathan suppose, the first-born, but chosen representatives of the priestly people; and Moses himself, as chief, sprinkled.

[2] Even Schulthess can think of no other origin for the word than "that classical passage concerning the blood of the covenant," though he perverts its meaning in the Gospels.

New Testament sacramental word is connected with it in his thoughts.[1] When the Lord says, Of the *new* covenant—He made the first *old* and abolished it, as we are taught in Heb. viii. 13. But it is also true on the other side, "of the *new* covenant —then is the old placed by its side, as if not to be forgotten." (Braune.) It is however fulfilled in its abolition; and the unintelligent horror of the blood, which unbelief in the truth of God in the Old Testament has created, is here done away in the centre of the Christian worship, in this most gracious bond of love between Christ and His own; for even in this we still find *blood* and *covenant* essentially connected. (See Zech. ix. 9—11, in that remarkable Messianic promise, a new *blood of the covenant!*)

The other, the prophetic passage, which Christ had also certainly in His thoughts, since in it alone a "*new* covenant" is predicted, we have in Jerem. xxxi. 31—34. (Comp. again Heb. viii. 8 seq.) We there read—*Not* according to the covenant made with their fathers when *I led them out of Egypt;* so that the allusion to this passage is very plain and significant here, where a new Passover is instituted. There we find the chief blessing and the foundation of the new covenant to be the new actual *forgiveness of sins;* and in ver. 34, the "*for*" has no other meaning than this, that the new spiritual lawgiving in the heart, the general enlightenment unto the knowledge of the Lord, all the glorious blessings which the new covenant possesses and brings to man, should take their rise from that one—"*For* I will forgive their iniquity!" We feel at once how appropriate is all this here. And we read further, by no means as a mere parallelism, "And I will *remember* their sin no more"—for the old covenant with its typical sacrifices and propitiations did no more than perpetually bring to remembrance abiding sin, Heb. x. 3. But now the new covenant takes the place of the old, and in it there is a remembrance of the full and perfect atonement, of the one Highpriestly sacrifice, from which grace and strength

[1] As we observed in the exposition of that epistle, "certainly for no other reason than to point to the fulfilment of the type, to the sublime word of institution which corresponds to the Mosaic word—*This* is My blood, of the New Testament." A hint, too, that the apostle was well aware of the original historical formula τοῦτό ἐστι.

are derived, from age to age, in ever renewed and living application.

But we must look more closely at the word διαθήκη, and observe how we arrive at the idea of *Testament*—which indeed the διατίθεμαι, Lu. xxii. 29, had slightly foreannounced. V. Gerlach presupposes as certain that the word used was the Aramaic קְיָם, but this expression less plainly contains the idea of Testament; and we must confidently *assert*, even on account of the reference to the passages already cited, that the Lord's word must have at any rate proceeded from בְּרִית. Either this expression itself was (and we may easily suppose so) extant still in the living language; or, if another was substituted, as in the Chaldee Paraphrases, it could be used by our Lord only in its strict connection with the בְּרִית of the sacred text. What then is the meaning of this word? Primarily, it is certain, that of *fœdus*,[1] as a compact between two parties; from this the *condescension* of God sets out, when He establishes a covenant with men, as Noah, Abraham, Israel. But it is obvious that even in the Old Testament two things were prominent in connection with it:—the *initiative* on the side of *God*, and the *mediation* of a propitiating *blood*. When God is regarded as coming down to man with such condescension as to enter into covenant with them as with His equals, it must never be forgotten that it is God, nevertheless, who first proposed and established the covenant, and laid down its conditions and promises. The *condition* of the Sinaitic covenant in particular is the law; hence the *book of the covenant*, Ex. xxiv. 7, and most specifically *the words of the covenant, the ten commandments*, Ex. xxxiv. 28, and the *tables of the covenant*, Deut. ix. 9, and so forth. But still more emphatically prominent, as the initiative of God, is the *promise* given; so that בְּרִית *a parte potiori* simply signifies—not the παραγγελία, but the ἐπαγγελία

[1] As the Vulg. translates it throughout the O. T., and in the N. T. always *testamentum*. But not according to the etymology which derives it from the cutting of the sacrifice; rather, as Hofmann teaches us from בָּרָא with the meaning, to place anything that it may be, or that it may be thus; consequently, not etymologically a covenant at once, but something laid down or established, a διαθήκη. It does not depend, however, upon any possible etymology; but upon the meaning of the phraseology as the Scripture itself makes it plain.

of him who offers peace and friendship, for which it would be enough (with Gesenius) to cite Isa. lix. 21; see, moreover, the covenant with David (entirely equivalent to promise), 2 Sam. xxiii. 5; Ps. lxxxix. 4, 35; 2 Chron. xiii. 5. All this of itself would prepare the way for that meaning of בְּרִית which is almost identical with *institution, testamentary disposition*; but this transition in the idea for the *new* covenant (in which the Old Testament notion of a mutual covenant, partly anthropomorphical, partly legal, must altogether drop), is found in the mediating *blood* of the covenant—not without blood—which has its fulfilment now in the blood of Him who makes us heirs of all the blessings purchased by that death, who gives them to us as an inheritance, making us heirs or co-heirs, partakers in fellowship of His new life, prerogative, and kingdom. Thus the apostle unfolds it, Heb. ix. 15—18, very plainly,[1] and "so connects the *death* which has now taken place with the ancient words concerning *inheritance*, that the conferring of the inheritance shows itself now to be an actual legacy, in the similitude of a human testament." He is not playing upon any enforced double meaning of the Greek διαθήκη, which, while it was used by the Sept. as synonymous with συνθήκη, was in the form of דִּיאָתִיקִי already in use among the Jews in the sense of a proper legacy; but the new turn given to the expression in the new *language* only corresponds with a reality in the *matter* itself.[2] Similarly, the same apostle, Gal. iii. 15, compares the promised gift to the firm testament of a man, and it is not an arbitrary comparison. The *authorisation* of the idea "New *Testament*," developed *now* from the בְּרִית, and coming forward in the διαθήκη, lies in *the Lord's words of institution connected with the cup*, even as we have already seen that Heb. ix. 20 alluded *to them*. Assuredly, the simple

[1] See my exposition of the Hebrews (Hebräerbrief i. 316—333), in which it is shown, and I hope satisfactorily, that no sophistry can avail to take away the idea of a testament.

[2] There is a half truth in what Bengel says: "The words בְּרִית and διαθήκη *differ*, and have such a difference as marvellously corresponds with the nature of the case. For בְּרִית is more congruant with the old economy, which had the form of a covenant; διαθήκη with the new economy, which has the form of a testament." This difference, however, is but a unity in the great development.

and plain meaning of this word of institution is just as if it had been said, Behold I *die* for you—and *live* nevertheless—I thus give, bequeath Myself to you—*in this ye have Me*, in My death and blood, so that ye may live in Me, because I live in you! Thus understood, the *for* of St Matthew assumes a strong emphasis—Drink ye *all* of this, *for* it is indeed My *blood* in which I offer to you all the covenant, and seal the testament, and give it you! Similarly, the significant *opposition* in the juxtaposition of the words—*that of the New Testament;* as pointing to the *new* element—*My own* blood makes the promise to you a *testament* of Him who dies for you!

It needs no further remark to show that *This is* in its construction with *My blood* is to be understood as in the case of the bread. The change, however, in St Luke and St Paul which makes *the New Testament* into a *predicate*, requires not merely *this is* for the subject, but by a similar change—this *cup*. For the wine, indeed, (or that which was given in the wine), is the blood; but only the cup can be called the testament in the blood. (Luther's translation in St Luke—this is the cup—is manifestly incorrect.) On the one hand, however, this amounts to the same; for the cup stands for its contents—that which I give you in it, as it were, this *drink*, *ποτήριον* almost equivalent to *πόμα*, *πόσις*. (As, in connection with the bread, we may say, with Schulthess, *τοῦτο* scil. *χρῆμα*, *βρῶμα*—only that it must be understood *concretely*, and not merely this eating or drinking.) But then, since it does not now follow—*is My blood*, but—*is the New Testament*, we must understand it—This My giving of the cup and *your drinking of it*, this fellowship in the cup is for you the New Testament; that is, your reception and appropriation of it, your acceptance into the heirship.[1] But *in My blood*, again, must not be interpreted as merely *per* sanguinem meum, *through* My blood; this is forbidden by the sacramental *this is*, for which the other form is only a substitution. But it retains the sense of a *real impartation*—The testament betwixt Me and you be-

[1] And in a continually repeated renewal of the sacred and firm *διατίθεμαι*, in the future; as Calvin says—"For the covenant which He once sanctioned in His blood, He in a certain sense renews or rather continues—*as often as* He offers to us that sacred blood poured out."

comes a reality through the blood drunk from this cup, consists *in* the blood, *it* being common between Me and you—the *drinking* is the obtaining of the testament, *because that which is drunk* is the blood. Compare the protest against the superficial connection as maintained by the Reformed Church (as if it were *the New Testament which is in My blood* merely), in Kahnis v. Abendm., S. 71, 72, and his correct solution—*This drink* is My blood, which is the new covenant; or—is, as My blood, the new covenant.

WHICH IS SHED FOR MANY. *Shed* like *given* makes the future present; the effundetur or fundetur of the Vulg., therefore, is wrong, although, in St Luke at least, *datur* is more correctly substituted. Περὶ in St Matthew, and ὑπὲρ in St Luke (and in St Mark as a various reading), are not to be distinguished; they go not beyond the simple *For*, as this was not the express place for the decisive ἀντί of substitution.[1] Nevertheless, the latter is involved in the former, as far as the life of Christ poured out in His blood enters into us as our life. We need not be dubious as to the incorrect displacement of πολλῶν in favour of πάντων—all instead of many. First of all, the *many* might point, in opposition to the Jewish ceremony, to the "multitude of those strangers to the old paschal lamb who were now invited;" and this of course leads to the most universal inclusion of mankind. That the blood of Christ was shed *for all*, in the sense of sufficient merit and general grace, is testified in the Scripture generally, and here decisively by St Luke's ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν—for *you*—which certainly *includes* Judas.[2] The many *might* be intended as the ordinary interpretation of Rom. v. 15, 18, 19, the

[1] The arbitrary and foolish notion of Schulthess, that ἐκχυνόμενον is equivalent to ἔκχυτον, ῥαντὸν, ῥαντήριον, and ὑπέρ equivalent to περι, עַל—that in St Mark the idea of the covenant blood is only the blood of *sprinkling*—needs no refutation for our readers who have discerned the whole clear connection. We cannot but respect the spirit in which Ebrard proposes the Pauline formula, which he expounds one-sidedly, as the decisive explanation of τοῦτό ἐστι; but our exposition of the sacramental words must still maintain the whole fulness of meaning in this sacred and mysterious discourse, as we have set it forth.

[2] For Kahnis has no reason for saying that this word could not have been used in the presence of Judas:—it is sufficient to refer to 2 Pet. ii. 1.

many all, who spring from Adam, in opposition to the *One* who redeems them. (Comp. 1 Cor. x. 17, *οἱ πολλοὶ, οἱ πάντες*.) But, strictly speaking, even in Rom. v., the *πολλοὶ* are not the *πάντες*, but in the promised result only those for whom the redemption finally avails, *οἱ λαμβάνοντες*, those who receive it. (Jno. i. 12.) And therefore we regard the contrast between St Matthew's "drink ye *all* of it," and the "*many*" (*πόλλῶν*, not altogether the same as *τῶν πολλῶν*) as intimating that only in the case of many (Isa. liii. 11, 12), does this blood approve itself as *quoad efficaciam* shed for them.[1] Under one aspect, as Braune expresses himself, "there is something fearful in the subtil but manifest intimation in, Drink ye *all* of it—shed for *many*; wherefore not then for all? because thus also the *blood* of Jesus cries out *against* some!" Fearful, that is, is the protest and *exclusion* pronounced against the same Judas who was bidden to drink with the rest, and whom the varying expression in St Luke includes—so that *this* dreary mystery within mystery in the Sacrament is exhibited in the twofold formula. But under another aspect, the comprehension in one of the genuine sacramental company—the correlative of that exclusion—is most *gracious*:—the *many*, saved and sanctified by this blood, are represented (as was said above, concerning the Passover) by every little company of communicants.[2]

But in St Luke *τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐκχυνόμενον* follows *ἐν τῷ αἵματι*; and how is this peculiarity of construction to be explained? It has been referred back to the *cup* simply; and the remark has been made, just as if *αἷμα ἐκχυνόμενον* in the two other Evangelists were spurious or of no importance, "that very little blood was usually shed upon the cross." As it regards this last point, we think that, in most certain and necessary exception to the rule, Christ actually, that is, physically poured out *all* His blood; and that there is a mystery in this which correspond to the idea of the Sacrament, and is indicated in it:—we would not, however, make this a stumbling-block to any, but simply remark that it may and must be said in a correct sense, that He poured out *His blood* (as it respects its virtue and influence as good as all

[1] As we said already on Matt. xx. 28.

[2] We must leave to itself the idea of Grotius, that there is an allusion to Dan. ix. 27. *δυναμώσει διαθήκην πολλοῖς*.

of it) for us. That the *shed* in St Luke does not alone or even primarily refer to the *cup* (in contradiction to Matt. and Mark), is clear from Bengel's saying—nam poculum plenum non effunditur, sed ebibitur.[1] Consequently, the transition to the nominative here is to be explained as in Sommer's Synoptic Tables: St Luke had previously spoken with St Paul, or according to the form handed down by him; but he then returns back to the Synoptic account, in order to connect with the former the main word of the original tradition—hence the nominative. It is a *constructio πρὸς τὸ σημαινόμενον*, since in the essence of the *communication* and *appropriation*, which is here concerned, *διαθήκη ἐν τῷ αἵματι* and *τὸ αἷμα τῆς διαθήκης* are one and the same. But, on that account, it is plain on the other hand, that *ἐκχυνόμενον* also refers to the cup (or strictly speaking to the wine in it); not in the external sense, however, but in that *symbolical* sense which now first passes over from the shedding of the *blood* to the pouring out of the wine. The *cup* in a certain sense points (symbolically) to the *unity* of the whole blood of Christ, and is therefore parallel[2] with the whole mass of the bread, or the body; consequently the *ἐκχυνόμενον* must lead us to think of the wine presented to be drunk, just as the *διδόμενον* and *κλώμενον* of the bread. As the body is broken *for us* when we eat of it, in the perfect unity of the death and the life which comes from it; so is all the poured out blood of the Lord sacramentally included in this cup, and is from it, when we drink, "poured out" as to its efficacy *for us*, that is, in us—in the analogy of the *pouring out* of the Holy Ghost, that is, His abundant, full communication. And here we see a new reason, in the profound symbolism of the whole, why Christ could say—Drink ye *all* (the cup of the Sacrament is provided like universal redemption for you all);—but could not say that the *blood* contained in it was livingly *poured out* for all who presumptuously and externally drink of the cup.

[1] Hence Schulthess, to save his exclusive interpretation and remove the reference to the *αἷμα*, mends the *ἐγχυνόμενον*.

[2] As Ignat. ad Philad. means in the well-known passage: *μία γὰρ σὰρξ—καὶ ἓν ποτήριον εἰς ἕνωσιν τοῦ αἵματος αὐτοῦ*. Similarly, Dionys. Areop. (quoted and perverted by Schulthess), *τὸν ἀδιαίρετον ἄρτον διελὼν —καὶ τὸ ἑνιαῖον τοῦ ποτηρίου πᾶσι καταμερίσας*.

FOR THE REMISSION OF SINS. This added clause is by no means spurious (however distateful to D. Schulz, whose peculiar *in remembrance of Me* it altogether opposes); it is certainly omitted in all but the first Evangelist, and even in St Paul's form, but the omission says no more than that it was already understood in the *blood* of the *covenant*. When the Lord expressly thus spoke, He brought into special prominence (with further allusion to Jer. xxxi. 34) the *main blessing of the New Testament* as now sealed to us in the blood of atonement. To the old covenant belongs the πάρεσις, to the new covenant, essentially and properly, the ἄφεσις ἁμαρτιῶν. Rom. iii. 25 (Acts xvii. 30), Eph. i. 7.[1] "For what is the New Testament? Certainly it is the promise of the remission of sins and reconciliation through Christ." We may set out with these words of Melanchthon, but must follow them up, as Luther does—Where forgiveness of sins is, there is also life and blessedness. Luther's controversy with those who would have the forgiveness of sins through Christ sought at the Cross, and not in the Sacrament, is well known. He says,[2] "We deal with the forgiveness of sins after a twofold manner. First, as it has been obtained and must be sought by us; and secondly, as it is *dispensed* and given to us. Christ obtained it for us on the Cross, most assuredly; but He has not distributed or given it on the Cross. He did not obtain it for us in the Supper or Sacrament, but He did there *through the word* distribute and give it, *as also in the Gospel in which it is preached.* If I would have my sins forgiven, I must not run simply to the Cross, for I do not find it dispensed there; I must not, as Carlstadt will have it, simply bring to my memory and dwell upon the sufferings of Christ, for neither do I find it there; but I must go to the Sacrament, or to the Gospel, and there I find the word which proffers, gives, and dispenses to me my privilege in the forgiveness of sins." Luther, therefore, has rightly taught that whoever has a guilty conscience may go and

[1] Schultheß makes bold to strike out ἄφεσις in the last passage as a gloss, so that "it is not even a Pauline word." See Heb. ix. 22, x. 18.

[2] Das ander Theil wider die himmlischen Propheten vom Sakrament. Comp. also Jul. Müller in his excellent Latin work upon the Sacramental doctrine of Luther and Calvin, S. 5: Itaque ne Lutherus quidem, quem principalem statuit sacræ cœnæ effectum, ei soli vindicat.

find comfort in the Sacrament, not in the bread and wine, not in the body and blood of Christ, but in the *word* which in the Sacrament presents and gives me the body and blood of Christ *as given and shed for me. Is not that clear enough?*

We make bold to answer this last question, No. Yet it must be maintained, with Luther, that the forgiveness of sins is also imparted in the Gospel, as here, through the word; we may say, further, that the first Sacrament, Baptism, had already communicated forgiveness to the participants of the Supper; yea, it must not be overlooked, that a preparatory word of absolution had been pronounced upon those who now partook—Ye are clean; and so, according to the old saying, Holy things were for the holy! But what Luther intended, though he did not plainly enough on this occasion express himself, is the truth—that, in the Sacrament, the word given for the appropriation of faith receives its stronger assurance and guarantee through the *accompanying real communication* of the body and blood. Thus it is not, properly speaking, for forgiveness—the word concerning which we already believe—but for the assurance and confirmation of it, that we fly to the strong consolation of the Sacrament. So that "the forgiveness of sins is not derived from the participation of the wine and the bread, but from the shedding of the blood upon the cross." (Krahner.) And most assuredly, therefore, this forgiveness cannot be (as Lindner says) the essential and distinctive blessing which is received in it. But that blessing is confirmed in the Sacrament: first, because we, by the believing reception of the elements, place ourselves ever anew upon the objectively certain ground of the accomplished redemption, of the *established testament*;[1] and, further, because we thereby receive anew in the body and blood forgiveness *unto sanctifying influence.* All progress in sanctification, all increase of strength in the inner man, is conditioned by an appropriation of justification in ever new and living power: *therefore* and *to that end* Christ gives to us on every renewal of the Sacrament a new and mighty consolation of forgiveness as the food and invigoration of the soul

[1] Hence Luther, not clearly penetrating the *unity* of the divine gift and the glorified corporeity, spoke of "the most noble and precious *pledge* and *seal*" of the promise of the covenant. See Kähler dritter Luth. Katech. S. 174.

which is first necessary. With this view He added the word, which speaks of such remission of sins; and anticipating, moreover, that all communicants, as they would bring weakness, so also would bring sin requiring forgiveness to this table.

According to St Paul the Lord added a second, repeating *This do ye in remembrance of Me*, strengthening it by the additional AS OFT AS YE DRINK IT. It scarcely needs proof that this πίνητε is not, as Stolz, de Wette, van Ess, Allioli, Kistemaker, Gossner, with one consent translate, As oft as ye drink (and eat, respectively); but, As oft as ye drink *this* cup.[1] *As oft*—this is not to be perverted, in direct opposition to the *Do this*, into an entire surrender of the Sacrament to our own option. Barclay says, "These words (as often) import no more a *command*, than to say, As often as thou goest to Rome, see the Capitol, will infer a command for men to go thither." Now this carelessly and wilfully forgets that this repetition at the cup itself *presupposes* the first *injunction* to *Do this*.[2] The ὁσάκις—*as oft*—plainly enough intimates that Christians are not to eat and drink thus once or a few times in their lives:—there is to be in their hearts a *deep desire* for it. But *how often* is left in evangelical freedom; this last expression abolishes all limitation to any definite festival season, as in the old economy.[3]

The renewed importance given to the old sacramental controversy in our own times, is a sufficient apology for the dispro-

[1] That Luther's *es*—it—had the *blood* for its object, is only a charge of Schulthess.

[2] Yet Schulthess seems to coincide with this Quakerism, when he serves his own purpose by urging and pressing the ἄν,—understanding it to mean—At every voluntary occasion on which ye meet to eat and drink joyfully! This is worse than the old notion that the meaning of the institution was—*At every meal* remember Me!

[3] "It was added, because He would have the Sacrament free, not bound to any fixed time, like the Jewish Passover. As if He would say, I appoint unto you a paschal festivity or supper, which ye are not merely to celebrate yearly on the evening of this day, but to enjoy *often*, when and *as oft as* it shall be proper and for your good, tied in that particular to no place or time." Catech. Maj. p. 501. Quite opposed to this is the strange opinion (which Lindner holds) that in this *as oft as* a yearly and public ceremonial like the Passover was appointed.

portionable length of our exposition upon the words of that institution which is so closely connected with the union projected among our churches. And we cannot close without entering into a dogmatic and pacificatory consideration of the controversy.

What was said concerning the feet-washing may be applied, even in a higher degree, to our Lord's act and injunction in the Sacrament:—Ye do not yet know and understand what I do, but ye shall know hereafter. The disciples could not at that moment properly understand the Lord; the experience of the enjoyment here promised, and the illumination of the Holy Spirit, expounded afterward the mystery to their minds, so far as being a mystery it was capable of it. The further doctrine of the Apostle Paul concerning the Sacrament presents itself to us with the most definite precision, simply, and without affording any pretext for baseless subtilties. The Apostle John points only to its mystical depth in the brief and sudden hint of 1 Jno. v. 6—8. The words of the apostolical Fathers, despite the commencement of *human* dogmatising, retain as a whole the same simplicity; and so with the early Fathers who followed them,—until *gradually* the overstraining of the words written in the Scripture led to the doctrine of transubstantiation. And then came the reaction of a manifold protest against superstition, which was early prepared for, and which (though not yet complete) in and after the Reformation approached its maturity, and will re-establish true concord in the living apprehension of the true faith.

The testimonies of the Fathers, from Ignatius, Justin, and Irenæus downward, are well known to those who study this subject. The ὁμολογεῖν of the church stands firm against all heresy. "The Eucharist is the flesh of our Saviour Jesus Christ, which suffered for our sins, and which the Father in His loving-kindness raised again." It runs most decisively, "*We do not receive these* as common bread or common wine—we have received and *been taught* that they were the body and blood of Jesus *made flesh*." To explain away this *common faith* of the church from the beginning requires sophistry and artifice; while to contradict it in our greater wisdom is in itself at least suspicious. Tertullian proves the "*truth* of the body and blood of Christ," not so much *for* the Sacrament, which bears its own clear testimony to itself, as *by means of it*. Distinction was carefully made

between the ἐπίγειον and the οὐράνιον πρᾶγμα, as by Irenæus; between the *visible species of the elements* and the *invisible flesh and blood*, between the *Sacrament and the matter of the Sacrament*, as by Augustine. In proportion as the contradiction of unbelievers brought into prominence the individual details of the question, the faith of the early church, destitute of apostolical illumination, was obviously exposed to the danger of deviating to the right or to the left from the exact truth of the sacramental mystery. But it is most perverse to place in the fine balances of a later dogmatic terminology, the indefinite and simple words in which a pure faith expressed its views—whether as testimony to the transcendent character of the Sacrament, or in positive defence of its certainty, or in profound contemplation of its wonderful meaning. If, for instance, we meet with ἐν τύπῳ or *figura* corporis, that is not at once to be explained as bearing Zwingle's meaning;[1] on the other hand, *corpus in pane* and ἄρτοι σῶμα γενόμενοι do not mean precisely what Paschasius Radbertus, and Lanfranc made out of it, or what may be termed now *transelementation*, after the early μεταβάλλεσθαι, μεταποιεῖσθαι. Would that men had adhered to their simplicity, instead of imputing to them the petty exactitude of expression which better befits scholastic disputes, than devout contemplation! Alas, that the unhappy controversy should ever have been kindled, in the course of which "polemical paper enough has been consumed to build a fortress!" This sigh is warranted, as far as the controversy has a deplorable side; but sighing will not settle it. It will not suffice that simplicity of spirit would retreat before the presumption of reasoning; the great dogma must be pursued into all its developments; until the true simplicity of faith is reconciled with the profoundest investigation of science.

The concise exposition and paraphrase of those who, following the *first* Helvetic confession (second of Basle), would solve everything by saying, "His body and His blood, that is, *Himself*," is exegetically incorrect, and contains the germ of heretical opposition to the simple words of our Lord. It is not only permitted, but absolutely necessary, that we should protest against

[1] Even τὸ αἷμα οἶνος ἀλληγορεῖται in Clem. Alex. does not exclude the mystery.

this, and point to His simple expressions again. But that ecclesiastical doctrine or theology is utterly to be rejected, as no better in this matter at least than Rationalism, which reduced, as in Zwingle's teaching, the presence of our Lord's body into "a realising contemplation of faith, and thankful recognition that the Lord had truly suffered in the flesh," and did not scruple to deny altogether the presence of the actual and natural body, declaring this to be "a looking back to the flesh-pots of Egypt, and an error which opposes the plain word of God!"[1] What Zwingle, who alas went back at last to the mere empty tokens of an absent body, retains of mere ceremony and typical teaching, is not only far from being enough, but is itself in flat contradiction to the words of our Lord.[2] That, on the other hand, which Calvin not only avows but confidently maintains, is a testimony to the true faith which must be hailed with joy. He thus retorts the objection which Rationalism had urged against him:—"Is it a dictate of common sense that the immortal life of the soul should be sought in the human flesh of Christ? Does our poor reason tolerate it, that that vivifying energy of the body of Christ should proceed forth from heaven, and flow into and pervade our souls upon earth? Is it in harmony with our philosophical speculations that a dead and terrestrial element should be the efficacious organ of the Holy Spirit? Can it be deduced from natural principles, that any emblems and words of the minister should be the channel for the impartation of Christ? Most assuredly, if the holy Sacrament were not to us a celestial mystery, we should not attribute to it effects so marvellous and so incredible to carnal reasoning."[3] And he must, on calm consideration, be confessed to be in a certain sense right, when he thus urges his aggressive polemics against those whose affirma-

[1] Zwingle's Glaubensbekenntniss von 1530, Artikel 21, d. 22. *Solâ* contemplatione.

[2] Thus, as his doctrine contends *against* the deeper view of the corporeal-spiritual mystery, we cannot agree with Ebrard that "what Zwingle says is not the full truth, but it is altogether true." Ebrard himself traces in his words the first step in the downward progress toward a denial of all life-union with Christ; and, for our own part, we regard the doctrine of this most unmystical teacher as having been wrong from the outset and fundamentally.

[3] Zweite Defension gegen Westphal, S. 675, 676.

tions go beyond this:—"If they would explain the meaning thus, *that while the bread is being offered and given, the exhibition of the body is annexed thereto*, because the truth is *inseparable* from its sign, *I should not much quarrel with them.* But when they *locate* the body itself in the bread, and assign to it an *ubiquity* contrary to its nature; when in their "*Sub* pane" they would have it to be latent *there*—it becomes necessary to vindicate His lips from all such ineptitudes."[1] The distinction here introduced suggests misunderstanding and exaggeration of words on *both* sides of the question; and it is the problem of a later age to adjust the points and reconcile them. But Calvin's zeal goes much too far when he says, "I speak not of Papists, whose doctrine is more tolerable, or at least more modest!" He is altogether too keen upon that *communicatio idiomatum* which enters so essentially into all christology, and requires such careful dealing, when he protests, "As if indeed that union had produced out of the two natures some third thing we know not what, neither God nor man!"[2] But they gave him ample occasion for this:—the truth lies, according to our firm conviction, in the middle; though it may not be easy to find express terms by which to define it.

The *doctrine of ubiquity*—we say with Hagenbach[3] and many Lutherans—"was in fact only a product of embarrassment, and formed the shadow, as it were, of the doctrine concerning the bodily presence in the bread. But its worst feature is its untenableness." The absolute ubiquity of the body of Christ which has been taught,[4] Möhler justly regards as a "marvellous notion," and the protest of the Landgrave of Hesse says appropriately, "we have not been able to find *these* paradoxes about the ubiquity and *unlocalisation* of the body of Christ in the Bible." Our present exegesis must admit that Luther was wrong in asserting, *in the relation which is here in question*, that "the Scripture teaches us not to regard the right hand

[1] Institutt. iv. 17, 16.
[2] Idem, § 30.
[3] Stud. u. Krit. 1854, i. S. 37.
[4] To be carefully distinguished from the *possibility* of being present everywhere, particularly in the church, from the *spiritualitas* = *ubiquitas*, which we admitted in Vol. v."

of God as a particular place, &c."[1] In this, the truth of the spiritual immanence of God in all creatures is confounded with something quite different, concerning which the Scripture gives us sufficient intimation to render it certain that there is a locality opposed to this earth into which Christ has *ascended* and from which He will *come again*. Luther's impetuous fallacy would prove far too much: "Christ's body is at the right hand of God. But the right hand of God is everywhere in the universe. It is therefore *also* in the bread and wine upon the table. Where the right hand of God is, however, there *must* be the body and blood of Christ." If he were speaking merely of Christ's corporeality as so far participating the Divine omnipresence that it also *could* be where it *would*—it would be quite correct. But the "*must*" says too much, as does the "*also* in the bread and wine;" for where is then the specific presence in the Sacrament, and how could we then avert the fanatical extreme of spiritualising which would enjoy the body and blood of Christ in all the world as Christ-pervaded? Not yet to mention the distinction, that *only* in those united to Him by faith the Lord bodily as well as spiritually *enters* and *dwells*. It does not obviate this objection, to allege in feeble retractation, that "nowhere but in the Sacrament *can we say*, Here is Christ; since concerning that alone He has given express assurance. God is here is one thing, God is here *to thee* is another; the latter follows only when it is said —Here shall thou find Me!"[2] For the reply is obvious—What right hast thou to say, He is everywhere?—It is plainly a perversion to say,[3] "For the personal union and the union at the right hand of God testify the *presence* (omnipresence?) of the body; but the institution and the words of the Sacrament testify its *dispensation*." The Scripture, rather, testifies that Christ is

[1] With which the Formul. Concord. agrees, "that the right hand of God is everywhere."

[2] "Christ is around us and in us. Although He is everywhere, in all creatures, and I might find Him in the fire and in the water, since He is there; but it is not His will that I seek Him without the warranty of His word, and throw myself into the fire or the water. He is everywhere, but He wills not that we should grope after Him everywhere; only where His word is."

[3] As in the declaration of the Würtemberg divines.

in heaven, in the sense of a bodily circumscribed presence;[1] while the Sacrament assures us that, and how, He will be present also upon earth. We are free to admit that we must here hold with the Hessian divines:—"Thus we determine and teach, that although Christ is and remains true and natural man, it does not follow that His body and blood *cannot* be distributed and received in the Sacrament; but, since the *humanity* of Christ is *assumed* by the eternal Son of God, and is thus *indivisibly united with* the divinity, it follows and is irrefragably proved that Christ *as omnipotent* and true God *can* be present in His body wherever He *will*." This "*multivoliprœsentia*" or this "*ubicunque vult*," with which the *Form. Concord.* (pag. 787 Rechenb.) agrees, is much more correct, more conformable to Scripture and the thing itself, than the doctrine that His body also *must* be there *as omnipresent!*[2]

An absolutely *everywhere present* body, not merely *dynamically* present according to the design and influence of the Spirit in it, but *locally* present in the manner of corporeity generally—can that be a *body?* No more than that immaterial something, which others are in our time content to attribute to the glorified Christ! Why then is the church of Christ *specifically* his *body?* Why *specifically*—that touches the one; why His *body*—that strikes at the other. Even Petersen[3] says, in his careful manner, "It has ever been a fundamental article that the Son of God became true man, and even in His exaltation remains true man; this is the precious treasure of our faith concerning the abidingly true and efficient humanity of our Saviour, which neither Zwingle nor Œcolampadius wished to renounce, though Luther's exaggerated doctrine of ubiquity gave them *not without reason* trouble

[1] As the *second* Helvetic confession, which elsewhere speaks with precision concerning the flesh and blood of Christ, citing Jno. xiv. 2; Acts iii. 21. Augustine: "In some place of heaven, according to the manner of a true body."

[2] Richers asserts (in his important, though in many points erroneous, book, Die Schöpfungs-Paradieses-und Sündfluth-geschichte, S. 299) even concerning the not yet incarnate Jehovah: "There is only an *essential* and not a *personal ubiquity*;" that is, wherever and as far as person and personality enters, there can be nothing said about absolute universality of presence."

[3] Die Lehre von der Kirche. iii S. 446.

upon the subject." He then quotes the words of the latter, "To exhibit the body of Christ *ἀσχημάτιστον καὶ ἀπερίγραπτον καὶ ἄτροπον καὶ πολύτροπον*, what is it but to assert a Christ *imaginary* and not *real?*" and the right principle in which they both concurred, "that nothing should be determined which might oppose the real humanity of Christ, as Luther's doctrine *threatens* to do." Augustine's words are, "We must take care not to build up the divinity of Christ in such a manner as to take away the truth of His flesh. For when the flesh of our Lord was on earth certainly it was not in heaven; and now that it is in heaven it is not on earth." We may and we must agree with Ebrard, that in this we have at the same time the necessary protest against *pagan* creature-deification. And also with Martensen, that through the exaggerated doctrine of ubiquity the individuality of Christ is volatilised away, the personal Christ of grace and salvation is resolved into a pantheistic nature-Christ, and thus in the end all is turned into one great Sacrament. But we may maintain the true presence of the body and blood in the full Lutheran sense, and yet join Calvin and Beza in rejecting the overstrained Lutheran argument for it. This is shown in the eight counter-questions which the Anhalt divines sent to the Elector, after they had replied in a clear affirmative to the first six which they had received. Let those critical counter-questions be pondered, as they are given in Planck.[1] The first—Whether heaven is a place distinguished from the earth? The second—Whether, so far as the partaking of the true body of Christ in the Sacrament is concerned, there is a *difference* between that which was celebrated on the night of institution, and that which is celebrated now? The sixth—Whether the original words of institution are not sufficient for the hindrance of all sacramental fanaticism? The *eighth*—Whether the human nature of Christ in its majesty remains not, nevertheless, a *creature* of like nature with ours?[2]

We can, indeed, be quite at peace, and communicate with those who will not let the Spirit teach them more than Calvin

[1] Protest. Lehrbegr. vi 658.

[2] In which *last* question touching the creatureliness of the man Jesus, His Divine-humanity is, after the manner of the Reformed, not enough considered. Comp. Liebner's Christologie. i. 298—307.

asserts: "Nor do we say that anything is exhibited which is not truly given. The Lord commands us to receive bread and wine; meanwhile He declares that He gives the spiritual aliment of His body and blood. We do not say that it is a fallacious figure of this which He sets before our eyes; but a *pledge, with which the thing itself, its realisation, is conjoined.*" Again (and often similarly), "since the Lord is the truth itself, we cannot doubt but that He will fulfil the promises which He there gives, and add the truth to the figure. Wherefore I doubt not but that, as He testifies in words and signs, *He makes us partakers of His substance,* by which we are united with Him in one life." The Reformed Confessions from the Heidelb. Catech., which is superficial enough in other respects downward, are right in this point, that they put first—*Although* Christ is now in Heaven.

But now we can confidently go further, with Luther, we can believe and avow and teach, obliged by the words of institution, that He *upon earth also,* that is, in the believing reception of the bread and wine,—not merely *operates,* but bodily *is.* And that is a presumptuous word, and to be rejected, which Beza uttered, "The body of Christ is as far removed from the holy Sacrament as heaven is from earth!" According to 1 Jno. v. 8 the *blood* witnesses, like the Spirit, *upon earth.* In Acts iii. 21 we read, ὃν δεῖ οὐρανὸν μὲν δέξασθαι: *Christ* must receive, possess, rule over heaven; not, Heaven must receive *Him*[1] in any such sense as that He should be locally confined and bound to it. For in the Sacrament *Christ comes down* to us, we are not taken up to Him in heaven; the latter again contradicts the plain meaning of the words of institution, and is a mere human device, like the false ubiquity. The mere *operative* presence does not suffice to the perfect recognition of the mystery in the plain letter, whether as spoken at the Sacrament or in Jno. vi. In the *hard saying* of the latter Christ's flesh and blood are spoken of, not a mere effluence or influence of them, not a mere vivifying vigour, and the like. Concerning these we do not say *eat* and *drink.* Still less does it speak merely of a virtue, operation, or *merit* of the absent body—as the perilous theories weaken it more and still

[1] Which Bengel calls a violent interpretation, and opposed to the exaltation of Christ above all heavens.

more. Here we must take our stand, according to Melanchthon's later words, quoting Cyril on John (Loc. Com.), "It is to be considered that Christ is not in us only through His love, but by our natural participation; that is, He is with us *not only in His efficacy but in His substance.*"[1] Calvin's words cannot be vindicated from a certain vacillation, when he says, at one time, with Luther, "*Under* the symbol of bread we may eat His body, *under* the symbol of wine we may drink *distinctively* His blood, so at length to *receive Him entirely*;" and then turns round, "The kingdom of Christ is not so circumscribed but that He can diffuse its power wherever He pleases, in heaven or earth; but that He can manifest His presence *in its power and virtue* otherwise than as present in body; but that, finally, He can feed us with His own body, the fellowship of which by the virtue of His Spirit He can communicate to us. On this principle the body and blood of Christ are exhibited to us in the Sacrament." The virtue of the Spirit is indeed there; but the *otherwise than as*[2] is far from reaching the meaning of τοῦτό ἐστι, understood according to the analogy of the whole of Scripture and of the whole of faith, and is far from the sense of the great mystery, Eph. v. 30. When Calvin says, As if indeed we should not equally enjoy His presence, if He called us up to Himself: we may reply to the question, But why speak of our being taken up to Him? As if He had not said that He would descend to us! So v. Meyer, admitting almost too unreservedly "Luther's happy medium between Tridentinism and Zuinglianism," says excellently, "between Zuinglianism and Lutheranism, Calvin again wavers, but has found an *unhappy* medium." This is true; but Lindner expresses himself too strongly with regard to Calvin: "He makes of the one sacramental act two distinct matters; of which the one is empty, and the other full of meaning." For he does expressly maintain the *unity*, and not merely the "simultaneousness" of the two acts, as *actio in actione, actus in actu.*

[1] So in the Leipzig Conf. 1631—Sammlung der reform. Symb. Bücher, Neustadt 1830, 1, S. 490.

[2] And so again, "Although the very flesh of Christ do not enter into us." The Hungar. Confess. says, "*But He is not* bodily present, as He was present in the womb of His mother, in Judea, in the sepulchre. For as He rose again and ascended, He is *not* here and *must* be in heaven till the day of judgment." Tanquam carcere inclusus!

This much is certain to the penetration of our faith, that, *although* (as we have repeatedly expounded, and as it follows from Jno. vi.) the Lord can give and does give His flesh and blood *independently* of the sacramental bread and wine, *this* participation of His glorified corporeity is nevertheless something different from that which we receive through faith in His *word* and as the operation of the *Holy Spirit*.[1] On the other hand *it is equally certain*—and here we come to the second point on which the Union must deviate from rigid Lutheranism, the ubiquity being the first—that the proffered flesh and blood of Christ cannot possibly be received by *unbelievers* in the same sense, in the same truth and actuality, as by believers. That Christ corporeally glorified, and as He essentially *dwells* in believers, should by means of any *manducatio oralis* only for one moment enter into unbelievers; and thus that it should be *possible*, as Luther says, "for the flesh of Christ to be bodily eaten in the Sacrament without faith"—we protest against as a *horrendum dictu*, and a thing utterly unimaginable, in the assertion of which the Lutheran doctrine has overstepped the limits of all intelligent understanding of all words of Scripture.[2] If even—we would say in the spirit of concession—this *could* for a moment take place, then either must Christ become in them a consuming fire, or their immediately following *rejection* or casting forth of Christ (things simply unimaginable in themselves) must extend at once to their *eternal* condemnation. Neither the Scripture nor experience knows anything of this. "We never read," says Calvin, "that men bring down upon themselves death by *unworthily receiving*; but rather by *rejecting Him again*." The confession of John Sigismund appeals (Article ix.) with perfect

[1] Consequently, not the question but the answer, is altogether wrong in the Geneva catechism: Do we attain to *this* communication only through the Sacrament? No, for according to the testimony of Paul Christ imparts Himself *also through the Gospel*." For thus all flows vaguely and undefinedly into one, into the communication of Christ to us.

[2] Calvin: "To receive Christ without faith is no more possible than for a seed to germinate in the fire." We say that in the Sacrament the *for us* becomes an *in us*; and thus that there is here no other *in us* to be thought of than the *for us* which is so applied. In Ebrard's excellent words, "the most real unity of the *gratia forensis* and *gratia medicinalis*." (Only that Ebrard incorrectly excludes both Christ's body and ours from this *medicinalis!*)

propriety to Jno. vi. 54 and 47, in affirmation that unbelievers do *not* partake of the real body and blood of Christ. The twenty-ninth Article of the English Church utters the simple truth: "But rather, to their condemnation, do eat and drink the *sign or Sacrament of so great a thing*."

On *this* point Petersen does not preserve his clearness of apprehension and statement. His explanation of the condemnation of unworthy recipients—that "because they receive *bodily* and *not at the same time spiritually*," therefore it becomes to them, as Luther said, "poisonous and deadly"—appears to us itself inexplicable. Here we ask boldly with Calvin, "Who does not see that Christ would become exanimate, and be by a sacrilegious divorce sundered from all His spirit and virtue?" For then must the flesh and blood of Christ, that which has been penetrated throughout by spirit and life, be capable of existing also *without* spirit and life, in a *bodily sense* alone[1]—and what would this lead to? The true body of Christ without spirit, and now a poison unto death—let him who can conceive this, and bring it into harmony with Jno. vi! Petersen in a contradictory manner goes on, "Where Christ's body is, there is *also His spirit*, even with and in the unbelievers, that is, in the *absolute objectivity of a judicial presence*;" but our hard understanding derives not the slightest help from this addition. Such "absolutely objective judicial presence" of the *spirit of Christ*, which at the same time comes into a man in a *bodily* sense, we no more find in Scripture than we find there the poisonous and deadly influence of His living and life-giving flesh and blood. Least of all have we scriptural ground for the utterly inconceivable notion of Kahnis, that "the unworthy recipient desecrates and as it were destroys and put to death *the body of Christ* by receiving it into his impure personality."

"A state of faith, an existing commencement of the new man

[1] With Ebrard: "The body and the spirit of Christ disjoined violently; the former being conceived not as living and quickened, but as an independent, separate, and indifferent substance." See what he says against Rudelbach's arguments, vom Abendm. i. 130. Similarly Jul. Müller (Lutheri et Calvini sententiæ p. 11) against Kahnis' misunderstanding. We agree with Nitzsch that the Lutheran doctrine can only then be maintained when it gives up the absolute *ubiquity*, and "renounces any such presence of the body and blood as cannot be other than an *absence of the full person of Christ*."

generally, is thus the condition for the essential virtue of the holy Sacrament," we say with Ebrard; and apply to this what he has maintained with regard to Baptism, "the Scripture knows nothing of a *magical* influence of Christ which is independent of a free and conscious faith in the word, operating upon the passive and unconscious side of human nature." Luther has here, at the topstone of his superstructure, strangely forgotten the foundation of *faith* which he had so well known how to lay.[1] The doctrine of a like reception on the part of unbelievers retains in it a kind of *opus operatum*, if not with regard to the distributor and receiver on earth, yet with regard to *the almighty Christ*, who is thus held to connect His body and blood, for life or death, with the external act, in a manner which is utterly opposed to the spirit of His kingdom.[2] Indeed, to this we may apply with greater propriety what Hardenberg said concerning the not intentionally wrong "*under the form* of bread and wine"—This has an odour of transubstantiation.[3] The objection arising from the desecration of the body of Christ[4] is not decisive; for the Lord does certainly in other ways hold intercourse with the impure, and expose Himself to be contemned without any disparagement of His honour. But the nature of the case itself does not

[1] Although we find him often using expressions inconsistent with his rigid doctrine, such as "The Sacraments are nothing but signs which minister to faith; nor are they of any use without that faith."

[2] Credimus—quod nullum opus humanum, neque ulla ministri Ecclesiæ pronuntiatio presentiæ corporis et sanguinis Christi in cœnâ causa sit, sed quod hoc soli *omnipotenti virtuti Domini nostri Jesu Christi* sit tribuendum. Formula Conc. Epit. vii., p. 599.

[3] Planck, Band v., Th. ii., S. 205. Hence, Guericke (der Calvinismus Unionsvehikel, S. 29), assures us that there is so important a basis common to the Catholic and Lutheran doctrines, that the superaddition of transubstantiation almost vanishes into nothing (!)—and that the Lutheran is infinitely nearer to the Catholic than to the Calvinist. So Kahnis teaches that "a great truth lies at the foundation of the Catholic doctrine (the *concomitantia* lying beneath the denial of the cup!") We might say that the Catholic doctrine of the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper is erroneous, indeed, &c." (S. 265.) This is very different from the "vermaledeiten abgötterei" of the Heidelberg catechism.

[4] Which Calvin stated in the strongest form: "If a filthy whoremonger, a perjured man, a robber, a poisoner, one stained with worse crimes if possible than these, or a half heathen, approach the holy Supper, and bring with him there unlimited defilement of vice and superstition—they prostitute to such a man the body of Christ!"

suffer it: the objectively almighty power of God, present for all, cannot distribute even in the Sacrament the body and spirit of Christ where there is no corresponding grace with which it may connect itself; but, being utterly rejected, all its operation must be withheld. Calvin, in reply to Westphal, says keenly but truly, that God does not cease to send down His rain because the rocks and stones do not imbibe it;" mira vero stupiditas, quod cœnæ *effectum* incredulis ipse *adimens*, non expendit, *hanc primam effectus esse partem, quam illis vindicat.*"

It is most important, at this culminating point of the controversy, clearly to fix in our minds these two things:—*What* the glorified corporeity of Christ really is, that is, *spirit and life* according to Jno. vi. 63; and that *our faith* is throughout and alone the mediating condition on our part of every reception of the Lord's grace and gift. St Paul does not teach that, as oft as we eat of this bread and drink of this cup, all receive, and eat and drink the body and blood of Christ; nor does He by any means say that the unworthy eats and drinks the body and blood of the Lord to his own condemnation. He merely teaches what we *read in his own words*[1]—although Luther, the Form. Conc., and many Lutheran theologians, have failed to read it aright, and have most unjustifiably cited 1 Cor. xi. 27 or 29, as *proof* of their doctrine. "The strict exegetical requirement of the passage" is only the *presence* of the body and blood of Christ, but by no means the participation of the unworthy. The latter is implicitly denied. To the question, How can he partake of the mere elements to his condemnation? (S. 467), there is answer enough to be given. And of what kind is the exegesis of the *Formula Concordiæ*, which confidently argues from the κοινωνία of 1 Cor. x. 16—*hoc est*, qui hunc panem edit, corpus Christi edit! (pag. 600), without reflecting whether these unbelievers can belong to the ἓν σῶμα of ver. 17. For the rest, we have abundantly shown that the assumption of a participation of unbelievers does not, as Ebrard thinks, stand or fall with the assumption that the *body and blood* of Christ—in or apart from the Sacrament—are really partaken of.

[1] Although at a very early age the idea was inconsiderately substituted—Whoso eateth and drinketh unworthily the body of the Lord!

We have thus seen that while, on the one hand, the honest and zealous defence of the mystery is exaggerated through human infirmity into dangerous error and offence; on the other hand, a deficient apprehension of it may be sincere in itself, and express much that is undeniably true. For ourselves, we are not disposed to lay any such stress upon exactitude of doctrine and statement as would *divide the church*. When the adorable Saviour uttered precisely these words in the institution, He certainly represented to us a mystery which was to be received in simplicity, to be magnified in faith, to be investigated by the humble boldness of enlightened intelligence; but He never intended that the blessing of the Sacrament, fellowship with Himself and His church, should be made to depend upon the degree of our understanding. As all our intelligence must necessarily in general be matter of *degree*, this holds good yet more strongly in such a mystery as the Supper of the Lord. It may be said with truth that as the Lord has plainly given *something* for *each* stage of understanding, while He has left the kernel of the mystery unexplained and undisclosed in the shell which He created for it—it was His intention that we should discuss it in love, though not contend over it in divisions. That which He will have us finally acknowledge in faith He does not express in plainer words (which, as the church shows, was possible); but He intimates it so definitely, that we may and we should press forward to it. *The Lord's Supper itself*, in its profundity of meaning, which the church can apprehend only by degrees, in its comprehensiveness of meaning, which gives even the weak something to lay hold of, *is a declaration of the union-principle*—union in the participation of Christ, according to the degree of the knowledge of each, apart from any formularised dogma.[1] For, as the words of institution provoke difference of opinion, so also they tolerate it; and the gracious "*for you*," embracing each, will always make peace and secure the acceptance, by the *heart* which longs for salvation, of the wonderful "*this is*." If

[1] "All breathes here of love, all tends to union, communion, communication!" So Sartorius, better than what we read in the Lutheran historian Maltzan (Umriss einer christ. Weltges., S. 275),—"The doctrine of the Sacrament was always (and rightly, as the kernel of the Gospel), the point of distinction and separation in the church!"

the Lord did not so intend, but would hedge about the institution with rigorous and Sinaitic enactment, why did He speak *precisely thus*, that is, in words which, as the history of all ages shows, may be so variously expounded by men equally believers in Him? Why did He not rather append to this union-rite,—in the truest, sublimest sense of the term—an authentic *formula concordiæ*, the *solida declaratio* of His own lips?

We hear much said about three stages or critical points in sacramental views—we ought rather to say, in the celebration and reception of the Sacrament—but the first point is for the most part very incorrectly defined. It is *not* to be found in the theory which rests upon "this signifies," and the reception of mere "signs:" that must be regarded as itself a symptom of an essential deficiency at the very outset.[1] That which is really the *first* essential, and which becomes error only when we fail to go beyond it, is the obedience of Christ's word—Do this *in remembrance of Me*. Who dares to empty this word of its significance, and make it mean nothing in the ordinance? Who does not feel that he must complete even St Paul's and St Luke's accounts by introducing this word as the necessary introduction to all? Who can approach the Sacrament otherwise than as remembering Christ, thinking, that is, of His death, testifying and at the same time strengthening this remembrance by the act appointed by the Lord? It is something, indeed, to show forth, in the true earnestness of faith, the death of our Lord, to commemorate it festally, to *renew, seal, and confirm our fellowship as members with the Head*. But the more emphasis we lay upon "the true earnestness of faith," the more certainly must we be led on to that exposition of the "remembrance" which we have given above. Zwingle set out with a perfectly correct fundamental principle, and spoke of it sometimes warmly and excellently; but he was rigorously condemned without any attempt to assist the development of his views by gentleness, and thus led through an unhappy offence to establish a one-sided system of doctrine on this great subject. The solemn "this is" was at once explained to be "this signifies;" and the whole celebration was reduced to

[1] Ebrard has the merit of having clearly shown the historical process of Zwingle's insufficient exegesis of the words of institution; and how that which was correct at the first naturally proceeded into error.

a simple *declaration* of faith in Christ: polemics then drove him back so far (as may be seen in Ebrard) as to deny even the *strengthening* of faith to the Sacrament. The truth would have been: I receive, according to the Divine institution as it is first understood, a *pledge* in the symbol that Christ died *for me* as certainly as the bread and the cup are put in my hands. Meyer's excellent words apply to this: "Every true Christian will admit that, in the participation of the visible bread and wine, the spirit works grace in every one who worthily receives.[1] For wherefore else should we seek this invigoration? And, if it were even merely the blessed feeling of grateful remembrance and brotherly fellowship, this of itself is from a Divine influence, a joy in the Holy Spirit." Yea, we would add—the body and blood would be received even in this commemoration, whether we acknowledge it or not. But instead of this, Zwingle's excited polemics went so far *backward* as to say, "The Sacraments are signs and ceremonies, let me say with all deference to all, by which a man approves himself to the church to be a candidate or soldier of Christ; and they *rather make the whole church sure of thy faith, than thyself.*" This presupposes the existence of a "faith" which is quite self-sufficient; unintelligently denies all grace and gift in the Sacrament, which nevertheless has eating and drinking for a symbol; makes the last meaning of "remembrance" the first and the only one; and yet takes away its own justification, since he who thus commemorates in sincere faith must wait upon the Lord and ask—Make Thou me stronger and more assured, *work* Thou in Me a living remembrance, and *give Thyself to Me!*

He who apprehends *this* as the object of his deep desire, will soon reach, in the "this is" which comes as a present gift to meet that desire, the *second* stage of the mystery:—even as, thank God, most of the Reformed churches reached it.[2] There is no *real* fellowship with the death of Christ—even though at first only through the appropriation of faith, beholding the figure

[1] That is, in believing and earnest remembrance of the Lord's atoning death.

[2] For only the Heidelberg Catechism takes the superficial view, and that says much more than Zwingle; a Zwinglian church, strictly speaking, there is not.

in the symbols—which must not lead further to the "*fellowship of His life.*" The plain words of our Lord must be understood through the heart's experience to mean that He who died for us actually comes into us as He who liveth, that He *gives us to eat and drink of Himself.* (As Ebrard ii. 401, states very plainly this transition from Zwingle to Calvin.) This second critical point contains the third within it, even more essentially than the first led the way to the second. All who are sincere should go on and say, as the formula expresses it, "The external participation signifies the internal, but it effects it also while it signifies it." As certainly as the Lord appointed not the bread to be merely broken before our eyes, nor the cup to be merely poured out "in the manner of a libation," but instituted an *eating and drinking*, speaking therein of His body and His blood, so certainly is He in this our meat and our drink.

It is now essential that we should proceed to the *sacramental* community which there is between the sign and the things signified; as also to the testimony that the *body and blood* of Christ, that which was broken and that which was shed, are imparted as *vivifying.*[1] But instead of this, men wander, through a one-sided misapprehension of this second critical point, into a certain spiritualist interpretation, the beginnings of which were seen as early as the Alexandrian school (according to their distinction of the *αἰσθητὸν* and the *νοητὸν.*) In Origen's detailed application of this to the Sacrament, it is a *σῶμα τυπικὸν καὶ συμβολικὸν* of that which *πνευματικῶς χριστιανίζοντες* inwardly experience; although he attributes even to the external symbol a marvellously quickening energy as being a *ὑγιὴ πρόθεσις* for the *σωματικῶς χριστιανίζοντες.* This last thread of connection with spiritualism being broken, he loses or *denies* the mystery which it was sought to obtain, the *φάρμακον ἀθανασίας, φυλακτήριον εἰς ἀνάστασιν,* which the ancient and original faith of the church found in it; then last, while spiritualist expressions are used, the corporeity of Christ is altogether lost sight of, and our *incorporation* into Him, according to His and our perfect humanity.[2] Guarding, on the other hand, against this spiritualism,

[1] Calvin's caro vivifica goes as far as that, and is therefore condemned by the ultra-Zwinglian Schulthess.

[2] And yet this is and must be the decisive point of completeness, which even the Lutheran dogmatics have failed to set forth fully,

we go on at once to the *una cum pane et vino*, in which a part of the Reformed churches have so clearly concurred that there is no room for opposing them on the ground of a third and higher critical point;—for this *una cum* is that third point.[1] So the confession of Basle: "in which, *with* the bread and wine of the Lord, the *true* body and the *true* blood of Christ are by the ministers of the church symbolised *and offered*." The declaration of Thorn also: "By means of and on account of the sacramental union, which consists not in the one signifying the other, but in the united though different bestowment of the earthly and the heavenly elements." This is simple and moderate exegesis, as even Durandus said, "if the church had not decided otherwise, we might very well understand it—contentum est *sub hoc* corpus meum."

Here then we may very properly oppose Calvin's words about our *going up to Christ*[2] instead of His *coming down to us*; here we may in the spirit of peace dispute about the *locality* or *ubiquity* of the Lord's body, as far as this may do any good. But these *scholastic* contentions carry *backward* instead of forward the ecclesiastical and practical doctrine of the Sacrament. We see in this question no ground for the Lutheran wrath which was poured out upon the enthusiasts of 1527, and in the "Short doctrine of the Supper" in 1544. Having reached this point, they should have been contented to rest on the Wittenberg agreement, which did not renounce the fellowship of those who differed. As Luther

though they speak so expressly of the *body*, and regard the sacramental forgiveness of sins as only a fruit of its reception. (See Nitzsch, Urkundenbuch, S. 55.) It is very observable that (as Ebrard says, though he in vain strives to confute it) most of the ancient doctors of the church attribute to this heavenly food, besides the nourishment of spiritual life, a wonderful influence also upon the bodies of those who partook. This was not, as Schulz thinks, an old materialist notion; but all true metaphysics must lead to it, if the meaning of corporeity be rightly understood, and the words of Christ acknowledged.

[1] The three essential points we thus apprehend:—the *remembrance* of the redeeming death (quickening), brought thus into the present; the actually entering into the fellowship of Christ (*receiving* Himself anew); the eating and drinking His body and blood, not merely bread and wine.

[2] Which was, moreover, taught in no *Confession* of the Reformed church; but may be capable of a good modification through its connection with the old Sursum corda.

in 1537 wrote peacably and mildly to the Swiss States: "We leave the manner how His body and blood are given in the Supper to the Divine almightiness: we think of no ascent to Him or descent of Him, but hold to His own simple and plain words." And so he goes on concerning the necessity of avoiding all anger and wrath, of giving scope to the Holy Ghost, and firmly establishing concord and love—of taking care to avoid all suspicion of each other, and so forth. Or, as in 1531 to Bucer: Let us commend our cause to God, preserving meanwhile as far as in each lies His peace, and holding fast that concord which we have reached by agreeing that the body of our Lord is *truly* present, and offered to the believing soul—feremus discordiam minorem cum pace minore! Here father Luther exhibits himself as the patron of all true union.

It was quite otherwise in the *Formula Concordiæ*, which came less from the heart than from the head, and which condemns its opponents in mass (like Luther the "fanatics") as saying all they say deceptively and with reservation. Were not *these* Lutherans bound to confess, as the Confession of Basle declared, that the natural and true body of Christ *was not included in the bread and wine?* or, as it ran, that there was no *unio substantialis*, and no *unio localis*. Assuredly, a *unio sacramentalis* must be admitted, for the apostolical *κοινωνία* is certainly no *sodalitas*, community, or fraternity established by the eating and drinking (as Schulthess says!), but it is the common participation—*κοινὴ μετάληψις*—of a third element, the body and blood of Christ, community in partaking of this Object. So Luther avows that "this one word had been the living medicine of his soul amid all the contentions about the Sacrament." (Melanchthon, also, in the celebrated Response to Pfalz: "The Apostle does not say, like Hesshusius, that the bread is the true body of Christ, but that it is the *κοινωνίαν*, that is, that by which is produced the fellowship with the body of Christ.") But this *sacramental union* is, as the name shows, something which is incapable of further definition; although many subtle attempts have been made to clothe it scholastically, in all variations of *substantiatio* and *οὐσία* (not *ἀπουσία*, not *ἐνουσία*, not *συνουσία*, not *μετουσία*, but *παρουσία*)—see in Gerhard and Quenstedt.

How is it then? The peremptory shibboleth "*in, with, and*

under" is in fact also inappropriate,[1] because this formula aims to say something which however says nothing. "When Luther makes what is partaken by the mouth avail only for spiritual life, or only as spiritual nourishment apply to the whole man in the proportion of his faith, he in a certain sense abolishes the importance of the oral participation (and knows not really what he contends for); and when he refuses to admit that the sacramental union is a consubstantiation, or an impanation, or as a physical admixture, and presses the formula *in* into *sub* and *cum*, nothing but negation is gained, and that which is asserted is simply unintelligible." (Nitzsch in reply to Möhler.) Even the excellent Richter (in the Family Bible), who was throughout a rigid Lutheran, said: "The words *in, with, and under* direct the view to the *bread* as much as the false explanation—This *bread* signifies. Therefore adhere to Christ's words, and pray, &c." Yes, indeed, with all the protest against impanation the view is too exclusively fixed upon the bread, weakening the force of Christ's word which was τοῦτο not οὗτος ὁ ἄρτος[2]—*this* not *this bread*. Else how came it that the mild Melanchthon could complain about the *certamen* περὶ ἀρτολατρείας, and of an actual *artolatry* on the part of the Lutheran zealots?[3]

The manducatio sacramentalis may be called a manducatio *oralis* in a certain sense rightly understood—propter unitatem actus; since through the energy of the operative word (*Spirit* rather) of Christ, His body and blood have a fellowship with that bread and wine which we receive with our mouth. But with this kind of language we should be very cautious; for Calvin's words are not lightly to be rejected: Take with the hand the bread and by faith My body; Drink with the mouth the wine, and by faith My blood.

Justin's words—τὴν δι' εὐχῆς λόγου τοῦ παρ' αὐτοῦ εὐχαριστηθεῖσαν τροφήν—are as profoundly as simply expressed; and in

[1] Although Baumgarten explains it to the utmost advantage: "*in*, during the act and no longer; *cum*, at the same time with the visible thing, when bread and wine are given; *sub*, by means of these, in the reception of these visible elements."

[2] Palmie (Konfessionsstreit, S. 18) is quite right:—According to the Lutheran view our Lord, strictly speaking, should not have said—This is My body, but—In this is My body.

[3] In letters to Calvin 1554 and 1555, and other friends in 1556.

accordance with the results of our exegesis. But when the Lutherans lay such stress upon the *consecration* (which *now* is performed by man), terming it indeed only a *consecratio destinationis*, but connecting with it a *consecratio unitionis* taking place simultaneously with the pronunciation of our Lord's words;—when they assert a preliminary *sacramental union* or *total consecration* "*in these words*," which is followed by a *partial consecration* at the individual distribution;—then their doctrine approaches too nearly that of the Papists, for in consistency with that view there must be a presence of the body and blood *before* and *independent of* the personal partaking. He whose conscience revolts against these dangerous advances toward error, and, in his horror of superstition and human additions, would keep at the utmost possible distance from that transubstantiation by which men upon earth dare to be "creators of the Creator"—he who, standing upon Scripture and upon faith, without any further ecclesiastical development, finds in the Sacrament the essence of the New Testament gifts of grace, *the enjoyment of salvation through the living and effectual presence of the glorified Christ, appropriated by faith*, or, more briefly, *the self-communication of Christ in us*—is fully vindicated, and has his place and privilege in the *evangelical* church. Thus we return to the point with which we set out; and have expressed, as we hope, a clear and undeniable *formula of union*. If any man is not content with this, we must declare him to be, either a wilful disputant who arbitrarily holds fast points of contention, or one who in this matter is narrow in his spirit, and incapable of distinguishing the essence of the matter from the words and notions which represent it,—the word and meaning *of the Lord* from the exposition and ordinance of man.

At the limit where we shrink back in fear and horror from the "tabernacle-Christ" which all church-history declares to be an *Idol*—it is yet permissible to speak of a great "transformation" in this mystery. But what is it? Is that which we partake of changed *in its effect* into the body and blood of Christ, not indeed by the hand of the priest or in the mouth of the partaker, but in the inner man of the communicant?[1] By no means, for

[1] The spiritualist Lange actually makes this the *fourth* critical point in the Sacrament, corresponding to the ancient catholic faith."

bread and wine remain bread and wine; and such a change, with all its idealism, is but an "ideal" expression, a nonentity. This, rather, is the simple and true "transformation," that through the energy of the body and blood of Christ *our* flesh and blood becomes partaker of immortality, is preparatorily glorified in the germ of the resurrection. And thus probably we must understand Justin's well-known words—*τροφὴν, ἐξ ἧς αἷμα καὶ σάρξ κατὰ μεταβολὴν τρέφονται ἡμῶν.*

But we would ask in conclusion, Does the free and abundant blessing of our Lord, offered in the Sacrament, require in the partakers of His table an apprehension of all these doctrines and words? Most confidently we answer, No! The reception of Christ's grace and gift is, in the Sacrament as in all christianity, independent of the development of knowledge, of the more or the less of light in the understanding. If only the love of desire be there, He will respond to it who can (and will) do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask *or understand.* (Eph. iii. 30.) Are not true Lutherans willing to agree with the devout Calvin, "I am not ashamed to confess, that the mystery is greater than my thoughts can grasp or my words set forth, and must be *rather experienced than understood*—?" and will they not accept the words of Zwingle himself, when he unconsciously goes beyond his theory, that "Christ is to be *eaten,* but in a *wonderful manner,* which the believer should not too anxiously scrutinize?" The Holy Spirit preserved Luther in the smaller catechism from making *τοῦτό ἐστι* into a fence of terror around the Mount Zion to which *we* have come; his language is, "the word *for you* requires nothing more than *believing* hearts." Let us cling to that! For a man may contend with very high or very deep words for the true doctrine of the body and blood of Christ in the Sacrament, while he is much less worthy to receive than a sincere and unintelligent Zwinglian. We quote once more the excellent Meyer:[1] "the participation of the Redeemer in His Supper is matter of experience, consequently of that most real gnosis, without which all mere speculation of the understanding is unfruitful, whether on one side or the other. The Christian is a man of the heart. What avails it me to say with Luther

[1] Critique upon Scheibel.

that I 'orally' eat, if I have no 'heartfelt' influence therefrom? But he who has this heartfelt influence is, to my mind, whatever his head may think about it, a man who lives in Christ and in whom Christ lives." The Lord himself says—If ye eat not, ye have no life in you; but He does not say—If ye believe not and know not *how*. And we can appeal to Luther again, on this all-important point:[1] "Therefore take heed! It is more necessary that thy faith have regard to the spiritual, than that it have regard to the natural, body of Christ; for the natural without the spiritual availeth not in this Sacrament: there must be a *transubstantiation* wrought *through love*." This is the real κοινωνία and the true transubstantiation, the working of which through the spiritual body and blood of Christ the Holy Ghost alone can solve.

Let the mystery remain, as it stands in the not vainly spoken *words of Christ*. Let every man investigate it with earnest solemnity; and avow and teach with power, light, and love, what the Holy Spirit gives him to understand. We regard nothing here as matter of *indifference*, but would not suffer *scholastic terms* to divide the church. The real truth which is in the expression of the Swabian Syngramma—though wrongly applied at the time—Verbum ad panem fert, *id quod in se continet* (scil. τὸ σωμά μου, τὸ αἷμά μου)—we would accept and rest in, rather than sin against the weak, and throw a stumbling-block between them and the body of the Lord which is given also to them.

Let us content ourselves with the tenth article of the Augsburg confession, as a symbol of union—Quod corpus christi *vere adsint* et distribuantur *vescentibus*; leaving this *vescentibus*, like the *vere* before it, to free interpretation, without any further theological inquisition. Nor is there any danger or impropriety in the softened *exhibeantur*, since it is connected with *cum pane et vino*; and the *improbare* secus docentes may fall back if it is thought to portend a *damnare*. On the other hand, the et *substantialiter* added in the apology, as also the exhibeantur *cum* illis rebus, quæ *videntur*, is certainly very *true*; but as scholastic terms going beyond the letter of scripture they are also very doubtful, and as inappropriate as it would be to make the formula

[1] In his sermon on the Sacrament, 1519.

of distribution go beyond the Lord's word—"this is the *true* body!"—and so frighten away instead of allure those whose weak faith goes as yet no further than doing it in remembrance of Him.[1] We have sufficiently shown that the words in the Smalkald articles are altogether unwarranted—et non tantum dari et sumi a piis, *sed etiam ab impiis* Christianis; as also those of the Formula Concordiæ—*ore* sumantur, ab omnibus illis qui hoc Sacramento utuntur, *sive digni sint, sive indigni* etc;—there cannot be many who with firm hearts and anything like clear insight subscribe them. For the disputants of our times are not thorough theologians, nor are they independent investigators; but they have unfurled the old banner on principles which can scarcely be understood, being partly good and partly evil. The more livingly practical is the view which is taken of the thirteenth article in the evangelical church—de *usu* Sacramentorum—the more plainly must it be seen that its "ore sumi ab omnibus qui Sacramento *utuntur*," stands in contradiction with its "ita ut fides accedat." To speak otherwise, that "independently of the *right* use there is no Sacrament"—as Ursinus explained. And so John à Lasco[2] made this prominent, and deduced his fourth position—"that we can be partakers of the grace and influences of the Holy Spirit, which are symbolised and offered in the Sacrament, *only through faith*"—from this thirteenth article of the Augsburg Confession, as if it stood there, nam hac fide accipimus promissam gratiam. "It is plain," he inferred, "according to the sense of the Augsburg Confession, that the nourishment of the body and blood of Christ is *there* exhibited *where* we seek, behold, and apprehend Christ himself by faith—and that it is not to be regarded as inhering in the earthly elements."

We must then deeply ponder Melanchthon's "Christus adest propter hominem, non propter panem;" and consequently retreat from the violent exaggeration of the dogmatic expression, without in any sense giving up the mystery. We must retreat back to that sense, which Luther expressed in his earliest sermon on the Sacrament: "The holy Sacrament of the altar, and of the true

[1] And this *substantialiter* as *corporaliter* in the apology approaches too nearly the Romanist error.

[2] "A man of fundamental science, and great, *almost* indifferent theological moderation"—says Guericke, not venturing to say more.

body of Christ, has three points which must be noted. The first is the Sacrament or *sign*. The second, the *signification* of that sign. The third, the right faith toward those two. These three things must go together in every Sacrament. The Sacrament must be external and visible, in a bodily form or appearance. The signification must be *internal and spiritual*, in the spirit of the man.[1] Faith must unite both for man's good and enjoyment." But he goes on in his careless simplicity, "it is nothing but the receiving a sure sign of fellowship and *incorporation* with Christ *and all His saints*"[2]—and then combines together in one transubstantiation and spiritualism: "At the same time as the bread is *changed* into His true natural body, and the wine into His true natural blood, so truly are we taken and changed into the *spiritual body*, that is, into the fellowship of Christ and all His saints." We must retreat back, that is, not to these indistinct words of a not yet clearly apprehending knowledge, but to the *practical sense* of these words, as it hits the real decisive point of the question, without urging it too far. For as the excellent Meyer (one of the oldest and best witnesses for the union, whom the church has almost overlooked!) said—"It would be better not to speak about the meal of love than to begin new quarrels about it." And again: "We condemn no man who with a sincere heart thinks thus or thus concerning the Sacrament. For we know that He who gives Himself to be received in the Supper can do more than the recipients ask or are able to conceive. No believer goes to the Lord's table without desiring the forgiveness of sins, life, and salvation. Let the idea he sets before his mind be what it may, it is given unto him according to the desire of his faith. For the Lord looks at the heart.[3] The Sacrament of the altar may be worthily received in every Chris-

[1] And then, as some infer, a *spiritualis* and not an *oralis* manducatio. So Luther presently quotes, without any apprehension, Augustine's *crede et manducasti!*

[2] Mark well this last, according to which the incorporation is into *that* true "body" of Christ, the members of which are only the saints.

[3] This is right, and so let us teach and act accordingly! But it is miserably wrong, on the one hand, to maintain the participation of unbelievers, and, on the other, to disturb the enjoyment of true believers, and refuse their fellowship, on account of differences of exposition and views.

tian church; it is not an imperfect doctrine, but the condemning of him who partakes which is condemnable.—We do not by this leave every man to his error; but we know that it is the perversion of the will which is the hindrance to salvation, and it is in the power of the heart to enlighten or to darken the mind.[1] Let therefore every man understand according to his best lights; and if he lack wisdom let him ask of God and he shall receive it."

We hold with Jul. Müller (who in this can refer back to Chemnitz) that "as to the effect of the Lord's Supper, Luther and Calvin entirely agree." But we do not demand this agreement in doctrine from all, provided only they in the living faith of the heart seek Christ in the Sacrament, and thus seeking find Him.

Thus we would affectionately bear with error, for the sake of the truth which adheres to it and on which it rests; the truth which, if we have patience, will make itself heard; we do not surrender the mystery, but we acknowledge it with love which helps the understanding. We want no union on such ground as that of Hahn, in 1828[2]: "Luther was in error when he asserted that in, with, and under the bread and wine, the true body which suffered for us, and the blood of Jesus Christ which was shed for us, are communicated." For the words of Christ assert this very thing. The body and blood of Christ is *not* merely "His personality, after the removal of the actual body" —as Nitzsch once broadly avowed. The doctrine of the *corporeal* body in the Supper was not (as Ebrard says) "honourably and decently buried with the person of Luther;" but it lives in the words of Christ himself, and is constantly revived as the self-testimony of Him who lives, in all who with an enlightened apprehension receive the corporeity aright. Thus we want no Lutheranism as such, but the truth and the truth in love. We wish to oppose to every evident contradiction of our Lord's words the *improbamus* but not the condemnation or the ban of the church's testimony; and we would guard in our exposition against all exaggerated teaching. Let v. Meyer speak once more, "The matter is and must ever be a Sacrament, that is, a mystery,

[1] As the Westphals, Hesshuses, Mærlins (not to mention some in our own day) were darkened in carnal controversy.

[2] Lehrbuch der Christlichen Glaubens, S. 603, 604.

which cannot be set forth in any formula of words. He who can understand the union of the divinity with the humanity in the Man Jesus, can understand the union of the glorified humanity of Jesus with the external elements of the Eucharist. Luther has preached, and laid down his doctrine; it is the work of the Holy Spirit to give us true knowledge of the great mystery.[1] Words are of no use, if they become not in us spirit and life. Now it often happens that the vehemence of controversy affrights back those who are groping their way toward the truth. They who receive Christ as the sole ground of their salvation according to the Scripture, and who would be justified and saved through His blood, must be at one in this, that just as Christ is not a figure but a reality, so His communication of Himself in the Sacrament is not a mere figure of speech but a literal truth. But He could not make Himself intelligible, in human language, and to man's weak understanding, concerning the manner of this communication; and hence there has been contention about it from the beginning. But from this we should learn the insufficiency of all our ideas, and all our words; and that the words and the things of God are spirit and life."

FINAL WORD CONCERNING THE FRUIT OF THE VINE.

(Matt. xxvi. 29; Mark xiv. 25.)

No satire will shake our conviction, as already expressed, that this word of our Lord, which the first two Evangelists not merely record at the end of the Supper, but connect immediately with the words of institution, was really spoken twice by Him. To us it is unimaginable that both the Evangelists—led by the "mention of the cup" as is irreverently said—should introduce afterward and insert what had been really said before. As they have not mentioned the *paschal* cup at all (not—as they did eat and drink)—so they cannot be supposed to intend that this supplemented word should be understood as having accompanied

[1] And to teach us some happier medium between Luther and Calvin, and by which in Catholic love we may hold communion with Zwingle too.

another and a former cup. But it is not hard to suppose that our Lord, as at the opening of the meal, so also now at its solemn close, spoke of the final and full realisation of it in the kingdom of God. For till then even the Sacrament remains but a type, and it was quite appropriate that this should be once more certified *after* its institution; this testimony may, indeed, be said to have been a necessary supplement, and to have been as significant now as it was before in connection with the prophetically longing desire to eat the Passover.[1]

We have now to add to what was said upon St Luke the more specific observations for which now first we are prepared. By γεννήματος (or γενήματος) τῆς ἀμπέλου the Lord designates—as in the פְּרִי הַגָּפֶן in the thanksgiving formula—the physical wine then present and used, though without mentioning the word. Whether we regard the fruit here as the specific grape, or (as the analogy of the פְּרִי הָאָרֶץ renders more probable) the whole plant and produce of the vine, so expressed (Deut. xxii. 9 תְּבוּאַת הַכֶּרֶם) —affects not the question; τούτου τοῦ γεννήματος, *this* vine, expresses more emphatically than St Luke's first word its identity with that which now grows as wine. This τούτου contradicts every notion of an οἶνον νοητὸν, an imaginary figurative wine, and of a metaphorical drinking, just as the previous "I will not drink *henceforth*." V. Gerlach well remarks that this word shows the consecrated wine to be *wine* still; but we cannot regard it as conceivable, that Jesus himself (as v. Gerlach deduces) partook of that which in the institution of the Sacrament He called His body and blood. Olshausen says, very properly: "We should carefully note that the Lord does not say ἐκ τούτου τοῦ ποτηριοῦ, but τοῦ γεννήματος; the οὗτος evidently forms an antithesis with καινός, and therefore the reference in these words is to the meal generally." This last is not however to be understood as if there were no reference to the paschal wine consecrated to the Sacrament; the Lord embraces the whole together—Of this earthly fruit of which I drank with you in the

[1] Kahnis thinks that as the word concerning the glorified enjoyment refers to the Passover, *not* to the Supper, its place is more appropriate in St Luke. But it does refer naturally and necessarily *also* to the Supper; and this is to us a sufficient reason why our Lord spoke it at the beginning and also at the end.

paschal feast, and which I have now consecrated for *your* drinking (*of* Me but not *with* Me.) Consequently, He "distinguishes not the matter, but the time;" and speaks as strongly and definitely as expression could be of that drinking as to recur in a final futurity. Nothing here must be explained away; the Lord speaks quite otherwise in Jno. iv. 32—34, for instance, concerning spiritual food.

He does, indeed, distinguish the *new* wine from this present wine; but this *καινόν* is by *αὐτό* made no other than a predicate of the present wine. Thus it is not merely, I will drink it "quite otherwise" with you—"a wine of a higher nature"—and so forth. He had spoken of the *new* Testament; He now promises *new* upon new, because all things will be finally made new (Rev. xxi. 5)—the creature will be glorified and re-established in its fundamental forms upon the renewed earth, apart from the Lord's body, the church. He who thus understands Rom. viii., and the Apocalypse generally, and the earlier Prophets, will find no difficulty in thinking of the Lord's drinking with us upon the new earth. I will drink with you—thus clearly does He speak, not meaning the Sacrament in which we only eat and drink of Him, but a further and transcendent heavenly-earthly fellowship of glorified bodily enjoyment, *in which the paschal lamb and the Lord's Supper will have their last fulfilment.* We must not interpret the *new fruit of the vine* as merely a new, higher community at the table or family fellowship, as W. Hoffmann does, who "cannot be convinced that the Lord intends here any reality of eating and drinking in His kingdom." That such men can so express themselves is a lamentable proof how far we have wandered away from reality in the interpretation of Scripture.

In My Father's kingdom: this expression decisively refers to its condition of future *glory,*—see the plain parallel in Matt. xiii. 43; and it corresponds with "in My kingdom" elsewhere, as Lu. xxii. 30, Matt. xiii. 41. And it is very consistent with this, that not only Lu. xxii. 18, but even Mark xiv. 25, substitutes for the present word the more general *kingdom of God;* but we must interpret the more general by the more specific expression, and not conversely. Hence, if Christ had *drunk* with His disciples

after the resurrection[1] (as is supposed by some, through a wrong punctuation of Acts x. 41),[2] it could not have been wine, certainly not paschal wine. If this be supposed, and the fulfilment of His words found thus early, the truth of St. Matthew's record is contradicted, as well as that of the two other Evangelists, since He would then have drunk with them again *before the future of His kingdom*. "That explanation of this passage which refers to our Lord's companionship with His disciples after His resurrection (which Theophylact first broached) is altogether untenable; since that period was never termed *the kingdom of God*." (Olshausen.) But in Lu. xxiv. 42, 43, He only ate; certainly He did not drink during the forty days (however this may be inconsiderately asserted):—much might be said about this in relation to the bloodless body (Lu. xxiv. 39.)

The drinking here promised will take place when Lu. xxii. 29, 30 (which must be connected with ver. 18 of that chapter) is fulfilled. The wine corresponds as being *paschal wine* with the eating of the passover Lu. xxii. 16—although ἐξ αὐτοῦ there cannot be intended of the eating of flesh, for in the new world animals will be no longer slaughtered. The eating of the broiled fish was the last condescension to the economy of killing. The Old Testament passover typified the one sacrifice of death for man's life; the New Testament Supper substituted for it bread. But that eating and drinking are not incompatible with the condition of the risen body, is evidenced by the *eating* of the risen Lord; and He himself here testifies that the partaking of the fruits of the earth—not for necessity of preservation, but as a *cultus of joy* to the *honour of God*, to which all *nature* will then be ministrant in His saints—is not inconceivable in relation to the blessed in the Father's kingdom upon the earth, where all things will be heavenly and new. He who *will* not separate between this authentic, profound, and sublime word of His mouth, and the chiliast dreams and expectations of earlier and

[1] Hence it is wrong to say of the consecrated cup—This is the wine of the kingdom of God!

[2] Since ὀπτασία—αὐτῷ belongs only to ἡμῖν, and points to the earlier fellowship of the Apostles, to whom He, the self-same, *appeared* after His resurrection.

later times (such as Irenæus relates of the vines with ten thousand branches and so forth)—must bear the consequences of his own wilfulness, which seals his understanding against the truth.[1]

As it regards, finally, the necessary position which this concluding word of our Lord holds in relation to the Supper, we entirely agree with the beautiful observations of Thiersch.[2] "The holy Supper points not only back to the Past but also to the Future. It has not only a memorial, but also a prophetic, significance. We not only show forth the death of our Lord in it, *until He come*; but we have also the *time to think upon when He will come*, to celebrate anew and in another manner His sacred meal with His own, in the kingdom of glory. Every celebration of the Sacrament is a type and prophetic anticipation of the great marriage supper, which is prepared for the church at the reappearing of Christ. *This* signification of the Sacrament is set forth in the Lord's words—I will not drink henceforth, &c. *These words should never be omitted in the Sacramental* liturgy." Yes, truly, for this *until that day*—ἕως τῆς ἡμέρας ἐκείνης—this goal of the new futurity expressly defined by the prophetic term, includes (as 1 Cor. xi. 26) that *terminus* in which the *interval of separation* will cease, and the eating and drinking appointed for the present time will be done away, or pass over into another. It is as if the Lord had said—Do this *in the meantime until* I am again with you! The Sacrament is, looking back, a commemorative feast; in the present it is a receiving and partaking of the Lord, the true possession of Himself; nevertheless in prospect of the end it is itself something preliminary and transitory, an essential type and effectual pledge of that feast which in the great and permanent morning of the renewed world—in *that day*, which is ever the one great day—Christ will provide for His own. Let us be on our guard against that false anticipation, which would bring forward the final consummation into our present New Testament condition, and refer all this eating and drinking to the Lord's Supper; for the Sacrament

[1] Nägelsbach gives us a deeper view of these matters, when he (Der Gottmensch, i. 276 ff.) finds in the specifically named trees of Paradise the "elemental nourishment of the Elohim natures," and combines therewith Rev. xxii. 2—with the New Vine in our Lord's words.

[2] Lectures on Catholicism and Protestantism ii. 276.

which, on account of our sin, receives us into the fellowship of *death*, must ever be in contrast with that other eating and drinking:—it is, otherwise than that, sanctified to us by our accompanying *fasting* and prayer. But we must be also on our guard against thinking of that final feast as a continuous and unceasing eating and drinking *of Christ*:—for how then would it be fulfilled in Himself? When we become as He is, then will He be again as we are; He will eat and drink with us the new fruits of the new world in the fellowship of an eternal enjoyment of the renovated creation of the Father.

SECOND INDICATION OF THE BETRAYER.

(Luke xxii. 21, 22. [Jno. xiii. 23—29].)

Certain it is that our Lord spoke again concerning the traitor *after* the Supper; and St John records this in a way which shows that it is quite different from that of the Synoptics in connection with the question *Is it I?* See what was said upon Jno. xiii. in the last volume. To us the idea is utterly inconceivable, that any Evangelist or reporter would be bold enough to work up the notice that Jesus so expressed Himself in the presence of Judas, into an "addition" of this kind. No, we read submissively what we find written; and as, according to the first two Evangelists, the Lord repeated the words concerning the vine after the words of institution, it is quite consistent with this, that if not immediately—yet afterward, He made renewed mention of the betrayer. It is at least probable, too, that Lu. xxii. 22 was now spoken once more, as we have remarked upon Matt. xxvi. 24. On the other supposition, that is, if Luke, ver. 22, is a return to an earlier word, then it becomes almost certain that Luke, ver. 23, is one and the same with the first *Is it I?*[1] But this is opposed to the letter of the narrative, for this τίς ἄρα εἴη,

[1] Which Bengel supposes, on account of *they began*, which could not have been said of a repetition. But this narrative ἤρξαντο must not be pressed too much; and, moreover, there is no repetition in the case, since they did really now *begin* to ask—*what other* it could be.

who it should be, is manifestly the introduction to Peter's demanding of John, τίς ἂν εἴη, who is it? Thus the Lord did, after the institution of the Sacrament, more or less literally repeat vers. 21 and 22 in St Luke; the former verse we have already expounded, and it only remains to make a remark upon the latter.

The meaning of the antithesis in πλήν is what we have first to observe upon, and it is twofold. It is first the utterance once more of that *sorrowful complaint* which the Lord does not yet give up:—*Behold* I give My body, I pour out My blood for you, *behold* that with anticipating thanksgiving I institute for you and My whole church this feast—*yet behold!* even now, even yet the presence of the wicked and lost one follows and troubles Me! This is undeniably its fundamental meaning; but it does not exclude another, which J. v. Müller's short note expresses, "He seems almost to except this one!" To except him, that is, from the *for you* of the Sacrament; and, when we take St Matthew's full saying, from the *forgiveness of sins*. That, while in one sense Christ died also for Judas, yet in another he is excepted from its benefit, we found already in the original "for *many*" περὶ πολλῶν; and this justifies our present acceptation of the meaning—*Yet behold!* there is the unhappy one, for whom my death is in vain!

It stands in connection with this, that our Lord here specifies only the daring external fellowship of the traitor with Himself, and does not unite him with the rest. Bengel, in his N. T. makes the subtle remark upon μετ' ἐμοῦ—"He does not say, with *us* or (with *you*). Thus He distinguishes the traitor from the faithful disciples, and shows that He alone has to do with him henceforward, and that as an enemy."

This daring sinner presumes to be *with Me*, and even until now, as My betrayer—and *behold* I suffer it! This ἰδού is obviously no external indication; but it is quite appropriate, since the disciples know and see that they are twelve sitting around, and therefore that the *one of the twelve*, although they know not *which*, must be there as *eating with Him*. This pointing to him and yet not pointing, this seeing him on the Lord's part and yet not disclosing him on the disciples', is presently made more intense and definite by the emphatic—Behold *the hand!* This embraces

in one the whole accomplishment of the hypocritical act with which *this hand* is concerned, as if He would say—This hand, which yesterday received[1] the reward of treachery and to-day dippeth with me into the dish, receiveth the bread and the cup of mystery! But as the hand is specifically mentioned, ἐπὶ τῆς τραπέζης does not mean at the table during the meal, (ἐπὶ being *sub* de tempore, and τράπεζα, the meal); but literally, *upon the table*, in daring hypocrisy, serving with the rest! Ah, this hand wrenched His heart, and therefore He thus spoke of it.

FIRST INTIMATION OF THE DENIAL.

(Luke xxii. 31—34; Jno. xiii. 36—38.)

On the harmony of these two Evangelists see in the last vol. on Jno. xiii., where Lu. ver. 34 is shown clearly to coincide with John ver. 38. The questioning of the disciples among themselves led to the questioning of Peter through John; the Lord gave the confidential answer by means of the sop; Satan then entered into Judas, and our Lord, having dismissed him, spoke more freely to the others concerning His glorification, and the new commandment. Hereupon came the question of Peter, Whither goest Thou? with the assurance, I will lay down My life for Thy sake!—all as it is related by St John, down to ver. 37. *Now first* comes the warning Simon! Simon! at the same time with its gracious promise. But Peter receives no warning, undervalues the promise, affirms still more strongly in

[1] For ἔστησαν, Matt. xxvi. 15, does not mean, They promised to give (Vulg. constituerunt, Luth. appointed or promised, for which 1 Macc. xiii. 38 is compared)—but, as Meyer corrects, They *counted* to him (as earnest money, beforehand), Stolz the same, and De Wette, They weighed out to him. Though the parallel passages in St Mark and St Luke speak only of promising and agreeing, we must understand St Matthew of reckoning out, since ἵστημι scil. σταθμῷ occurs in Herod., Xenoph. and others, as it also does in the Sept. for שָׁקַל (Dan. v. 27; Job. xxxi. 6; Isa. xl. 12; Jer. xxxii. 10; 2 Sam. xiv. 26), especially in the *corresponding prophecy*, Zech. xi. 12, comp. Ecclus. xxi. 25.

his confidence—I am ready—and thus as it were constrains his Master plainly and expressly to predict his denial.[1]

[1]Those who are not disposed thus clearly to connect the whole, are free to accept a more indefinite view, according to which each of the two narrators deviates a little from the original literal version; but we do not see any reason for preferring this. Certainly the historical truth consists with the special selection in reference to which each narrator has recorded the circumstance. What, therefore, St Luke records from ver. 25 to ver. 38, may be embraced, independently of its historical connection which was certainly different, in one connection of thought, according to the design of the guiding Spirit; and he who thus simply reads it will not do wrong. The Lord has, according to ver. 25—27, suppressed the pride of the apostles which had shown itself even at (that is, *before*) this Supper; He had pointed them to *His own procedure* through ministering humility to greatness. Hereupon He shows them (what belonged to the same discourse at the feet-washing), in ver. 28—30, their *future dignity;* and then (later, but returning to this), in ver. 31—38, the *way thereto* through *test* and *danger*. These are indeed two separate discourses; between which—as they were spoken, the whole of Jno. xiv.—xvii., and Matt. xxvi. 31—34, must be interposed; nevertheless, in their meaning they are connected in one, just as St Luke here joins them one to the other. For the discourses of our Lord admit of diverse combination; he who seizes their connection as any Evangelist exhibits it, is more secure of the main point—the right understanding and appropriation of what is spoken—than he who, neglecting *this*, troubles himself over much about the chronological harmony, which after all is subordinate.

Thus, that we may anticipate and introduce the subsequent word concerning the sword into our preliminary glance:—the Lord shows to His disciples *the way to future dignity*, as it leads, according to His own example *(as the Father hath appointed Me)*, through *internal testings* and *external perils*. There is, however, this difference between Him and us. He goes first and alone,

[1] So Sommer (Synopt. Tafeln) says rightly on Lu. xxii. 31: "this coincides with John xiii. 38 in time." But that is, of course, *after* the Supper.

as in perfect humility, so in His own strength of perfect righteousness; we follow after His pattern and in His strength. Only in Him has Satan nothing by right, although he cometh even to Him; we, on the other hand, are under the power of the tempter through the right which our weakness and sinfulness give him. He alone has no counter-protection, *gives Himself up* for the world's redemption, but goes before as Victor both internally and externally; we, on the other hand, are sustained in temptation by His intercession, and receive permission to use the sword (in what sense, we shall see) in danger, for the question is our *salvation* and *purification*. Thus we endure with Him (of which ver. 28 was a feeble type) in His temptations, inasmuch as He graciously attributes to our temptations a fellowship with His own; thus this endurance is itself our dignity, for the kingdom is appointed to us as led through these.

The Lord speaks, vers. 31—34, concerning *internal testings*, or the inevitable sifting by Satan, in such a manner as to make Peter, who would prematurely grasp at dignity, and thinks himself already a persevering disciple, an example for all. Concerning *external perils* in their way through an evil world He speaks, vers. 35—38, to all in common:—intimating another and more severe future which must come after He has been reckoned among the transgressors; and pointing them to the use of the sword, in a sense which they indeed do not understand. In the former section, which now lies before us, the Lord proceeds from the more general instruction of the collective apostles (or disciples) to the *more special humiliation of Peter*, who would stand out from the rest, and contradicts the Lord's word. The enemy wills to have *you all*, and comes to you all! Mark this *thou, O Simon*,—to thee especially! But to thee I also especially promise strengthening, protecting grace—and when thou shalt have experienced it, then be mindful of thy apostolical office and priority! But, because all this is not received, He says emphatically—Thou Peter wilt fall beforehand so deeply, as to deny Me thrice in a short space, overlooking My first warning.

Ver. 31. He who reads the whole, as penetrating the great subject of this generally symbolical instruction, in one connection, cannot go astray, as we have said; but more exact observation will correct the error of supposing that it was actually such.

This is opposed by the "and the Lord said" of ver. 31, "and He said unto them" of ver. 35: the sudden outbreak of the address, *Simon! Simon!*[1] cannot be conceived after ver. 30; nor can we understand it at all in a discourse at the Supper, unless we suppose some *special occasion* given for such a warning. We feel that this is presupposed though not recorded by St Luke; but I cannot find a more appropriate point of connection for such a warning and awakening appeal than Jno. xiii. 36, 37. Thou wilt go with Me at once into heaven through death; thou art ready to give up thy life for Me, before I have given up My life for thee and the world! "Hast thou reached so far? Simon, Simon, bethink thyself who thou art, and how it stands with you all!" From the rash contradiction at the feet-washing, followed by the repetition of curious questioning about the betrayer, down to this hasty and absolute affirmation of zeal to be with the Lord, as St John describes it, he is the same Simon throughout this evening as the entire course of his previous probation had exhibited him. Nevertheless, their faithful Master, calmly contemplating and looking through the whole, has not to do with him alone, but connects with the emphatic personal address to Simon the general word "*you*;" for he was indeed addressed only as the leader and representative of all. It is certain that in one sense he is to be or become the first and the greatest among the apostles, but only in the strong, *confessing faith* which grace will enable him to maintain, after his fall into the deepest weakness of denial. At present he is the first only in his own unreasonable ambition, and renders it needful that the general warning should be addressed to him in particular.

At the time of his former glorious confession of faith the Lord had addressed him with "Satan," because he neither understood nor would understand the *way of the cross* to glory; but here this word is qualified and changed, expressing, however, very plainly what was there signified. Because his thought was on that occasion *human*, springing simply from *flesh and blood*, Satan would tempt even the Lord through him to shrink from the cross;

[1] The Sixt. and Peschito (לְשִׁמְעוֹן) leave but one vocative; but this is no more than an explanatory variation. The original has certainly not Σίμωνι.

and here the same human character of the *natural Simon* is a handle for the enemy, whereby to seize at least all the rest of the apostles. Therefore he is addressed only by this name of his natural birth, here alone emphatically spoken twice:—see what was said upon Matt. xvi. 17, in comparison with John i. 43. Besides these instances this return to the old name significantly occurred thrice:—with its gentlest meaning in Matt. xvii. 25, where his private thought was in question; much more severe in Mark xiv. 37, at his sleeping in Gethsemane; and finally, when he was humbled by a reference to the past, Jno. xxi. 15—17.

The Lord speaks here of Satan, not for Peter only, but for all His disciples in all time;—for He knows him well, and all his desire, and all his deeds. The history of the Passion exhibits around the Holy One of God the pure wickedness and sin of man, penetrating even the circle nearest to Him; but it exhibits also the cause of and tempter to sin, whom the conqueror alone reveals to us, as an enemy overcome, but still strong, subtle, and dangerous. Satan desires the souls of men without measure or end, is insatiable to have and keep them all: if He dared to assail the "Son of God," how can we be secure from his assault? If he broke into the circle of the Apostles with success, how anxiously should every one of us receive the Lord's warning when he is addressed of the Lord by the name of his birth! As king Herod, after killing James, proceeded also to take Peter (Acts xii. 2, 3), so Satan is not content with Judas (Lu. xxii. 3; Jno. xiii. 27), but *desires* them all. But we must understand this word, thus loosely translated, according to its meaning in the original:—He *demanded* them, on the ground of a right, He *challenged* in a certain sense their delivery to himself.[1] We must think of the prologue of the generally typical book of Job, to which the expression seems probably to refer; and of all that is there taught concerning the necessity of a permitted test under

[1] The Midd. ἐξαιτεῖσθαι, here alone occurring in the N. T., means properly to demand another for himself; sometimes in the sense of a request for deliverance and mercy, but also for the delivery to justice of a transgressor—which latter occurs especially in ἐξαίτησις. But that ἐξητήσατο intimates the obtaining of what was sought (as Alford thinks) we cannot admit; we do not, indeed, understand this interpretation, for Satan demanded not merely the sifting, but the apostles themselves (ὑμᾶς.)

the righteous eye of the Supreme, in the congregation of the heavenly children of God, among whom the accuser enters with his demand that the pious upon earth, if their claims are to be valid, may not be spared. All this holds good, as our Lord here testifies, all the more expressly of those who are already in near communion with Christ, in order that they may be approved, and become worthy of their dignity:—and at the same time with reference to their significance in relation to all others. Therefore is Peter the first of the apostles, the first in the temptation, and must take precedence of the rest as an example of sifting. Bengel: "This whole saying of our Lord presupposes that Peter was the first of the apostles, in whose standing or falling the others would be less or more endangered." This Satan knew, and would through Peter's fall offend, weaken, and overcome the others. Braune expresses this too strongly, "He was the *heart*, hand, and mouth in the apostolic circle; while Thomas was its head, and John its soul"—for the heart was, rather, John, who hence in his innocence led Peter to the fire of coals. But Peter was the *mouth* and the courage of a *confessing faith*; hence this assault upon all in his person. That he must thus take the lead in trial is his real prerogative, and something very different from that which his Romish successor arrogates—concerning which Bengel says vigorously, *Totus misere in cribrum incidit!*

Satan would *have*, retain the apostles, and yet yield them to the Lord his conqueror:—that lies first in ἐξητήσατο ὑμᾶς, hath desired *you*; then follows the closer definition of his purpose, τοῦ συνιάσαι, to *sift* you. This *Infinitive of design* (usual particularly with St Luke) is not so much to be explained, "*that* he may sift you"—for if he already *has* them, that was no more needed—as in the light of an accompanying, modifying explanation—*While* he will sift you, cast you into the sieve of test. The sifting is granted and takes place; but the intercession of the Redeemer stands in the way of the attainment of the accuser's entire demand. The word in its condensed significance intimates that Satan at first demands their temptation as his right, but with the understanding at the same time that he will thereby obtain them for his own; just in the sense of that daring but infatuated word—*what avails it* that he will bless thee to Thy face (Job ii. 5). So thinks he still, having learned no better; but is in manifold ways

mistaken, since the permitted sifting does no harm to the wheat of God. He would "mightily overwhelm you, cast you into apostasy and despair through My sufferings, so that ye may be (individually) as chaff." Thus Meyer's note gives the design of the enemy, but Christ interweaves His protest when He says, *like wheat.* He does not mean merely that Satan lays claim to the sifting of the wheat, if, peradventure, chaff should be in it, or it should be nothing but chaff; but He has a further twofold meaning. The sifting must not be refused to Him,—and the wheat will stand the test. Does He not merely declare His beloved disciples to be *His wheat?* Does He not allude to the *winnowing-fan,* which, according to the Baptist, He himself would also use, to purge out all the chaff? The sifting is the same as the winnowing, but with an intenser meaning of terrifying and affright. No company of the disciples is so united and so near to the Lord as not to go through this text; but when Satan, the sieve-holder of God, thinks to obtain them collectively as chaff, God has provided that no grain of wheat should fall to the earth. See Amos ix. 9, the only place in which the figure occurs, and to which, according to His word, the Lord may refer.[1]

Ver. 32. The Lord now by His Ἐγὼ δὲ—*But I*—majestically opposes Satan, as retaining His own supremacy over His disciples. That He must, though but for a season, give up His beloved ones to the tempter, and behold the fall of Peter, is a part of His own suffering, yea, in a certain sense, a temptation for Himself; but He abides in His serene self-possession the conqueror, He performs His part for victory, and bears witness to it. With that most gracious tempering of majesty by humility, which we everywhere see in His actions and words, He opposes the proud and in some sense justified *desire* of the enemy, by a *request* on His own part. For the evil one has, indeed, some show of right, but mercy triumphs over justice, and "the holy supplication of mercy countervails before God the daring appeal of the accuser." (Lange.) Christ *had already* prayed:

[1] Certainly צְרוֹר in Amos, as elsewhere, lapillus is equivalent to *granum,* not by any means "verbundenes," as Hengstenberg (Christ. iii. 226), thinks. We stated this to be the only place in Scripture which speaks of sifting as a figure, and the separation of the grains of corn; for it is incorrect to interpret Is. xxvii. 12, in this sense.

—not, as has been unthinkingly expounded, before Satan's demand, as if anticipating him,—but the intercession of the Mediator (apart from the eternal counsel) comes actually into that later time when He prominently declared Himself our Intercessor, and specifically took place after Satan's desire was seen through. The Lord plainly means His intercessory prayer, Jno. xvii., in which, as the Son in the Father's presence, He nevertheless humbly says—I *ask* for them! He had not uttered this when He spoke to Simon; but He anticipates it with reference to the future sifting: *then* will it be said and avail, I have prayed for thee!

For thee! This is the transition to Simon alone, and foretells to him a special sifting before that of the others. Moreover, it is to be understood that in thus making him prominent, the promise, like the warning, holds good of all. *What* then was prayed for? The substance of the intercession is not stated, because, as it may be said, it also is self-understood; yet we may take ἵνα for ὅτι as in St John. (See in St Luke, *e.g.*, chap. i. 43.) In any case the meaning is nearly the same, whether we take the sustentation of his faith as the matter of the intercession, or as its design and result. Of his *faith*—for the translation "that thy *fidelity* may not fail" is contrary to the phraseology of the Evangelists. Christ here ascribes also the decision of the matter to *faith*. Faith alone, that is, in God and in Him (John xiv. 1) settles the contest with Satan; in faith alone are we strong and stand; through faith alone, when it is still present, we arise from our fall. The most evil element in every sin of believers, even in those which are called lesser sins, is this, that in sinning their faith is each time weakened, because the unbelief present with it, and from which the sin proceeded, obtains a new power. This unbelief may, if it be not checked, go on gradually from sin to sin; and in a fearful fall it may at once proceed to a *total cessation* of faith! Let it be carefully noted in opposition to all false teaching that our Lord declares an ἐκλείπειν, a *deficere in totum*, an utter extinction of faith not only to be possible, but, without something intervening, to be certain—and even in the case of an Apostle, of Peter! But the Father's grace, prayed for by the Son, defends from this ruin; and not only so, but the superabundance of His grace makes the experience thus gained of

our infirmity and impotence the means of strengthening our faith when we are delivered. Christ did not pray that from the sifting or in the sifting we should be spared; but that we might not through perfect unbelief become chaff which must fall through; the fulfilment of his supplication takes place in that He can strengthen our faith, and preserve and revive the spark which was ready to be extinguished, through that prerogative of grace which is of more avail before God than the demand of the accuser. Christ names not his *unbelief*, which however was strongly manifested in Simon's denial; but his faith which was very weak and near to *failing*, which, however, was consequently sustained and not utterly extinguished. Again, where there has been from the beginning no faith, there can be no room for such intercession of Christ for its preservation; it cannot therefore be said with regard to *this* intercession that Judas was included. To his case is applicable all that which we have explained in John xvii. concerning the distinctive intercession of Christ for His own. However specifically the word of our text refers to the person of Peter, it has a universal significance; the general rule comes out only in particular instances. We all have cause to be mindful of Satan's desire for us; and to invigorate our failing faith by the comforting thought of Christ's intercession, when we fall into the enemy's sieve. But we must not beforehand and independently rely solely upon it. We should learn what conflict goes on in the invisible world about our poor souls, which so often like Peter forget themselves; we should "never forget how often the hand of Jesus has saved us from falling into hell, that we may encourage others to put their trust in the intercession and help of Jesus." (Rieger.) The more pre-eminent thou art, as the guide and representative of others, the more carefully shouldst thou guard against all self-confidence, and all boasting beforehand of thine own strength; learning what this word of Christ, and the history which it explains and which is explained by it, is intended to teach.[1]

[1] It is enough to mention in a note the melancholy perversion of the Papist's exegesis—that Peter was specially prayed for, because all was to depend upon him as the head; and that the subject of the prayer was that the confession of the true Christ should never fail in the chief head of the Church, or in his successors. But *the faith* which

If the previous clause generally and indefinitely predicted a fall of Peter, down almost to the verge of total loss of faith; that which follows contains in it mighty consolation, as taking it for granted that he would remain an apostle and discharge its functions afterward all the more effectually.

In a future *when* (ποτέ), he will *come back* from his wandering and error, and rise all the more vigorous from his fall. Or are we to interpret ἐπιστρέψας adverbially—Then strengthen them *again* as I have strengthened thee—? It does indeed occur in this sense (in the Sept., *e.g.*, Ps. lxxxv. 7); and, after Beda, Maldonatus, Grotius, Bengel (who incorrectly compares Acts vii. 42), van Hengel has lately defended this view. But there is something unbecoming in such a comparison between Peter's strengthening his brethren and the Lord's strengthening him, for there is a great distinction to be observed; and, moreover, even if this be explained away, the phraseology of the New Testament too generally and distinctively employs ἐπιστρέφειν and ἐπιστρέφεσθαι to signify return from sin, *conversion* to God (as in Matt. xiii. 15);—see it, as used by St Luke himself, Acts xi. 21, xiv. 15, xxvi. 18, iii. 19, ix. 35, &c.[1] When the Lord, in this preparatory *promise*, which included a *requirement* that His apostle should do what David promised in Ps. li. and honestly did, speaks of his ἐπιστρέφειν or returning, He makes His meaning perfectly plain. On the one hand, Peter's deep fall is more definitely predicted as first to take place; and then, on the other, the *condition* is made prominent, on which alone the fulfilment of the promise is suspended. Only to this end has He preserved in Peter's heart even in the midst of his denial a secret faith, that this faith may be strengthened into full return and conversion, might take courage to return to Himself who should forgive such sin, and strengthen His disciple's faith through the experience of such grace. (And whosoever has already been converted to God, must after every fall renew this returning.) The Lord prays for all who have any faith; but not all return back to

Peter even in his denial never utterly lost, was something very different from externally true doctrine. The word of Christ, here as in Matt. xvi., has nothing to do with "successors."

[1] Hence also ἐπιστροφή chap. xv. 3, not the conversation, but the conversion of the Gentiles.

Him, to receive the virtue and fruit of His intercession, which constrains none, but "props up those alone who receive the prop." Thus while *when thou hast turned* is a certain prediction, it is at the same time a direct Imperative to Peter.

Then strengthen thy brethren! Then shalt thou be able! And here is a reason why God permits us to fall for our own deeper knowledge of ourselves; that our sin may be turned into a blessing to ourselves and to others. When, humbled and encouraged, we understand the ways of the Lord, we can from the resources of our own experience warn others of the power of the enemy and encourage them to rely upon the victory of grace,—knowing the voice of the wolf and the voice of the shepherd, the cunning of the one and the fidelity of the other, we can teach others to know them also. Although the Lord afterward terms the disciples His *brethren*, He cannot here say, Strengthen My—or even our—brethren. For the Apostle was to strengthen and encourage those who were exposed to similar defect of faith as himself—thus *his own* brethren. The word extends assuredly beyond them, but Peter's fellow-apostles are primarily meant; and the intimation is given that all his brethren would waver likewise. The fall of the first of them, of him who had been the most courageous confessor, must be a stumbling-block to the faith of all. Finally, it is observable that Peter is to strengthen his brethren *as their brother;* no such primacy awaited him as should change his brotherly relation. When he afterward wrote 1 Pet. v. 8—10 he remembered this word of the Lord, as almost all his expressions show. The Dispersion was strengthened by these his epistles; for ch. i. 12, iii. 17, in the equally genuine second epistle, have the same tone.

But now as yet he is the old, lofty, but weak Simon, who knows not himself, whom we have learned to know in Jno. xiii. 36, 37. Most unbecomingly he contradicts the scarcely at all received word of his Master:—Thy intercession *for me* is not so necessary, I have a true and strong faith; I *am ready*, I will abide with thee and follow thee wherever thou goest, so that I shall never need to return back again! If they put thee into *prison*—that is the first thing which he can think of; what follows he hardly meant in full earnest—*and unto death.* (If it should go so far as that thy body should be offered up, thy blood

be shed.) Vain as is the impotent self-confidence which expresses itself in these words, there is no hypocrisy in them; at the moment when he uttered these strong feelings there was a real truth in his willing readiness.[1] Therefore his *heart*, which truly hung upon the Lord, puts first the warm and resolute *Κύριε μετὰ σοῦ—Lord with thee.* Yet, on the other hand, there is something very blameworthy, self-willed, and blind in his continuing his contradiction after a similar rash assertion had given the Lord occasion to anticipate every further excess of presumption by the warning rebuke of His *Simon! Simon!*

Ver. 34. What remains to the repelled Master but to utter, in sorrowful affection, the more definite prediction of all that which He foresaw down to its minutest detail concerning him? *I say unto thee*—because thou dost enforce it—and wilt thou contradict this also? And now in gentle irony—Unto thee, the supposed *Peter!* Thou didst in the name of all confess thy faith in Me, and then wert thou Peter; but thou wilt soon, to-day, *deny*, and say that thou hast never known Me![2] (Which, according to ver. 57, compare Mark xiv. 68, 71; Matt. xxvi. 72, 74, was literally fulfilled.) Even *thrice* in persisting blindness and increasing guilt—until at last the *cock-crowing* will awaken thee in thy deep night, and bring back to thy remembrance my slighted *Simon! Simon!* What more might be said upon this must be reserved for the immediately following *repetition* of the same most memorable word of Jesus.

[1] Niemeyer (in the Charakteristik) carries this too far, and is too indulgent to the flesh when he finds here "the voice of a noble and resolute spirit—honourable ambition (?)—the warm feeling of love—*not* excess of presumption—*not* mere words—but the generous outburst of the bravest decision, as noble at the moment as the act itself!" Dräseke is more correct: "Man is always better than his evil, and *worse* than his good, impulse and humour: in other words, no man *is* as good as moments of glorious inspiration exhibit him; and no wicked man is so wicked as he appears in the outbreaks of wretched self-oblivion." But we may ask if this glorious inspiration is not also wretched self-oblivion. Krummacher wishes for us all a similar zeal for the Master, and says that "no self-exaltation is more tolerable and pardonable than that which springs from such an enthusiasm for the Saviour." But the Saviour himself deals more severely with this not thoroughly well-grounded devotion.

[2] The *μὴ* after *ἀπαρνήσῃ* is, as frequently, a reduplicated negation: see ch. xx. 27.

SECOND INTIMATION OF THE DENIAL.

(Matt. xxvi. 31—34; Mark xiv. 27—30.)

According to St John, with whom St Luke well agrees, the Lord predicted the denial of his professor, after the Supper indeed, but *before* the final discourses of Jno. xiv.—xvii., before the *going forth* in ch. xviii. 1. But, according to St Matthew, with whom St Mark almost verbally coincides, the Lord said the same specifically predicting words *after* the actual going forth, *in the way*;—in a connection quite different from that which St John plainly gives, and constrained by a similar yet still different word of Peter, to express Himself so distinctly. Nothing is clearer than that their accounts are diverse; nothing more certain than that both must be true; nor does anything prevent our assuming a repetition of the word which Peter rejected the first time, when such an occasion as we shall find demanded it.[1] We therefore pray all believing expositors of Scripture, all Passion-preachers especially, to give up the confused attempt to make these two distinct sayings one. The *then* of ver. 31 in St Matthew (consequently also the *and* of ver. 27 in St Mark) cannot possibly go back to something said at an earlier time, as an indefinite formula—*about that time*. It must indicate the succession of time after they *went forth*. As St John makes it plain that the discourses and prayer of chs. xiv.—xvii. were uttered before that going forth, it follows that the words which we have now to consider were spoken after all this, even after the highpriestly prayer. And it is a superfluous confirmation of this that Matt. xxvi. 31 only again takes up what had been once declared immediately before the prayer in Jno. xvi. 32.

It remains to be asked, in what connection of time the *singing* is to be placed. As this solitary recorded instance of Christ's singing—ὑμνεῖν[2]—must refer to the customary psalms which were

[1] *Very possible*—Olshausen admits.

[2] Not merely, they uttered a song, or the song of praise—but an actual recitative song. The only time that we find our Lord sanctifying *singing* by his own example.

sung over the fourth paschal cup at the close of the ceremony,[1] it is plain that it here forms the close of the paschal meal; yet so as that the sacramental institution is regarded as in part taking the place of the old rite. If we would strictly connect the *singing* with the *going out*, our Lord must be represented as returning again to Old Testament words *after* Jno. xiv.—xvii., that is, after the sublime, all-fulfilling and all-glorifying *prayer*—and this is to us at least quite unimaginable. No one who enters fully into the spirit of the whole will suppose this; and nothing can be more violent than Grotius' perversion, who thinks that the high-priestly prayer itself was intoned as a hymn! Thus, *after* Jno. xiii. 23—38, and Lu. xxii. 31—34, all inseparably connected with the meal, the customary hymn was sung to calm the spirits of all, fitly to close the feast, and to give the first signs of the approaching going out. But the discourses in St John *during the delay* of setting forth must be interposed between the *singing* and the *going out*. The connection of these two in the first two Evangelists only declares that this part of the paschal rite was not omitted; and that they did not set forth *before they had sung*.

This night—thus does the Lord *now* begin again, as He goes forth accompanied by His disciples through the night, and sees in His spirit how soon they will fly from Him, be scattered as sheep without a shepherd, and leave Him alone (Jno. xvi. 32.) This is the *hour* already come, in which the *night* must come in a deeper sense, in which the power of darkness will break in upon the light of the world. All the powers of hell—as of heaven—are excited; the whole world of spirits is stirred up to the decisive conflict; and in the world of men around the Lord there is such concentration of suspense, such confusion and darkness

[1] The so-called Hallel, or great Hallel, Ps. cxiii., cxiv., having been sung during the meal, Ps. cxv.—cxviii. followed as a closing doxology. The book of Wisdom, ch. xviii. 9, dates this back to the first passover of the fathers. Certainly the Lord did not omit these most appropriate Messianic psalms; they were prophecies prepared for Him and His present hour. But we must endeavour to realise His thoughts in singing them, to get their wonderful meaning! To understand how He sang "in the confident expectation of the glorious songs which would be born of His sufferings."

of mind, as baffles all attempt at human description. The Lord alone, now as heretofore, is serene and collected; He looks through the whole, lets His light shine forth until the final crisis, and seeks still to bring His disciples to thoughtfulness, and arm them against the confounding powers of the night. For this prediction of fall and offence is itself, connected as it here is with words of gracious consolation, a defence against their perfect fall and continued offence; for they would afterward remember—He foretold us this!

What σκανδαλίζεσθαι—their being offended—is, we have seen from Matt. xi. 6, down to Matt. xxiv. 10; so that no explanation is further wanting. *All ye* still remaining around Me—this comes prominently first in contrast with the "*one* among you," this one being now removed. Observe how this appears here again to be *taken for granted!* They have received the praise of continuing with Him hitherto (indeed only in a typical reference to the future), and great promises in addition; but their great weakness must first become manifest, that weakness which, however, has not restrained Him from instituting with them the Sacrament. In all these relations we must find pure generalities, as typically as historically presented; the design of the *words* of our Lord which are recorded is no other than to make prominent these fundamental points in the whole procedure, and thus to point out to His future church the way of a perpetual application. *Shall be offended in Me*—this is almost in direct antithesis to the betraying of that One; it is far from meaning, what de Wette's translation suggests, "be apostates from Me," but only intimates the perilous beginnings in that direction. Yet it is no other than a sinful weakness in *all* the Apostles; and if not one of them was excepted, so there are no disciples of all times to whom the night of offence will not come. His words are piercing and deeply humbling, but they are also consolatory, since the Lord thus calmly and reconcilingly speaks of it in this night of atonement. One has *betrayed* Him, one has *denied* Him, *all* have *forsaken* Him: here we have three degrees, but the two latter are only different in their external manifestation; hence the Lord, if we compare His words elsewhere, includes the *denial* of Peter with the general *offence* of the eleven who remained with Him. Positive *denial* indeed is in its actuality much more

than the as it were negative forsaking or leaving. Yet both are in principle one, and are thus related: the offence is opposed to a *faith* which adheres, waits, holds out, and follows; the denial is opposed to an *avowal* of that faith.

For their stronger consolation the Lord gives them His prediction with a γέγραπται — *It is written.* We know how precisely His quotations of Scripture are to be understood. The notion that He occasionally derived a figure, or a proverb, or a striking saying from the Scriptures, without reference to the real connection in which it originally stood, is altogether unworthy everywhere, but especially inappropriate to the holy solemnity of the season of the Passion.[1] We have not one solitary instance of any such unbefitting use of a scriptural word! Von Gerlach's remark is here strictly appropriate: "Jesus nowhere so often as in His sufferings quoted or alluded to passages of holy Scripture, as *fulfilled;* so in the desert He repels thereby the assaults of the devil, and obviates the offence of His disciples, as if something unexpected had befallen Him." Consequently, this reference to the prophet Zechariah is to be taken as a precise quotation; and thus that passage secures, to a believing exposition, its only true meaning.

The last chapters of the Prophet are, as is well known, very obscure, through their profound and often designedly paradoxical expression; but the Christian reader, at least, is perfectly sure that they refer to the Messiah and His time. It is for us now, assuming this, humbly to investigate them; and, avoiding all presumptuous arbitrariness which can only confuse our understanding, to let the light of fulfilment shine upon the path of investigation. We now give the view which we believe that in this manner we have found.

The collection of Zechariah's prophecies consists (according to the preface, ch. i. 1—6), of two main sections, the former of which (down to the end of ch. 8), bases upon the then renewed typical Jerusalem, a prospect of the essential *new Jerusalem.* In ch. vi. we have the new temple, a living temple, growing up from its foundation, which the Man, the Branch builds, who

[1] But that notion lies at the root of the very false supposition of Grotius, that Zechariah's subject is de aliquo *non bono* pastore.

unites the Kingly and Highpriestly crowns,—the typical circle of prophecy thus at the end returning into and coinciding with its beginnings in 2 Sam. vii., and Ps. cx. See further the high consummation of the prophet viewed in the realised glory of Jerusalem, ch. viii. But with all this we have not particularly to do; the second section, ch. ix.—xiv., more directly concerns us here. This pictures the future new Jerusalem *without* any typical connection or basis; but, instead of that, with a comprehensive glance over the history of its preparations in the counsel of God down to its full establishment; a glance, however, dim before its great fulfilment. Chs. ix.—xi. prophesy especially of its *preparations*, give us first a most general glance at the plan of the Lord's government, which looks upon *men* and upon all the *tribes of Israel*, (ch. ix. 1), that is, embraces mankind as in its centre Israel; and then disclose to us purifying judgments inflicted upon the nations, the peculiar protection of the house and people of God, the consummation of the kingdom of peace for the Gentiles and for Israel. In ch. x. the prophet is more limited, having reference rather to Israel after the flesh, which will be restored at the end. Ch. xi. gives almost historically, in the manner of Daniel, the history of Israel down to the days of Christ, and even beyond.[1]

[1] We are loth to abstain from endeavouring to set right the perplexities of Ebrard, Hitzig, and also Hofmann on this subject, but a few words only must be permitted. Antiochus had destroyed and laid waste, vers. 1—3. Then in ver. 4 the prophet comes forward in the name of the *Shepherd of God*, the Messiah, who, before His manifestations in the flesh, was the true Shepherd of this people; this flock of slaughter (and here belongs Acts viii. 34.) To him are opposed, in ver. 5, the wicked shepherds who possess and devour them—then follows, in ver. 6, as a punishment, the giving them up, which followed as in Jno. xi. 48, xix. 15. I will no more pity and save them, as many times before—but why? For they have *rejected the best Shepherd*, Myself, when I came unto them! This sad history then proceeds more in detail. Not as if (according to Ebrard, Off. Joh. S. 94) the "flock of slaughter" was the community of peoples, and he who took pity on the flock, the people of Israel: this introduces a misconception which would run through the whole chapter. The people of God, who are to be judged, are called generally and as a whole the flock of slaughter, yet some among them are genuine and humble *sheep*. For the sake of these last, they are all pastured; but, because one staff is not enough, with alternate gentleness and woe. (For this, and not *bands*, we hold to be the interpretation of חֹבְלִים.) Thus had God

This exclusion of those who rejected as rejected themselves, this laying waste and abandonment of the old Jerusalem and of carnal Israel, takes place first; but in ch. xii.—xiv. we have the founding and building, the *establishment* of the true, the *new* Jerusalem. Ch. xii. glances forward preliminarily to the time when Jerusalem—which is to be a *burdensome stone*, a test for all nations—shall return from its blindness and misery, the spirit of grace descending upon it so that its people shall mourn

dealt with this people from the beginning, and down to the last period of history (ver. 8)—but all in vain: the manifestation of the good Shepherd in the person of Christ turns to the cutting off of Israel, and the abolition of the covenant for a time—vers. 9, 10. Israel's treatment by means of the heathen had been hitherto *gentle* enough! But only the sheep who marked the prophetic word of the Lord *know the Messiah* in the fulfilled prophecy, ver. 11. And how then? In severe irony, which embraces the literal accomplishment in the general figure, it is so described as if the Shepherd of God, even the God of Israel himself, when He laid down His staff and His office, demands His *hire!* As if he had served for reward, like the false shepherds! And they weigh out to him the slave-price of *thirty pieces of silver*. Are not these the high priests, when the Lord, as it were by the question of the traitor, asked them—at what price do ye value Me? In mockery they *sell* the Lord as a slave, while they *buy* him; and Judas is the seller as the representative of the whole of wicked Israel, which rejected Him. Then says the Lord in *His* counsel wrathfully—*To the potter* with it! Mire and clay, to be redeemed by this price of shame and mockery! But *this* potter's field lay, according to Jeremiah (ch. xix. 2, hence the reading in Matt. xxvii. 9), in the valley of Hinnom; and by a frightful requital for the rejected price at which they estimated their Shepherd, Jerusalem becomes as Tophet (Jer. xix. 12; Isa. xxx. 33.) Thus, "to the potter!" is equivalent to "to the tormentor!" or "to Gehennah with it!" And yet Judas threw the money first in the *temple!* He does this for a witness in his despair, for the temple itself is a place of scorn. Their rejection of the "price of blood" avails not to the hypocrites; their counsel, Matt. xxvii. 7, only fulfils the counsel of God. The price of blood is to perform a work of charity "for the burial of strangers"—but who was first buried there? According to Acts i. 18, Judas himself. The field of blood becomes a name notorious; and the guilt of Judas, to whom *they* say, See thou to it! (as Pilate again to them, Matt. xxvii. 24) falls back upon them; so that soon the whole of Jerusalem, of whose doom the field of blood was the last prophetic symbol, became one wide, waste grave, where to this day—strangers are buried in spiritual death. For, according to vers. 15—17, the guilt and punishment of wicked shepherds over Israel, now rejected, goes on (as it is here darkly intimated):—they are given up to blinded leaders and oppressive lords.

as for an only child in whom was and in whom is their life. Ch. xiii. gives us several specific glances backward, yet only as from the final consummation; predicts the open fountain for all sin, the destruction of all false prophets and unclean spirits; then describes, suddenly returning to the very centre of the time of foundation, how *the Shepherd goes before* into condemnation and the death of atonement, how the entire flock, even the true flock, knew Him not at the first, but how, finally, His true people, after separations and purifyings, shall come forth at the last. Ch. xiv. finally closes the specific prophecy of the Old Testament (for Malachi gives rather a retrospective *postscript*); and shows in the dim futurity that which the Apocalypse alone, itself interpreted according to the prophets, can interpret:—the last conflict and victory, vers. 1—3; the future coming of Christ upon the Mount of Olives, vers. 4—7; the new Jerusalem, vers. 8—11; the feast of Tabernacles for all nations, vers. 12—19; the sanctification of entire Jerusalem, the bells, and the pots, and the bowls, being like the High Priest's breastplate, *Holiness unto the Lord!*

The rightly disposed reader will accordingly expect that our Lord's citation will be exact; he will observe that Zechariah contains many distinct Messianic prophecies; and will perceive at the outset that the *Shepherd* of ch. xiii. 7, in whom Christ now discerns Himself, can be no other than the same who in ch. xi. was sold for the thirty pieces of silver, and whom in ch. xii. 10 they pierced. Immediately before our passage, there is something obscure in ver. 6, where we may hang in doubt concerning the wounds between the hands (according to Maurer, who compares 2 Kings ix. 24, on the breast.) Whether these refer to the marks of idol-worship (which is not clear to us), or, as we prefer, to the stripes of the parents[1]—in any case there is a *transition* in the parallel of מַכּוֹת and הַכֵּיתִי, ver. 6, with the דָּקַר of ver. 7, which signifies—In a quite different sense will the *true* Prophet and Shepherd *suffer* for the guilt of others, let

[1] For see ver. 3. Thus it is not, as Kimchi thinks, a punishment for idleness in youth; but, as Jerome seemed to discern, a chastisement for false prophesying, which the humbled delinquent acknowledges as a testimony to truth.

Himself be smitten by them who hate Him because He loves them! (For which transition to bitter lamentation, as the undertone, בֵּין יְדֵיהֶם must mean the hands literally.) That which now follows in ver. 7 consists of three clauses: the death of the Shepherd marvellously decreed of God; the immediate result of this paradox, a rejection of the whole flock which knew Him not and refused Him; and, thirdly, the leading back of the true and humble sheep by the hand and power of God.

"*My* Shepherd"—thus in this prophecy the Messiah is plainly termed:—He whom I have promised and will give, whom I have set, comp. Ps. ii. 6. But He has, besides this first name (which unites in one the title most appropriately and in the highest sense God's own, with the closest relationship to God, as in Ps. ii. *King and Son*) yet another term applied to him, and here alone in the Old Testament. He is a גֶּבֶר, that is, a Man pre-eminently, a human hero—how else could He suffer the death which is here recorded? But God calls Him גֶּבֶר עֲמִיתִי —the Man that is my fellow—and this most lofty word of the Old Testament says more in its anticipatory letter than our New Testament dogmatics allow to it. Gesenius gives the word in this passage its first, indefinite, and slenderest meaning of *fellow ship*, but without authority. For, even admitting that the phrase was originally derived from this etymon, why must we in this single passage of the later Zechariah return to its most general fundamental meaning? The word is, as much as any one word, a fixed term from Moses downward; besides this place it occurs only eleven times in the Pentateuch for *neighbour*, fellow-man, πλησίον—thus in the same meaning as appears in the related root of לְעֻמַּת and עִמָּת, *juxta, pariter ac*, equal, by the side of. Certainly, עֲמִיתְךָ in the giving of the law is equivalent to *thy equal;* and let it be well considered what it means, when Jehovah terms a man His עָמִית, His fellow-man, at the same time His fellow-God! Hofmann, who better understands ch. xiii. 7 and on the whole hits the point well, declares, however, that "this is far from declaring a connection of the Divine and human natures, but rather a community of spirit, one *related* to God, His Son." And he is right as far as that the doctrinal statement is not yet unfolded; but it is undeniable that in the Mosaic

עֲמִית *equality* is more prominent than mere fellowship or relationship:—thy neighbour is on the same level with thyself, is as good as thou.[1] Consequently, גֶּבֶר עֲמִיתִי—the Man My fellow—is stronger, and nearer to the plain "God and Man," than for example the rather typical אִישׁ יְמִינֶךָ, man of Thy right hand, of Ps. lxxx. 17. And, moreover, we hear in Isaiah of a child born, which bears the high names of God, in Micah of Him whose goings forth were from everlasting, in Jeremiah of the name of Jehovah given to the Messiah, in Ezekiel that *the Lord Himself* will come as the promised *Shepherd* (ch. xxxiv. 11—16, 23, 30.) And in Zech. xii. 8, *as God* is strictly parallel with *as the angel of the Lord;* and in ver. 10 Jehovah says, *Me* whom they have pierced! Thus this *Man, the Fellow of Jehovah,* is at the same time distinguished from all His *hosts* as being one equal to Himself.

Christ, indeed, very significantly and designedly *left out* in His citation this name of high dignity, given to the Shepherd surrendered to death, because His primary object was to speak of the *sheep;* but it was necessary that we should thus perfectly explain the passage, and place *the Man My fellow* in its true light, that we may rightly estimate the blindness of our recent Christian commentators, who, like the darkened Rabbins, interpret this Shepherd to be a common man![2]

Most wonderful and paradoxical proceeds the Divine counsel concerning this Man, His Fellow, that the sword should awake against Him and smite (that is slay) Him. Instead of the protecting legions which the Lord of *Hosts* might have provided for His *Fellow,* He calls for the sword! But the *sword* is primarily a general designation of *death,* as in Ps. xxii. 21. (The cross could not yet appear in the Old Testament). But then, looking closer, it signifies, not indeed "the power of this world, in its judicial rigour," although God did accomplish His purpose

[1] This was so clear to the Targumist that he preferred to make the one person into two: Concerning the King and the Prince his fellow, who is *as He and equal to Him*—דְּכֻוָתֵיהּ דְּדָמֵי לֵיהּ.

[2] Jarchi, the king of Moab; both Kimchis, another Gentile king who devastated Jerusalem; other commentators an Israelite hero or king, Judas Maccabæus, Jehoiachim, or the like.

by that, but still a *judicial* infliction, comp. Zech. xi. 17, and see the normal passage Job xix. 29.[1] The sword of God had as it were rested and slept till now; this suffering, this death, this judgment had been yet in arrear; but now a עוּרִי, a sword, is called for, and the *Shepherd is slain* for the sheep.

And now its *immediate result.* Very naturally as its consequence, but yet another paradox. The flock is scattered instead of being collected together; the sheep flee as if there were no longer a Shepherd! Thus is it again a starved and dispersed flock? Assuredly, but only as the first result and only in part. The shame of the death of condemnation into which the Shepherd falls, cannot otherwise than be a stumbling-block (the offence of the cross, Gal. v. 11), to the *whole* flock, הַצֹּאן—it turns away from its Shepherd, not being able to discern Him in such a form and condition. What, according to the meaning and connection of the prophecy, is this flock? Certainly *now* the people of God, all who belong to this Shepherd as His flock, not merely Israel, but mankind (Ezek. xxxiv. 31.) The unbelieving are dispersed, turn away from the Smitten One down to this day (Is. liii. 1—3, 1 Cor. i. 23)—but so are also at first those who believe, as the disciples of Jesus in the night of His delivery to His enemies. Even John, who lay upon His breast and apprehended His heavenly discourse as no other did, is offended; and through the faithful heart of Mary the sword passes. It is finished with Him! Thus, when at this season of crisis and decision all forsake Him, so that He is left alone, it first becomes plainly manifest that the flock would be utterly lost without the return of this Shepherd.

[1] Where Luther's translation, though not literal, hits the sense, that by the sword judgments fall upon evil deeds. For חֵמָה does not mean, as the Jews expounded it, the wrath or the wrath-provoking contention of the friends of Job, who would thus fall under the sword-deserving עֲוֹנוֹת. But, there is an anger (of God), which rests upon the misdeeds (deserving) of the sword! Such sins as yours will be avenged by the sword (death), that thus ye may know that there is a *judgment!* We would not therefore remove the *judicial* element from the work of atonement; but it is another question whether (as Krummacher preaches), the common view which the juridical theory of substitution takes, is justified by such passages of Scripture as this.

But now comes the third point, the solution of the mystery. Thus is the counsel of God accomplished, and in a sudden transition we have as a *further result* His return and the gathering together of His faithful ones. Thus or then *will I turn My hand upon the little ones*, saith the same Lord of Hosts. Let it be carefully observed: Not they first of themselves turn back, but the hand and power of God in the *risen* Shepherd returned from death is turned upon them and gathers them together. That is what the Lord, without direct literal citation, means in the words which follow. Mark further: Not all the dispersed flock; but that difference is now made manifest which existed from the beginning. The remnant remain in dispersion, still more and otherwise are offended, deny yet more wickedly their Lord and Shepherd. The whole of Israel is first fully *scattered*, and in their flight from the cross they are perpetually followed by the unbelieving part of the called nations of mankind. But the *little ones* plainly distinguished from the whole *flock*, are His true sheep from the beginning; not merely the "needy," but the עֲנִיֵּי הַצֹּאן—the poor of the flock, ch. xi. 7, 11, that is, the miserable, the *humble ones*, who wait upon the word and the hand of God, just as עָנִי has this signification included in it in the Psalms, those who ask for the Lord, Ps. xxii. 26.

Thus is the great distinction made through the death and return, the cross and the resurrection of the Shepherd; they are *His* sheep among the great flock called back from the first universal offence and brought to Him. This progressive purification and separation בְּכָל־הָאָרֶץ (that is, at the sametime, in the actual type—in all the land, throughout the whole earth), is finally predicted by the prophet in vers. 8, 9. "The shepherdless flock is indeed scattered; but Jehovah Himself fetches back His little sheep. The greatest part of the peoples is indeed sifted away, but what remains is the true people of Jehovah."

Let it now be observed how far this prophecy is from being a mere prediction of the isolated contingent circumstance of the disciples' leaving Jesus on *this night*. The prophecy does not indeed speak merely of this night and of these disciples, but of the general destiny of dispersion which was to befall the entire flock, so that no restored one should ever be able to boast that

he had been exempted from this offence and this general turning away from the Shepherd who was slain; and this is made especially prominent in the addition found in St Matthew—*τὰ πρόβατα τῆς ποίμνης*—the sheep *of the flock*. The specific fulfilment in this one historical event is thus here, as it is often, itself an embodied prophecy, a type of the universal fulfilment. It is, as remarked upon Lu. xxii. 31, an allusion to Amos ix. 9. As the whole of the genuine house of Israel must be sifted without the loss of a single grain of corn, so is it with the first family of the discipleship, the apostles. What Zechariah prophecies of the entire flock has its luminous fulfilment in the first and nearest circle of the sheep. Bengel: "The disciples were *like unto* the whole flock to be afterwards collected by them;" less correct, and only looking at one side of the matter, is von Gerlach's note: "When the Jewish people had rejected their last Shepherd, the *judgment* of dispersion fell upon them; this was as it were foreshadowed in the dispersion of the disciples upon the death of Christ, just as their final deliverance and salvation was foreshadowed in the bodily deliverance of the disciples when Jesus was taken, Jno. xviii. 9." For, although this is really connected with it, yet the dispersion of the disciples did not typify the judgment of unbelievers, but the preliminary and apparently equal offence of all believers.

The translation of the Seventy was not to be used on this occasion; for it did not perfectly understand the passage, having given *ποιμένας* twice in the plural, and similarly *πατάξετε—καὶ ἐκσπάσατε*.[1] Therefore we have the quotation according to the original, and with certain alterations which are strictly appropriate.[2] The first person *πατάξω*, I will smite, became necessary when the invocation of the sword and all the first part was omitted, because it was not the Lord's purpose to speak of Himself now as the Fellow of God, but simply that He was *the* Shepherd of the flock: hence also we have not *τὸν ποιμένα*

[1] Not to speak of the unintelligible *πολίτην μου*, which falls away from the citation.

[2] Not *arbitrary*, to bring out what was suitable, as Döpke thinks, who, moreover, refers to the agreement of Barnabas, Ep. cap. 5 with St Matthew.

μου, *My* Shepherd, continued from the previous words. But Grotius is quite wrong: "Nor does that, *I will smite*, indicate a certain person, but the first person is put for any indefinitely;" for *God* is the subject of the verb, as afterwards in the *I will turn my hand* of the original text, and thereby the whole is defined to be a Divine decree and purpose. And after the resurrection Jesus appears again, Jno. xxi. in the figure of a *Shepherd:* He is the centre and rallying-point of all His own; all who forsake Him are scattered every one to His own (Jno. xvi. 32), like the foolish wandering sheep, Isa. liii. 6. And in the apostles themselves, as the future shepherds, this must first become manifest!

We have already seen that the consolation in Matt. xxvi. 32 was derived also from the prophecy of Zechariah, and is no other than an interpretation of what followed there. As there the Lord God was to turn his hand to His little ones, so now Christ comes to that end in His own person, that the meaning of the whole may be conclusively established. In the *after I am risen* He refers, as if it would be self-understood, to all His earlier predictions; and teaches all investigators of His word to understand that here in Zechariah (as often elsewhere) the *resurrection* of Him who was given up to death, and yet retains His kingdom, is silently *prophesied* as the necessary transition. The *going before* is consistent with the figure of the Shepherd: I will then first truly be your Shepherd, and gather you around Me after your dispersion! And in this the forgiveness and removal of their offence is necessarily to be understood—Ye forsake Me, I forsake not you. That Galilee is made the rallying-place (the same Galilee where He began His teaching, and for the most part continued it), we cannot regard, with Schleiermacher, as "highly improbable and a later addition." This does not exclude our Lord's intention to see His disciples more than once in Jerusalem, it rather confirms it: *Before* ye return from the feast to Galilee, I will as risen be with you, and lead you in the way thither. And the direction is contained in it, that they should not set forth alone, but remain in Jerusalem until He had risen. But the same intimation, that not Jerusalem (now rejected!) but the still and distant Galilee should be the place of meeting

for the regathered flock (the place for the last commissions to the apostles, Olshausen more doubtfully adds), is repeated by the angel at the sepulchre, and immediately afterwards by the risen Lord himself, Matt. xxviii. 7, 10, 16.

Peter, to whom (according to our view of the whole) Lu. xxii. 31—34 had been already spoken, will hear nothing of being scattered and offended, at least as far as concerns himself: the *all* is said to no purpose. With that uncharitableness which is always inseparable from presumption, he admits it as regards the remaining *all;* but concerning himself he makes the unconditional boast, extending far beyond this same night that had been spoken of—*I never.* He makes himself stronger than a whole company of men, and knows not how soon the questions of women will turn him from his mind.[1] Then he receives for the second time the emphatic notice which he still rejects, Ἀμήν λέγω σοι[2]—*I have told thee!*

St Mark on this occasion gives us from Peter's lips the exact words which were spoken by Christ: He alone has the two cock-crowings, and he alone the swift succession of predictions as they reach their climax, Thou—to-day—this night—before the cock crow twice! *Thou,*—who sayest, I will not—and for that very reason! *This day* (as Lu. xxii. 34), because the day was reckoned from the evening. Even *in this* already commenced and fearful *night* of universal confusion and tumult around Me. Finally, the most exact definition of the time, as a previously given *sign* of the prediction; the second *crowing* of the cock, the mystical warner and crier of the night! Baum.-Crus. is quite wrong in his indefinite interpretation of the thrice denying. "Thrice, indeed,—who knows how often?" For, apart from the recorded fulfilment, and the fitness that a prediction thus enforced should be thus convincingly specific, the *twice* and *thrice* of St Mark indicate that we are to take the reckoning as exact. *Denying* is the acted expression of offence; both, as we have already said, are the same in principle and feeling, yet one alone *will* deny, as one alone betray; but he is the confessor pre-eminently, and he denies, warned and yet unwarned, *thrice!*

The mention of the cock-crowing might be, first of all, a

[1] As Draeseke puts it.

[2] In St John also the first time *Verily, Verily.*

simple definition of time; as in Mark xiii. 35 the *ἀλεκτοροφωνία*, elsewhere also *ἀλεκτρυοφωνία*, the Latin *gallicinium*, among the Hebrews קְרִיאַת הַגֶּבֶר. The cock crows once at midnight; then again toward morning, that is, very early, midway between midnight and morning. The first, the earliest crowing, is not heard by most, hence the *cock-crowing* generally signified the second;[1] yet we also find *gallicinium secundum* mentioned. Hence in Aristophan. Ecc. the expression, *ὅτε τὸ δεύτερον ἀλεκτρυὼν ἐφθέγγετο*—and the like in Heliodor., Synesius, Juvenal, &c. Hence the proverbial saying adduced by Erasmus, *πρὶν ἢ τὸ δεύτερον ἀλεκτρυὼν ἐφθέγγετο*. And we may accordingly say, with Meyer's note, "What elsewhere (in Matt.) and even here seems to be only a general definition of time, was afterwards literally fulfilled." But this admits that it only *appeared* to be a proverbial expression, and, consequently, as the result showed, was *meant* literally at first, and the latter is all the more important, as the time of the cock-crowing was not invariably fixed; but here, as the climax given above shows, the exactitude of the prediction was designed for Peter's especial conviction.

But there is, in addition to this, something mysterious which envelops the mention of the *cock* in this place. It is a strange and significant creature;[2] its cry as a nocturnal watcher *(vigil nocturnus* in Pliny) is a specific token among men. Cicero de Divin. lib. 2 records it as a saying of Callisthenes, that the gods had given to cocks the sign of their crowing. Its voice affrights even lions, as was observed in very early times with wonder. "In the crowing of a cock," says the venerable Bochart (Hierozoicon, in the chapter *de galli cantu)*, "there are two things remarkable: one, that so small a creature should cry with so loud a voice, as to be heard at a vast distance; the other, that it sings at *stated hours*, and at such time as other birds are silent in sleep." That is—He is the watcher and crier in nature. As such, the ancient Christians often referred to it, in

[1] According to Censorinus, follows the *conticinium, cum conticuere galli.*

[2] Whose names in all languages (as Augusti, in his treatise concerning ecclesiastical animals, shows) are very diverse and obscure. The derivation in Eustathius seems plain, but as far as it regards *ἀλέκτωρ* alone—who goes not to bed, the wakeful.

relation to Peter's history. Ambrose magnifies the cock even as the comforter who proclaims mercy to those who return from their sin. In the hymn *Æterne rerum conditor* the cock is said to cry to us not to deny our Lord. In that of Prudentius *ad galli cantum* the cry of the cock is represented as driving away the evil spirits of the night.[1] Though all this arose after the fact, yet it points back to a typical significance of the cock in nature, of which antiquity had a universal feeling,[2] and which the Lord in His word to Peter recognised. It is as if He had said, *The watcher in the night* will finally awaken thee, yet (as in the case of most who sleep and hear not) not till the second crowing in this night; although thou bodily watchest—and sinnest—the first cry will be in vain, and the second find thee already a triple sinner! And all Christian people should learn to be sober and watchful while God is making His cock crow in our ears. There are many appointed to confess His name who deny it, and the very cock on their church-towers should remind them of Peter. But the question has been asked—Were there cocks in Jerusalem? It is certainly strange, since their connection with Egypt might have led us to expect otherwise, that the Jews from the beginning seem to have known nothing of fowls: in the Old Testament at least they are unmentioned.[3] But that may be explained as a fortuitous circumstance, like many other words and things which do not happen to occur. Further, the Mischna records that the inhabitants of Jerusalem, and the priests everywhere, could not possess them, because they

[1] We are told that a figure of the cock which crowed at Peter's denial is had in reverence in one of the Armenian convents! (Baseler Missions-Mag. 1847.)

[2] Those who are fond of the like may find the Rabbinical fables about the gigantic *gallus silvestris* in Buxtorf, Lex. Thalm. s. v. תַּרְנְגֹל; and in Bochart, Hieroz. l.c., the Arabian myths about the white cock by the throne of God, whose voice gives the signal to all the cocks upon earth. But we do not refer to these fables, but to the fundamental feeling from which they sprang.

[3] The old translations so termed the collective זַרְזִיר Prov. xxx. 31, and שָׂכְוִי Job xxxviii. 36, but this was incorrect. The Chaldee and Talmudical name is תַּרְנְגֹלָא, תַּרְנְגוֹל (of doubtful derivation); the cock was also called גֶּבֶר (the man), and the hen גַּבְרִית.

scraped up unclean worms! Accepting this in good faith, many have resorted to the strangest expedients to account for Peter's cock;[1] but Winer may well say that the saying in the Talmud has no force against the evangelical narrative. Certainly, *a* cock might crow at any rate outside the city, or in the Roman precincts (we do not find the definite article, as might have been expected, in any of the four gospels), and we may say with Bengel: because cocks were unusual among the Jews, though the Romans could not of course be prevented from having them, *so much the more wonderful* was the prediction of our Lord. But we prefer to seek the wonderful or the more wonderful not so much in these externalities, as in the naturnal significance of the cock-crowing generally connected here with the precise appointment which showed that in the Divine counsel all was arranged for the awakening of Peter at the hour.

The *crowing of a cock*—and in how many ways has nature, overruled for our salvation, provided such cockcrowings!—may suddenly awaken the deafened sinner,[2] but only when a *word* has preceded which it impresses upon the mind. Again, the most powerful and convincing word may be in vain, as we see here in Peter. He is not to be instructed by mere words, even from the lips of his Master; he goes beyond his Master, as he goes beyond himself, in assurances of his fidelity. As according to St Luke and St John he had once already spoken in contradiction, he does now again. The ἐκ περισσοῦ in St Mark (another reading ἐκπερισσῶς) may mean the strength of his affirmation, and the repetition of what he *said;* but it may also mean *yet once more*, with a hint that this was not the first time. Yet we prefer, comparing Mark vi. 51, the former, connecting it with μᾶλλον:—the more determinately the Lord had spoken, the more express was his contradiction! And now the rest will not be worse than he, but suffer themselves to be led away

[1] As that ἀλέκτωρ was the Roman *Buccinator*, or the watchman of the Jewish court of judgment, or some other human watch—see Winer in Reallex. On the other hand, Sepp. (iii. 477) refers us to קְרִיאַת הַגֶּבֶר, as also to other Rabbinical sayings, which imply that there were cocks in Jerusalem.

[2] Hiller: Jesus might have astounded him with thunder! But His love wakened him by gentler means.

into equal presumption. *All* the disciples, that is, all who remained (for Judas' removal is silently taken for granted since ver. 61) say the same. And the Lord says nothing more, but leaves them the last word, till the approaching hour shall convince them of their folly; and also (as Wesley remarks) that He might not provoke them to greater guilt.

CONCERNING THE SWORD.

(Luke xxii. 35—38.)

The Lord spoke yet one serene word to His disciples, before the anguish of His soul began; and at the time of their going forth. For His mind and heart are full to the last of all that He had to say to them at His departure: He continually pours out of that fulness by degrees, as they might bear it. His own destiny less occupies His soul—what self-renunciation!—than the future trials and dangers of His disciples in the world, which will begin with the withdrawal of His earthly presence. This great *But now* is ever before His eyes in its aspect toward *them*, and it presses upon His heart as the critical hour approaches: —the less they anticipate its issues, the more constrained is He to speak of it. He has already spoken of their impending *temptation* and sifting, and therein of their spiritual perils, with the melancholy fall of the denier: it remains now that He should utter a warning of their coming *external dangers*, exhibited by a few emphatic touches. He thus returns to the theme, variations upon which had been heard in John xv. 18—21, xvi. 1—4; but now with most decisive explanation of His meaning, bringing into sharp prominence the contrast between their previous and their future condition. This is the saying, so naturally to be expected, which St Luke preserves. The *and He said unto them* as a formula for the indefinite compilation of the various sayings of this evening (as in ver. 31) leaves us quite free to place these words either here or there; but we have found the order of time hitherto so specifically marked that we may probably regard this word concerning the sword as the last before Gethsemane. It thus actually followed (after a pause in the going forward) upon

the *second* prediction of the denial, as it stands here in St Luke after the first.[1] But if St Matthew and St Mark are right that that second intimation of the denial took place when the going forth had already begun, ver. 39 in St Luke must be a supplementary notice that this also concerning the sword was spoken *during* the continuous journey. Nor do we see anything to oppose it; for St Luke does not write *καὶ* or *τότε* or *ταῦτα εἰπὼν ἐξῆλθε* (as Jno. xviii. 1), but rather, *καὶ ἐξελθὼν* (after thus speaking He had gone forth) *ἐπορεύθη*, &c.

We saw before, when giving St Luke's summary, how perfectly the words harmonize with the position of things at the time, and the circle of thought in which the Lord's discourse moves. He had predicted to them, in contrast with their previous circumstances, and especially with their earlier mission, a *time of need and danger* for His disciples; He gives the reason for this, ver. 37, in His own going before to a shameful death. But, as we saw before and shall now see again, while there is a similarity, inasmuch as the enmity of the world will be shown against His followers even as it was against their leader, there is yet also an important difference:—He alone surrenders Himself to pure suffering, they may use foresight and prudential defence. When the disciples misunderstand His strong and sharply-defined word as if it referred to the present time, and the question was His own defence, He breaks off sorrowfully and abruptly—for the experience which will teach them all is as near as the denial of Peter.

Ver. 35. It must be admitted that their wise Teacher does all that He can to awaken His disciples' attention and understanding. It is His intention to say—But now it will be otherwise! He therefore requires them to say how it had been before. He catechizes them upon their past experience, just as in Mark viii. 19. The *when*, with its backward reference, points to something distinctive, *when* I sent you forth—not, as Luther translates, *as often as*—for He had sent forth disciples generally only twice,

[1] Schleiermacher thinks that if this was the case, "many middle members must be omitted, or a new occasion altogether must be sought." But when he joins ver. 35 immediately to ver. 31, he views the internal connection rightly:—temptations *and dangers* impend! Only that the Lord might return back to this not yet expressed second subject, without any "middle topics" or "new occasion."

and the Twelve only that once which St Luke reports in ch. ix. 3, and to which therefore the reference here is plain. The Lord does not ask them if *with Him* they had ever suffered want, for *præsentes eos aluit Dominus*, as Bengel says, and there had been always something remaining for the poor. But, when I sent you away from Me into the world (as the type of the mission now approaching), without provision and with the express prohibition to make any[1]—had ye *need* of anything? Mark that not to have need was then at the outset enough, superfluity was to the Lord's disciples too much. And He may with confidence so ask; for although in that itineration things might not have gone so pleasantly with them as Lange poetically describes, "when they went along through the enthusiastic welcomes of His people"—although there might have been occasionally mockery and rejection, slight necessity and self-denial, yet on the whole they never really lacked anything, certainly they were never in absolute want and peril. His accompanying protection, His Father's providence had gently led them through all, protected them sufficiently and cared for their necessities. It would, indeed, have been no wonder if these preachers of repentance and of faith in a kingdom of God which came without observation, and in a Messiah different from the general expectation, taking nothing with them, moreover, had fallen into great necessity: and therefore the Lord points to the wonder of their successful course *when He sent them.* The blessed disciples perfectly well understand Him in this; and, unlike those who have complaints always ready that this or that has been wanting to them, they admit joyfully, thankfully, sincerely, and in the same sense in which they were asked—*nothing!* No Christian but may and must for ever make this symbolical word his own, even in the hardest times, and "looking back upon his past, whatever may have been its character, utter nothing but contentment, thankfulness, and praise."[2] The Lord has been our Shepherd, we have wanted nothing—see further Ps. xxxiv. 10, 11, lxxxiv. 12. The Lord sends us and leads us all at first in such a manner that this admission is rendered easy; many so gently and graciously

[1] See the explanation on Matt. x. 9, 10. Βαλάντιον (there ζώνη) stands here for the provision of money in the purse.

[2] Nitzsch Predigten, V. Auswahl. S. 46.

that they may go further and be disposed to think they have been lacking in no spiritual gift. (1 Cor. i. 7.) But this is only the discipline of children: the sterner sequel must follow.

Ver. 36. The Lord does not proceed as probably many expected—And so shall it still be, ye may still reckon upon the same! O no, *from this time* they are not only to use purse and scrip, but before all things, even if at the cost of their garments, they are to have a *sword*. How can that be meant? Certainly not in the special literal sense which the word seems to bear, and which has found its tame and unworthy explanation in Seiler's remark—"The apostles would now have, in part at least, to travel far beyond Judæa, and in regions where they would require provision of sustenance and even weapons to defend them against robbers and murderers." He who has in any degree entered into the spirit of these last sayings of our Lord will presuppose a more comprehensive and profound meaning in these words. It is obvious that there is a correspondence between the preliminary, typical "*when I sent you*" and the now approaching period of their new and proper *mission*, as apostles; consequently, the Lord speaks here of the entire future of these apostles and of His disciples in common, of that new and different time which should follow the *now* of His death;—and in the same symbolical and general sense as He had spoken to them on their first mission. It is still more certain that He does not speak concerning the few days immediately at hand.[1] Hitherto there had been no lack even in external things, but an easy well cared for course, with rest and protection from above; *but now* their way would need provision and prudence, and would even involve *conflict*, in which they themselves must provide for themselves protection and defence:—*this* is the plain meaning in

[1] So Hess as superficially as Seiler dismisses it: "Because He foresaw that they would be scattered, He recommended to them the prudential provision which every refugee makes on flight, as, being undefended, he would be exposed to all kinds of oppression. This provision He recommended for the short space during which they would be separated from Himself. And that this provision was appointed only for this interval, is proof enough that they were not to carry weapons afterwards, &c." The Lord speaks of no interval, but shows with what directions they were to be sent forth by Him from this time onward.

general. Thus will it go on, before ye (ver. 30) sit at My table, and on your thrones! That must be said in some form as the complement of His farewell-discourses; as we shall see if we take this occasion to glance over the whole.

We must now observe the individual expression a little more closely, in order to proceed more safely in the investigation of the meaning of the whole clause. The *he that hath* seems to intimate that there will be many who will *not* have purse, and scrip, and shoes; thus preparing the way for what follows—that there will be something else still more needful to them. But he that hath these must not leave them at home, as was enjoined formerly, but must *take them with* him as prudent provision against lack. This interpretation of ἀράτω is plainly demanded by the antithesis; it was only an exegetical necessity on account of the μὴ ἔχων (which can be much better explained) that gave birth to the artificial rendering—Let him who hath purse or scrip *take*, that is, *sell* these to procure a sword! It was scarcely needful for Olshausen to remark that the weighty contrast with ver. 25 would in that case be lost: it may be added that *everything* would then be made to depend upon or be subordinate to the sword. *He that hath not* must sell his garment and buy a sword instead![1] The saying is thus made very singular, and there is some difficulty in the first words of it μὴ ἔχων. Many take it to be, He that hath no purse, consequently no money. So Grotius: "He who hath, that is to say, no such purse as those carry who have money." Similarly Bengel, "no money wherewith to buy it." This seems very simple, but is not correct; for that concerning the *scrip* is not simply interposed, but the "likewise his scrip" must be also completed by "he that hath, let him take;" but the interpretation of the μὴ ἔχειν by the *following* ἀγοράζειν (he who hath not what is necessary in order to buy) is forced, and forgets that ὁ ἔχων preceded. Equally forced seems to us the other method of solution, "He that hath no *sword*," let him buy one at any cost; although the Peschito translated at once דְּלֵית לֵהּ סַיפָּא, which is followed by Stolz,

[1] Bengel prefers the reading καὶ ἀγοράσει, which would make little difference even if it were admissible: he takes that for a *futurum consecutivum* as in Mar. iii. 27, and adduces several examples.

de Wette, van Ess, and confirmed by Lange, "he who is not yet provided with a weapon." Olshausen hits the right medium, and gives the only true sense, according to which ὁ μὴ ἔχων is as it must be the antithesis of ὁ ἔχων, but without any further specific reference to scrip, purse, and shoes. The contrast is now, He that hath and he that hath not; consequently, μὴ ἔχων is equivalent to οὐδὲν ἔχων, having nothing. Lange says correctly, He that is not provided beforehand: but it is to be supplied by—with that which is necessary or commanded. There is thus a *sudden advancement* of the thought—To him I will recommend something still more needful, yea the thing *most needful;* let him by all means take care to have *a sword!* For that he may even sell *the* garment, that which was otherwise necessary—for such is the meaning of τὸ ἱμάτιον αὐτοῦ, and it does not merely refer to "decency" which must be made subordinate. Consequently: a time is now at hand, when—in certain circumstances—it may be more necessary for you to have with you weapons of defence, than to have gold or bread and be fitly clothed, &c.[1]

Thus the Lord speaks in startling contrast with Lu. ix. 3, or Matt. x. 9, 10. But, as we saw there that the prohibition of any equipment and provision for the way had a meaning for all times and all circumstances, so also the direction now decisively changed must be understood in consistency with that; and there must be a mediating interpretation sought here, as in all those places where the Scripture, and the Lord in the Scripture, teaches thus paradoxically by rigorous contrasts. If He now says to His disciples, Henceforward understand not my former words in their strict literality—without thereby contradicting the spirit which was in that letter; so we must be similarly on our guard in the present case lest we take the words in their strict literality alone.

It must be perfectly plain to every one who understands our Lord's manner of speaking, that He does not intend literally to

[1] Finally, that μάχαιρα stands here in its common acceptation for a *sword*, is incontrovertible from the gradation in the sentence, and its connection with the subsequent swords, and especially that of Peter. It is only through despairing of the meaning that the idea of a "sacrificial knife" as necessary in travelling could have entered into the mind.

ordain that whosoever among His disciples had no sword must, even at the cost of selling his garment, procure one. What then does He intend? He expressly and concretely says, Henceforth be it not merely permitted, but My command, that ye avail yourselves of all natural means of provision and defence in your way through an opposing world and all its oppression. All this is very well, if we can content ourselves with such fleeting generalities; but when the expression is so sharply defined as it is here, it must retain its literal significance. But how is this to be defended in connection with the obvious truth that Christ's disciples, as such, and in His affairs, are not to bear or use the sword? Orthodox expositors have with one consent, from Chrys., Theoph., Euthym., downward to the present day, explained it as by a firm tradition, that the Lord spoke figuratively or proverbially concerning spiritual armour. "Using a proverbial and figurative mode of speaking very familiar in those days, He intended to say—It will now be as when men in times of peril are wont to say, thinking of their defence, Whosoever has a purse with money, &c." Thus runs the confident comment of the Hirschberg Bibel. Pfenninger, too, regards this as the evident meaning: "We know already that He by no means designed to put swords into the hands of His disciples for defence. This, therefore, is one of His bold and penetrating sudden turns, and expresses the fundamental idea—*Danger must now be provided against by all.*"[1] If we think no deeper, nothing seems clearer than this; for although the external sword has its proper place and occasion, yet it cannot be used in the affairs of Christ, and by His messengers as such, who are here especially spoken of. It is altogether inconceivable that the Lord would give *such* counsel to *every* disciple who was not so provided.

Yet, when we look more closely, everything is against this cursory spiritual interpretation. Not, indeed, because it might be asked—How could the sword of the Spirit be bought? for Rev. iii. 18 might answer that. But first: If the Lord meant spiritual defence against an evil time, He used a very perilous

[1] See Pfenninger's Philosoph. Vorlesungen uber das N. T., and again in his "Sokratischen Unterhaltungen" he says, The Lord expressed the thought in "a manner very figurative and easily misunderstood!"

word to signify it, and one which was necessarily open to misunderstanding. It has, indeed, been solved thus: "The heaviest persecution was now about to begin, enemies were at hand with swords and scourges, so that if a man should wish to depend upon human defence and take care of himself in the manner usual among men, he could not do better than, selling all things, provide himself with a sword. By this sign, therefore, was given to be understood the thing signified. By the necessity of the sword He *symbolically* intimates the greatness of their impending danger." But, to our feeling, it is strange and perfectly unjustifiable to introduce this "if a man should wish" where such a wish was to be *forbidden*, and this "usual manner" where it was to have no place, and the "*necessity* of the sword" as explaining *great danger*. We ask, If the Lord will have no use of the external sword, why does He speak to people already too much disposed to it in a manner so misleading? Lange gives an acute answer, which does not seem to put the full force of the question: "He knew that *Simon* had already been thinking of the means of offence and defence, and that his heart was set upon the evil method of physical violence. This He would now bring to light. He used the expression *sword* when He exhorted them to the use of spiritual armour, in order to make them disclose and exhibit their provision for earthly violence." However ingenious this is, it is manifestly wrong. Who would not immediately reply that Christ could rebuke the disciples' hankering after the sword in a much more fitting, intelligible, and piercing way than by the use of such irony as *must* fail of its object. Again, who can imagine that even Simon, not to say others with him, would provide themselves *secretly* with swords against the enemies of Jesus—and moreover with just *two* swords? According to this view, they produce their weapons triumphantly, and their *behold Lord* means, Thou hast rightly spoken, and we have already cared for this! I confess that this is to me perfectly irreconcilable with the whole character and relations of the disciples; and hold that their wise Master could never have corrected their great error by a seeming requirement, masking a spiritual meaning, to provide themselves swords:—and then, when they have shown the swords they had, said merely, *It is enough!* In truth, He must have foreseen not merely the misun-

derstanding of His "prophetic, figurative words," but also the utter insufficiency of His rebuke—and therefore could not have spoken in this sense. "It is true (says v. Gerlach) that the misunderstanding had evil results; but it was better that they should be produced, and the roots of the evil thus disclosed and corrected." And did the Lord then speak in anticipation of Peter's drawing and using his sword, that so he might be condemned? How can it be so easily forgotten that this rash use of the sword was a heavy disgrace to the cause of Christ, and as such a not insignificant element in His passion? Most certainly, this will not, any more than the other methods, warrant our supposing the Lord to have spoken of "spiritual equipment."—But, secondly: As the scrip, and shoes, and purse are to be understood, so and not otherwise must the sword be understood. But these things are in Matt. x., and here also, prominent examples of many other things of the like kind; figures therefore which, however, represent *external* provision for need, corporeal resources, unless the whole connection of thoughts is thrown into confusion. (Or are we to think of heavenly treasures which are current in the kingdom of God, of provision in spiritual purses of spiritual virtues?) To this corresponds only external corporeal defence, though "sword" as the strongest expression of it includes very much. As the Lord permits from this time forward, yea in a certain sense commands, that all the earthly good which a man *has* should be used in His service for provision against *need*, just so he appoints, yea commands, the provision of external defence against threatened enmity. For *need* through enmity even against life—is the climax of the *lack* which they did not experience. Olshausen indeed contends, in order to bring out a fully consistent meaning, that *sword* must be, like *purse* and *scrip*, taken in a figurative sense; Lange carries that interpretation so far as to make it say, "What is now requisite is an entire relinquishment of and departure from the old world!" But how does this suit the directions of Matt. x., from which the whole discourse takes its rise? It must be maintained that the resources of provision are primarily external against earthly need, consequently the resources of defence are similarly against earthly danger.—Thirdly, and finally: The entire development of the most general connection, as we have laid it down at the

outset, carries us not back to spiritual armour for spiritual conflict, which had been already spoken of in vers. 31, 32, but leads now to a warning word of counsel as to the *external danger* of need, yea rather of persecution. This critical point, which has its essential importance and reality, would be altogether omitted in the farewell discourses of our Lord to His disciples, if these last words are interpreted simply in a spiritual sense. Hence we can perceive how precipitate is the conclusion of Lange, who generally is so peculiarly penetrating and original, but here falls in with the predominant exposition—"It is almost superfluous to observe that the words can be understood only in a figurative sense." When he mentions his only reason, "that in this late evening hour no man could think of buying a sword in the proper sense," this does not by any means hit the point. For it is plain enough in any case that the Lord is not speaking of a defence on this same night; this was the specific misunderstanding of the disciples. Between the reference to His disciples' appeal to the sword in that which *must yet be accomplished in Him*,[1] and the mere inculcation of spiritual defence for all His future disciples, there lies much which must be His only true meaning. That they were to arm themselves with faith, prayer, patience, and wise provision generally for all spiritual emergency (Matt. x. 16, 17), was not the thing which He intended in this connection by the mention of the *sword*.

When, however, the Lord speaks thus strongly of the sword *alone*, all kinds of defensive armoury being in question—when He so plainly declares, as it were, that *every one* at *every* cost must procure a sword—*that* must be referred to the proverbial, vivid tone of expression, to the living feeling and profound earnestness with which he would bring into contrast the evil time coming, as well as the necessity of being armed against it. *Such* a proverbial character of expression, from the mere letter of which a spiritual interpretation has something to deduct, is quite in harmony with our Lord's manner of teaching elsewhere; but that cannot be said of a spiritual sense alone, ex-

[1] *Sword*, awake against My Shepherd! This word our Lord had still in His thought, from the former discourse. This gives a new explanation, how He came to express it here so strongly, and also a new evidence that He did not mean it simply of spiritual weapons.

cluding all externality, when the words and the entire connection pertain to external things. It must be especially remarked that the progression of His words even to their most rigorous climax has led Him to this *buying of the sword*—and this indicates the worst contingency, of course, not the ordinary rule. In fine, the Lord's very remarkable saying concerning the sword,[1] as far as our most careful and well-considered exegesis can apprehend it, is intended providently to recognize and appoint for the future of His disciples *the employment of earthly means of protection and defence*, in opposition to what we may call, for brevity's sake, the Quakerish view. And is there anything untrue or needless in this? It is of itself perfectly plain that the death-dealing sword has nothing to do with the things of Christ's kingdom, the spread of His gospel and church (however earthly power may be sanctified to its preservation and defence); it is no other than a wilful misunderstanding to think that the Lord's word has any the most distant Mohammedan sense. This is manifestly shown afterward in the case of Peter in Gethsemane (as we shall develop the consequences of his word), and still more expressly in Jno. xviii. 36. And it is equally self-evident that the counsel or commandment of our Lord must be followed in *the spirit and meaning* of the commandment *not to resist* evil, in Matt. v. 39, (which, however, itself leaves room for counter-defence, see vol. i.) To this Bengel's subtile remark in his Germ. N. T. points: "a sword, not (so much) to kill any other, but to *keep another's sword in its sheath*." In other words, for defence always and only, never for the first assault; the sword as the *necessity of a traveller*. Nevertheless, when we have made all due concessions and deductions as to the sense of this concrete and progressional utterance, the actual mention of the actual sword remains as a testimony of Christ to us all:—that His disciples, servants, and messengers in this evil and unfriendly world must no longer reckon upon that miraculous protection and gentle course which His apostles experienced on their first trial-mission, but *that they must for their personal protection of the life which belongs to the service of Christ* (*that* alone is here spoken of!), in certain circumstances and times of intenser danger, even have recourse to the

[1] Its paradoxical form is proof of itself of the authenticity of St Luke's tradition.

equipment of the *sword*.[1] The sword here stands on the same level with the purse and the shoes, and is in certain cases the most pressingly necessary of all. As we must not neglect care of the exchequer (and the Moravian Brethren understand now better than they did how important is the care of the finances), as manifold provision for the pilgrim's need in the service of Christ is by no means unimportant, when the necessity of that high service is studied alone, and there are many ὑποδήματα which might assist and expedite his way through the world; so it is right and proper that he should be armed, not only when he carries the peace of Christ among the wild Battas of Sumatra—where the fate of Munson and Lyman are examples—but even in carrying the Bible through Christian Spain. Generally speaking, every one should consider that the promised protection of the Lord is vouchsafed by Him ordinarily according to the course of this world; and where his life is in danger, he may confidently and without scruple defend it, since it is the Lord's commandment that he should not throw his life undefended away.[2]

Ver. 37. The first *For* which connects the new clause shows that the Lord is here giving the *reason* of what He had said, and we understand it at the outset: For with Myself the way leads to dire ignominy, through the bitterest enmity raging against Me; thence learn to estimate how much hatred ye may expect from the world as the followers of One thus singled out. (Jno. xv. 18.) This is the first time that the Lord himself directs us to the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah, that most pre-eminent and complete text of the Passion; but it will scarcely be expected by our readers that we should here, as in the case of Zechariah, investigate the Messianic character of the entire section, and show the connection of this individual passage in the unity of the whole prophecy. That would lead us into too discursive disqui-

[1] Accordingly, Ebel was so far right when in 1813 he preached upon this text the defence of the "holy war." But he admitted much error into his sermon, unhappily intermixing throughout politics with the affairs of Christ's kingdom, and confounding the general defence of the state with the necessary defence of the individual. Christ's word speaks only of the latter as a New Testament word, but the former belongs to the not abolished Old Testament.

[2] Rothe's Ethik (iii. 194), when it treats of defence, might have very properly quoted this passage as a positive confirmation.

sition; and if anywhere it is here permitted to us to fall back upon the ecclesiastical and scriptural interpretation which has prevailed from the beginning. The later theology, after all its investigations of the עֶבֶד יְהוָה, and its occasionally useful correction of the onesidedness and disjointedness of former views, must needs come back to the old reference to the Messiah. Call it type or prophecy, and develop the ultimate meaning as it points to a fulfilment in the New Testament, as you will—but do not contradict the supreme authority of Him who between the sacramental passover and Gethsemane places this γεγραμμένον among the prophecies, of which He decisively says—τὰ περὶ ἐμοῦ, that is, in this connection, *the things written, spoken, appointed concerning Me.*

Chs. xlix.—lv. of Isaiah announce most clearly to all open eyes the Divine *plan of redemption*, according to which He acquires, prepares, and glorifies His true Israel *in the Messiah*; and by the means of His atoning, regenerating *sufferings*. Israel is God's servant, but only because the Coming One is Himself the true Israel. (Ch. xlix. 3.) Thrice in progressive development we have exhibited before our eyes the conflict and victory, the sufferings and the glory, of the Future One; then the following of His people in the same way, and the covenant of grace thus established. The third of these recurring sections embraces ch. lii. 13—to the end of ch. lv. The same Lord and God who, according to ch. lii. 12, is in the van and rereward of His people's new deliverance, accomplishes this prudently by *His servant*, in whose person He comes and is Himself with them (ch. lii. 6). He who was deeply abased is nevertheless exalted; His suffering is an offence and cause of rejection, but His suffering heals the offence; after the patient endurance of a sacrificial death He lives again in many. This great transition appears under three points of view: The despised root-shoot grows up to a rich harvest of seed; the labour of His soul obtains the fulness of recompence; He who conquered in death carries with Him His great booty. And so in vers. 10—12, the *exaltation* of Him who was humbled is described specifically at the close:—He bears and takes away the sin of many, Himself dying the death of a sinner; He enters as Mediator and Intercessor for evil-doers, *even as* He is reckoned one with them. This is the crown, the τέλος of this

chapter, compact in itself. To the sublimely comprehensive לַפֹּשְׁעִים יַפְגִּיעַ corresponds finally, as the ways and means to it, אֶת־פֹּשְׁעִים נִמְנָה. As certainly as the same יַפְגִּיעַ which in the most general and fullest sense means, *He interposed for*[1] the transgressors, was specifically and visibly fulfilled in His *intercession* upon the cross; even so was it concretely fulfilled that He was reckoned among the transgressors (Niph. *He submitted to be reckoned*, parallel with the וַיֵּרָע, וַיֵּעָשׂ, וַיֵּהָלֵךְ יַפְגִּיעַ of His own personal act), when in His crucifixion He was placed between the two murderers as the third.[2] Therefore the Lord himself cites this word, too, in the same manner as that other in Zechariah.[3] When He says, ἔτι τοῦτο (this addition must be accepted as genuine), He makes prominent the disgrace thrown upon Him as the climax of His suffering in its external manifestation. *It must* be accomplished in Him, because it is written. But what means the apparently superfluous second clause with its repeated *For?* Τέλος ἔχειν, have an end, is generally regarded as one and the same with τελεσθῆναι, be accomplished, and this again is made the same as πληροῦσθαι, be fulfilled, but all this is flat tautology—It must be fulfilled because it is fulfilled. The turn of expression receives, indeed, another sense when τὰ περὶ ἐμοῦ is emphasised as meaning *all things* concerning Me:—Because *all* that was written concerning Me must be accomplished down to the last, *this* also is accomplished, the last word of that most eminent prediction of the Passion. And this gives the words their true meaning, only that τέλος ἔχειν must have a more exact application:—If this τοῦτο is *yet* accomplished, because *all* must be accomplished, then the fulfilment of all has thereby an *end*. It is useless here to make the petty objection that many later circumstances of the Passion, and many things concerning the resurrection and ascension of our Lord, were also predicted, and that therefore the reckoning among the transgressors could not be the last thing; nor should this objection

[1] The continuous future of His exalted state, the ἐντυγχάνειν of Heb. vii. 25 parallel with the וְהַפְגִּיעַ בּוֹ, ver. 6.

[2] Although the fulfilment already begins in Jno. xviii. 30, indeed still further back, Jno. ix. 24, viii. 48, &c.

[3] Again μετὰ ἀνόμων more exact than the Sept. ἐν ἀνόμοις.

itself be explained away by weakening the force of the simple expression, as if it meant only that all things tended thus to the end, and when this took place were not far from the final close. For, on the one hand, the Lord speaks here, as is evident from the significant Δεῖ, *must*, (which always has this reference), only of His *sufferings*; and, on the other, the *being reckoned among the transgressors* continues the abiding indignity even to the end, is itself the climax of His reproach, the lowest depth of His humiliation. The τελεσθῆναι had already implied this; and the words concerning fulfilment here must be taken in the same sense as the τετέλεσται upon the cross.

But we must now look more closely into the twofold *for* and the *end*, in order to bring out what most expositors have overlooked. If it is rightly regarded as saying generally at first—Prepare yourselves for danger and enmity, think of protection and defence, *for* your Lord must die the death of a malefactor; we must add that *this* "for" plainly intimates also—*But not on My account*, to protect and save Me, provide your weapons! That was so plain that the misunderstanding of the disciples can only be explained by their habitual tendency to overlook all the announcements of the Passion. That which must be accomplished in Him cannot be averted by any sword of theirs! Thus it is in the future and for themselves, as the disciples of a rejected Master, that they are to provide defence; and *for this* the *second* "for" brings a new reason, and plainer explanation. For if all that was written concerning the Passion has primarily *its end* in the personal, patient, and passive atoning sufferings of Christ, it follows that *we* are by no means appointed to a *similar* perfect renunciation of all defence and resistance, as if all were binding upon us as by an equal Δεῖ, and therefore to be passively submitted to. Presupposing and admitting all that fellowship of reproach, and suffering, and patience, which is our badge as disciples of Christ, there is yet a *distinction which is here signified.* Concerning *us* this or that has not been specifically *written*, and therefore at once to be yielded to with submission, as in the case of the Lamb who was led to the slaughter and opened not His mouth. If our Lord, according to the special and sole decree which was upon Him, was under the necessity of devoting Himself to the sufferings of redemption, that had its end in Himself;

we, who suffer not for atonement, but for our own purification and the good of our brethren, may and ordinarily should spare, protect, and even defend our life—that so we may spend it the longer and the more effectually in love for our brethren, and make it a sacrifice in the only way which is permitted *to us*. It will be seen what light now falls upon the words concerning the sword: the Lord does not speak of spiritual things, but certainly of need and danger to befall His disciples, just as of His own sufferings and death; He does not mean how they are to defend Him, but how everyone is in due time to preserve and take care of himself. He has in view the great and important distinction —that while He yields Himself to the sword which God had summoned against Him, His disciples are in the future in His name, in His spirit, and in His service, to contend against an evil world, and in cases of stern necessity to resort to the defence which His kingdom of grace justifies—Sword against sword.

The disciples do not understand their Master; they seize the *word* concerning the sword, but without perceiving the whole connection and meaning of His whole *saying:* "when it concerns natural things, man is apt and prompt enough"—says the Berl. Bibel. Their gross misunderstanding is the opposite extreme to the "spiritual interpretation" of later Christians. But their misunderstanding did not lie in their assuming that actual swords were meant, but in the supposition that He was referring to the present night and the defence of His person; therefore they produce the two swords—*See here they are*—thus giving Him to observe that they already *have them*.[1] This has introduced a needless difficulty in accounting for the disciples' being pro-

[1] Certainly not now first procured, or even brought in the strict sense—this is opposed by the simple *and they said*. They had the two swords with them, and merely said, See, we have them already! Thus the narrative was not intended, as Schleiermacher thinks, to account for Peter's having the sword when he afterwards used it; though it does give rise to the natural question—Whence and wherefore they had them. Friedlieb's remark that Peter's having a sword in Gethsemane was the result of their having misunderstood the Lord's words, might be true, if it were not that those words were uttered, as we have seen, on the way.

vided with swords. Chrysostom, though he regards the Lord as speaking of a sword, thinks that the instruments of the disciples were large sacrificial knives for the passover! Bengel first states as more probable what is in the highest degree improbable—"which they had found in the chamber;" but then he adds, "*or* had brought with them." Nothing is to be objected to the latter, since the Galilæans (a quarrelsome race) were accustomed and necessitated to travel armed. The road between Jerusalem and Jericho was never safe from robbers and murderers (Lu. x. 30), and, according to Josephus, even the peaceful Essenes bore arms.[1] And this the Lord, as we see here, had silently *permitted* to the disciples—a new confirmation of the meaning of His word concerning the sword! Thus both swords were brought with them from Galilee; Peter (as we might expect, and the sequel in Gethsemane shows) had one; and so had another disciple—hence the question, Shall *we* smite with the sword? Thus all is clear. But the notion that the disciples had provided themselves now first with weapons against the threatening enmity of Jerusalem, and for the defence of the Lord's person, is far more unreasonable than that they should now impetuously and without reflection produce the weapons which they already had. But we cannot attribute to them the folly of supposing themselves sufficiently provided in this little arsenal; the explanation of Hess seems more correct: "Alas, Lord, would that we were now better provided—but here we have only two swords!" (What are these against so many threatening Thee and us, in such a time of danger as Thou speakest of with such ever increasing earnestness.)

It is probable that the Lord's answer connects itself with this meaning of their *here are two*—so far, that is, as His answer has an ironical reference to the swords. Indeed, the fundamental force of Ἱκανόν ἐστι—it is enough—is by no means that which is given by the London Heb. New Testament—דַּיְּכֶן, for that standing alone would be quite insufficient to express the Lord's regret at the lamentable misapprehension of his profound and far-reaching word. But with look and tone of sorrow He breaks

[1] See Sepp Leben Christi iii. S. 40. Compare also Grotius de jure belli ac pacis, lib. i. cap. 3, § 3, Nr. 4.

off and says, It is already enough of this: I will no further speak of this, since ye are so entirely without understanding, ye will better apprehend it *soon*. This is in harmony with the use of the phrase,[1] comp. Deut. iii. 26, רַב-לָךְ, Sept. ἱκανούσθω σοι. If it is not just the "common oriental form of speech, when anyone has said anything very distasteful or palpably false," yet it is the everywhere common style of breaking off a subject, in some circumstances with anger, as here in sorrow—Enough of it! let it be so! We need not ask *for what* it was enough; the word of our Lord ceases to speak and to explain, because the disciples do not cease their misunderstanding and perversion. Inasmuch as this *It is enough* is His last recorded expression before Gethsemane (followed, if not by perfect silence, yet it is probable by only monosyllabic utterances), it may be regarded as involving the *generally* significant meaning—Enough of *speaking* and *not understanding*, now follows the *accomplishment* of all, and all things will develop and explain themselves! Still more: In these two swords the Lord's all-comprehending glance beholds all the misunderstanding and perversion which will lead to the use of the sword on the wrong occasion, and as Lange very pertinently says (more to the point than the note just quoted): "*It is enough*—this is a sigh of the Godman, which sounds as a wail of lamentation over the Romish swords and stakes, over the Paulician and Hussite butcheries, over all the terrors of civil power which His religion should witness."

Further, although He thus means in sorrow—Enough of speaking in vain, enough of misunderstanding! (enough, alas, of all that your swords show me, as typical for the future!) yet He also knows that the disciples had signified, when they exhibited them, Are these two swords enough? or rather, Alas these two are *not* enough! Therefore, when in His reply He uses such an expression as this, it seems obvious, as Olshausen

[1] But highly artificial is the interpolation of Grotius—satis *ad significationem*, the two are sufficient to illustrate my parable concerning spiritual weapons! Not much better is Lange's turn: "Enough to bring to light your ignorance, to explain your approaching fall, to bring Me into suspicion with My enemies, as if My cause were connected with that of the transgressors." This is a plentiful exposition of these short words!

says, "that the phrase *it is enough* involves a sort of *double meaning*, since they might refer its meaning to the two swords—Two swords are sufficient! as well as to the whole matter in hand—It is enough of this subject, I see ye do not yet understand Me!" But on two points we differ from Olshausen; we view the former as only the *second* and concomitant meaning, and we do not hesitate to call the other what it really is, a sacred *irony*. As such it retains its most solemn earnestness, since the insufficiency of even a general equipment of the disciples against the Lord's enemies was at the same time *proof* that He could not have spoken of His own present defence.

Finally, the Lord does not, as some might have expected, peremptorily repel them, and command the swords to be left at home or to be *taken away*. But His patiently breaking off with *It is enough* seems to permit, or even require, them to take them forward to Gethsemane. The Lord thereby acted in the spirit of His own words, for He thus teaches in act and symbolically that He would not have every sword unconditionally taken out of the hands of His disciples; He leaves it for the present till the consequences of their misunderstanding will appear, and give Him occasion to interpose more intelligently in word and deed.[1] He did not speak from the beginning with intent to bring out that future act; but He now keeps silence, in expectation of it. Thus *the history*, as we know it, brings fresh light, and in view of it we may reflect upon the words of Jesus—Yes, verily, the two swords were enough for our Lord's protest against the violent misuse of them! Although, on the other hand, His first word concerning the use of the sword was necessary in order to prevent the subsequent words, Put up thy sword into its place! from being pressed beyond their legitimate limits. Before the actual commencement of our Lord's Passion, where all defence was utterly forbidden, there was given a word which intimates to us, His disciples, another course than this unqualified all-suffering submission. But, because the right understanding of this, the drawing the line between commanded and forbidden self-defence, and the giving the *sword* especially its proper place, is one

[1] Comp. Stein's observations, which obscurely point to this, in his commentary upon this passage in St. Luke.

of the most difficult things to our ignorance, and never can be taught in words—*therefore* the other saying is given, which points us to the teaching of the spirit in actual experience.

THE CONFLICT IN GETHSEMANE.

(Matt. xxvi. 36—42; Mark xiv. 32—39; Lu. xxii. 40—42, 46.)

The synoptic record of Gethsemane now follows, in strong *contrast* with the seventeenth chapter of St John—a contrast, however, which has its christological, that is, its theanthropological propriety. A mediating transition between these two extreme limits of His Divine-human emotion we have already seen in the going from the chamber of the testament to the place of betrayal: he who can in a reverent spirit go out of himself and transpose himself into the humanity of the Lord, will understand what we mean. Hence the words which were spoken *in the way* strictly correspond to this character of transition: *this night*, out into which all things now go, is the preliminary fundamental theme which gives its aspect to all, even as the *glorification* had been before. The Shepherd must be smitten that "the Scripture may be fulfilled"—and its dark counsel, particularly as it respects the lost one, is present even to the highpriestly prayer, as its gloomy background. And before the glorification in heaven can take place, it must come to pass, as the end to be accomplished upon earth, that the Holy One is reckoned among the transgressors—not merely before men in appearance, but in harmony with Divine justice, which has in this a profound truth. If the question is still asked—and to ask is the prerogative of the wise as well as of fools—why St John has not recorded the mysterious and profound conflict which preceded the Lord's captivity, there is at least answer enough at hand to convict all doubts about the truth of the synoptical account—utterly inexplicable as an invention without historical ground—of being the offspring of wilful perverseness. If it is sought to reconcile the contradiction which has been needlessly found between the first three Evangelists and St John, it only requires to be observed that the latter gives in ch. xii. 27 the oft-repeated beginning and prelude of the agony,

and moreover in chs. xiv. 30 and xvi. 21, records the plain prediction of what was impending, and even, ch. xvii. 19, in the very midst of the glorification-prayer, utters the Lord's own consciousness as to how He would *sanctify Himself* for His own: while the Synoptics have sufficient anticipations and prospects of that glory which would follow the Passion, introducing the consummate feast, and the kingdom received and bestowed after His conflicts should be past.

Suffice that there is so much deep reason for the historical truth of the soul-conflict in Gethsemane—at least to every true believer in Christ—that we may leave all discussion about it to the unbelievers. All right understanding of the previous life of Jesus is prepared to expect that *when* the hour of suffering comes, that hour of which John also was not ignorant, His suffering would have an internal commencement before the assault from without began, and that the perfect obedience of the spirit in the flesh would thus approve itself after sharp conflict. For our own part, and to speak as fools, we should sooner be able to doubt the elevation of His consciousness which the highpriestly prayer exhibits, than its depression as shown in Gethsemane. Though, when we look into it, this word is itself a foolish one, for what appears to be depression is only the same profound intensification of inward emotion which before appeared as elevation; and the two feelings are represented as necessarily alternating according to the law of true humanity. As Lange has excellently said:[1] "The same spirit which uttered there the highpriestly prayer, brings here the highpriestly sacrifice."

This proper commencement of the sacrifice is therefore indicated in that most important apostolical commentary upon Gethsemane which we have in Heb. v. 7, 8:—in which words, although they at the same time embrace "all the days of His flesh," there is an undeniable reference to a known and acknowledged event, the strong crying and tears of Gethsemane. The High Priest is tempted at all points like ourselves, in the weakness of the flesh assumed in fellowship with us; otherwise than in this infirmity He could not not undergo atoning sufferings; He could neither be crucified (2 Cor. xiii. 4), nor consummate that obedience

[1] In the first part of his Leben Jesu, S. 175.

which alone was the internal and essential validity of the sacrifice of the cross. And here there is nothing of the wrath of the Father against His beloved Son, nor of any sinfulness in the Just One. Nor can there be, in the sense of the old theology, any Divine anger and pains of hell for Him who still cries *Abba* in Gethsemane, and even upon the cross *My God;* but "the grief of the Holy One over sin takes the place, in the *Saviour*, of condemning wrath"—as Ebrard says. And this recoil of the human nature from the cup of sorrow is no disobedience, nor is the weeping in which the obedience of faith found its expression unbelief; but, as Luther once said, "Christ loved His Father with all His powers; but these agonies being beyond His powers so oppressed His guiltless infirm human nature that it was constrained to sigh and fear and cry: just as when a beam is tested beyond its strength it gives way because of the weakness of its nature, not through anything wanting in itself."

Thus might even the willing *spirit* of the man Jesus not have conquered the *flesh*, which recoiled by reason of weakness, and the overpowered *soul* might have given way to an internal death before the external death of the body, had not a strengthening accession of Divine power into His human nature (according to that *right of grace* which avails for every praying man, and found place even here) been earnestly *sought in prayer*. But that prayer cries most loudly, Strengthen Me, Father! while it follows the question of anguish permitted to the Son, Is it then truly thy will? by the most entire filial *resignation* to that will. *The way to Golgotha leads by Gethsemane.* So was it with Christ himself, as the way of voluntary surrender of Himself to the deepest agony of soul in sympathy with our sin and our consequent death—and thus Gethsemane teaches us to *understand* Golgotha. Similarly is it with us, as the way of fellowship with His sufferings, through that faith in Him which brings down even into our flesh that power of the Spirit which He has obtained for us:—and thus we surrender ourselves also to the inevitable conflict, without which the redeeming judgment in our fallen human nature cannot be brought forth unto victory.

Thus much beforehand for the general direction of our thoughts for the understanding of the wonderful and transcendent object of exegesis which now lies before us. If we look more

closely at the three records, we find the most sufficing agreement. It is only natural that, in relation to *such* words, and words which no man at the beginning could clearly hear, there should be found a certain variation; but the reminding Spirit has given the essential substance to the record of the Evangelists with perfect and unqualified certainty; and the differences of the independent narratives is itself a new proof of their truth, speaking after the manner of men. We shall see in detail that the first two Evangelists mutually supplement and agree with each other; St Luke's peculiarity here (as in the Supper and elsewhere) regards the whole without exact relation to the order of time, which must be supplied from the others. He records in brief and in the most general manner the *words* which the Lord spoke on this solemn occasion, but He retains the *three essential points* to which they may be reduced:—the prayer which passed from a supplication to be spared into an act of entire resignation; the word which exhorted the disciples to like prayer; and the final "Rise, let us be going." He lacks, indeed, the first "Tarry here!" the selection of the three nearer witnesses, the immediate prediction of the agony, the threefold repetition of the same prayer; and that which he in vers. 40 and 46 places both at the beginning and the end has probably lost its right place. But, on the other hand, that we may not be misled as to his authority as an Evangelist, St Luke, at one remove from an eye-witness, adds those most important facts in the historical record—the removal to the distance of a stone's cast, the strengthening angel, and the bloody sweat.

He has also at the beginning the important word, Jesus went *as He was wont*, to the Mount of Olives—see chap. xxi. 37, and compare John xviii. 2. This *wont* might refer more immediately to these last days, in which He retreated before His enemies until His hour came, and took refuge there; but there is also something more in it, which is not on that account to be overlooked or denied. The Lord knew, more or less clearly and specifically, and felt in the presentiment of His spirit, that here was the appointed place of the commencement of His sufferings: and therefore he had consecrated it beforehand by many assemblings with His disciples, and by many seasons of solitary prayer. *To-day* at least He knows in the strictest sense all that should

befall Him (Jno. xviii. 4)—and therefore does not go directly, at so late an hour, to Bethany, as if to "sleep and take His rest," or, as on other occasions, to watch and pray there; but He turns aside to the garden of *Gethsemane*, under the Mount of Olives. He not merely knows that the betrayer was acquainted with the place, and would seek Him there to deliver Him up, but He experiences also, as His first word shows, a presentiment of that agony which awaited Him before God previous to His being delivered into the hands of His enemies. St John gives significant prominence to the brook Cedron which they passed over—the dark brook in the deep valley, over which David went in his deep humiliation on account of his sin, and where in old time the abominations of idolatry had been thrown (1 Kings xv. 13; 2 Kings xxiii. 4, 6, 12), as in later times, according to Jewish accounts, it had carried away the blood of the sacrifices and the refuse of the temple. From Gethsemane to Siloam stretched the valley of Jehoshaphat, the place of graves and of judgment. Thus, surrounded by such memorials and typical allusions, the Lord descends into the dust of humiliation and anguish, as his "glorification" had taken place upon the top of the mountain. St Matthew's emphatic *Τότε ἔρχεται* (comp. ch. iii. 13, *τότε παραγίνεται*) designs to give prominence to the place as well as to what took place there; St Luke, although he first spoke indefinitely of the Mount of Olives, expresses it still more plainly, indicating a well known tradition concerning Gethsemane—and when He was *at the place—ἐπὶ τοῦ τόπου*—(where this mystery was to take place, and where, as is well known, it did take place)—*He stood on the scene of* His mysterious conflict. Let us then now enter into the Holy Place! "And His disciples also followed Him." Not all indeed are prepared to follow Christ hither even in devout reading and penetrating apprehension of the words; still fewer in the fellowship of His suffering way. May the Divine Spirit make me and my readers fit, and guide us into both the right understanding and the spiritual fellowship of this scene.

St Matthew and St Mark give us the first word on coming to the place in almost the same terms; the latter being, however,

more concise, and the former more exact, even to the ἀπελθών and ἐκεῖ. The Lord feels the near approach of His anguish—thus much is plainly expressed; but the Berlenberg Bible very incorrectly and unbeseemingly gives a too human explanation of the choice of a place apart from the disciples: "Those who are in deep anguish go here and there, &c., &c." O no, with all the commencing anticipation of His conflict when he came ἐπὶ τοῦ τόπου—was at the place—there is to be observed the most calm collectedness, as this first word testifies, and the selection of the three witnesses *before* His beginning to be exceeding sorrowful. Καθίσατε obviously includes their sitting down and waiting; it does not, however, mean this sitting as such, but corresponds to the μείνατε of Matt. ver. 38. In this meaning καθίζειν occurs sometimes in the Sept., as the translation of יָשַׁב, and similarly in the New Testament, Lu. xxiv. 49; Acts xviii. 11. St Luke (as we shall see further on) represents the Lord as already bidding them *pray;* and we must understand by that that He did not enjoin upon His disciples to *sit peacefully down*, while disquietude and horror were assailing Himself! Dräseke altogether confuses the scene when he describes the Lord as having first entered into *a house* (whereas we read χώριον, τόπος, κῆπος), and then says, "Here in the dwelling of faithful and devoted friends Jesus counselled His disciples to take their rest. He himself must go again into the open air." Tarry ye *here*—I will and I must go forth apart: this is the sole meaning; αὐτοῦ being in Matt. instead of ὧδε, αὐτόθε, according to the well-known phrase (as οὗ for where), comp. Acts xviii. 19, xxi. 4. Tarry—sit ye down if ye are weary—here wait for Me—"this is now the best that ye can do, *I must myself go forth alone!*" He gives it plainly to be understood that something earnest and solemn awaits Him, and therefore that the question was not about simple rest for themselves:—until (or while) I *pray*; in Matt. more distinctly—Going apart pray there! This is now, as His seclusion from them shows, an altogether different praying from that which they had heard immediately before their setting forth. As *knowing all things that should come upon Him*, the Lord certainly had a special presentiment and anticipation of everything as it *came;* He could not be taken by surprise or overcome suddenly by anything: hence He now knows the approach of the conflict,

and orders all things with regard to it in the fittest manner, and with the utmost collectedness. But that which He now feels to be approaching He speaks of, and with perfect propriety, as His going generally to *pray:* this was the gentlest expression for it, and used in order that the remaining true disciples, whom He designs at this time to keep further from the mystery, might not be at once affrighted. We cannot but be involuntarily reminded of that similar word, which the Lord doubtless had in His thought, on occasion of the offering up of Isaac. As there, Gen. xxii. 5, the faith of Abraham termed the sacrifice, looking forward already to its being given back, an act of *worship*, so in like manner does the Lord speak concerning His own bitter soul-conflict at the commencement of that sacrifice in which not the Father binds *Him*, but He lays Himself upon the altar, uniting in Himself both the faith of Abraham and the resignation of Isaac.

Tarry here! was said at first to all; but in the *going yonder*, deeper into the recesses of the garden, He calls three to accompany Him, those ἐκλεκτῶν ἐκλεκτοτέρους—those elect of the elect—who had been witnesses of the transfiguration, and had been otherwise distinguished: Peter, who would know nothing of *falling in the time of trial*, and the two sons of Zebedee, here so termed in allusion to His former prophecy to them of a fellowship in His *cup* instead of the places of honour. And what was it that they might have expected? Certainly no scene of high revelations and glory, for the evening of the Supper had not pointed this way, nor did the words of the Lord *while I pray;* but rather something in harmony with the prayer of Jno. xvii., and which they should have the privilege of seeing and hearing. On the one hand, the sacred event must have *witnesses* for the future of the church, and on the other, the Lord would not in His tribulation be left quite alone. Both lie at the foundation of the selection of the Three; but we must give the pre-eminence to the latter, as the Lord afterwards plainly says—Watch *with Me*, could ye not watch with Me? The others He left behind in their weakness, but from those Three He expects something more, or rather might have expected something more; and to bring *this* to their humbled consciences, their impotence, which deceived His expectation, is made manifest. We must be on our

guard against laying an undue and exclusive emphasis upon either of the two things which here seem to be opposed, but are strictly consistent—the Lord's design to solace Himself with the presence and devotion of these His nearest disciples, and His foreknowledge at the same time that He should look for comforters but find none (Ps. lxix. 20). Indeed, the latter thought is not strictly and entirely true, for this passage in the Psalm, which is so often adduced, prophecies only of His enemies; we think it is very obvious that the three beloved disciples, the nearest to Him of those whom the Father had given, *were*, notwithstanding their weakness, an actual consolation and strength to Him by their being at hand. He could pour out His soul to them in the intervals of His prayer, and make their very unsusceptibility strengthen Him in His devotion and resolution to offer His sacrifice for mankind; and in this we have reason enough for the wisdom which permitted them to accompany Him.[1] Although He must now urge His prayer alone before the Father, it belongs to His humiliation in our likeness that He should seek and take with Him, if not companions in prayer, at least companions and helpers in His watching.

Before the eyes of these men thus taken with Him, and at a distance from the rest, *He began to be sorrowful and exceedingly dismayed!* This ἤρξατο—He began—has here an impressive emphasis: Now as never before, as no man had previously seen Him! At the same time there is some intimation here of His own predominant voluntary energy in relation to the sufferings which came upon Him. Not to the extent to which Rambach carries it, resting on the *words*: "In the expression '*He began* to *become* sorrowful,' we have the *active* and the *passive* together. The Redeemer is exhibited as One who *in suffering acts, and in acting suffers*; and this pervades the whole Passion." But the *thing* itself is correct, and may be so far found in the *began* as

[1] See Dr. Beseke's very original sermon on Gethsemane concerning Christian deportment in *soul-conflicts*. And Rambach (whose most valuable reflections upon the Passion generally we shall henceforward amply quote), makes a sound application here: "He would consecrate and hallow Christian fellowship as a means of consolation and strength in suffering. Those who too studiously seek retirement in their heavy conflicts act not wisely, especially if they despise the encouragement, consolation, and prayer of other children of God—resolved to fight their battles altogether alone."

this intends to say—He did not begin to *surrender Himself* to the pressure of His anguish *until* place, time, circumstances, witnesses, and all things were appointed and ready.

The expressions which indicate His emotion are at the outset exceedingly strong, exhibiting after all something sudden and most vehement. The translation "sore amazed and very heavy" might seem in St Mark to refer one to the body and the other to the soul, while St Matthew's "sorrowful and very heavy," might seem to refer only to the soul; but in the original both speak only of the soul, although its emotions would obviously exhibit themselves in the body also—how otherwise could they have been discerned? *Λυπεῖσθαι* takes the lead as the most general expression, corresponding to the Lord's own word (*My soul is exceeding sorrowful*); but as the Lord had strengthened even that word, so St Matthew adds an intenser expression. St Mark in his vivid and graphic manner places first *ἐκθαμβεῖσθαι* (see his ch. ix. 15, xvi. 5, 6), which might represent amazement *as if* in the presence of something unexpected, a manifest shuddering and recoil—though not terror or *horror* in the ordinary sense. The second expression, common to both, leads us deeper into the reality, but requires to be carefully examined. *Ἀδημονεῖν* (Phil. ii. 26) does not mean, "to feel oneself forsaken," as Lange thinks;[1] but the word is derived through *ἀδήμων* from *ἀδέω*—to be weary, exhausted—primarily *tædet me*. Thence it signifies any deep anguish and extremity of soul generally; Suidas explains it by *λίαν λυποῦμαι, ἀπορῶ*; Hesych. by *ἀγωνιῶ*; Eustath. gives it thus fully: *ἀδήμων ὁ ἐξ ἄδου ὃ ἐστι κόρου τινὸς ἡ λύπης ἀναπεπτωκώς. ἀδημονεῖν τὸ ἀλγεῖν καὶ ἀμηχανεῖν.* Aquila puts it for נָשַׁם (Niph. of שָׁמַם) Job xviii. 20. Symmachus for רשע Eccles. vii. 17, עטף Ps. lxi. 3, חפז Ps. cxvi. 11. Thus this latter is equivalent to *not knowing where to get help*. But the former, as well in its lower degree *λυπεῖσθαι* as in the more express *ἐκθαμβεῖσθαι*, indicates the *positive* reason of this negative abandonment of spirit;[2] as Bengel says *incursum objecti horribilis*,

[1] According to Buttmann's false etymology from *δῆμος* and the privative *α*: "Primarily the feeling of being far from home and country and friends, generally the feeling of being forsaken, spiritlessness"—thus "the experience of a *negative* opposition."

[2] My heart hath failed Me, Ps. xl. 13.

and Lange very properly, "the experience of a positive opposing influence, which restrains and oppresses the soul in its living energies, as if it would take away the spiritual breath. The first result of this is grief; the last *anguish*, fearful, amazing, and vehement wrestling of the soul with the evil." This last, being, notwithstanding its negative character, a positive counter-influence of anguish, is the ἀδημονεῖν. For the rest, we shall soon see in the unfolding of our Lord's own words what was the *object of horror* which at this time came upon Him.

He said to them, that is, to the Three—My soul is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death. As He had been accustomed to reveal to the men who were around him similar emotions of His soul, so now He bears testimony in their presence to the experience of His heart at this crisis. In silence and in secret He had often suffered and wrestled; and he who would picture to himself the Lord's internal life of prayer as equally tranquil and even with His external life of word and deed, does not estimate rightly the true humanity of the Godman. That which He teaches us concerning being instant in prayer, came assuredly from His own inmost experience. Thus the Lord had been accessible from the beginning to sorrow for sin and death: that which Mark iii. 5 records of His grief over the hardness of their hearts, and John xi. 33—35 of His anguish over the curse of death, are only isolated examples which testify to the deep reserve of His soul's emotions, whence many other such mighty exhibitions proceeded. Nevertheless, all this was but the slight preparation for the fulness and strength of that suffering, of which His word *now* gives evidence. What a most simple testimony is this declaration of His horror and amazement; and yet how profound in His lips, and how sufficient a witness of the inexhaustible depths of His anguish! A thousand times before and since have men uttered this word, expressing it still more strongly in their immoderate, sinful lamentation, or in their insincerity; but how different is this simple word as He utters it in all its fulness and unfathomable meaning!

It has a proverbial character; but it would be simple folly to understand it as used by Him in its common proverbial meaning. There are to be found echoes of this lament in the Scriptures, especially those which refer typically and prophetically to the

suffering Messiah; but it appears to us needless and inappropriate on *this* occasion to refer the Lord's immediate and most simple expression of His internal emotion to any one word of Scripture, consciously appropriated.[1] It is more important to understand in their fullest, deepest solemnity of truth, the two things here expressed—the amazement of His *soul*, and that even unto *death*.

Only in John xii. 27 and here, does the Lord say concerning Himself, *My soul*. He thereby avows Himself to be a true human person in the likeness of ourselves, just as He afterwards speaks of His *spirit* and of His *flesh*, according to the scriptural trichotomy of human nature. We therefore are justified in speaking of a soul-conflict and of soul-sufferings at Gethsemane. Assuredly in a certain sense every suffering is soul-suffering, inasmuch as bodily pain affects the soul, and is experienced only through the soul; and, further, the most spiritual anguish passes over to the as it were bodily feeling of the soul which mediates between spirit and body, and constitutes the personal consciousness. Nevertheless we rightly distinguish, as to its pre-eminent seat and origin, the *sufferings of the soul* both from bodily pain and anxiety of spirit; and all that follows shows that such a distinction must here be maintained. In Jno. xii. 27 it was simply ἡ ψυχή μου τετάρακται (it was this, rather, which might have been taken from Ps. xlii. 7 Sept.)—but here it is more intense περίλυπός ἐστι. This word (in Mark vi. 26 concerning Herod, and Lu. xviii. 23, 24, concerning the rich young man) is not to be rigorously and literally interpreted—surrounded with difficulty and sorrow (as in Ps. xviii. 6 סַבֻּנִי, περιεκύκλωσάν με)—but, although the signification of this frequent περί intensive starts from the "round about" or "wholly and entirely," this meaning is not to be pressed, as classical Greek phraseology

[1] Thus neither from Ps. xviii. 6, cxvi. 3, does the Lord take His word, as Grotius thinks; nor from Ps. xlii. 6, 7 (Sept. ἵνατί περίλυπος εἶ ἡ ψυχή μου) as Ols. and Hengst. assume; nor from Ps. xl. 13 as v. Gerl. asserts. I cannot possibly agree with Hengstenberg's explanation that the Lord takes the words from a Psalm so rich in *consolation* (that is Ps. xlii. xliii.) in order to intimate that there was also for Him consolation in the background. In truth, *Gethsemane* left Him no room or rest for such consideration and selection!

shows, and the Sept. for הִשְׁתּוֹחֲחָה in Ps. xlii. But this intense expression of *exceeding sorrow* is followed by one yet more intense—*even unto death*. This is, at the outset, not the same as the עַד־מָוֶת of human oppression and despondency—Oh that I might at once die; though the expression in Jonah iv. 9, *σφόδρα λελύπημαι ἐγὼ ἕως θανάτου* has been inappropriately compared —but see its explanations in vers. 3, 8. Such a sense is self-evidently unworthy of Jesus; but the analogy of the ordinary phrase, as in Judg. xvi. 16, וַתִּקְצַר נַפְשׁוֹ לָמוּת, his soul was vexed unto death, comes nearer to the point, as also that of Ecclus. xxxvii. 2—a sorrow bitter as death, grief like the anguish of death.[1] Only that this *bitterness of death* must have as it regards Jesus a quite specific sense, and His *agony* (Lu. xxii. 44) must not be understood as in the case of a sinful man.

Luther rightly supplied the meaning of that *ἀγωνία* as His contention with *death*—for Heb. v. 7 speaks of His being *saved from death*. But how is this to be understood? It has been generally referred to painful anticipation of death, the shrinking of nature from dying; and there is truth in this at the outset, as representing the Lord's feeling when He said—My anguish is as if I were about (now already) to die: such is the most obvious meaning of the *ἕως*. Death is to every one that lives, through the operation of a law of nature, an object of shuddering and fear: how much more to the pure, mighty, and transcendently susceptible life of Jesus, against whom death came as a strange thing and a perfect contradiction! And, moreover, there was what we must not forget, the *shame* of His approaching death, as numbered among the transgressors, as also the *grief* that He was to be given over to death by the hand of sinners (see afterwards Matt. xx. 45). All this must have, humanly speaking, mightily moved Him, *now that it has come near*, notwithstanding that He had long contemplated it in spirit, and had already overcome it all in perfect resignation. For, as Lange says, "there is a great difference between the consummation of vic-

[1] Even the excellent Pfenninger (in his Passion sermons) paraphrased it—I am troubled even to death, as if my soul would sink under sorrow! But he afterwards wrote more profoundly of the real nature of this mortal anxiety.

tory over extremity in the spirit, and the consummation of the same victory in the *soul's actual endurance of it.*" Those who are stoutest-hearted and strongest in the courage of faith often find their heaviest trial just when it comes home as an actual reality. And such experience is by no means inglorious, as arguing any deficiency of strength or courage; it is rather a clearer consciousness of the object and the character of the opposition, and the process of the victory, as the mocker Voltaire said—C'est la vraie grandeur de l'ame, courir à la mort, en la rébutant. Or still better Beck[1]: "It is Divine heroism, to feel and to see the whole burden and danger, and yet not to shrink from it, or evade it." But all this—the anticipation of death bitter in itself, and thrice bitter to the holy and loving Saviour as a death of shame and unrighteous suffering—is far from satisfactorily explaining the deep emotions of His soul. All that might have excited in Him grief, the λυπεῖσθαι, but not the exceeding amazement and anguish of the ἐκθαμβεῖσθαι and ἀδημονεῖν; that could not have driven Him to the extreme in which, as His prayer illustrating His word reveals to us, He, recoiling from the cup, asks that it may be removed. While we concede to Him the universal human shrinking from death, we must, on the other hand, expect from His consummate typical human virtue, and much more from His Divine φρονεῖν τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, that He would not encounter death with less courage and power than many sinful men have actually exhibited. But here there is exhibited an anxiety, an amazement, a horror of an altogether peculiar kind (εὐλάβεια, Heb. v. 7), for which an altogether deeper reason is to be sought. Fear, again, in the sense of unbelief or the feeling of guilt, can have no place in relation to this Holy One; hence the apostle takes care not to speak in His case as in ours of a *fear of death* (Heb. ii. 15); but still there is the dismay and anguish, and what is then its specific ground? Assuredly no other than *sin*, the penalty of which is death, the *judgment* upon the sin of men in man's death! If that is the significance and meaning of the atoning death upon Golgotha, it must apply also to the internal commencement of that death in Gethsemane: this alone must be the sting of this "absolute

[1] In the Gethsemane-Predigt, christl. Reden i. Band S. 381.

grief of his soul" through experience of sin, as Ebrard rightly speaks, if we understand him aright. The Lord does not say —My soul is sorrowful on account of My death, or in prospect of My dying, in dismay at encountering it; but He declares Himself by the ἕως to be already translated into the θάνατος. But what this involves and includes *as it respects Him*, we must learn from the entire tenor of Scripture.

We quote the words of Kleuker against the rigid juridical theory of wrath and satisfaction: "away with the thought that Gethsemane was the hell of the Son of God—horrible notion! God measures not with such measure as this."[1] But we cannot go on with him: "It was His deep emotion, that the members of His body, which He had kept so pure and undefiled for God, should be put to shame by the hands of an adulterous generation." Our protest against the false satisfaction-theory which pours out wrath and the condemnation of hell upon the Beloved Holy One of God, in virtue of an impossible substitution of persons, must not rob us of the irremovable truth that in another, and much more real, sense, in the only actual and possible sense, the *sin of the world* lay upon the Lamb of God. This holds good of Gethsemane as the beginning of the great *hour* of the Passion, of the soul-sufferings in Gethsemane as the first drops, giving, however, the entire and full taste of the *cup*. The Lord felt the bitterness of death, *tasted it as the wages of sin*, and this alone is the bitterness of death:—not as His own, but so much the profounder and keener as the sin *of the whole world*. Thus it was to Him *more bitter* than to any believer; for, as the Lord's pure and perfect bodily life (in which sin had never introduced corruption), would resent bodily death in an immeasurably higher degree than in the case of our organism invaded by sickness, so the same holds good of His holy sinless soul in its experience of the condemnation and judgment of sin. The words of Ebrard may be too keen and intense: "In the deepest internal suffering that *we* know, in the torment of conscience, which is a smart for sin, there is mingled a minimum of complacency in sin;" but those of Lange are true and striking: "As the death of an unanxious child in the house is related to the death of a man, and he

[1] Menschlicher Versuch über den Sohn Gottes, S. 304.

the head of the house, so is the death of Christians related to the death of Christ." For the child is without care, either through ignorance, or, as in this application to believing Christians, because it is conscious of being well cared for in the bosom of parental love, and has no anxiety; but Christ, as the Father of the house, who had to take the place of entire humanity, which he carried in his bosom for its regeneration, contended in anguish for that peaceful victory which we enjoy. In this He did not and could not by any means feel what the woe is of him who is condemned for his own guilt; but more keenly than any damned soul in hell did He in His purity feel the righteousness and the judgment of God. *His* horror in the presence of death was a pure and absolute horror in the presence of *sin;* and this, finally, was at the same time no other than the purest, deepest awe and reverence before God, the righteous Judge and Father; hence in Heb. v. 7, the religious εὐλάβεια, the same which occurs again in ch. xii. 28:[1] Thus alone, but thus truly He takes the place of us evil-doers, in an equality of condemnation; in His voluntary love submitting to be reckoned among the transgressors by a death of shame in the Father's presence. This was so overpoweringly hard to Him, that He recoils with fear through the weakness of the flesh. In this mysterious fellowship with us, and interposition for us, there remains something *judicial;* hence in Isa. liii. 8, *distress* and *judgment* come together, where, despite the being delivered by God (לֶקַח), the same God, according to ver. 10, imposed upon Him this עֻצַּר וּמִשְׁפָּט, just as according to Heb. ii. 9, Christ, *by the grace of God*, tasted death for all. Justice in mercy requires, since not otherwise was it *possible* to redeem mankind, that the Mediator should enter into this judgment; *grace*, with and before the judgment which here is exhibited, *heareth* the supplication of the humbled Son, and *strengthens* Him to endure.

[1] Luther's translation, darum dass er Gott in Ehren hatte—therefore because He had God in reverence, is absolutely incorrect in the *Darum*, and relatively incorrect in unintelligibly erecting a subordinate into the principal idea. The passage is untranslateable, inasmuch as it declares that Christ in this His horror and amazement at death and sin, offered to the righteous God the deepest reverential fear, intensified into the ὁμοίωμα of our fear.

He was troubled *even unto* death. Not only, that is, would an ordinary man have succumbed and died in such anguish, but He himself, according to His humanity must have, before the time, become the victim of death had He not been strengthened from above. This is the deep significance and necessity of the *angel's* appearance as in St Luke. In receiving this grace the Lord, on the one hand, humbles Himself, as we have already said, to be partaker of the right of appeal which every petitioner has to the help of God; but, on the other hand, He receives in His own person for us all the highest and most decisive of all ministrations of help from above. In the wilderness the angels ministered to Him only after the first and lighter victory; but here the messengers of heaven appear in the very midst of the conflict. And why? That he might be enabled to wrestle and to pray ἐκτενέστερον—the more earnestly! But how and by what means did the angel strengthen Him? Was it by holding out to Him the prize, or by a "message and assurance from the Father at this point concerning the necessity of His Son's sufferings and His own complacency in them," the Lord being at this juncture in darkness? This may or may not be; but the main thing which St Luke intimates by *strenthening Him* (comp. Acts ix. 19), was a miraculous accession of strength in body and soul, or rather a summoning up of this strength from its concealed and oppressed spiritual ground, by the heavenly manifestation. For this appearance of itself, without word or message, would at such a crisis have this influence. "A ministration like that after the temptation which served to invigorate His sinking bodily energies. All the previous and subsequent ministrations of angels chiefly referred to the condition of His *body*." So Hess, and again very excellently: "This strengthening had reference to the physical part of this deadly conflict—it was an augmentation of power." We cannot understand how Pfenninger can speak of "*words* of consolation and power" which the languishing soul of Jesus eagerly received from the angel's mouth!

Before this heavenly strengthening (between the first and the second prayer) came, the Lord felt His weakness and need of help so sorely, that He not only sought His consolation in announcing beforehand His coming agony, in the pouring out of

His heart to the three disciples, but, moreover—like a brother, weak and supplicating help!—seeks to take refuge in the sympathising neighbourhood of the men whom He loves, and by whom He is beloved. This lies in the added clause—*Tarry ye here and watch with Me!* The repeated μείνατε ὧδε is in contrast with the previous καθίσατε ὧδε—But remain *ye* here, near to Myself, leave Me not! Your presence is a stay to me in My tribulation! But, because He feels in His own soul what power of darkness, obscuring and oppressing, is breaking in upon the scene, and will on His account invade His disciples also, He adds the strong exhortation to them to *abide watching.* This *watch* rests at first of course upon its physical meaning; for the disciples sank into bodily sleep; but the bodily waking or sleeping was only the outward expression and *figure* of the wakefulness or sleep of the soul. The watchfulness here first required already includes the praying which He afterwards added; but it very properly stands alone at the first as the fundamental word of that exhortation to His present and future disciples which springs from this conflict of their Master.

Watch *with Me*—thus we have it fully in St Matthew. They had all, like Peter, promised to die with Him! As here the Three are brought forward into symbolical prominence, so there are times ever recurring when some elect spirits are called before others to watch with the Lord in His conflicts in His church. That, however, does not affect its universal meaning for us all; His meek request—*with Me*—becomes a most mighty exhortation and a most precious promise—See then how I watch, and thus abide with Me![1] He does, indeed, mean, as we have said, to include their praying; but here, where the emphasis falls upon "with me," He cannot add that word, for He could not be supposed to say—Watch and pray with Me! There could be no strict fellowship and equality between Him and sinful men in relation to his prayer generally, and especially in regard to this prayer of Gethsemane. "He had never prayed with His disciples, nor could He; He challenges them not to pray with Him in his sharp conflict in Gethsemane, but only to watch with

[1] H. Lössel: "To watch *with Him* is *watching* indeed."

Him."[1] Least of all could He summon them to share His amazement and horror! That is never matter of requirement or exhortation; so far as it is demanded by our communion with His sufferings, it comes of itself at the appointed time; but only so that His mediatorial redeeming pre-eminence remains alone and without parallel.

Tarry here—in My neighbourhood, indeed, but at the same time as it had been said before to the others—Follow Me no further! For *His* prayer, to which He now has recourse in the extremity of His soul, needs separation even from the Three, and perfect solitude with God. Hence the προελθὼν (another reading in Matt. προσελθὼν) μικρόν—the same which St Luke records in ἐπεσπάσθη ἀπ' αὐτῶν. For although he does not specify the selection of the Three, his narrative being more concise, he cannot mean by this ἀποσπασθῆναι—being withdrawn from them—the same as that first ἀπελθεῖν of Matt. xxvi. 36, which took place in perfect tranquillity. The former word does, indeed, occur as a Greek phrase in the enfeebled meaning of a mere *going away or departing;* but its connection here gives it the emphasis of a violent and vehement *rending Himself away:* compare the impetuous ἀποσπασθέντας of Acts xxi. 1, on which Grotius says, *as if torn away by force.*[2] It is here, therefore, opposed to the *with Me* which clung to them before; and *now* we perceive that fluctuation of anguish which the Berlenb. Bible assumed too soon: He had just asked them to tarry and watch with Him—He must then immediately tear Himself from them to pray. The removal *a stone's cast* appears to be more exact than the *little* of the others; but both are perfectly accordant, since St Luke's proverbial expression means only as far as a stone goes when thrown without any force or design. For it is plain in the whole narrative that the disciples heard His words, and even saw his knees bent and His bloody sweat.[3]

[1] As a critic in Tholuck's litt. Anzeiger 1845 S. 336 remarked against Valentin in reference to a false apprehension of the "*Our* Father."

[2] Schöttgen: They are said ἀποσπᾶσθαι or ἀποσπασθῆναι, who are hardly withdrawn from the embraces of their friends. But he incorrectly asserts that in Luke xxii. 41 it must be taken according to a common usage, simply for χωρισθῆναι, to be separated.

[3] I asked in the first edition, And why not that they saw the angel? Hofmann (Schriftbeweis i. 343) appears to me, however, to go too far:

This was a very different prayer from that which St John records as having gone before! But it proceeded from the same spirit, from the same Son of God and Redeemer of men. The glorification already begins in the Passion,[e] as we have been prepared to find it since He first began to speak of the coming hour. His power over all flesh manifests itself first as the power of His contending and victorious spirit over His own flesh, by means of which He belongs to us.

The Incarnate Son, who had already prayed Himself up to the Father and into Heaven, now first truly experiences that He is still in the world, that its prince is coming against Him, and that the righteous Father had appointed to the Son that He should sanctify and offer Himself for His own. With what other incense could the great offering be presented, than *such* a prayer? If it had not been recorded, our own profounder understanding of the person and work of Christ must have led us to assume such an internal conflict in the sanctuary of His soul. But it is revealed to us, and we have only to read and mark it, that we may follow our Forerunner.

"*He prayed*"—thus is it twice in St Mark and St Luke, and thrice in St Matthew, preceded too by *while I pray*, and with *pray ye also* intervening. "This word is so often repeated in the history that it might seem as if the Evangelists had concerted it that no man should fail to be impressed with this prayer of our Lord." (Rambach.) It is very natural that these words of awful prayer should not have been literally heard or retained in their exact form by the affrighted, sleep-oppressed disciples, themselves sorely harassed; yet the Spirit has given to us in their divine records the three principal elements in it, with perfect unanimity: the preliminary and confident *appeal* to the Father, the urgent *supplication* of the first recoil, the instant and entire *resignation* to the Father's will which closed all.

St Luke has merely *Father*, St Matthew *My Father*, St Mark preserves (as his wont is) the very language of Jesus *Abba*,

[e] The fact could not have been recorded, unless the disciples had witnessed it. The *appeared* indicates a plain manifestation, but the *to Him* seems to exclude the disciples. How then did St Luke know it? May it not be that this among other things was told to the disciples during the forty days?

with *Father* then added. Not that he thereby, as Grotius thinks, indicates a redoubled cry as a testimony of deep passion; and certainly not, as the Berlenberg Bible inappropriately says, because He appealed to God as a Father in His twofold nature! No, he does not give either the Abba or the Father as repeated; but only interprets for the reader the filial voice, which still urged its claim. In this present obscured humiliation, with which the Passion commenced, there is still "a ray of filial confidence," otherwise than at Golgotha, in the noontide darkness, when the consciousness of Christ passes entirely through the *My God* of the Psalm, into the level of unity with mankind. But here the Son approaches still the Father, though in deep prostration: when He takes the edge of the cup to His lips, this first taste of bitterness throws Him upon His *knees*, as St Luke reports the commencement—upon His *face*, as St Matthew proceeds—upon the *earth*, as St Mark most impressively closes. "The only Son of the eternal Father is now found *in the dust*—the supreme Good is weighed down with our weak flesh and blood!" Yet in His profound weakness there is still the clear consciousness—*My Father!* He who lies as a worm upon the earth, nevertheless appeals to the Almighty as a Son! Thus, let it be observed, there is here no *fear* of a punitive justice as in our stead, nothing of this Father's *wrath* against the person of His beloved Son.[1] We wonder at Beck's lapse into the old error of an unsound theology, when he says:[2] "When that is taken away from a man which is the sole dependence of his heart, that in which he lives and moves, His heart and spirit is broken. The soul-conflict of Christ in Gethsemane could have no other ground than this, that here that was taken from Him which was

[1] This protest does not, as my critic Münchmeyer objects, contradict what was said before of the mysterious mediatorial fellowship with us in the condemnation of God. There is exhibited even here in the depth of the mystery, the rigorous distinction, according to which the Mediator sorrows for, feels, bears, and even appropriates the sin of the world, but still *as* the sin of the *world*, for its *salvation*. There is indeed judgment here and punishment; but not as only punitive, not as wrath which rests upon the Son personally, who can still say "*Father*." We must once more say, The vial of wrath in Rev. xiv. 10 is very different from the cup of Gethsemane!

[2] In the sermon before quoted.

the treasure of His heart, that in which His whole heart rested, that wherein He lived and moved—*the love of His Father, unity with Him*—the feeling that the Father's complacency was in Him, and that He was in the complacency of His Father. This was to Christ as indispensable as His breath." How can that vital breath be regarded as taken from Him, when at the beginning it vehemently cries *My Father!* and still more victoriously cries at the end in submission *As Thou wilt!* Verily, in this "Abba" the Father's complacency is retained and not lost; in this "*Not* as I will," unity with the Father is preserved absolutely inviolate.[1] We see *here* at least that the full feeling of what sin is in all its consequences before God—*this* assuredly was Christ's experience—consists strictly with the consciousness, But I am, and I remain *Thy Son.* And then, through the communication and implanting of His Spirit, we also may adopt the same cry of *Abba Father* in the midst of the sorrow and condemnation of our sin: hence we regard the apostolical sayings, Rom. viii. 15, and Gal. iv. 6, as having direct reference to the personal example of Christ, and probably even to the scene of Gethsemane.

To the *Father* He might freely put His *request,* even though it were with strong *crying*—not merely with *desire and confidence,* but in the profoundest urgency of need. But because the Almighty Creator is the Father of Christ, His faith places first the appeal to the *almightiness* of this Father, that it may be the foundation and the sole restriction of His request. We must now, in considering the whole, invert the order, and hear first what the request is, in order that we may then understand in what sense He makes His appeal to God's omnipotence, as able or not to grant the request. Thus the Son of the Almighty, come into the world in order to suffer and die for mankind, *asks* the Father now, when the crisis is coming, out of the dust—for what? That this cup may pass away from Him, may be taken away, that He may not drink it! So wonderful is this when we hear it first that we may well ask in doubt—what can *here*

[1] "The *blessedness* of His life in unity with the Father was absorbed through His anguish for sin" (as Ebrard more cautiously says), but not the unity itself; its *feeling* was invaded, but its *consciousness* was far from being obscured, rather was it brightened.

be the meaning of this *cup*? St Mark gives us, before He introduces that word of Christ, the first tone of which is so incomprehensible to many, an introductory explanation—mentioning the *hour*, and moreover that the request was urged *only if it were possible*. That explanation is certainly most important and decisive; but it must not be interpreted in any such way as to separate the present hour of anguish from the coming suffering of death, and oppose the one to the other.

Does then the Lord here shrink from suffering and dying for the world? Would He, at this crisis, be delivered, if it were possible, from the sacrifice of death,[1] *or* does He pray only for the taking away of the present overpowering burden of His soul's anguish? Thus must the question stand at first, until its right answer corrects the question itself, and makes it intelligible. The predominant opinion among practical orthodox expositors may be seen by the following quotations: "It was not, most assuredly, a supplication for the turning away of that which had been long predicted, and which He had always known, to be essential to His one vocation; but it was a prayer, urged by deep distress for the taking away of that which *just now* pressed so heavily upon Him." Or again, more plainly still: "*I will willingly suffer*, if only I might be delivered out of this anguish, and this suffering be shortened!" Again: "Thus He does not, properly speaking, ask it of the Father that He might be saved from His Passion as a whole; but He only supplicates for an alleviation and shortening of His internal anguish in the present *hour*, of that terror and fear which He felt, and which might have been an offence to the disciples, who understood not the mystery." In support of this, they appeal to all the previous definite predictions of our Lord, and to the impossibility, which He therefore knew, that His Passion should pass away from Him; and further to the fact that it must, according to Heb. v. 7, have been a supplication that might be *heard*, and therefore that this present cup must be no other than "the present feelings of anguish which the wrath of God excited," or whatever else may be substituted.

[1] Or Schleiermacher's strangely forced remark (Homil. ueber Jno. ii. S. 4): "Does He pray only for a *delay* in suffering, that the cup be postponed?" This is so utterly incongruous as to need no refutation.

Hess carries all this to its climax when he says: The Lord prays for the removal of this anguish, even in order that *He might be able to suffer.* "As the physical element in this feeling took such form as He could not struggle against, and would if it continued render it impossible that He should sustain the remainder of His Passion with the composure and dignity which were required of Him. For supposing Him to be thus full of anguish before Caiaphas and Pilate, would He not have assumed the appearance of one consciously guilty, or, in a sense inconsistent with His character and work, fearful of death?"

But such a view of the matter is altogether wrong, whether put in this most rigorous form, according to which the prayer would mean, "Father, give Me back only the strength and dignity necessary for the drinking of that cup which it is My will to drink," or in any other application of it whatever. For the Lord had Himself just declared His *sorrow* to be the beginning and the fearful approach of *death*, and He had spontaneously given that offence to His disciples by exhibiting His anguish. But what now, to be more definite, is the meaning of the *hour* and the *cup*? We have already seen that by "the hour," Jno. xii. 27, nothing else is to be understood but what the Evangelists, like the Lord, from the beginning call by that name—His entire sufferings of death. And here in Gethsemane the Lord himself testifies in His word of invigoration after the anguish (Matt. ver. 45, Mark ver. 41—thus in the same Mark who previously explained *the hour*), that the hour had *not* passed away, but drew near still, and was come. Farther, in Jno. xviii. 11, He describes His passion as the *cup* which He is to drink of; consequently His prayer means the same cup of the suffering of death which now is at hand after He has appointed to His disciples its fruit and benefit through the institution of another cup. Finally, as it respects the decisive parallel, Matt. xx. 22, in which He similarly spoke of the cup, we must appeal to what was said there in exposition; only adding Bengel's well-grounded note: "when baptism is mentioned with the cup, the cup is the internal passion, baptism the external:[1] *when the cup alone is mentioned*, the

[1] Which however, as we have shown upon St Matthew, must be more deeply understood and fundamentally distinguished, than might seem to be the meaning here.

universal passion is to be understood, but so that under the internal is also included the external passion." That which God offers to men to taste in suffering, is called a cup in the ancient Scriptures; that which the Father presents to the Son to suffer is the cup, concerning which Christ speaks here as elsewhere. And this suffering is an indivisible unity, so prepared, *mingled*, and *presented* in the cup by the Father, that it must be drunk and altogether drunk by the Son.

Certain it is, that the question is here of *drinking it altogether and all.* But—and we now recognise the truth in the error which has been mentioned—this recoil, which revokes while it expresses its own utterance, refers in its declining to drink the cup to the *present experience of its first drops.* And having tasted —He would not drink. In "*this* cup"—τὸ ποτήριον τοῦτο (which τοῦτο St Mark still more emphatically isolates), so much is condensed, that in the present anguish of His commencing passion and death, the entire cup is, as it were, presented to the Lord. Is it then such suffering, Must all this come upon Me? Father spare Me! would My soul fain cry. Thus the distinction in the former question—*either* the suffering of death itself, *or* the present *hour*—was baseless, for the latter retains with the former its distinctive force and meaning. It is the will of the Son to be saved by the omnipotence of the Father from *death* (*to Him* that was *able* to save Him from *death*—is the word of the apostle): —This is marvellous, but natural for Him who is the Life, the *Son* of the Almighty! But according to the feeling of His soul, which urges Him to this strong crying and supplication, He beholds and experiences death now only in *this* horror of death which falls upon Him. When the Father strengthens Him, and takes away this anguish, His request is assuredly *heard* and answered (εἰσακουσθεὶς ἀπὸ τῆς εὐλαβείας); but He is equally heard in that the Father accepts and fulfils His cry of resignation—"*As thou wilt.*" As a present oppressive burden the time of suffering generally is called the *hour*, and so is it now in specific reference to *this* particular present.[1] Hence the lan-

[1] Else we may say generally: The Passion is called His *hour*, first as one definite and measured suffering; secondly, as the final and most decisive suffering (*passio extrema* as distinguished from the *passio inchoata*) of His whole life; thirdly, as *transitory*, though while it lasts, an *oppressive present.*

guage of the request, to which St Mark's explanatory phrase points, παρελθέτω, ἵνα παρελθῇ (which must mean no other than *pass by* or *pass over*, notwithstanding the *from Me* connected with it; for St Mark joins it with the *hour*)—παρέυεγκε, παρενεγκεῖν in the same meaning. The *cup* must be drunk, *internally* tasted in voluntary acceptance of it—that now takes place, and this accepting obedience is consummated in the struggling, lamenting prayer which urges the conditional petition in the prerogative of a Son. As in this *prayer* the whole Passion appears as it were condensed in the present anguish (sub internâ passione connotatur externa), so afterwards in Jno. xviii. 11, the word of victorious resignation embraces in the drinking of the cup the beginnings even of the *external passion.*

If we have thus far apprehended with any clearness the meaning of our Lord's petition, it will be still further cleared from all objection by going back again and observing that it is offered only *under a becoming condition.* According to St Matthew, the Lord, before He laid the *let it pass from Me* upon the Father's heart, had said—*If it be possible.* St Mark begins with the same expression, and in the prayer itself makes the Lord's word still stronger —All things are possible with Thee. We will not distract our understanding of the words by the gratuitous question, How and with what precise words did the Lord speak? No single word literally pressed would suffice for the profound, immeasurably *concentrated* meaning of this petition; the Holy Spirit therefore teaches us by St Mark to unite and spiritually to understand a double formula. If, on the one hand, *all things are possible unto Thee,* as an urgent appeal to the Father's omnipotence, only makes the petition the more intense—Almighty Father, is not then this possible to Thee? yet, on the other hand, this urgency carries with it its own humble *limitation,* as St Mark has already given it—*If* it be *possible* to Thee! Again, this *if* itself is an urgent appeal, and has for its undertone—And before Thee all things are possible. Whether the Lord said the one or the other,[1] in either case both are implied. St Luke's words are certainly not intended to be verbally exact—*If thou be willing* to remove. That might be, as Grotius says, Oh, that Thou wouldst!

[1] Scarcely both in succession: such an unfolding of the thought would be contrary to the vehemence of the condensed petition, as it is well preserved by the Evangelists.

and thus it is translated by Stolz, van Ess, and even the Berlenb. Bible. But this would introduce an element of fearful desire, almost unworthy of Christ, into the confident petition of the Son to the Father; it would further interfere with St Luke's perfect accordance with the other Evangelists, which depends upon the like signification of the *if* in them all; and it would remove from his record one of its three main points, the conditional strengthening of the prayer or its strengthening condition. We cannot, therefore, agree with this *utinam*—oh that—and the reading παρένεγκε shows, at least as a gloss,[1] the true explanation. That is, it is either the Infinitive for the Imperative, as Bengel's Gnomon at first preferred, and as Luther translates—If Thou be willing, remove; or, as we prefer, there is an *aposiopesis* of the verb παρένεγκε, by which St Luke would express the "meek submission of Jesus toward His Father." So Bengel in his Germ. trans. gives it: If Thou will remove this cup from Me (the conclusion is withheld); and similarly de Wette marks the aposiopesis by a line. But what is it that we learn from St Luke's words thus taken? That most important truth, which first solves the understanding of the whole, and which the Holy Ghost teaches as the truth, though it seems to differ from the rest, viz., that the Lord's *if it be possible* really meant *if Thou wilt*, and spoke of the Father's almightiness only under this modification. Christ's not suffering was indeed *absolutely possible*, if He had not voluntarily laid down His life (Jno. x. 18), but had called in the legions of angels; *but*—as He then said Himself—how would then the counsel of God have been fulfilled? Thus that possibility alone was intended which was *relative*, and within the scope of this counsel. This variation of the word is its interpretation: the Lord speaks of no other possibility to God than is consistent with His will and decree—But let all be, if and as Thou *wilt*, which the subsequent clause fully brings out. Thus this following word of entire resignation was already included in the first utterance of the petition; and the πλήν or ἀλλά—*but*—contains no direct antithesis. If it be possible *in Thy will*, let this cup pass away; for My will is not other than Thine, even though I will otherwise than what now befalls Me! Grotius says very

[1] For the more difficult Infinitive is certainly genuine.

correctly: If thy counsels admit that in any other way Thy glory and man's salvation may be consulted and attained. Thus the Lord's thought, in these words of shrinking, does not border on the idea that humanity was not to be redeemed; this great decree, this *will* of the Father and of the Son alike, is rather *presupposed* in *if it be possible, if Thou wilt.* The petition *asks* only with urgency—Is the accomplishment of Thy counsel, O Father, is the redemption of mankind not otherwise possible than by My thus suffering, My drinking this cup? Such a question and such a petition were possible to Christ through the hard *conflict*, under the pressure and in the midst of the darkness of which His otherwise clear insight into God's counsel, into the *thus it must be* (Matt. xxvi. 54), was for the moment obscured. Braune is right, that in the "Father, is it possible," there is the expression of *wavering*, more awfully strange than in His previous dismay; but however strange it is, it is perfectly intelligible through the oppression of our Lord's humanity under the dread weight of His present *suffering*, which He must endure, that He may learn, approve, and consummate His *obedience*.

And He was and continued obedient. It was not otherwise possible to redeem the world than through the sufferings of the Son of God in human nature—*This* testifies Gethsemane! The Son had no other will, in the unity of the Father, even here where His human I opposes itself in order perfectly to submit—*This* is testified by the closing clause of His prayer. Here again we have a threefold phraseology which retains, while it varies the expression, the same fulness of meaning in all. St Luke gives the most general, and for us all prototypical form of it in the abstract, the accomplishment of the *will*, and thereby anticipates the repetition of the prayer which passed into that expression (Matt. ver. 42); St Matthew and St Mark preserve the original aposiopesis of the γενέσθω, and place the *I* and *Thou* in living and concrete opposition; the former adding the *as*, and the latter the *what*, both including comprehensively every appointed speciality in the decreed and inevitable suffering.

As or what I will—most profoundly significant words in this place, which must not be qualified away! The Lord does not say merely—as *My flesh* will, for that, strictly regarded, would be saying too much, and would assume even in Him such a

dividing antagonism of the contradicting flesh as could not exist in the harmony of His sinless human personality. But, although the *velle non pati*, or *non velle pati* proceeds from the weakness of the flesh, yet this θέλω or θέλημα is mediated by the *soul*, which unites flesh and spirit in the personality, in the entire ἐγώ. Hence Lange says truly, "the exclusion of monophysitè and monothelite heresy from the doctrine of the church, finds here its firmest foundation." Two wills declare themselves here in Christ; the one full will of the particular human I, but at the same time another, distinguished from the former as its contrast, and yet one with it in the unity of the one praying person, which says—*As Thou wilt*, that is, *let it be*, that is, *I will*. Although this last *I will* obtains and preserves the victory, the first is not on that account to be reduced, with Grotius, to the level of a mere θέλοιμι—I might wish[1]—for see the same full opposition of a continually renounced will as the universal law of Christ's life in Jno. vi. 38; and compare the law for His followers in Jno. xxi. 18. That may be termed, on the one hand, a merely negative passive will, a not-willing of the flesh, of nature, which the spirit must endure; yet there is, on the other hand, so much of positiveness in it as to make it an opposition to be overcome, a contradiction to be resisted. It is not the individual personal will, which every personal creature (and therefore the true humanity of the second Adam), has and must have, which is sinful; but the power of that individual will in act, then first man's *own* will, against the will of God. The natural tendency to shrink from suffering, and specifically the horror which life has of death, is in itself sinless and innocent; and must have existed in Christ, in order that He might truly suffer and die:—only in us is "the touch of original sin connected therewith." Suffering and dying is "a strange work, and one for which human nature in the beginning was not created;" therefore it was all the more abhorrent to the pure humanity of Christ. "Death was to Christ a total contradiction of nature, so that His sanctified soul must have experienced the deepest woe in the taste of death; it must have been all the more fearfully such, because His conscious

[1] Or, with Lange (iii. 510) distinguish artificially θέλημα from θέλησις (which occurs in the N. T. only, Heb. ii. 4), as the natural willing!" For is not the same θέλημα used of the Father's eternal counsel?

spirit penetrated the mysterious affinity and *connection between death and the wrath of God*[1] and the power of darkness; moreover, because of the dominion of wickedness and hatred to which His soul must now offer an extreme submission in His death.—It is the sacred spiritual energy and power of His own holy human nature which is roused up[2] in opposition to the appropriation of the curse and death of sin as His own, resisting as it were the surrender of His own flesh to this dark power of nature.—Thus He had to reconcile the two things, His great vocation to lay down His life as a Saviour, and His horror of death."[3] Thus the flesh, or more strictly, the I in the flesh, so far as that had become flesh or man, wills otherwise than the Father, wills not —negatively—to drink the cup; but *at once and at the same time* His spirit (the creaturely human spirit), in unity with the eternal Spirit, with God as His Father, takes that cup; the *I will* is uttered only as preceded by *not as, not what*, and thus is denied and renounced. Thus He sanctifies and offers *Himself* in an entire self-surrender to God on man's behalf, such a resignation as was not disturbed but rather glorified by that dreadful conflict,—and the issue is—*As Thou wilt!* "For *our* heart is as a vessel full of water, at the bottom of which there lies mud and uncleanness, which rises to the top when the vessel is *stirred*. Thus, the impurity of our original sin clinging to us, it needs only some slight agitation or temptation, and all that we do is rendered impure. But the soul of Christ, which knew no sin, is as a crystal vase of purest water. No agitation, temptation, or disturbance can make it impure, or in the slightest degree trouble it" (Rambach.) That is to say—The *counsel* of God may become obscured to Him to such an extent as to allow the question whether He must thus awfully suffer, but this only brings out from the spiritual ground of the disturbed soul its unshaken unity with the *will* of God. Again, as the subsequent word teaches us, not the less was the whole power of the spirit,

[1] We might venture to say: Christ tasted the wrath of God as *death*, under the form and experience alone possible to Him of death; the unreconciled sinner, on the contrary, tastes of *death as the wrath of God*.

[2] That is, appears as weakness *in relation to this*.

[3] Beck, Lehrwissenschaft, S. 514.

wrestling in watchfulness and prayer, necessary for this great victory, for the firm fidelity of the spirit under the assault of the weak flesh. For voluntary suffering demands more energy of the ἡγεμονικὸν—the ruling spirit—than acting, as contradistinguished from it; patient resignation is itself the strongest *action* of the spirit.[1]

This first *word of prayer*, which we have now slightly considered, is followed by a *word of instruction*, which is added in order to be the ground and confirmation of our apprehension of the former. In all essentials St Matthew, vers. 40, 41, agrees with St Mark, vers. 37, 38, and literally as it respects the fundamental word; but St Luke has only the abbreviated foundation for the saying as repeated in quite another position, vers. 40 and 46. If His account is chronologically exact, the Lord must have said these words twice, at the beginning and at the end of the whole transaction; moreover, as the others give it in its certain connection, a third time between His prayers. This might have been the case, but it is scarcely probable; since the plain motive cause of the saying appears in the connection which they give, and the words which begin and end the transaction in St Matthew and St Mark are quite different. We may therefore set this to the account of St Luke's less immediate record; but a spiritual insight will justify his statement, inasmuch as in ver. 36 and vers. 45, 46 of St Matthew, the same *pray ye* appears as the groundtone of the whole.

We have now *first* the specific reproof of the disciples, Peter especially, for their sleeping at this time—*then* a general word of instruction for all the future of all His disciples, the Lord's exhortation to all His own given at Gethsemane in word and act. This resolves itself to our consideration into three parts: the matter, the design, and the reason of the exhortation; or, *what* we should do (watch and pray), *to what end* we should do this (that we enter not into temptation), and *wherefore* so (because the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak.)

According to St Matthew, the Lord (as Lu. xxii. 31) turned to *Peter*, but spoke in the plural for all; according to St Mark (which seems the more exact), He addressed in the singular

[1] Or, as Hamann expresses it: "Our passive nature stands in intimate and constant relation with our active nature."

Simon, not Peter now. He returned after the first prayer to His disciples, partly to see how it was with them, and partly to strengthen Himself in the interval by their presence. He *cannot* and *will not* be entirely sundered from them, and continue thus separate in prayer:—this interchange of praying and returning, as we said above, shows us both the necessity of His weakness, and withal the zeal of His love. For when He finds them *sleeping*, with what was indeed deep sorrow, He does not omit to utter, from the depth of His own need, a stimulating word of exhortation; so that, as Rieger says, "the labour of His soul in the obtaining of our salvation never forgets the solicitude for the appropriation of it to the hearts of His own."—*Could* ye not *watch* with Me one hour?[1] Many whole nights they had toiled with their nets; but in this night of temptation they are stupefied and smitten down by an invisible power—even Simon, who made such lofty pretensions, and John, who so profoundly loved! The οὕτως in Matt., as the humbling reference to their sleep, corresponds in its meaning to the *sleepest thou* of St Mark: it is to be translated, with Erasmus, by *adeo*, as in Mark vii. 18, Gal. iii. 3. Are ye *so very*, to such a degree sleepy, so impotent in body and soul for that "watching" which I asked of you? Physical is here only the expression and figure of internal sleep; hence He connects with it at once, by such a transition, His mighty WATCH AND PRAY!

This He says assuredly first for the immediate present, with reference to the temptation which was coming upon these disciples; but this word of instruction reaches out to all the future of His church, represented to His eyes by these disciples. It is remarkable that we understand it naturally enough and without any explanation, when we are spoken to about "watching" in other than a bodily sense; we thereby acknowledge the sleepfulness and the slumbering of our souls. What this essentially is, and on what principles it proceeds, are questions which belong to the most difficult investigations of psychology, or rather of the

[1] We very much doubt whether, as many think, an actual and full hour had transpired in Gethsemane. It is rather a general expression for the present period of His trial; and so far an involuntary prophetic utterance of the presentiment of His hope, that this would be no more than a *transitory* hour.

nosology of the natural man; for, as in the physical domain, so also in the internal, *sleep* is connected with the *weakness* of the flesh: this is evident in us all, though not alone and not necessarily, as the example of Christ shows. But to proceed with this is not the province of exegesis, which has here to do only with the signification of the expression in its general application. It may be remarked that in the entire Old Testament we have but few references to "watching" in the sense here intended by Christ.[1] The watching and keeping of Ezra viii. 29 (שָׁקַד), the wakeful, watchman-like observation of other persons and things, which is often alluded to (and anthropomorphically of the Lord himself, Jer. i. 12, xxxi. 28), as, *e.g.*, in the case of the watchmen appointed by God, is essentially very different in its idea from absolute "watchfulness and sobriety" in the sense of recollectedness, readiness of spirit, self-conscious and self-ruling determination of mind toward the good and the right.[2] It is only in a few passages, such as Ps. lxiii. 2, lxxvii. 5, Isa. xxvi. 9, and particularly the significant Cant. v. 2, that the Old Testament phraseology seems to border upon the New Testament injunction of *νήφειν καὶ γρηγορεῖν*, be sober and vigilant, 1 Pet. v. 8 (i. 13), 1 Thess. v. 6.

Watching and *praying* are here set before us as twofold; but they are essentially one, and inseparably united. To watch is first of all not the same as to wake (Eph. v. 14 comp. *ἐκνήφειν*, 1 Cor. xv. 34), and is required only from him whose being awake is already presupposed. When our eyes are opened (Acts xxvi. 18), then it imports us, and then most solemnly, to keep them open. But the inability of man in himself for such continued watchfulness is exhibited in the disciples as types; hence the Lord's universal word, with the reason of it first given —*Could* ye not—? We *cannot* watch, however much the injunction may be pressed upon us—*Watch ye!* Therefore the essential and inseparable—*Pray!* Again, he who shall pray, and thus lift up his soul to God, must assuredly be already awake.

[1] As He had paved the way for His words in Gethsemane by the parables of the householder, his servants, the virgins, &c., see particularly Mark xiii. 37.

[2] Hence in Isa. xxix. 20, comp. Micah ii. 1, the watching unto iniquity can be ironically spoken of.

Thus for what do we watch? That we may be able to pray! (*Be ye sober and watch unto prayer*, 1 Pet. iv. 7.) For what, and wherefore are we to pray? That we may continue watchful through help from above! Hence in Eph. vi. 18, *watching* and *praying* are blended and interchangeable, εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο and ἐν αὐτῷ τόντῳ. Prayer without watchfulness—what is it but self-deception and a vain thing, improperly so called? An imaginary watchfulness without prayer—what is it but a delusion and a dream? Thus we may say—prayer to God is itself the true and perfect wakefulness of man in the spirit. (I wake *unto Thee*, Ps. lxiii. 2, with my *spirit* within me, Isa. xxvi. 9.) Only when the spirit—to anticipate the following word—watches in and unto God, that is, prays, will the flesh inclined to sleep remain wakeful. The two are in their reciprocation one; for the commencing watchfulness, which must be presupposed, sees the danger and remembers the weakness, and the prayer which follows brings down help and power for watching, then become perfect. But we may further say—*Gethsemane* provokes and awakes the soul, but *Golgotha* first gives confidence and power to pray in the name of Him who hath obtained for us the filial cry of Abba, Father. Gethsemane coming before has for its fundamental word the exhortation *Watch!* for it shows us how needful it is in the heavy conflict of the Lord himself. This thought prepares the way for the right understanding of what is afterwards said concerning the flesh and the spirit.

It is however introduced through the medium of the transitional clause—*that ye enter not into temptation!* (This saying is singled out by St Luke, and impressively placed at the beginning and the end of the whole scene of Christ's present trial—its superscription and postscript at once.) Thus *this* is primarily the important matter, this is the *first* object and reason of the necessary watching and praying—Temptation is near, and will draw us into itself. And when the *weakness* of the flesh is afterwards spoken of, we are to understand—It is too weak (οὐκ ἰσχύει) to stand in the temptation. Indeed, the *temptation* which assails us is something different from and more than the *weakness* which it, alas, finds in us. But what is the temptation of which the Lord *here* speaks, and why does He thus speak of it here? He himself was assuredly at the time in heavy temptation; con-

sequently, this word spoken to the disciples out of His own present experience and condition gives us a new *explanation* concerning the trouble and anxiety of His soul. The *hour* which came upon the Lord was from this time forward specifically the time of the assault of the *power of darkness* (Lu. xxii. 53), of the *prince of this world* (Jno. xiv. 30.) The temptation came not to Him *from* the flesh, as it comes to us in whom the tempter has something already; but it assaulted Him *in* the flesh, which He had in common with us even in its weakness. Yea, it fell upon Him as the champion, with whom Satan now decisively contended for the world, all the more vehemently; not only as human temptation, but according to the righteousness of God, as the temptation of the Godman. The tempter who was permitted thus to come to Christ, and desires us all, is the enemy against whom we have in watchfulness and prayer to stand on our guard; —and what is the evil and hurt from him which we have to fear? Not temptation in itself, for that came upon Christ, and being overcome issued in the salvation of the world; we must all enter the sieve, as we have already heard. Thus the emphasis must not be laid upon *temptation* in the interpretation of *that ye may not*, as if we were to pray for the removal of temptation, or our exemption from it; but upon the *entering into*, which all the Evangelists have remarkably retained, and St Luke has strongly emphasized. Thus the preachers do wrong to exhort that we should pray against the coming of temptation, and that it should be altogether spared to us; for its inevitableness is demonstrated in the example of Christ. His word to the disciples is far from saying—I alone contend and get the victory for you, that ye may be under no such necessity. It says precisely the contrary. But what means the emphatic *entering into temptation*, the *falling into it*, or, as it assuredly indicates, the *falling in it:* how can that be entering into temptation? Neander's note is not enough, "that external may not become internal temptation to you;" for a *merely* external temptation would be none, and to Christ himself, though it sprang from without, it became internal; and Neander, in the parallel place of the Lord's Prayer to which he refers, says, "Save us *from* or *out of* the *inward* temptation through the might of the evil one!" Thus Εἰσέρχεσθαι—to enter into—does not mean the coming of temptation or the being

tempted, which is altogether independent of our watching and praying, but the falling into it or being involved with it in such a manner as not to come out of it, the remaining in it and falling. Grotius compared very properly the ἐμπίπτειν of 1 Tim. vi. 9, falling into temptation and a snare, the end of which is the *being drowned*, βυθίζεσθαι. We have given our explanation upon the sixth petition of the Lord's Prayer, referring there to these words: this *that ye enter not* is in fact an interpretation of that *lead us not into*.[1] However near the enemy may come to us, and however seductively he may come even in us, he can overcome us only if our will make common cause with Him; that is, if we "enter into" His mind and will, as our own idiom very appropriately speaks. But we enter into it and are victims, not merely when we *despair*, but in the far more perilous circumstance of our thinking ourselves secure and strong when we are not. Thus the Lord, who well knew our nature, the *weakness* of which at least He had experienced, does not counsel us to make ourselves (that is, to think ourselves) strong—but the very reverse. To know our weakness in sincere and wakeful thoughtfulness, to bring it before God in self-renouncing prayer and supplication for strength, that and that alone is the perfecting of our strength, 2 Cor. xii. 9, 10. Wake and continue awake to prayer—then, but only then, temptation brings no fear. To pray—and to sin, is impossible. Who could with a wakeful and recollected spirit say unto God—*Not* as Thou wilt? Who, when the word of Jesus bids us watch, and the spirit of Jesus teaches us to pray, may answer Him and say—Lord! but I cannot, I am too weak!

All this has sufficiently paved the way for the third word concerning *flesh* and *spirit*, by which the Lord's saying profoundly closes, opening up to us the inmost of the matter. Τὸ πνεῦμα, ἡ σὰρξ—the spirit, the flesh—it runs, not *My* and not *your* spirit and flesh. Which of these are we to supplement; does the Lord speak of Himself, or primarily of these disciples and then of us all? It is sufficiently evident that in the obvious connection a

[1] H. Witsius, on the Lord's Prayer, p. 359 (Clark's Biblical Cabinet, vol. 24.) "*To enter into temptation* signifies to be so involved in snares and dangers as *not to be extricated from them*. The Hebrew phrase expresses it more fully, to enter into the hand of temptation, that is, into its power and dominion, so as to be subjugated and absorbed by it."

reason is given here for *our* watching and praying, and the application of the assertion therefore to ourselves is not to be controverted; but at the same time we must unconditionally reject as erroneous and misleading the common opinion which confines the reference of our Lord's words to others, to sinful men. Of course, if the words are so interpreted as to be a definition of our natural fallen and corrupt condition, the Lord could not have intended to refer them to Himself; but this, as we shall show, is wrong in more than one aspect. At the outset, is it natural or conceivable that He, after His own sharp temptation, and speaking to us of temptation, would altogether in the conclusion forget and omit Himself? No, although he appropriates the saying to us, He speaks it on the ground of His own condition and feeling; consequently, we must admit that he pre-eminently and in the first place refers to that which was just now made manifest in Himself, of the willingness of the spirit and the weakness of the flesh. Once more, this final word gives an *explanation* of the reason why His soul was so troubled, how death should thus assault Him, in what the conflict consisted, which they had marked in Him and His "praying:"—in order that they might not be offended in Him or doubt of the willingness of His spirit, but at the same time that they might definitely know His own experience that—*the flesh was weak*. He by no means speaks this word as a gentle *apology* for their sleep (it rather urges watchfulness), as if He should say—*I see how it is with you, that your spirit is indeed willing*, &c. For, in strict fact, as we shall see, that was not true of the disciples. But, conversely—*Behold ye in Me*, how it is and must ever be, even supposing the utmost willingness of spirit, with you men! Thus He presents Himself to us as a type and pattern, He says no more than what the event itself says, but *interprets* to us by this word the nature and character of His own conflict in this *temptation*. *My soul*—thus He had spoken in full appropriation; but He does not now expressly say *My* flesh, for it is properly speaking *our* flesh, to the spirit in Him alien, which He had taken on Himself, see Rom. viii. 3. Nevertheless, as certainly as *the* spirit, which was absolutely willing, can be only His own, so also *the* flesh is now intended of His own person. The interpretation of this Gethsemane-word has been very loosely dealt with even

by profound thinkers, and the fatal habit of superficial exposition has led most of our commentators astray. Daub (Jud. Isch. i. 72) supposes that this was said at the same time of "*every* mortal," but this in his case is an inadvertency. Jul. Müller (von der Sünde i. 378) appears to refer this saying of the willing spirit and the weak flesh to the *disciples* alone; though he rightly admits that *spirit* here is not to be understood as in Jno. iii. 6, it is not the Spirit of God, but "evidently a constituent part of human nature." We found on this admission the question—If Christ is true man, does He not speak all this of Himself? Nor are we content with the form in which Rieger admits the truth: "The Lord Jesus at this solemn time experienced even in Himself the difference between the willing spirit and the weak flesh." We maintain, rather, that in the pure experience of this *distinction* without admixture, He, the sinless man, stands alone; and the reference of this subsequently to ourselves can hold good only through the impartation of His own Spirit.[1]

Gethsemane gives its most specific and strong testimony to the true humanity of Christ; and His own words plainly declare the same. He had said before—My *soul*, and when he now adds *spirit* and *flesh*, we have complete the scriptural trichotomy of human nature and personality; for although *flesh* is not altogether synonymous with *body*, it has an undeniable reference to body. We would add that σάρξ, flesh, has a somewhat different meaning here from that which it has in all those passages which connect with it the idea of sinfulness; it is assuredly only that "constituent part of human nature" in itself, which, though unaffected as in our case by the fall and sin, belonged to the second Adam. The Lord therefore means no more than to say —My spirit, which ye shall receive from Me; your flesh, which I also have received from you. Bengel's words, relative to the *second* clause, "this saying, sin being taken away, held good *also* of Jesus," are wrong in the assumption that sin must first be conceived to be removed in the clause *the flesh is weak*. It is no

[1] Comp. now Liebner's Christologie i. 303, where we find, though not definitely enough: The words concerning spirit and flesh are to be referred back *also* to Christ himself. Again, de Wette against Müller (S. u. K. 1849, 3), where the Gethsemane-word has a general anthropological meaning only.

more involved in this, than in the former concerning the *spirit;* it is more correct to say concerning both clauses together—This saying, apart from sin in us, *also* holds good *now* of us.

How can then the natural man as such go on at once and say that his spirit is *willing?*[1] In Jude, ver. 19, we read of *sensual men having not spirit,* that is, whose human πνεῦμα is, through entire separation from the Divine, no more than as if not existing. Even the θέλειν, the willing, of Rom. vii. 18 is far from meaning the πνεῦμα πρόθυμον, the רוּחַ נְדִיבָה Ps. li. 14, the willing spirit in all its New Testament reality and truth. In Rom. vii. it is, as the sequel shows, an impotent and biassed willing, no better than none at all—but here it is evidently such a willing as through watchfulness and prayer may maintain its prerogative and get the victory.[2] It is only in that condescending, prophetic and proleptic sense in which the Lord always and especially addressed His disciples as the representatives of His future church, and only therefore as He beheld in them the germ of regeneration, that He ascribed to them, in fellowship with Himself, a *willing spirit:*—had the full truth applied to them, they would have watched and prayed. He had only said—Ye *could* not, graciously assuming in them a certain willingness; but He cannot now mean in the full sense—I see that *your* spirit is perfectly willing, and that there is nothing lacking there! They had indeed vauntingly declared that they would go with Him whithersoever He went, would suffer and die with Him; but do we not know, do we not see even here, how much self-deception there was in that? In its full truth the spirit of Christ only is entirely and absolutely willing and prepared, as Ps. xl. 9 expresses it; *and therefore*—let this be carefully observed!—it is only *His* flesh again which is nothing but weak. *In the humanity of Christ alone* are the willingness of spirit and the weakness of flesh purely distinguished and separate entirely each from the other; on the other hand the *I* in us is *carnal,* and in the *flesh* itself there is a *will,* a *positive* tendency to sin.

[1] Πρόθυμος occurs again in the N. T. only Rom. i. 15. It does indeed oppose itself to a hindrance (as there κατ' ἐμέ); but it also expresses an independent and full willingness of the spirit.

[2] Beck (Seelenlehre, S. 34) very improperly makes these two passages parallel!

We say rightly, with Schulthess (vom Abendmahl, S. 334) against a false theology: "He himself experienced most perfectly what he said in Gethsemane—*the flesh is weak*—and *all the more* in the degree in which His *spirit was willing*." But we utter our strongest protest against his unscriptural combination of *weakness* with *sin*, and the fearfully foolish conclusion which he draws, "Ἁμαρτία is an essential attribute of the flesh (how with respect to Christ who was *made flesh!*), just as humidity is of water,—*where flesh is there is sinfulness*."[1] Most certainly not: there is weakness, indeed, but where with that weakness there is not merely a gradual preponderance of the *willing spirit*, but the willing spirit in its absolute predominance—as in the case of Christ—there can be no room for any sinfulness of the weak flesh. It is only *when* and *as far as* the spirit of Christ enters into us, that we can appropriate the truth which is here spoken to the disciples. Bengel's concise hint—"Hence the frequent mention by the apostles of *flesh* and *spirit*" must be taken with much emphasis upon the *Hence;* the apostolical phraseology actually rests upon this appropriation of His words by Christ to His disciples. *Flesh* consequently does not signify *here* the entire natural man, "corrupted nature" or the like, for what would then be left for the *spirit* which is evidently also a constituent element of human nature? *In my flesh*, Rom. vii. 18, is quite identical with *in me*, in spite of the *willing* and *delighting* which were present to him; therefore *sin* dwelleth in *me*, wholly and entirely established within me, even in my spirit and *will*, the impotent assent of which to that which is good is itself a bias toward and vote for the evil; for sin must be in the will, it cannot be in the *flesh* as such. But here, where the spirit stands in contrast, the *soul* (before mentioned) is not included with the flesh, and the meaning is, that the soul, standing between the spirit and the flesh, must, in watching and praying, itself derive strength from the spirit and overcome the weakness, although through sharp conflict, amounting even to convulsion, as their eyes had seen in Him. The gracious anticipatory equality assumed between His disciples and Himself holds good now of His

[1] The same, from another point of view, is that which Apollinaris affirmed, on account of the freedom of choice, which is necessary to the νοῦς: "where there is perfect man, there is sin."

saints, but only in as far as they are in Him; no man may absolutely glory that *his* spirit is only willing, *his* flesh only—*weak!* In the background there is a most solemn application, at least *similar* to the saying—If this be done to the green tree, what will it be to the dry? If *such* prayer is needful to Me, the Holy One, on account of weakness, how much more will it be needful to you sinful men, with your *confusion* of flesh and of spirit? Alas, with us even as standing in grace, the flesh is willing, that is, to evil; it is not *weak*, that is, not willing because not able (rather thinking itself not able), but it is mighty, and proud, deafening the Spirit, and making common cause with the tempter. This is to be seen in the disciples themselves. That Peter could not now watch one hour was occasioned by the *sin* of his presumption. He slept most profoundly when with open eyes he first contradicted and then denied! But if we through the grace of regeneration are so far awake that to the willing spirit in us, as in Christ, sin, that is, the temptation to sin, is no other than a *suffering* and a *burden*, bringing no longer pleasure with it—then may we take the consolations of Christ's word, that the weakness, which feels the suffering, and which is exposed to the temptation, is no sin, any more than it was in Him. No more is then demanded of us than to watch and pray, but both with the utmost earnestness. *To watch* against the enemy, on account of the weak flesh exposed to his assault; *to pray* with a willing spirit for the strength of God which maintains and strengthens that willingness.

But nothing is more lamentable and more perilous than the perversion of this equally rousing and comfortable sentence, which in common with many such scriptures, Satan skilfully tempts men to misuse. He rends the latter saying from the former, separates it from the "watch and pray," and makes that which was designed as an encouragement to watchfulness and prayer a pillow for self-deception. He persuades the sinner to regard it as enough that his poor, imaginary willingness of spirit (his good heart, right intention, &c.) is enough of itself; and apologizes for sin and entering into temptation as "weakness of the flesh!" Just as in Phil. ii., ver. 13 is wrenched from ver. 12, and in Rom. iii., ver. 23 from ver. 21. We trust that all

such perversion has been thoroughly guarded against throughout this exposition.[1]

We turn to the *second, repeated* petition of our Lord, which St Matthew alone records in words. We have already given the reason of our Lord's interrupting His prayer, and going in the interval to His disciples: let us now quote the words of the Berlenb. Bible: "Among other things we may here learn that in all times of sore conflict we should not continue in one uninterrupted strain of prayer in order to prevent our devotion from being feeble and lukewarm; we should rather pause, and take breath, that it may be urged with all the more vehemence." When the Lord, yielding as it were for a moment to the weakness of His flesh, sought the society of His disciples, their impotence must itself have invigorated His strength to still more ardour in the conflict. *Πάλιν ἐκ δευτέρου* in St Matthew is an emphatic tautology, specifically enumerating. St Mark's *saying the same words* (explanation of *ἐκ δευτέρου*) is in the general right; but they were not entirely the same words. St Luke refers to the second prayer as *ἐκτενέστερον, more earnestly*, not, however, as more *urgently* supplicating for the removal of the cup, but, according to St Matthew's sense, even if we had not his words—more vehemently struggling for the victory of submission in His agony.[2] Christ knew that the Father always

[1] Spener (Sentences of Scripture, which have been perverted) does not thoroughly meet the case, for his exposition is cramped by his reference of the words to the disciples alone: "The willing spirit was the noble purpose which they had formed, but the weak flesh—is what we read in Rom. vii. 1 and viii. 3!"

[2] This became so severe as to cause the bloody sweat in the cold night (Jno. xviii. 18.) We would not, with Athanasius, pronounce a ban upon those who deny this sweat of blood; but we would not join them in the denial, like Theophyl. and Euthym., who understood the *as* to be simply parabolic, or Grotius, who appeals to Justin as saying only *θρόμβοι*. "The force of the particle *as* falls upon the *drops*, not the *blood*," as Bengel rightly remarks; for it is *καταβαίνοντες* not *καταβαίνοντος*. "If the sweat had not been *bloody*, the mention of blood might have been omitted; for the word *drops* would have been sufficient." Rambach remarks that the driving out of the blood from the heart is contrary to the course of nature, as anxiety and fear drive it inwardly to the heart; but here all is alone of its kind, though after human kind, and we therefore doubt the correctness of his remark.

heard him (Jno. xi. 42); He therefore understands the *not* passing away of His anguish as the granting of His last word—As Thou wilt!—as the confirmation of the Divine will that He should drink the cup. He therefore comes to the conclusion in the second prayer, as if an answer had been received; He no longer says—If it be possible, *let it pass*, but—*If it may not pass*, and girds Himself to obedience. His willingness expresses itself still more strongly in *unless I drink it*—"He now addresses Himself more directly *to drink*." Similarly, the more general and definitely spoken—*Thy will be done*, in this as in all things—corresponds now to a perfect submission; but this does not exclude the continuous *conflict* in the praying utterance of this determination.

The *third* prayer is at least intimated by St Mark also—He cometh the third time; that is, after a third departure and prayer. St Matthew adds—Saying the same words, that is, as on the second occasion. That which He had taught his disciples concerning the fewness and the simplicity of their words in prayer, finds its exemplification in His own case, through the weakness and the oppression which made more impossible. To repeat the same few words is before God the deepest earnestness. The poverty of the words pertains to the weakness, their perseveringness to the sincerity, of prayer. And before even this third prayer He found the disciples once more sleeping! Their eyes were heavy, pressed down βεβαρημένοι Matt., καταβαρυνόμενοι Mar.); according to St Luke He found them sleeping *for sorrow*, which last addition would almost seem to be a doubtful and inadequate reflection in some way inserted into the record. For, although this uttermost impotence of man here where the Godman treads the winepress alone, may be humanly explained by their exhaustion in the deep night after such a day, by the reaction after so much excitement, and most decisively as St Luke says, by the stunning power of a sorrow which was too great for them; yet was there something more than all this assaulting them, as the Lord himself had intimated—the *temptation* of the power of darkness, the satanic sifting, *without* which their sympathy with the sufferings of Jesus would have held their eyes waking. But this prostration under the assault of the enemy is itself part of the impotence of men. The Lord knew

this; He beheld it with compassion, and was urged by it to perseverance in His conflict for these poor men: *He left them* (ἀφεὶς αὐτοὺς) and continued in watching and prayer, until He had overcome in this commencement of the hour which had come; until, with returning power, serenity, and peace, He could deliver Himself up to the betrayer and the hands of sinners.

THE INVIGORATION.

(Matt. xxvi. 45, 46; Mark xiv. 41, 42; [Lu. xxii. 46.])

This last word before His being taken, while He was speaking which (all three unite in this) the betrayer came near, as the Lord had just intimated, is given with precision only by the first two Evangelists; St Luke has retained only καὶ ἀναστάς —ἀναστάντες. It falls once more into a threefold arrangement: the final, and most sorrowfully gentle reproof of the disciples' sleeping to the last; the announcement of the time of His being delivered up into the hands of external enemies; the voluntary surrender of Himself to meet it, through the vigour which His conflict had given Him.

Are we to make the first clause, which the first two Evangelists give us literally alike, a question, or not? We find indeed in St Luke the question—Why sleep ye? But we have already seen that his account gives up all literal exactness, and condenses the whole; we might say that this *why sleep ye?* in *his* record is but the echo of the earlier *Simon, sleepest thou?* or, *could ye not watch?* The τὸ λοιπόν of itself scarcely allows the idea of a question here; for that does not mean, properly speaking,—Do ye then sleep *still on?*[1] but the *indicative* character of the whole sentence decidedly contradicts such a notion. It might be possible to take them at once as in the Indicative—Ye sleep and take your rest *still;* and, behold, it is time to awake, and stand up, and go forth! But this does not content us;[2] this would

[1] As Winer observes, resting on the phrase itself.

[2] That is, our own individual feeling; for in the interpretation of all such dubious and pregnant sayings there cannot fail to be more or less of the subjective element.

require for the connection *and, behold,* whereas we find in St Mark an abrupt ἀπέχει which can be fitly rendered only as an *Imperative.* We therefore, with Winer, take the words as in the Imperative, and regard them as noting an advancement beyond the previous question, and thus being more in harmony with the Lord's present invigoration of spirit. He had previously lamented that they slept, while oppressed Himself with need of help; but now, so far as regards *His* need, He permits them to sleep on: He requires and demands their watching for Himself no more. Thus much of permission there is in this conceding Imperative; but it is far from being a permission or direction to sleep, expressly intended, as it were, to intimate that now for the rest—τὸ λοιπὸν—they were exempted from the necessity of watching and praying! (For Bengel is right—As sleep is opposed to watching, so rest is opposed to the labour of prayer. The ἀναπαύεσθαι is not synonymous with καθεύδειν; but this double-saying corresponds to the former double-saying.) *On His account,* indeed, and as it respected the previously urgent *watch with Me,* they might now continue to sleep, and cease from prayer for His strengthening; but does He not go on to say that His *being betrayed* would soon awake and arouse them, and make them watchful in earnest? Bengel: "Shortly others will come, who will awaken you. In the meantime (we would add—as it respects Me) sleep, *if ye can!*" Or Neander: "Sleep *on still,* I will no more awake you, no more ask you to watch and pray with Me; but ye will soon be roused out of your sleep by violence, *for behold,*" &c. Quite true—but may this be called irony or not? Bengel says, "It is not irony, but metonymy." Winer maintains that the assumption of irony is contradictory to the whole tone of our Lord's mind at such a juncture. This is true also, if there is to be connected anything like his *levis irrisio.* But there is a sort of irony, at least in the expression, which has no mockery in it, and which is consistent with the most sorrowful gentleness; and such Bengel's "si vacat," and Neander's *sleep on,* seem to express. For if I give permission to do a thing at the same time that I say—But you will not find it possible—what is that but the language of irony?[1] Glassius was right in the main: "This is

[1] The translation—"Sleep *afterwards, at a future time,* but now it is inappropriate," is altogether contrary to the language and the con-

by no means the *time* for sleeping and taking rest (this lies in *the hour*), but for watching; but, because My words have been lost upon you, *I shall cease to exhort you now*; however, though you may sleep on as it regards Me, there are enemies who will not permit you, but will constrain you unwillingly to watch." Winer would evade this connection by sundering the two clauses thus: In the first clause the Lord would in all earnestness let them sleep on, and knows nothing yet of the *Behold*; but scarcely has He said so when He beholds the traitor approaching, He speaks to Himself the *Behold, they are at hand*, &c.; and then, retracting what was said first, He says to the disciples—*Arise!* He who can may content himself with this: *to us* this sudden surprise of our Lord,—which assumes Him to have really thought that the disciples could have slept on during the remainder (that night being so far advanced which He knew to be the night of His sufferings, and of their offence and denial!),—and such an intervening monologue of the Lord's surprise, are altogether insufferable.

But it is certainly a "*rebuking* word" (as Lange says, taking it as a question—"Do ye thus sleep through the time and take your rest? meaning, Are ye then thus full of sleep throughout to the end?"—but a rebuking word in the most rigorous sense, this final, and sorrowfully gentle, condemnation of the Lord cannot be called. It is His sorrow and His gentleness which dictate the ironical form; and only in this latter is the reproving element, which cannot be evaded. In Bengel's "with tenderness and severity" the former must have the emphasis; there is no anger to be thought of, now when immediately after His own sharp conflict the Lord's heart has no room for anything but the deepest *sympathy, and feeling for our infirmities*. Thus Chrysostom is wrong when he says (Hom. 71 in Joh.)—"It is not the voice of command, or of counsel, but that of reproach."

Much more ambiguous than the former clause would be the ἀπέχει which St Mark adds, were it not that the one illustrates the other. We must first reject the interpretation (in Wahl's

nection. For Wahl, who gives *posthac, i.e., alio* tempore, forgets altogether that in all the parallels for posthac (Gal. vi. 17; 1 Cor. vii. 29; 2 Tim. iv. 8 in New Testament), the time must be reckoned from the moment of speaking—ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν.

Lex. again): transiit scil. anxietas, My anguish *is over*, has *passed away* for this time.[1] That would involve a perfect chasm between this word and that which he goes on to add, without any *Behold,—The hour is come.* We cannot suppose Him to say both in one breath, who had previously prayed *that the hour might pass.* And it is a very inapposite record—"There is no more anguish for me"—at the moment when His whole language and deportment attest it much more strongly. Applying the same interpretation of the word another way, it might be said, with Grotius—"The time is gone during which the apostles might have been a solace to Christ." More plainly, The time in which ye should have watched and prayed with Me, is past, ye have slept away the hour of probation! But this would be too stern a rebuke, and such severity we have repelled already. Or, if ἀπέχει must retain the meaning of *abest, transiit* (which Grotius maintains, appealing to the passage in Anac. afterwards to be quoted, and to *peractum est* in Seneca), it only remains that we render it with Lange, "there is now an end *of it*," that is, of your sleeping, your rest must be broken, others are coming to disturb it! This comes near to the fact, the subject of the impersonal verb being the *sleeping and taking rest;* but in this sense the ἀπέχει makes the irony too keen in the sudden change: "Sleep on *yet?* It is now *at an end with* sleep!" What then is our refuge? We confidently decide with Bengel, for the interpretation *It is enough,* according to the Vulg. *sufficit;* and understand—*Enough now of dreams!* This interpretation of the word appears to us established by the passage quoted from Anac. Od. xxviii. 33; and thus only do we obtain a *gentle* and fit *transition* between the two opposite clauses. The Lord would indeed say *sleep on*—but He is constrained at once to proceed—*Enough* of sleep! This parallel Imperative is more appropriate than the rigorous announcement—There is *nevertheless an* end of it![2]

[1] The Syr. and Arab. express it—*It is over*—but it remains doubtful what they would supply.

[2] The recent attempt of Sepp to interpret it as a misunderstanding for ἀπέχοι, μὴ γένοιτο, the translation of a חָלִילָה, is no better than the correction of the difficult ἀπέχει in the marginal gloss ἐπέχει (as if it were spurious, and sprung from the remark of an expositor—Here He restrains Himself!) The view given in the S. u. K. 1843. 1. 104 con-

The remainder of the word needs but little explanation. The ἦλθεν or ἤγγικεν says strongly enough that there is no sudden surprise at this sacred crisis, in which this victory of resignation has been fully gained. Even if the first *Behold* coincides with the visible appearance of the multitude, and referred to that (but, *because* the Behold occurs twice, we cannot but think that the *second* only points to that circumstance)—yet it is plain that the Lord had felt this very *hour*, and all that it would bring with it, to be near throughout His conflict; and to our mind it is very impressive that in the Father's counsel the *first moment of the Lord's invigoration should coincide so exactly with the first instant of the external assault upon Him.*[1] The reading *appropinquabit* in the Vulg. deranges all. The καὶ after ἤγγικεν in St Matthew is not to be resolved into *that*; but *the hour* stands alone in its pregnant fulness of meaning, as in St Mark also. To be betrayed into *the hand of sinners*—this is still a thought of dread to the Holy One of God, even after He has overcome, and devoted Himself to this fearful horror. By this, however, we are not to understand, according to the common Jewish phrase, the Gentiles; the article in St Mark might lead to that conclusion, were it not that its absence in St Matthew gives the more general and appropriate sense. Even in Gal. ii. 15 the word has by no means this meaning, if it be closely considered; the Apostle says—sinners of the Gentiles, but the antithesis is—sinners of the Jews; and his ironical allusion is to the proud word of the Jews who called all heathens *sinners*. And very different from that is the ἄνομοι of Acts ii. 23; 1 Cor. ix. 21. The Saviour in Gethsemane knows only of *sinners* in simple contrast with His own holiness; so that He here, as everywhere, places Himself as the One *Son of man*, in contradistinction to all *sinners*. If it had been said, The *Messiah*—we

tradicts every right feeling of the Christian. The Lord, vibrating between hope and fear, whether and when Judas would come, and accompanying him on his way by His spirit, said concerning him, whose name He would no longer take into His lips (but see Lu. xxii. 48)—*He is still far!!* At the same time perceiving the contrary, he was constrained to cry *He is at hand*, οὐκ ἀπέχει. This is, in a sense which even scientific exposition will admit, *unchristian* exegesis.

[1] Not till He had finished the struggle! Hence Judas *must* "keep the multitude till then quiet in the background."

might have been justified in thinking of the heathen. Those to whom He was immediately betrayed were rather the Jews, the High-priests and Rulers, to whom He himself, Jno. xix. 11, ascribed the greater sin. The keenest point of the sin which was permitted thus to come upon Him was the fact of His being *betrayed* by the traitor, the worst of all sinners:—of him He thinks especially, he was in His mind when He said, the Son of Man is *betrayed*, before He directly mentions him as he draws near at the head of the multitude. To utter this with the deepest grief and yet with the calmest resignation, to *go forth and meet* this traitor and these sinners' hands,—this was the point to which He had strengthened His soul, as His invigoration is expressed both by word and act.[1] The disciples must be there for a brief space when their Master is seized, consequently to *them* first is addressed the solemn *Rise!* (which echoes in St Lukes ἀναστάντες); then follows the Ἄγωμεν! *let us be going!* which, while it seems to include them, really means only Himself. It is almost as if He would remind them of that first *Arise, let us go hence!* Jno. xiv. 31. This *Rise* entirely put an end to the *Sleep on now;* no one of the disciples found sleep or rest that night.

THE FIRST WORD TO THE MULTITUDE.

(Jno. xviii. 4, 7, 8.)

Notwithstanding the *immediately*—not only in St Mark, whose use of this expression we are familiar with from the beginning, but also in St Matthew, ver. 49—we are convinced that the whole of Jno. xviii. 4—8 took place before the kiss of Judas, and we shall hereafter justify this supposition. The increasing divergence of the Evangelists, as they go deeper into the history of the Passion, is quite natural on the human ground of their observation and remembrance, and makes all the more wonderful

[1] A devout observation has been made: "The creative—Let us make man! did not cost so much as this *Let us go!* of the Son of God in His redeeming work."

the absolute unity of their testimony throughout. That which, in the confusion and excitement attendant upon its occurrence, was viewed from various points of view, was not by any means left as the material which a human tradition might variously weave; but the Holy Spirit, without effacing the stamp of human credibility which is impressed upon their artless differences, has defended them from all incorrectness, and set upon the whole the seal of His own sure testimony. But only the unprejudiced perceive that human stamp; and to none but the partakers of that Spirit is the assurance of His testimony perfectly plain.—St John knew of the kiss of Judas, but it was not his purpose to record it again. He takes us immediately after the highpriestly prayer, out over the brook Cedron (to the significance of which in the scene he aloner efers)—into the *garden* of anguish and victory, where the second Adam began to make atonement for the sin which the first Adam committed in the garden of Paradise.[1] But *his* province was, presupposing all else that had been recorded concerning the Lord's sufferings, to point out His *glorification in suffering*. When he now, in ver. 4, sets over against the Lord's *knowing* all things that should come and came upon Him, the fatal and wretched knowledge of Judas concerning the place, and with a remarkable *second* ἐξελθών, went forth (after the ἐξῆλθε of ver. 1), immediately adjoins *He said unto them*—we can hardly suppose the betraying kiss of this Judas, thus mentioned in vers. 3 and 5, to have intervened. It is evident that St John would mention that *first* going forth of our Lord to meet the multitude, which anticipated *all that came upon Him*.

In the whole interval between the two dark periods of conflict in Gethsemane and upon the cross, the Lord exhibits outwardly the most sublime serenity and strength, although this might consist with the continuance of the conflict within. Before God, before the Father, He had obtained the first victory of resolution to *drink the cup* (Jno. ver. 11), the inmost contents of which His soul already tastes—now may men and sinners come, and in them the whole power of darkness! And this is to us an example in

[1] Which obvious parallel we find in Cyril and Augustine.

our own appointed sufferings—that our preparation must not wait till the outward pressure comes, but that we must see to it that it find us prepared.

The multitude which comes against Jesus—ὄχλος πολύς in Matt. and Mar., briefly ὄχλος in Lu.—consists, as we apprehend it, of a combination of four if not five elements: soldiers, functionaries of the judgment or the temple-watch, servants, high-priests and elders themselves, and probably a miscellaneous concourse. St John rightly places first, as required by Judas and placed at his disposal, τὴν σπεῖραν, that is, as the article shows, the military cohort of the Romans stationed in Jerusalem for any such purpose. According to Josephus there was such a body, established in the fortress Antonia, in order to prevent or suppress any insurrection, especially at the great feasts; and with this Acts xxi. 31 agrees. Σπεῖρα, in Ennius found as *spira*, cannot possibly signify the temple guard; for compare Acts x. 1, xxvii. 1, and in John xviii. 12 the χιλίαρχος. Certainly it was not the whole cohort of five hundred men, but a considerable part representing the whole. "To obtain this escort it was only necessary to inform the chief magistrate that there were traces of an insurrection, which must be put down by the arrest of the leader of it." (Hess.) Thus this escort had been obtained by those whom the matter concerned—that is, secondly, the ὑπηρέται, the officers of the council, which must be here one and the same with the (Levitical) temple-guard: for see Lu. ver. 52 *captains* of the temple, and compare ver. 4, as also Acts iv. 1, v. 24, 26. There was one chief captain, and several subordinate[1]: the chief captain here corresponds to the χιλίαρχος. Then come, thirdly, the common or private *servants* of their various masters, whom the "high priests," &c., had sent with the rest in their zeal: see John ver. 18, δοῦλοι and ὑπηρέται distinguished, hence Malchus the *servant of the high priest*. Both the official and the private servants are included in the ἀπό of Matt., παρά in Mark, which the Vulg. has rightly in the former supplemented by *missi—sent from*—and it is the same with the ἐκ of John. But, fourthly, as we shall see in Lu. ver. 52, there were

[1] Friedlieb's Archæol. S. 35. Hence de Wette groundlessly opposes this Plural.

some high priests and elders—but whether by or against the will of the leaders, whether they went in their zeal or met the company, is a questionable point.[1] Enough, this ὄχλος (ὄχλοι Matt. ver. 55), this multitude, as it is called, as if to lay the charge of tumult rather upon these His enemies, was to have the appearance of a united rising of all kinds against a most guilty and most dangerous man, an ecclesiastical and political delinquent. But the temple-guard is summoned against the innocent teacher in the temple, the Prophet legitimated by many miracles, the Messiah and Lord of the temple, proved to be such by every sign! The Roman power is brought against Him as an insurrectionary and a murderer! St John mentions only *weapons* generally; the Synoptics have swords, and, moreover, ξύλα, that is, stakes, sticks, or however else it may be translated —not, however, "clubs." Either the soldiers had swords, the servants of the council or temple-guard only weapons of wood (*staves* as indicating office? but this is quite improbable); or, better, in this "tumultuously armed company" even the ξύλα had been hastily seized for help. This at least the Lord himself seems to intimate, Matt. ver. 55. This exaggerated arming was in any case a pretence, out of dishonour to Jesus, and to mark Him out beforehand as dangerous to Pilate. St John mentions also lanterns and torches, although it was the Easter full-moon; to seek diligently the object of their search, if He was not found in the indicated garden. We need not refer this to the locality of the valley of Cedron: on the one hand, there is in this light thrown upon these works of darkness an irony which condemns them; and, on the other, it was dealing with our Lord in a manner as contemptible as foolish—as if He would *hide Himself!* Similarly with the weapons—as if He would defend Himself! At the same time, as if He who called Lazarus out of His grave, could be taken with swords and staves! All this was as useless as the spices afterwards at the sepulchre—but this time all was for scorn and indignity.

But He had already spoken His *let us go forth*—that is, indeed,

[1] According to Lange: "Already the beginnings of the mob-tumult which was later excited against Jesus—individual *fanatics*, who joined the crowd." As Nonnus excellently describes it: καὶ πολὺν οἰστρήεντα παρ' ἀρχεκάκων φαρισαίων—σύνδρομον ἄλλον ἔχων κορυνήφορον ἐσμὸν ὀδίτην.

to meet them! Ἐξελθών (or in Lachm. and Tisch. ἐξῆλθεν καὶ λέγει), does not mean the going out of the garden, for, according to ver. 26, the entire capture took place within the garden; nor is it that "He went out from the midst of the disciples" (as Schweizer asserts); but the Vulg. *processit* rightly interprets this going forth to meet the advancing crowd, comp. Matt. xiv. 14. At the same time, the ἐξελθεῖν, if we supplement—from the inner part of the garden, may contain a latent reference by St John to the secret conflict presupposed in the tradition. His first word, *whom seek ye?*—the simplest and most sublime word at *such* a crisis—requires rather to to be penetrated by feeling than expounded in other words. He knew that which He inquired, but He would be answered, in order that He may *surrender Himself to them* solemnly and formally, with the pure simplicity of the highest truth confronting their artifices and pretexts. When they would make Him a king He fled from them—now, when His sacrificial death is come, He goes to meet them. He may not let Himself be *sought* as Adam among the trees of the garden. In this "*whom?*" there lies already the afterwards expressed aim of His surrender—If ye seek Me, let these go their way. The people must bethink themselves, and, against their will, with as much becoming calmness as was possible to them, do simply that one thing for which they were sent by God and men, take His person into custody. If this *whom seek ye?* carries our thought back to that first *what seek ye?* Jno. i. 38,[1] we find much to ponder in devotion, and to apply. The sincere seek *Him* for salvation, when He asks *what* seek ye? for the true reply of their good conscience. But they who seek *Him* in enmity, are affrighted at His *whom?* Alas, how many still there are who, as here, knowingly and yet ignorantly, are found among the crowds whom *Judas* leads!

Among those then present were many so altogether ignorant as not to know Jesus by person: this would apply especially to the Roman soldiers. They knew only that they were to seize "Jesus of Nazareth." That (according to Neander), Judas alone knew *who* was to be seized, and that the others were to

[1] And in St John's Gospel there are many such suggestive references from the conclusion to the beginning.

know at the right time through his sign, is altogether improbable, and leaves the first answer with the name inexplicable, for it could not have then been at once—even Thee! If He had declared Himself to be the person sought when He said *whom seek ye?* the amazement which fell upon them would not have waited for the *I am He.* And, moreover, there were many there who must have personally known the Lord, as He himself says—I was daily *with you!*

Are we to assume, with Grotius (and so Chrys. and Cyril), that they were collectively struck at once with blindness, and thus confounded at the very beginning? This is an altogether needless assumption. Or may we say that even those who knew Him could not recognize Him, in spite of their lanterns and torches, or through the blinding combination of their lights with that of the moon? We think that He stood before them visible enough, having come forward into the clear light. Many probably knew Him, but in these there is an anticipation of the fear which threw them down, and no man *dared* to say—*Thee!* It remains, therefore, for those who knew Him not, to say artlessly to the man who comes forward and asks them as if to help them, and who therefore was *not* the person himself—*Jesus of Nazareth.* This was His common name, Matt. xxi. 11, xxvi. 71, not without contempt on the part of His traducers, but among others simply the full name and designation of *this* Jesus. But we cannot reconcile it with any thoughtful study of the whole scene to suppose that any man of the multitude could have given such an answer *after* the kiss of Judas. Our hasty expositors should pause a while and meditate in stillness upon the whole, before they enter into their details.

In the same simple tone in which the answer had been given, though more calmly than that answer, which the question of the unknown one had somewhat disturbed, He says again, and in the plainest words—*I am He,* if ye seek Him, ye need *seek* no longer, He is before you! This was the necessary and designed protest against the seeking, the most lowly and yet solemn testimony to His own voluntary surrender of Himself. But, according to the Father's counsel, the fulfilment of which was brought on by the nature of the case, there was to be a yet stronger protest—that no *violence* could have availed to take the Son of

God, if He had not thus given Himself up. There proceeds from Him an unconscious power of the Highest, in connection with this lowly *I am. He!* which strikes amazement into the whole multitude.[1] First, *they went backward*—an involuntary retreat, the Old Testament frequent נָסוֹג אָחוֹר of smitten foes; but immediately afterwards still more—*they fell to the ground!* Then were *they* the evildoers, whom *fear* in their deepest hearts, which the word of Jesus pierced, had sought and found! He stands before them, lately risen out of his own weakness; before these sinners, in whose likeness He has appeared, though far as heaven separate from them in their guilty fear, He is glorified as the Holy One of God *even while* He is giving Himself into their hands! Many have appealed to the fact that "even Strauss discerns a miracle here"—but we have no sympathy with this ambiguous acknowledgment. There was no specific miracle here, apart from *the* standing miracle of our Lord's personality itself; for it was not the purpose of Jesus to perform any, it was not His conscious design to throw the people down.[2] Thus assuredly it was no "ray of His omnipotence" or His "divinity" which suddenly burst forth; for His divinity and omnipotence were now most profoundly concealed and withdrawn in order to His *suffering*. Strauss has not well shown, as Ebrard thinks, that this falling of the crowd could not admit of a natural explanation; we see here most plainly a manifestation in the highest degree of that which has not seldom occurred in much lesser degree in the domain of human experience. Enemies have been stricken backward in

[1] They speak now-a-days of a myth here, or at least a glorifying legend. There was a time when, *e.g.*, Bahrdt could talk about the officer falling back a step, being overturned by some obstacle, and causing the fall of many of the soldiers and others!

[2] "This is to be explained as the power of a good conscience over an evil, of faith over unbelief. For Jesus had no design to use here His miraculous power, rather in faith and obedience to render *Himself* up to the will and counsel of God, and save His disciples." Brandt, Schullehrerbibel. We think reason enough is found here for the rejection of the view which Krummacher, *e.g.*, and Luthardt still maintain—that it was the design of Jesus to throw down the people. To *our* feeling this is altogether inconsistent with the present position and spirit of our Lord.

the presence of sinful men, in the sudden view of their own guilt and superior dignity; history has may examples, such as Marius, Marcus Antonius, Probus, Pertinax, the Polish bishop Stanislaus, Coligny; and there are many which history does not record. But here there is one who is Holy as no other is; and the conscience of most in this crowd was susceptible of such a sudden recoil before the majesty of that *I*, from the knowledge which they had concerning this "Jesus of Nazareth." And the impression would reach to us all by sympathy. He had not said this time, It is I, *be not afraid*—therefore did they fear, because they had gone out *against* Him. But *to us*, His own disciples, this *I am He!* should say much which must be left to supplied and expanded by the believing heart.

Just as if *nothing* had passed, not surprised at this natural though undesigned result of His own word, Jesus in the transcendent elevation of His repose still *calmly hastens* to the goal —To deliver Himself up to them, and to secure the freedom of His disciples. He had waited uninterrupted in His composure, till they should rise up again,[1] and as soon as they can hear He asks them once more, literally as at first the same question. It is only in the compound ἐπηρώτησε, instead of the previous εἶπεν, that St John seems to intimate more urgency in the question. Whatever of humiliating or of ironical there was in the tone, resulted from the matter itself; their conscience would hear it, though Jesus meant not so to speak—What kind of man do ye suppose this "Jesus" to be whom ye seek, armed as ye are, yet without any courage to take him? They are constrained to return the same literal answer, though its meaning is now different. No man dares, even after the "I am he" no man dares, to say—We seek *thee!* The first time it was proudly, but now it is feebly said, as if a confession of sin—Jesus of Nazareth, Him we should and would take, but cannot.

[1] Which, through the predominance of the proud element in this multitude, speedily took place. The excellent Wesley unnecessarily interposes here a great deal: "Probably the priests among them might persuade themselves and their attendants that this also was done by Beelzebub; and that it was through the providence of God, and not the indulgence of Jesus, that they received no farther damage." O no, all things passed much too rapidly for this.

Hereupon the Lofty One says with the gentlest and most inspiriting tone which He could adopt—*I have told you that I am He.* Merely *told*—wherefore then did ye fall down at the sound? I say it once more, not to affright you, but because ye have found Me. Had He gone on to speak, no man could have laid hands upon Him, as we saw in the prelude of this scene, ch. vii. 44. The courage which enabled them to lay hold upon Him at last, sprang from the courage with which He surrendered Himself. Their falling before Him was doubtless, however, "a type of the world's judgment." "What will He do when He comes to judge, who did such things when He was judged? What will He be able to inflict from His throne, who had this power when about to die?" This is Augustine's question; and still more suggestive is Bengel's brief word, "He will say it a *third* time one day!" That is to say, So long as the limits of His forbearance are not reached, He ever repeats to His *enemies* as well as to His friends His avowal, *I am He*; until that day comes when the same words will cast down His foes for ever. If it had not been the Father's counsel that He should give Himself up for the *salvation of the world*—*then* would His deportment here at His capture lack its highest justification; but it is itself the strongest testimony for this counsel and will.

Finally, He omits not to say, what He had meant from the beginning—that they should do no harm to His disciples. In the terror-striking power and suppressed majesty, which involuntarily as it were attended Him in His humiliation, He extends the hand of His protecting love over His little, feeble company. They did not watch with Him, but He is watchful for their defence. His collective disciples are now around him, for the *going forth* of ver. 4 reached to the entrance and forefront of the garden, to the place where He had left the remaining eight. The description is very false which represents them as "attracted by the noise," and so forth; for there was no tumult at the first, the multitude came with cautious silence, and now when they had recovered from their fall and confusion, which of course would not take place without some noise, the Eleven were already there, drawn by the first, loudly uttered *Whom seek ye? If* ye seek Me, He says,—thereby once more plainly confirming what they could not apprehend in His *I am He!*—I defend not Myself, I

offer Myself to you, take with you Him whom ye have found! But in the same *gentle* tone He also *commands*—But let these go their way! Probably they had orders, or at least they might have had the desire, to seize also His dependents, as is shown afterwards by the case of the young man in St Mark; they might even have wished, having no courage to lay hands on Him, to begin by seizing His disciples. But He *says* to them what they are to do, and what not to do, just as He had *said* to them—I am He! That He does not say, My disciples,[1] has a reason of deep propriety; for that would be calling them, in opposition to these people, His dependents in a sense which He did not acknowledge, and in which He would not involve them. But it requires no proof that those who were thus found around Him, and whom He shortly describes as *these*, belonged to Him and lay near His heart. If a supposed conspirator and plotter should say—Let these people go, all the more certainly would the reverse be done, because he would thereby declare them to be his own people. But Jesus speaks one word, not, indeed, *as* a request, but as a command in the tone of a request,—and it has the force of a command at the very juncture when He is to be bound as a malefactor. Thus does He rule in the midst of His enemies, already in His humiliation. (Ps. cx. 2.) He remains always the same; the same when confronting the hosts of His enemies as shortly before in the circle of His friends:—He sees the right, speaks and acts with composure in every emergency, shows to each His place and way, even as He knew and maintained His own. What a man is this!

This last word says to the multitude—*These* (a few unarmed and affrighted people, as ye see) will not defend Me! He gives to the *disciples* an intimation and a command, as to what would and would not now become them,—though, alas, Peter understood it not. In its deepest sense, for everything in the Passion has its profound undertone of typical meaning, this saying, in which He devotes Himself and sets us free, shadows out the entire significance of the atoning sufferings:—He and He alone is made the victim, that we may go free, by a substitution which has its most real and vital truth, though not in the hard, juridical

[1] As Nonnus improperly paraphrases by λαὸν ἑταίρων.

sense. See here the *antitype* and the inversion of that saying of David—*I it is* that have sinned, and done evil indeed; but as for these sheep, what have they done? (1 Chron. xxi. 17.) In the midst of the disquietude which pressed upon Him He retains His pastoral solicitude for His sheep—that none of those, who have *deserved* death, may be lost, because and while He gives Himself to death for them. To this day He continues to spare our weakness; and gives up rather Himself, His name, His honour, when His enemies seek *Him* among us.

This meaning is profoundly exhibited in ver. 9 by the Evangelist; and his quotation is not such an "unhappy *that it may be fulfilled*," as Schweizer has most unhappily called it. But St John does not regard (as many say with a good intention, and as I myself thought at an earlier time) the protection of their bodily life as a bodily pre-fulfilment of that higher meaning which the Lord's prayer for His disciples must have contained. Certainly, such an exhibition of the spiritual by the external, which is its similitude,[1] is justified generally, and has several examples; but it is plain to me now, that as the Lord, in ch. xvii. 12, did not give His word an external meaning, so St John does not refer it in his quotation to their external defence and salvation. This has been acknowledged by older and later expositors. The Berlenb. Bible says: "*In this we see* that Christ had not in view so much their bodily salvation; but that He provided for their bodily safety for the sake of their spiritual." Both were here closely connected, for they could not then have borne with Him His sufferings; He would not have *lost* one only, but all. As Lampe himself was obliged to say—"Considered in themselves they would have succumbed to temptation, if they had been taken together with Christ." Rambach states it thus excellently: "Our merciful High-priest seeks to appoint and arrange our temporal circumstances in such a manner as that our souls shall take no harm—of this we have here a proof and example." Lücke against Schweizer: "It is perfectly in harmony that the Evangelist, remembering Peter's denial under severe pressure, finds

[1] Implementum literale implementi mystici præludium ac sigillum. Matt. viii. 17 is decisive for this.

in this external deliverance a rescue from such temptation as the disciples were then unequal to sustain."[1]

Not merely is the *power* of the Lord against the apparent *violence* of His enemies seen in this commandment issued at His capture ; but the whole scene, as we shall further contemplate it, *glorifies* generally—His (divine) *love* in opposition to the wickedness of Judas, His (human) obedience in opposition to Peter's self-will, His holy (divine-human) *dignity* in opposition to the wavering and confused conduct of the whole of those around Him. All, whether friends or enemies, are thrown out of their course in the mighty excitement of this event; the greatest injustice under heaven takes place, hell is moved, faith is broken in His disciples, and their presence of mind is gone—He alone exhibits the composure and power which is the prerogative of man in God. So every one goes his way at the Lord's direction, and He goes His own—calmness and order ensue. This must be taken as a preparatory glance at all that follows; all *human* (and otherwise justified) wrath He subordinates to *Divine* love, as is testified by the word to Judas, and at the same time by the healing of Malchus; He renounces all *Divine* power (though ever at His command) in the fulfilment of His *human* obedience, as the word to Peter teaches; with *Divine-human* dignity and light He *speaks, teaches, testifies*, from the beginning to the end, as His final word to the multitude will especially show. Truly, never man *suffered* like this man! He utters *I am He!* and faith understands the word, *sinks* voluntarily to His feet, and responds —Verily, *Thou art He!*

THE LAST WORD TO JUDAS.

(Matt. xxvi. 50; Lu. xxii. 48.)

The traitor had given them a *sign*:[2] Whomsoever I shall kiss, that same is he. St Luke, who does not expressly say this,

[1] Ebrard and Lange decide for the same meaning.

[2] St Matt. σημεῖον, St Mark more precisely σύσσημον, that is, *signum commune*, a concerted sign, known to all. The ἔδωκεν of the one is to be understood as the same with the δεδώκει of the other.

not only however records the kiss, but our Lord's word, presupposing it, which spoke of *betraying* with a kiss. The question whether or not St. Mark's word, ver. 44,—lead Him away *safely*—has an ironical meaning, as if Judas thought that the Lord would know how to save Himself, is bound up with the interpretation of Matt. xxvii. 3, and the whole view which we take of the betrayal. Into this we cannot now enter, but may remark that the assumption of such daring trifling on the part of the traitor, though to us improbable, would only make his wickedness the greater. It is plain in any case that he had made the most cold-blooded calculation and arrangement of all things, even down to the particular of this sign. In this most miserable act of forethought, he is daring enough to carry his mockery even to the awful point of showing himself at once His disciple and betrayer; but he is also unconsciously and secretly a coward, in that he does not dare to give any other sign, such as should externally dishonour his Master.[1] But now, through the declaration of Jesus, this sign has been rendered unnecessary;—are we then to suppose that Judas did kiss his Master? This apparently difficult question has induced many to reverse the order of time:—the kiss was first given, and then Jesus came forth to them with His *Whom seek ye?* For this Lampe appeals to Bynaeus; and among the more eminent names which have so decided we may mention Hess, Hase, v. Gerlach, Tholuck, Olshausen, Lücke, Ebrard, Lange, and Braune. That Judas went forward first alone, "to give the sign at a distance," while the watching spies kept in the rear in order that the seemingly artless kiss should not be interrupted, might appear to be a very rational explanation of their concerted plan; but we cannot agree with Ebrard that this is the only and the obvious solution, for it is easy to imagine a much more daring kiss than this would have been. But to what end and with what meaning the Lord could *then*, after He had thus been marked out and "*betrayed* with the kiss," put the simple question as to *whom* they sought; and, still more, in what conceivable sense the first equally artless answer, "Jesus of Nazareth," could have been given—we are altogether at a loss to understand. For in that case the first answer of the multitude would have

[1] He cannot, after the words of Jesus at the paschal meal, have thought (as v. Gerlach supposes) of concealing himself from Jesus.

been bold to such a degree that their immediate transition to amazement on hearing the "I am He"—which, however, added nothing to the intelligence—would be incomprehensible. And that, as Lange states the case, "Judas, on hearing the rebuking voice of Jesus, quickly hastened back, and his *hasty retreat* threw the first element of sympathetic fright into the mass of the people," sounds reasonable enough, until we study carefully the very words of the last Evangelist. St John's representation, in the direct sequence of vers. 3 and 4, produces at once the impression that this was the *first* time, and that Jesus went forth to meet *all* that was to come upon Him, thus anticipating the awful concerted kiss of Judas. The εἱστήκει of Jno. ver. 5 appears to us entirely to preclude the idea of any previous "falling back." Lampe, who takes for granted that the kiss had preceded, thus incorrectly interpolates: "He stands, therefore, suffused with shame, horrified at the commission of His own act, and dreading what the issue of the whole would be." For if St John had meant this, he would have recorded the commission of the act, or otherwise his narrative would be a very strange one. He rather stands, according to St John, as the same who had *received* this band and led them hither, and who had *come* with them—vers. 3 and 5 are closely connected. If the εἱστήκει—Judas *stood*, has, as it then would have, a special emphasis, that emphasis is a very different one, as we read in the Berlenb. Bible: "he appears to have been stunned, and not to know whether to go before or behind, to advance or retreat." More plainly: He stood irresolute, and delayed a while his kiss; perceiving this, our Lord would anticipate his act, and *spare* him this wickedness, as also obviate all unnecessary measures at His own capture. Still more, this *stood*, ver. 5, is undeniably a prelude to the *fall* of ver. 6, which is its direct antithesis, and intimates that Judas also fell with them. Assuredly, according to the plain word of the Evangelist, he did fall to the earth, and naturally was one of the first to do so.[1] But he was also, and this alone is in harmony with his character, which is described in the holy word as

[1] Dräseke's colouring forsakes the text: "The *I am He!* he still feels, the retreating and falling to the ground He still *sees*—then he vanishes." St John has no special εἱστήκει for him *after* the ἔπεσον.

devilish, one of the first, if not the first, who daringly stood up again. Chrysos., Cyril., Theoph., Euthym., assume that he did not give the kiss until after Jno. xviii. 4—8; and we agree with them, assuming further that this was even after he had already fallen to the earth in common with the others who had stood. The sign was now indeed superfluous, but in the exuberance of his daring he gives it nevertheless, though scarcely risen from the ground. Nor was it, as has been said, merely in his "confusion" that he did it, for a devil, a man into whom Satan has entered, may indeed be obliged to fall; but confused in his wickedness he cannot be, at least in the sense which has been maintained. Why then is the kiss given, when Jesus has already abundantly declared that it was He whom they sought and should take? Naturally—in the devilish spirit—that he may maintain his consistency, and redeem his word, and recover from the vexation of the fall to the earth as speedily as possible. All depends upon *him*, the leader; and he must needs inspirit his followers by showing them, what none knew so well as he, that they might approach Jesus without being harmed. Pfenninger, who is not far astray here, makes one of his characters say, "Judas, thou art a dead man if thou goest near to Him," and the wicked traitor replies, "Fear not, He never did harm to man!" Teschendorff[1] follows him, and makes Judas encourage the multitude: "Go on to him! What fear ye? *I will show you* that he may be approached without fear!" We agree with this, apart from the utterance of the feeling in words: it is the only view which altogether harmonizes the whole. And he drew near to Jesus, and with some customary word of greeting he *kissed* Him! Luke has simply φιλῆσαι, Matthew and Mark indeed κατεφίλησεν; both however only in the meaning of the ὃν ἂν φιλήσω which they have used previously. Thus here it is not the compound word, with its common intensification of meaning, *diu multumque osculari*, to kiss over and over (Tac. *osculis aliquem fatigare*), which is, apart from its impropriety generally, quite opposed to the φιλήματι, the single kiss which, according

[1] In his book, *Nicodemus*—which we have often quoted upon St John.

to St Luke, the Lord speaks of.[1] What a kiss was this, the symbol and proverb of everything horrible of the same kind, though nothing of the same kind could ever equal it, and Joab's kiss, 2 Sam. xx. 9, 10, was but its distant type! Among all the kisses of an enemy, which Solomon says, with a dark meaning, are נַעֲתָרוֹת, meaning thereby certainly something evil, deceitful, wily, *this* kiss upon the cheek of the Holy One of God was the most detestable and vile, and it might well provoke to *wrath* —in every other man, but not in the Lord Jesus. There is a sinless wrath of holy indignation which our Lord at other times felt and expressed; and if this pure human feeling in the Holy One was ever excited, it might have been supposed that it would be now, when He submitted to this blasphemer's salutation! What righteous man among men would not have turned away his face? What saint might not, under other circumstances, have felt holy and vehement anger? But here and now it is very different—toward this Judas the Lord will exhibit nothing but long-suffering and love. The hell *in man* is condemned, during the time of His forbearance, by that Divine love of the Son of man, which will not till hereafter become a consuming fire. The Lord turns not away His face, He suffers, He receives the kiss—this is transcendently more than what He requires of His disciples in Matt. v. 39. David's submission to the cursing of Shimei, and whatever else may be compared, falls infinitely short of the acceptance of this kiss.[2] Christ loved *His own* unto the end—but also the lost one, the apostate among them. (2 Pet. iii. 1.) Therefore He does not merely *keep silence*, which is generally an easier act of patience; but He still speaks, and now, as everywhere throughout the Passion, at the right place. His words become less frequent and more brief as events proceed, but they

[1] Bengel's translation is *gab ihm Kusse*—kisses—as in the Gnomon —*more than once.* Ebrard makes it an embrace; but all this is inappropriate and unnecessary, since καταφιλεῖν is certainly used for φιλεῖν. (Ecclus. xxix. 5 in Wahl does not suit, but 3 Ezra iv. 47 does.) The stronger word only makes emphatic the accomplishment of the purpose—He came to kiss, and did it.

[2] Pfenninger: "Wouldst thou know what Satan can do and God can bear, what the basest of mankind can do and the best of manhood can bear: behold the lips of Judas who kisses, and the cheek of Jesus which receives the kiss."

are all the more impressive and powerful when testimony demands them.

We shall not needlessly trouble ourselves with the doubtful question as to whether the twofold word to Judas was or was not spoken at once; we take both sayings, as they simply stand, as being intended by the Spirit to form one word. Thus first, the saying which St Matthew records; for this appears to us to have been actually first spoken, inasmuch as the immediate reply is connected with the greeting which accompanied the kiss. According to Matthew χαῖρε ῥαββί—a *mocking* salutation, the prelude of the soldier's mockery in Matt. xxvii. 29. This was the most confidential formula which a disciple could permit himself to use, according to the custom both of Gentiles and Jews; whether in the apostolical circle the Lord was ever greeted with שָׁלוֹם לְךָ—*Peace be to thee*—we very much doubt, at least as far as regards the reverent spirit of the others. Braune supposes that the Greek or the Roman salutation was used, on account of the Gentile soldiers, and then continues, "Judas might indeed have been able to take upon his lips the Jewish *Peace* be with *thee*;" we agree with him in the latter, and are willing to admit a certain truth in the former, if St Matthew reports literally. In St Mark the best Codd. and the Syr. have a double *Rabbi* without *hail*, Lachmann gives but one, the Vulg. *ave, Rabbi*. However it may be, they accord in this—that he greeted and kissed Him (with or without the expression of the greeting) calling Him *Rabbi*. Corresponding with this is the ἑταῖρε of the Lord's response. This is hard to translate, since the most obvious "My friend" is either too affectionate, and almost sentimental; or again too cold and indifferent, as it may be taken like a cursory greeting of a traveller. It was neither the one nor the other here; but uttered more graciously and affectionately now by the lips of Jesus than the half friendly and half repellent address in the two parables, ch. xx. 13, xxii. 12. The "gesell," companion, of the Berlenb. Bible has too good a meaning, that is, according to Ps. lv. 14; it would in its fundamental signification suit very well, were it not that common usage had given it another tone. *Friend*, in the sense of φίλος, the Lord could not possibly say, for Jno. xv. 14, 15 teaches us how much meaning that word has as used by the Lord Jesus; nor in the weaker sense of a merely human

relationship, could He so term this deceitful *enemy*, at the moment of his betraying kiss. Indeed, all allusion to former friendship would be beside the truth in the case of this evil man." Nor does this lie in the word, as Ammonius says: "ὁ ἑταῖρος is not altogether a φίλος. Ἑταῖροι are such as have been confederates for a length of time in life and work." Thus the recognition of a near relationship, so fearfully now dishonoured, is contained in the word:—As thou by word and salutation declaredst thyself, so, alas, thou *hast been*, a close companion of Mine! This Judas is the disgrace and refuse of mankind. Twice, with deep meaning, had the Lord's *behold* (as before at the table) emphatically announced His coming; the three Evangelists cannot otherwise record it than by once more adding in horror—*one of the twelve!* That this man betrayed Him is the shame and grief of Christ, the rejoicing and boast of His enemies. Nevertheless, *He is avowed by the Lord* as having been that which his former companionship made him; just as it is now with His false friends, and the apostates from His service:—the remembrance of their former title follows them. As to *Judas*, this is the mildest and most passive form of condemnation which the patient Lord can adopt—to remind him of all the grace of this fellowship which he had turned to evil, all the love which the Lord had never ceased to manifest toward Him: this heaps coals of fire upon his head. As to the multitude, who behold and hear all, and who cannot but be regarded also in these words, it is the most dignified form in which He can stoop under the fearful shame. It is the acknowledgment—Yes, verily, this is one of my nearest companions; and now, moreover, the *declaration*—I *know* what this kiss signifies.

Thus the question, *Wherefore art thou come?* passes over from the reference to the standers-by into a direct address to the heart and conscience of the traitor. That the sentence is a question[1] we firmly believe with Winer; the notion of an *exclamation* is altogether improper, for it regards the Lord as surprised, confounded, angry, or whatever else, instead of patiently accepting the iniquity which He clearly and serenely contemplated, and

[1] The Relat. ἐφ' ὃ instead of ἐπὶ τί. The same in the reading ἐφ' ᾧ—though this is not to be preferred. Hesych. ἐπὶ ποίῳ σκοπῷ.

expected. Nor is the *form* of the sentence an *aposiopesis*—though the reading in the Vulg. *ad quod* might lead that way: the question would then drop, and it would run, Wherefore thou art come—*I know!* This is involved in the thing itself, but the question has its piercing meaning as such for Judas. The true *aposiopesis* (not necessary in the form, only in the sense) is expressed by Bengel—hoccine illud est, cujus caussâ ades? Thus it is harmonised with the similarly constructed other words in St Luke; and has almost, humanly speaking, a tone as if the fearful, long known, and expected truth could hardly be believed, even now that it took place:—Unhappy man, cared for in vain, art thou then really come to do this work of evil? *Πάρει* is stronger than *ἦλθες*; not quite the same as *παραγέγονας ἐνταῦθα* (not as if—in this place, and in this company)—but indicating strongly and simply the actual accomplishment of his evil counsel, presenting the traitor in his actual present act.

The second word, which St Luke gives, contains all this—the most patient *acceptance* with the most piercing *complaint*, this last again only as the profoundest *lamentation of despised love, which had loved in vain*, and thus the expression of Divine suffering—but it also contains still more, something yet more piercing for the betrayer. Why should not both sayings be read in succession, as they appear to be the first and second degree of the utterance which impressed this crisis? The former word turned in the *ἑταῖρος* to the whole time past of his fellowship; the latter pauses now in the present, as summed up in the *πάρει—παραδίδως; betrayest thou?* The former acknowledged him, with reference to the crowd around; the latter seizes Judas alone and apart. The first scarcely expressed as yet the iniquity, the second defines it most concretely—*with a kiss!* The former measures his guilt according to the favour and fellowship which had formerly been enjoyed; the latter borders already, in its almost formal expression of guilt, upon the edge of the judgment which impends. The Lord now calls the wicked one by his *name*, that name for ever branded in him, but which otherwise has so lovely a meaning. This man had received at his circumcision the name of the ruling tribe, which spoke of the praise of God, and was to be for ever a praise itself. He had been called to be an apostle, bearing the distinctive name of the chosen

people (probably the only man of Judæa among them); and how often had his Lord addressed him by that name! St Luke points to all this when he sets out with ὁ λεγόμενος Ἰούδας—*he that was so called*—something like 1 Cor. viii. 5; comp. Jno. x. 34, 35. What a contrast, between this calling by name and the "Mary" of the risen Lord! Between the *last* word of the suffering Jesus to the betrayer, and the *first* word of the risen Jesus to that beloved disciple! With a kiss, with such a kiss —this first, in order to say, I *know* also this concerted sign, that thou thereby *betrayest* Me![1] In thy wicked design it is and will ever be treachery, but to Me it is really none. And, in conclusion, the Lord reminds the traitor of the word concerning him spoken at the Supper; *therefore* the similar expression, which here no more than there softens the guilt—*the Son of man!* The *Rabbi!* which he had just spoken seems also to suggest again that former "Rabbi! is it I?" and it is as if he says, in most unrestrained impiety, coming out from the multitude which he had brought with him—*Rabbi, it is I!* The Lord replies, veiling the fact as it were in a question, but only that its fearful truth might be brought home to the doer of it—And *such a man* art thou, Judas? doest thou *that?* This question was the last vain thrust at his hard heart—and with what a *glance* accompanied! No imagination could represent that; but we are disposed to think that Jesus only spoke, and withheld the condemnation of His countenance. "He preached to Judas, but only cast a look upon Peter. The preaching was lost upon Judas, the look brought repentance in Peter." (Gossner.)

What an emptying of Himself, what humble self-renunciation

[1] Lange puts in another form, what we have hinted at in the earlier passage: "The same spirit of spiritual infatuation which made him a traitor, led him to this diabolical refinement, this wonderful combination of the disciple's kiss and the traitor's sign, which has no parallel in human history." Yes, verily, this was his curse and ban, that the apostate ἑταῖρος must betray *with a kiss*. But that St Luke in his "drew near to Jesus, to kiss him," intends to say that the kiss was not accomplished, not only contradicts the express testimony of the others, but the Lord's own "*with a kiss*." Lange, further, regards the word of the Lord as a condemnation thrown into his face, by which, so to speak, the Lord finally cast him off. But this is quite alien from the Lord's full submission to all that then came upon Him, including this act and sign of treachery.

of that Son of God in His first coming, concerning whose second judicial coming it is written that He will destroy the wicked with the breath of His mouth! Here in the *last* word to Judas, however, there is a concealed sentence of judgment: this question and lamentation he carried with him as an accusation to his hell. The remembrance of this word will be the first thought with which he will stand before His judge—and fall![1]

THE HEALING OF MALCHUS.

(Luke xxii. 1.)

The moment of the word to Judas was, according to the first two Evangelists, the *Then* when they laid their hands on Him, and took Him.[2] And St Luke immediately connects this earnest execution of their purpose by his *ἰδόντες δὲ τὸ ἐσόμενον.* This is the beginning of His being reckoned among the transgressors before men. The disciples and Peter had seen with blank astonishment the kiss of Judas, they had not understood the patience and the word of Jesus—and now their spirit of opposition is aroused. The highest injustice possible in the world's history was done before their eyes. As our flesh wills not to suffer generally, so our carnally minded spirit wills not *in* particular to endure injustice; for it understands not the Divineness of this suffering of injustice, the patient long-suffering of the world's Ruler. So man invades the prerogative of God, and thinks he must execute justice for himself. It is probable that these myrmidons of the council still acted timorously (as Hess remarks) at the first taking of Jesus; and this would make way for the thought in the minds of some of the disciples—We also have *hands!* All, all had hitherto loudly cried, even as the Lord had prayed—Father, *Thy* will be done! But Peter in particular wills not that it should be, that the Son of God should suffer this: so Matt. xvi. 22. Others too with him (though not the

[1] Krummacher: "The word will then be divested of its questioning form, and be changed into the direct, judicial sentence—*Thou betrayedst* the Son of man with a kiss!"

[2] How can we interpose here first, that which St John records?

collective Eleven) put the question which St Luke gives—*Lord*, should we or *may* we not interfere with the sword, use our swords? literally: *If* we strike? What thinkest Thou? What a contrast here between *this* question, so self-willed with all its reverential appeal to Him as "Lord," and the gentle word of this Lord to the betrayer! What folly in the question—to think that the same Lord who had thus endured the kiss, would permit the sword! Yet there is such a voice which speaks in every one of us, when called to suffer injustice; and that though there is a stronger assurance of the Lord's answer than the slight presentiment of it which lies in the present *question*. But not all go on to the act without waiting for the answer, like Peter, whom St John first *names*. He will exhibit *himself*, where all should have been the contemplation of the *Lord*, whose aspect would have answered all such questions; he will solve the word earlier spoken to him, he will repair the error of his sleep—though in this act he is sleeping still! Instead of previously obtaining, by watching and prayer, the weapons of the Spirit against himself, his spirit breaks out in false zeal in the wrong place. Practical and devotional expositions of the Passion generally dwell solely on his denial, but the drawing of his sword was an essential part of that denial: both must be viewed together, if we would derive from it all its edification. The sword of Peter is the sword of the flesh, taken by ourselves against the ordinance of God. We draw it alas too often ourselves: when we are not enough humbled, but think too highly of ourselves; when we understand not our Lord's words and works which point to suffering, and because they do so, observe them not; when we rush on in blind zeal to smite the unrighteous, and instead of the help we mean work greater mischief and wrong. Luther has well expressed the sense of the *shall we smite*, without any accusative—shall we *drein* schlagen? for so it is, smite at random and blindly, whomsoever we may hit. When Peter unsheathed his sword and struck, whom did he hurt? It might have been a servant who stood forth more prominently, whose boldness chiefly offended him; it might have been an innocent and dutiful servant, whose heart went not with the duty which he was obliged to discharge. All four Evangelists notice his person, which was so marvellously wounded and healed at once, with

the article which pre-supposes a general tradition—*the* servant of the High Priest. The uncalled for and murderous blow was aimed at the head; but Malchus declined his head to the left, and his right ear only was struck. Instead of ὠτίον (in Mark and John also the reading ὠτάριον), St Luke uses interchangeably οὖς in ver. 50; whence we see that ὠτίον (as in the Sept. often for אֹזֶן) is not merely the *ear-lap*, but the ear simply.[1]

New and grievous indignity inflicted upon our Lord by another of His own disciples! It disturbs, impairs, and troubles, externally at least, the sacred dignity of His patience at its most august moment; it makes it seem as if they did right to come out armed against Him. For the first and only time the defence of Jesus brings injury here to man. What is the Lord's act? Assuredly He *could* do no other than what St Luke records; though Neander, alas so often an unsafe historian among orthodox expositors, doubts it. Pfenninger represents his narrating disciple as asking the question—What thinkest thou that He did? and Melea as replying with fine feeling—Repel Simon, and heal the ear? The narrator, astonished, demands—Didst thou know this? Melea answers—How could I know it? But how could He act otherwise, who endured the diabolical kiss of Judas? The healing of the ear, which might be understood of itself, is passed over by the three other Evangelists, because the word to Peter has in them its prominent importance; but St Luke connects with it the act and word of healing. The excitement of all parties at this apparition of the sword and the flowing of blood would make it evident that the Lord did not first speak what He had to say to Peter, and keep the wounded servant so long unhealed. Thus the *healing* and the *word* pertaining to it, come first; both required but a moment, and it is wrong therefore to say that during the healing the Lord proceeded to speak to Peter:—the healing was not a process which required time. No sooner was the rash blow inflicted than He knew what to do: He neglects neither side of the matter. Almost at one and the same moment He healed the wounded man, and rebuked the smiter (for his healing too); but, since the two were

[1] The old grammarians say: οὖς *Attic*, ὠτίον *Hellenic*. So, as is well known *auricula* was used for the ear.

in reality distinct, the removal of the offence and injury has the priority. Thus He himself, as if it were His own obligation to do so, repairs the unhappy injury of His disciple[1]—thus He once more gives testimony that His power of miracles had not departed from Him, even now when He renounces all help and defence[2]—He provides graciously that Peter should not be punished—and that where the life of a man was to have been taken, his soul should rather be won, which we may suppose was the case with Malchus. This is the *last* misdeed of His hands, *He now stretches them out to be bound.*

This last thought we find in the pregnant word which, according to St Luke, accompanied or rather preceded the healing. Jesus might have done this silently by an instantaneous touch, but in order to that He must have His freedom. Without touching it is not His will to heal; partly, because He would not now make exhibition of the miraculous power of His commanding word, partly to impress upon Malchus the moment and the fact of his experience of the power of God. Consequently, *He speaks*, and in the words which we must rightly understand in St Luke.

The most ancient translation, as found in the Peschito, represents it quite differently; and that has been approved of by almost all German translators, including Meyer. Grotius and Bengel interpret, There let the matter rest, let this be enough! as if spoken to the interfering disciples. Scholz and Theile, moreover, divide the words into two parts, Ἐᾶτε, ἕως τούτου (scil. ἀπόχρη.) Olshausen, Restrain yourselves, thus far and no further! Allioli: Desist, no further! Bengel: Let it end

[1] It was the *ear* of Malchus; and this should be remembered by those who by false use of the sword, that is, by an unevangelical preaching of the Gospel, with a perverted zeal, so often cut off the ear of the people, that is, rob them to their mortal injury of their willingness to hear the word of truth. We may all cut off the ear, but the Lord only can heal it again.

[2] One true miraculous work here at the last, not to be explained away! According to St John's ἀπέκοψεν, and the ἀφεῖλεν of the Synoptics, one might suppose that the ear was cut right off, and fell on the ground. But it was only as good as off, and yet hanging—for ἁψάμενος means healing by mere touch, not the taking up and restoring of the *ear*. Mark that St Luke has first οὖς, then ὠτίον—not conversely.

here! Kistemaker: Enough! But Lange rightly remarks that this is opposed by our Lord's reproof of the disciple after the healing. If He *blames* Peter, we cannot suppose that He would say to the other disciples who might proceed to imitate him (there was however but one more sword, which *also* opposes that view), and that, too, in a phrase which would involve some slight approbation—Enough has been done in this matter, ye have sufficiently shown your good will in My defence, which is, however, now out of place. There cannot be any irony here, for it is the plainest and most open protest against the use of all unrighteous violence which now follows. There are other views, however, to be considered, which are put forth by those who maintain the reference of the saying *to the disciples*. Luther translates: *Let them go on* thus far! and explains in the margin, "Let them do all their malice, so far as they are allowed; there is a Judge, let us not avenge ourselves." The Hirschberg Bible mends the construction, and brings out, in connection with this, the former opinion too: "*Let it be so*, that is, let the enemies do what they will. *Thus far!* that is, Go no further in a premature and rash *opposition* to them." This separation of the two parts of the sentence into sayings having a different reference is too harshly elliptical, and almost unintelligibly so; but Luther's view, which does not separate them, is open to the same objection. Let them fulfil all and do with Me what they will:—that would assuredly be an appropriate *first answer* to the question, Shall we interpose? But *in the meantime* the blow has been struck and the injury done, so that Jesus could not, omitting to notice this even for a moment, go on to speak to the disciples, who had, alas, given their own improper answer. To supply *them* after *suffer* is harsh; and still harsher to interpret the ἕως τούτου of *all* that which they were to do to Him by God's permission, the least act of which was now done. Ἕως τούτου "*as far as*" must in connection with the *suffer* refer to the *present crisis* and *something now transpiring*.

It only remains, then, that Christ, when He begins to repair the injury, should turn to the excited, offended, injured multitude, which, after this hasty blow, would set upon Him all the more vehemently.[1] Lange observes quite correctly: To the disciples

[1] For this sudden appeal to the sword would naturally, as Krummacher paints the scene, introduce much wrathful confusion.

the healing (and answer) itself was quite sufficient correction of their error; but in order to this healing the Lord must claim some short respite from His enemies, as He had already delivered Himself up to them. And *now* we understand this often overlooked word in all its dignity. What humility in the midst of His consciousness and use of the Divine power of healing! What most exquisite feeling of what was right, even in the suffering of injustice, that He should appeal to the ruling powers, to whom He had already surrendered Himself, for release and permission; that He should as it were *ask* it of His enemies that they would tarry a while, and leave His hands free for the performance of this necessary and obligatory act of benevolence![1] Now we understand this simple *suffer*, which vibrates between request and lofty command, and to which He does not add—*Me;* and now we understand the concealing τούτου, by which He means this work of miraculous power, *this* healing as indispensably necessary before He was finally bound.

PETER'S SWORD.

(Matt. xxvi. 52—54; Jno. xviii. 11.)

And they did give Him sufferance so long as to do *this*. Yea, they were constrained to hold back, as soon as He spoke; His word was enough, whether or not they understood His purpose. It is probable that the hasty touch and the healing which followed had not been remarked by the greater part; the Lord passes it over as a slight thing, a circumstance which explained itself, while He turns now uninterruptedly to speak a fitting word to Peter. As long as He speaks, they all listen and do nothing—this appears throughout the entire Passion. The multitude would have listened, notwithstanding their excited wrath, had the Lord spoken before the healing to Peter; but His percep-

[1] Rambach: "Hold back thus long! He demands (commanding while He asks) that they would leave His hands free until He had healed the ear." Wesley: "Suffer me at least to have my hands at liberty thus far, while I do one more act of mercy." Hess: "Jesus, whose hands they would bind behind His back, requires of them freedom for one moment while He heals the servant's ear."

tion of most exact propriety would not allow Him to do that. The word against Peter's sword is an instruction given to us all, on an occasion most suitable for its utterance; it begins with Peter's unsheathed weapon and ends with the *thus it must be* of the Scripture. We have, first, the universal instruction for all the future. The foundation of this in the sublime example of His voluntary renunciation of all violent help, even that of heaven—is the second thing. And, thirdly, there is the reason of this His own conduct in the Divine counsel and will—this is the necessary conclusion and final appeal against all self-will.

Ver. 52. This self-will is first addressed and repelled: Put up, return *thy* sword into its place! The σοῦ, probably though not certainly spurious in John, stands in Matt. more emphatically first. *Thy—most alien from My cause,* as Bengel explains it. That cannot help, but is the means of still greater hurt and offence.[1] These words, so decisive against Rome's appeal to the civil sword, have been perverted into the very reverse, into a witness for her carnal prerogatives. Pope Eugenius III. urged that "*thy* sword" assigned the weapon to Peter, though he is checked for using it just then! But every man must see the folly of this; for "thy" simply rejects the sword of Peter, as taken or unsheathed at an improper time and in self-willed rashness *by him.* There remains an altogether different question, the answer to which has nothing to do with Peter's particular person, or with Rome—whether the Lord forbade, or could forbid, to His disciples the use of the sword under all circumstances? The answer is plain enough elsewhere in Scripture, it follows from the relations of the matter itself, and is *intimated* here by a sure though subtile expression. St John, to wit, records it as if the Lord had said merely—*into its sheath,* comp. 1 Chron. xxii. 27; Jer. xlvii. 6; but it is remarkable that St Matthew gives *into its place;* and we think that this pregnant expression is, as the more exact, not to be reduced back again to the meaning of *its*

[1] This applies, it may be observed, to the sword of the *word,* when used in carnal pride and hate:—"not with wrath and bitterness, but with calm demonstration and sound instruction.—The truth is justified of all her children; but when we interpose rashly, she turns and says, with Divine tranquillity, Put up thy sword into its sheath! shall I not drink the cup?" (So v. Meyer, in the Lichtboten, ii. 195.)

sheath. There is a distinction which must not be lost sight of, between the mention of the sheath alone as such, and the mention of it as the *place* of the sword. The latter admits that there is *even for the sword an appropriate place for righteousness' sake;* and that of course the sheath; where it is carried, not to remain there always, but to be drawn from it on proper occasions. Salmeron is right as it regards this meaning, though with an application very different from that of Rome: "The Lord did not say, Throw away or give up the sword; but replace it in its sheath, *in its own time you may use it.*" This is very true, if this wider interpretation embraces "*the* sword" generally, which the future disciples of Christ were to bear and to draw. For the sheath is not merely now in Peter's case, but generally, the place in which the sword is to be kept *for use;* but the particular "*My* sword" of any successor of Peter is here once for all denounced. Bengel acknowledges this, when he explains τόπον, "the sword out of the scabbard is not in its place, unless it is subserving the Divine wrath." Braune, on the other hand, contradicts both Evangelists, and imposes his own meaning instead of expounding theirs, when he says, "Jesus commands him to put his sword into its place; not merely into its sheath, but to put it away generally." For that would be a strange method of commanding a thing to be put away altogether—to leave it *in its place,* and even direct to that place.

The sword is there and is to remain. That which the Lord had spoken, according to St Luke, not long before, He has not forgotten, while Peter thus unhappily remembers it. But there is a twofold use which is forbidden, and it must have its place in the sheath; as there is a twofold sense—whether as commanded or simply permitted—in which, even when *out of* the sheath (which preserves it only to that end) it is *in its place.* First, in the redeeming work of Christ, in the perfect drinking of that cup of sorrow once for all by Himself alone, it had nothing to do; and, secondly, it must generally be at rest in the matters of the *kingdom* of Jesus, founded upon His sufferings, and spread through His truth, in the testimony of which the sword has no place, as we shall hear in Jno. xviii. 36, and Zech. iv. 6 in the Old Testament had long before announced. But the sword is borne, and that not *in vain,* it is used in the service of the Divine

administration by God's rulers;[1] and, finally, it may in a certain sense be taken *righteously* in personal defence, when the case does not directly involve a testimony to the patience of Christ, and is not bound up with the interests of His kingdom—whereof we have spoken on Lu. xxii. 36. Therefore the Lord in the following clause says only λαβόντες—those who take—giving prominence to this distinction:—all who with carnal selfwill, with however much false show of spirituality, *themselves seize unjustifiably the sword*— but by no means those into whose hands God puts it. The fundamental *jus talionis* which the Lord expresses is only the concrete confirmation for the present case of the ancient word of God, Gen. ix. 6; and as to the patience of the saints in suffering for Christ's sake, in the drinking of the cup appointed also to them, the Spirit repeats this word of Christ in Rev. xiii. 10: which parallel passage proves, if it were necessary, what is however perfectly plain here—that the punishment is threatened against the wrong use of the sword in the manner of *Peter*. There was scarcely need for Olshausen's earnest protest against the old opinion which Grotius has adopted, which makes our Lord say that retaliation would soon fall upon *His enemies*. Peter, that is, *the disciple of Christ*, should violently defend neither Christ nor himself *in his office of disciple*. But if the Fut. *shall perish by the sword* is equivalent, as it is, to an Imperative of the Divine ordinance, then in the *second* clause the use of the sword by the magistrate, under God's commission, is retained and established. Now he who in circumstances of private peril, with which the work and kingdom of Christ have nothing to do, *without* personal revenge and sinful wrath, *in the name of God* (and it may be with zeal *of God)* can defend himself against the murderer who *would* kill him, and thus in God's view *has* killed him (*taken* the sword to that end)—is no other than a warranted avenger of blood for himself as well as for his neighbour; he *acts* just according to the command of God, as Christ has here confirmed it. But that Christians have ever found the utmost difficulty with regard to this in practice, has, alas, its good reason in this, that we, where our own life is concerned, know not how to act with pure unselfishness, only as the executors of the Divine judgment. As

[1] To this we may refer the duty of the subject to bear arms; the rulers being responsible for the justice of the war.

long as this is wanting, and the judgment *of God* is not pure and unimpeachable in our hands (according to that typical example in Judg. iii. 20)—the Spirit of the Lord cries to our flesh—Put up *thy* sword into its sheath, this is *now* its place, rather than thy hand! Had they slain Peter now, who would have slain another, that would have been no martyr's death, but his just award:—the Lord lets him *hear* this judgment hovering over his head, while by the healing He averts it from him. This remission of his strict sentence was not only in general the prerogative of grace; but there was an apology for Peter in the complication of the case, in which the rulers of Israel joined with Gentile powers in the attack upon Jesus, as also in his remembrance of a word of Christ Himself which led him astray. In similar cases the Lord ever shows the same consideration of all the circumstances; it is better to act, however, so that no such healing should be made necessary, by asking and waiting the Lord's answer in all doubtful cases. He will surely teach us by His Spirit when the sword should be in and when out of its place. Finally, all this has its application to every injurious and premature defence of ourselves, be it of whatever kind it may, which may be brought into comparison with the use of the sword.

St John adds that the Lord, when He thus repelled Peter's sword, said further—The cup which My Father hath given Me, should I not drink it? This coincides with Matt. vers. 53, 54; but it must have some preparatory notice here. And we observe, first, how expressly the Gethemane-prayer is *presupposed* in it; a reader of St John alone, who had no knowledge of that prayer, would almost necessarily conclude that Jesus had said something before, to which He now referred, concerning a cup to be drunk. Certainly we *might*, as Luthardt says, understand the words alone and independently—but why should we make needless concessions to those whose business is to rend asunder the Gospels? *We* understand in what sense the cup had been spoken of, and in what sense the Lord says to Peter—Didst thou not hear and dost thou not yet understand my thrice-uttered prayer, and hast thou so soon forgotten it? We understand, further, how our Lord by this word strengthens and confirms His soul in uplifting His eye to His Father, before whom all things were open, who had already *given* the cup, which He had already

begun to *drink*.[1] The Sixtine Vulg. says well—Non *vis* ut bibam? Is it thy will to put from My hand and My mouth, by thy sword, the cup which I have already received?—Oh let us, like Him, on all occasions of the attack of injustice, look up like Him to heaven, and place ourselves within the defence of the counsel of God for us; then shall we do right more certainly than if we only look at man, or retaliate the assault upon him!

Ver. 53. The Lord now points His application to the foolish thought of Peter once more, and more plainly, entering more specifically into the present circumstance, in its sole and unparalleled significance. He thought in his folly that their two swords might and should bring them help on this occasion. Then he thought that, if *they* did not help, the Lord would be entirely deprived of protection and strength. This, therefore, the Lord lays bare—Canst thou suppose that, in this My suffering and drinking the cup,[2] I can suffer otherwise than with a *voluntary* renunciation of all *that power of God* which otherwise is always at My command? Great and sublime word of perfect consciousness *who* He continues to be even in His self-renouncing sacrifice! Throughout His Passion there is no proper *I cannot*, which respects *power* simply in itself; His not being able is a sacred *not willing*, as with the Almighty Father: *for* the Father's almightiness, with all its hosts, is ever, as His prayer had expressed it, at the service of the Son. But the host and army of Divine omnipotence are the angels, in their personal reality, physically acting, and so far comparable with men, as is once more here established. The Lord speaks of *legions*, because the Roman soldiers are before Him, with whom the conflict would be; He mentions *twelve*[3] such legions obviously, as the universal supposition has been, with reference to the twelve weak apostles, one of whom is even among the ranks of the

[1] It is significant that the Lord does not speak, like Krummacher, of a cup which Satan was to present to Him! No, this is altogether unbecoming, for as a cup the appointment of the obedience of drinking came only from the Father.

[2] The word in St John must be taken with this of St Matthew, to shew the connection.

[3] Each about 6000 men among the Romans. Augustin. de Spir. et lit. cap. 1 and 35, where he speaks of *aliquid fieri posse, quamvis desit exemplum*, reads even *duodecim millia legiones!*

enemy. But as this reckoning of the traitor has ever appeared a difficulty, it has been assumed that the Lord regarded the complete number by anticipation as supplied in the coming future. But we are more disposed to accept what the Berlenb. Bible says: that the Twelve points to the number of the eleven disciples and Christ. Such collocation of His own person with the persons of His disciples is not only an expression of gracious humility while bearing testimony to His power, but it is also warranted by the fact that Peter's zeal would in reality defend them all as well as their Lord. Consequently, Do ye not think that one legion at least would at once surround *each* of us Twelve (as Elisha was surrounded by the heavenly guard) if I only willed it? The Lord further shows that the angels are superabundantly many (Dan. vii. 10; Ps. lxviii. 18; Heb. xii. 22), when He says, πλείους ἢ δώδεκα—*more than* twelve thousand—for every number expressed by us is in a sense too small for them; but He also intimates by the *legions* that they are marshalled in order, and distributed under principalities and powers. "*One* angel would have been enough to defend Christ against all the world"—preaches Luther here; and Wesley goes still further, "the least of whom, 'tis probable, could overturn the earth and destroy all the inhabitants of it." Others refer more temperately to the one which destroyed a hundred and eighty-five thousand of the Assyrians, and the other which destroyed the collective firstborn of Egypt. We feel the meaning: *All*, many as they are, indeed much *more* than twelve legions, would stand ready here for My assistance and at My command! Yet He befittingly softens the otherwise discordant thought by not saying that He could at once command their presence, but that He could ask the Father who would place them at His disposal. Yea, this was not only befitting, but strictly in harmony with His humanity, which has its claim upon the Father's omnipotence only through prayer. Παρακαλέσαι is certainly not "call to help Me" of itself, yet it is somewhat stronger than *asking* simply; and the παραστήσει following the request at once, strictly corresponds to it. Finally, the *now* which belongs to the *I cannot* must be understood as either—*even yet*, after things have gone so far, *if* I should resolve not to drink the cup; or probably better—*now*, that is, at once, upon the spot! There is little difference between the two; but

we should observe, that this whole reference to the angel-power, described in such lofty terms, sprang solely out of the contrast with Peter's sword, as an humbling condescension to his thought that foreign help was needed. For the Lord might have said yet more expressly—Hast thou not seen that I need only *speak* to and *look at* My enemies, and they fall! And would they not be obliged to obey every *suffer* which My lips might speak!

Yes, if He had *willed* otherwise, as He *might!* Had the legions come—let that with its consequences be thought of! But—"in the work of redemption patience goes before almightiness," as an old hymn beautifully says; similarly, love goes before wrath. "Yea, for the bringing forth this conflict into victory, the pure angels in heaven availed Him nothing,[1] not to say the sinful disciples,—for this His sacred cross alone was sufficient." (Lange.) The word of the Lord *of Hosts* to Zerubbabel holds good, as well for the foundation as for the building of the true temple of God—This is not by hosts or by power, even that of the angels, but by My *Spirit*, My Spirit willing for the suffering victory over the flesh. The angels must look on in adoring reverence, instead of drawing their flaming swords; the patience of Christ was to be to them, otherwise than to men, a spectacle! (1 Cor. iv. 9.) Christ is now conscious of their nearness, for one had already come to His help in the way.

Ver. 54. Οὖν is not here *but;* for no antithesis was necessary, the decision was firm from the beginning. Thus only: How *then* would the Scriptures be fulfilled, if I should *now* do so? Of an abstract *possibility* of these not being fulfilled He had spoken again in the previous verse; but as in the soul-conflict He had declined the absolute abstract *power* of God, so here His own. He rests in the Δεῖ of His holy willing, without constraint, with the assent of His full will. The note of interrogation might indeed be put *before* the ὅτι, so that the *must be* would constitute a new declaration of Christ's submission; but, after all, the submission is more perfect when we read the whole together, as is more natural—The Scriptures in which it is written that thus it must be. Where, however, these Scriptures express no specific

[1] Whose prerogative it will be to bear the sword of God's pure wrath and judgment, to cast the unprofitable into the fire.

will of God that we should suffer, we may look for defence, and it is permitted to us in our degree to pray for the protection of angels.

SECOND WORD TO THE MULTITUDE.

(Matt. xxvi. 55, 56; Mark xiv. 48, 49; Lu. xxii. 52, 53.)

He does not even yet keep utter silence—which is the easier part in human patience. As His hand had done good to the last, so He shuts not yet His mouth, even after His hands were bound. He stands in His majesty, retains His power, tranquillity, and love, to speak yet one word more. They listened in involuntary amazement to His words concerning the sword upon earth, and the angels in heaven, concerning the Father and the Scriptures. But, since He had again renounced all defence, and submitted with *it must be* to what had come upon Him, they finally proceed to bind and take Him away. It might have been probably while this was commencing, but more probably as already bound and led away, that He speaks the last words on this occasion; thus breaking the silence, and lightening, more than torches and lanterns can do, the darkness through which He goes. The *answered*, of Mark, ver. 48, (which certainly has nothing to do with *cut off his ear*, ver. 47, but simply notes a *commencement*, Heb. וַיַּעַן), and the *Jesus said* of Lu. ver. 52, leave the time undetermined; but St Matthew seems to intimate that a little after, but still in this hour of His seizure, our Lord said these words. What He in them says to *the multitudes*, He is constrained to say:—for the Father's honour, that He may be honoured in the Son even when men are pouring contempt upon the Son; as a testimony to the truth, that they might not think that they took Him with their swords, any more than Peter should have supposed that with his sword he could have defended Him; finally, in the love with which He, perseveringly teaching them, shows them their sin, and lays bare its self-contradiction and dark principle.

Ver. 55. The protest against Peter's sword still echoes—there needs no sword either *for* Me or *against* Me! He feels in His perfect humanity the indignity which is inflicted upon

Him; but turns that at once into a lamentation and complaint over their sin, which in that indignity He deeply feels and resents. *As* against a thief or murderer, with whom My whole life tells you I have nothing in common:—by this protest He removes the semblance of evil which Peter had cast upon Him. The *staves* He does not disdain to mention, because they most strikingly characterise the whole. We doubt whether the ἐξήλθετε (Lu. ἐξεληλύθατε var. ἐξήλθατε) should be made a question; since the exhibition of their sin has the emphasis, and a *wherefore* would seem wanting, if it had been a question. The two indicative clauses show expressly the contrast and contradiction of their conduct—Ye come thus now, but aforetime ye let Me alone peacefully teaching! (which connection Lu. gives in the ὄντος μου—while I was.) Συλλαβεῖν, comp. συλλαβόντες, Lu. ver. 54, συνέλαβον, Joh. ver. 12, is the full accomplishment of the commencing κρατεῖν, the taking entirely into their power; and this expression says—As if ye could not take Me into your power otherwise than by swords and staves! Thus is Christ, the Holy one before God, in man's stead, and therefore according to and before God's counsel, reckoned among the transgressors, and treated here at the commencement of His sufferings like rebels against the law:—and this must obviously befall Him *before men* also, and as His own personal reproach. He takes *this* patiently, to the utmost condemnation of many, who, being actually evil-doers before God, so that their misdeed is laid open, will not even confess this before men. Christ endureth the shame while He calmly speaks of it as an actual fact; but He also at the same time protests against it, as every guiltless person may in his relative innocence, under the same circumstances, taking care, however, that it be not, as with Joseph's brethren, a punishment of their greater iniquity, notwithstanding their innocence touching the cup:—for in such cases the humble confession should be made, We are not spies, but nevertheless murderers of our brother! And, because we are all concerned in having thrown into the pit and put to death one who is greater than either Joseph or Abel, *we* poor sinners should never, in the vindication of our innocence and honour, in our protests against indignity and unrighteousness, adopt that strong and absolute tone which becomes none but the Holy One of God.

His present word is a pendant to Jno. viii. 49. He speaks in majestic submission—I *am* no evil-doer, but I suffer Myself to be dealt with as such. He cannot suppose the Roman soldiers to have any knowledge of what He, this Jesus of Nazareth, is or is not; it is therefore obvious that this second saying is specifically addressed to the Jewish part of this multitude, to the leaders and authors of this aggression of the powers:—and the following appeal *I sat with you daily*, proves this. Still more, St Luke teaches us that high-priests and elders were there in person, as also captains of the temple. Schleiermacher, indeed, permits himself such a criticism as this: "Probably there were no high priests and elders, certainly no chief captain of the temple,[1] present in person—but this was the conclusion drawn from the words of Christ which he heard, by some reporter not well acquainted with the relations of things." But there is no difficulty in the presence of these high personages, when we remember the importance of the matter, and their own deeply excited interest. Unnecessary at least, though not entirely to be rejected, is the explanation of Ebrard (with which Lange and Sepp agree), that "*come upon Him*," is to be understood of the *first appearance now* of those who had come in stealthily afterwards. This, however, seems to be at variance with the simple account of the first two Evangelists, as also with the manner in which our Lord speaks of the (first) coming with swords and staves. This "which were come to Him" is not *superfluous*, even without the assumption of their later coming; it simply serves to make more prominent the *presence* of even these great personages. Bengel makes another remark upon it: "The officers were sent, the priests had come *voluntarily*." They might very well have thought their presence necessary to keep the peace and inspire the courage of the rest, to direct the miscellaneous multitude to the execution of their own purpose; besides which, it would be a gratification to their hate and their curiosity, to be there when Jesus was finally taken. But St Luke gives the fact prominence, in order to explain the circumstance that the Lord's words were not directed to the Romans.

[1] Who, according to Josephus Ant. viii. 5, held high rank, immediately after the high priest, as he stands in Acts v. 24. But St Luke does not speak of him in the singular!

They were not, indeed, addressed to the Jewish officers as such, for Pfenninger says rightly, "He knew well that the mob of the captors were only the instrument of the others." Braune: "Jesus knows well that, besides the Roman authorities of the temple-watch, there were priests also who had stealthily crept into the multitude; He therefore brings to light the cowardice and the malice of the *rulers:* for His word refers to them particularly, when He says—This is your hour," &c.

Daily: This is a vivid and general reference to His frequent presence on all occasions at the feasts, since His first coming to the temple; but especially during the last time, Lu. xix. 47. *In the temple,* in the most public of all places, where the temple-watch might have at any time done their duty, if there had been anything dangerous in Him. I was (or *sat* uninterruptedly, as Matt. gives it in full) *teaching!* He says nothing more, that this may itself stand against their coming as *against a thief*;[1] about His miracles, the series of which had been just marvellously closed before their eyes, He says nothing. And ye took Me not—Lu. and ye stretched forth no hand against Me (with violence!) He thereby reminds them of such occurrences and expressions of feelings as Jno. vii. 30, 44, viii. 20; but He still continues unrebuked to *teach,* after they had taken Him, and shows them the internal contradiction of their cowardly dealing, which the swords and the staves rather reveal than conceal. For, as Lampe says, "what fearfulness this, for so many armed men to come out against one unarmed!"

Ver. 56. The fourth time in this chapter of Matt. (vers. 24, 31, 54), such reference to the *Scripture!* Again and again He declares that one thing, which, nevertheless, Christian theology perpetually refuses to learn from the supreme Teacher and Doctor. "He holds firmly to the Scripture, whether speaking to the imbittered Jews, or the docile disciples; He puts those to shame in their folly by proofs from Scripture, and strengthens these in their despondency by its consolatory promises. He appeals to Scripture in His vehement disputation with men, as He does in His solemn way of suffering to die for them; He confronts Satan with—It is written! and prays to the Father—

[1] Alford calls it "the greatest possible contrast."

that the Scripture may be fulfilled."[1] The shortened clause in St Mark[2] makes it plain that this appeal was not a supplement of the Evangelist (which Bengel assented to, on account of the complete form *all this was done*), but the Lord's own words continued. By the γέγονεν he brings into prominence the fact of the present beginning of the γενέσθαι of ver. 54; but in adding *all* He includes all that was yet to be; for the *hour* of which He speaks already includes the whole Passion. If it were not for this restricting reference, we might assume a comprehensive glance backward to all the opposition and unbelief which had prepared the way for His being seized unto death—All this must have so come to pass! That, however, is rather in the *was done* than in *all this*. And let the plural *the Scriptures* be carefully noted (in Mar. yet more emphatic, as without *the prophets*), the force of which, as confirming and establishing every part of the canon, we have already pointed out, in Jno. v. 39. Here they are especially the φωναὶ τῶν προφητῶν, the voices of the prophets, which the rulers knew not, which predict in manifold unison the sufferings of the Messiah, Acts xiii. 27. Bengel well says—*Passio, confluens complementorum:* the passion, the confluence of fulfilments! This word spoken in the face of His enemies, and which by its γέγονεν embraces and accepts all that was written concerning Him, is the strongest expression of His resolution, not without a glance beyond the whole into the *It is finished* of His victory. For in this *factum est* He utters His *fiat* to all that the hands of sinners shall do unto Him—according to their thought *whatsoever they listed* (Matt. xvii. 12), yet only *that the Scriptures might be fulfilled*. This glance into the Scriptures had been obscured to Him before.

Lu. ver. 53, *instead* of this reference to the Scripture, adds another word of the same meaning. His own hour now come—and His Father's—He calls now in another aspect *their* hour. The Divine permission and appointment lies already in the *hour* of itself (Eras. hora *illa* vestra); but in the *your* which precedes it is given to them as the hour which was so welcome to their

[1] Thus in my Andeutungen für glaub. Schriftverst. ii. Samml. S. 476.

[2] Ellipsis, as Jno. xv. 25.

wicked minds, so long wished for on their part. The double ἡ will not allow us, with v. Gerlach, to combine the two clauses, "this *of yours* is the hour and power of darkness;" still less can we, with Kuinoel, take the καὶ epexegetically, and reduce the darkness to the black sin of these men—"the hour of night in which your sins have their power."[1] But the Lord plainly distinguishes the Satanic from the human, while He describes both as united against Him. *Now* comes upon Him the power of *darkness* from without, as before from within. This phrase (to which even Matt. xxii. 13 points, comp. 2 Peter ii. 17, and Jude 13) was derived from the ancient prophets, and is firmly fixed in the New Testament, see Jno. iii. 19; Acts xxvi. 18; 2 Cor. vi. 14; Eph. vi. 12; Col. i. 13 (in this last passage also with ἐξουσιά.) The *power* has as it were an ironical connection with the *your*—Ye have power over Me, so far as and because Satan has power *over you*, and he has power *over Me* only through you. Thus these men are the instruments of the devil; the devil is an instrument of the Divine purpose in order to this great, long predicted *hour* of redeeming suffering for the salvation of the world. But, as these men gave themselves up by their own will, and according to their own wish, to the service of the devil, there can be no excuse for them here as "blinded," least of all for the *leaders*, to whom therefore St Luke has specially referred this *your*.[2] Finally, darkness here has some allusion to the external *night* in which they had come (as in Jno. iii. 20, 21, see our exposition): I have sat with you *daily*, ye come upon Me as cowards in the night,—for a witness that the power and courage which ye have come only from him who has and exercises his power preeminently in the darkness, both external and internal. It is quite scriptural that the devil possesses especial power by night; for in the creation at the beginning and in its present ruined state there is a profound connection established between the material and the spiritual. At dawn of day Christ rose, at

[1] Bernh. Jacobi.: "When ye, under the protection of the dark night, accomplish the wicked purposes of your darkened hearts."

[2] Acts iii. 17 does not contradict this, for the ὅσπερ καὶ belongs only to the ἐπράξατε, not to the κατὰ ἄγνοιαν. The others did ignorantly what their rulers did knowingly, leading them on. See my Reden der Apostel, Th. i. S. 84, 85.

midday He ascended to heaven, in the evening He died, at *midnight* He is fallen upon by the power of Satan, and taken. But the light of His word shines brightly into this darkness, and then He follows the multitude, given up to the hands of sinners. What these did to Him soon follows.

PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION BEFORE ANNAS.

(Jno. xviii. 20, 21, 23.)

In assuming that the "high priest" with whom the Lord Jesus here speaks was *Annas*, we have many very important authorities against us;[1] but we have on our side many others, among whom we may mention Chrysostom, Augustine, Euthymius, among the ancients; Olshausen, B.-Crusius, Ebrard, Wieseler, Hase, Neander, Lange, Hess, v. Meyer, v. Gerlach, Luthardt, among the moderns. There is no difficulty in the circumstance that Annas (in Josephus Ananus) is also called *high priest*, for it is well known that several high priests occur in the New Testament—as many as were of the kindred of the high priest, Acts iv. 6. Annas had been high priest, and it is probable that the *viri pontificii* retained that title. Still more, the displaced Ananus must have been a man of special consideration and great influence, since his *son* and now his *son-in-law* held the office after him.[2] There was, indeed, a specific relation between them, according to which in Lu. iii. 2 he is mentioned in connection with Caiaphas, but nothing certain can be said concerning that relation. Whether he was, according to Lightfoot, the representative, סְגָן, or, according to Selden and Wieseler the president of the Sanhedrim, נָשִׂיא (which was not, however, essentially connected with the high-priesthood); or whether, according to

[1] Luther, Grotius, Bengel, Lampe, Tholuck, Lücke, de Wette, and Kling. Among practical expositors stand on this side *e.g.* Pfenninger, Rieger, and others, from the Berl. Bibel down to Braune. So also Sepp and Friedlieb.

[2] And later even the remaining four of his five sons together; hence he was esteemed highly fortunate, to have experienced such an unparalleled honour.

Hug, he yearly alternated with Caiaphas in the office, from passover to passover—which Friedlieb would make probable from the circumstance that immediately after the passover, Acts iv. 6, Annas is mentioned again as high priest *before* Caiaphas:—suffice it that he was in some way an important person among the high priests in a wider sense who were then existing. The relation which Lange suggests, that the Jews, that is, those who now led Jesus "regarded Annas as their proper high priest, while Caiaphas was necessarily accepted as the high priest *of the year*," might be received as very plausible, since *Annas*, as Sepp says (though he regards the examination to have been before Caiaphas), was the mainspring of the proceedings of this night, still holding the rule (*de jure* or *de facto*), and "since the troubles of the time had removed him from the chief seat, he had only placed his son-in-law in the foreground, that he might guide all things through him."—*But*, it may be said on the other side, if St John here, vers. 13, 15, 16, expressly terms Caiaphas the high priest, vers. 19 and 22 must in this connection have the same meaning. This argument does not appear to us insuperable, for by the "high priest *of that year*"[1] Caiaphas is really *distinguished* from other high priests, and not designated *the* high priest as such—as Neander has well remarked. Therefore the expression "the high priest" in ver. 19, as referring to Annas, is not inexplicable; nor is it so even in the mouth of the officer, ver. 22, for this title was used in common.

But, Tholuck says, the mention of that circumstance in ver. 14 would have significance only on the assumption that it was Caiaphas who appointed the examination,—as being an intimation of the Evangelist of the kind of hands in which the Lord's judgment was placed. But we think, on the other hand, that *the* examination, with regard to which St John points to the prejudiced determination, cannot on that very account be *this* one, which follows with a rather unofficial ἠρώτησε. (So de Wette's editor Brückner finds in the *asking concerning* not so much a judicial examination as a general questioning.) The decisive examination before Caiaphas is introduced in ver. 24,

[1] Which is meant as in ch. xi. 49, with ironical allusion to the frequent change at that time, as also with reference to the decisive year of the Passion.

that is, as presupposed according to the synoptical tradition; *to this* ver. 14 may refer, and *at the same time* introduce the parenthesis of vers. 19—23 by intimating that Annas would pave the way for his son-in-law by these insidious questions. Is not this a connection equally probable?

The great difficulty which a comparison of the Synoptics introduces as to the *locality* of the denial, becomes very slight, when, impelled on other grounds, we refer vers. 19—23 to Annas, and complete the whole accordingly. The dwelling of Annas did not lie merely in the way to Caiaphas (as Augustine supposed), but it was the same great building, a common *highpriestly palace*, occupied by the father-in-law and the son-in-law together. So was it understood by Euthymius; and Lange (consistently with the view we have quoted) says, "they had probably so arranged their relations in the dwelling that this doubledealing of the Jews as it respects their high priests fell as little as possible under observation." We agree with v. Gerlach, "St John manifestly presupposes this relation of one to the other in the same house as well known." Alford agrees that all arguments to the contrary admit of a good answer. Luthardt terms our view "too problematical;" but certainly it is not, as Brückner says, "without any ground whatever." We protest altogether against Lücke's peremptory sentence, "John gives it to be understood, in ver. 24, that the two high priests dwelt in different parts of the town"! How is this to be deduced from *sent Him*? Rather, when we read *this supplementary Gospel in the light of all that it presupposes*, St John gives us to understand, by the accompanying account of Peter's denial in the same place which the Synoptics describe as the palace of Caiaphas, that ver. 24 does not refer to any sending to another part of the city, or even to another palace. Nor must it be forgotten, in considering this question, how improper and therefore how improbable is any not absolutely necessary leading of our Lord through the open city—now, when for a while the utmost secrecy was desired.

We assert positively, with Olshausen, that apart from the Synoptics no man could read St John's account without assuming that Annas is meant in ver. 19. Why was the isolated notice given in ver. 13 that He was led first to Annas, if nothing more is to be said about it? Is it not plain that ver. 19 by the *therefore*

attaches itself to ver. 13, and means a high priest *to whom Christ, as had been said, was sent*, but certainly not *Caiaphas* to whom Christ comes first in ver. 24 (with a second *therefore*). This ver. 24 *closes* the scene, and tells us what the ἀρχιερεὺς Annas did after this his own examination or questioning. If we read the whole simply, without reference to Harmonies, how strange must St John's narrative appear, on the supposition that he *omits* at ver. 13, 14, the sending on to Caiaphas,[1] then immediately puts in what passed with Caiaphas, and not till then brings in what had been omitted before—Christ had been sent forward to Caiaphas!![2] Finally, what is the meaning of ver. 24 in its place, if it is not the continuation of the account of the result of the conversation just held? That ἀπέστειλεν should be taken in the pluperfect sense (as Matt. xiv. 3, ἔδησεν, and often in the N. T. as in classic writers) is not open to any grammatical objection, and is necessary of course, if Caiaphas had been the previous questioner;[3] but *in this connection* it is one of the greatest difficulties of the opinion which we contend against, and Ebrard rightly terms it a "neckbreaking operation." Setting out with such an assumption, a δὲ or καὶ or τε has been added; but the simple reading οὖν rests on good grounds; and this, especially in comparison with vers. 12, 16, 17, 19, decides most unconditionally for the historical continuation of the word *sent*. The pluperfect sense in *this* place has been further rendered palatable by laying the emphasis upon the *bound* and not upon the *sent*; "John would leave it to his readers to draw the conclusion as to why the treatment of the servant was so bold—He struck Jesus

[1] For Bengel says without reason: "St John had indicated in v. 15 by the verb συνεισῆλθε, and by the frequent repetition of the name *high priest*, that Jesus had been led from Annas to Caiaphas."

[2] That then ver. 24 would altogether belong to vers. 13, 14, was felt by Cyril, who interposed therefore at that point something of the kind, although he was obliged to leave ver. 24 as a *repetition*. Whether he so *read* it, is a question: the single Codex 225 and the Philox. margin signify but little But all these forced contrivances and variations (though Luther, Erasmus, Beza accepted them) are themselves strong evidence of the meaning of ver. 24 in the place which *it* surely holds.

[3] Not only our own Berlenb. Bible, Bengel, de Wette, van Ess, Kistemaker, and Gossner so translate, but alas also the English and Dutch Bibles:—had sent him—hadde hem gesonden.

bound!"[1] But this will not suit, for it introduces the notion that St John, or at least the servant, had thought of some possible defence of Himself on the part of Jesus—as Fikenscher says plainly, "because Jesus could not put forth the slightest protection for His own person!" Grotius, laying the emphasis also upon the *bound;* is still more forced: "John being about to relate the second fall of Peter, gives beforehand the reason, because Peter now saw Jesus remaining bound." The only unforced solution of the whole is to read in ver. 13 that Jesus was led before Annas, the father-in-law of the high priest *of the year* (and known by the name of high priest himself)—then in ver. 19 to hear what passed before *this* "high priest," Annas—then to regard ver. 24 as the conclusion: And thereupon Annas sent Him bound again—with which it ended. As Lange says, "His sending Him forward bound as he had received Him was to Caiaphas a plain sign, that the concerted doom was to continue unchanged." The examination before Caiaphas is taken for granted as known, and passed over; for St John relates throughout ch. xviii. only supplementary matter, almost entirely different from what had been recorded before. New reason this for our view! *If* St John designed to record the examination before Caiaphas and the Sanhedrim, he could not, we think, have broken off with this after-thought of an introduction to it, and passed over the solemn and momentous critical confession, I am the Son of God!—St John least of all. But we cannot connect with this *asking of the high priest* anything like a solemn assembly, nor can we imagine such an unofficial asking and answering to have been followed by an immediate production of false witness, and the condemnation to death. The one scene does not pass harmoniously into the other, as taking place at one time; and the most decisive reason for the conversation with *Annas* is the manner in which Christ answers, quite different as it is from His demeanour at the proper legitimate examination. But this will be more fully seen in our exposition.

According to the desire of His enemies, the death of Jesus was to be, either on the one hand, secretly and with cunning! or, on the other, in their rash wrath—violently, and on the spot! But

[1] So Tiele in his Essay on the Denial—probably without knowing that Gerhard, Glassius, Marlorat, Bengel, had preceded him in this.

it was already written in God's decree, "under Pontius Pilate," that is, by public condemnation. To that end it was ordained that no other charge of guilt should by possibility be brought against Jesus than that one, that He called Himself the Son of God and the King of Israel. For that alone should the Lord die; every attempt to fasten upon Him even the appearance of any other guilt, He determined prudently and persistently to bring to nought. This explains His whole deportment from the time that He was taken: His speaking and His silence, His answers after this or that manner according to circumstances. No such imprudence was possible on His part as would involve Him in anything which would disturb or interfere with this *confessing* character of His *death of martyrdom* in the highest sense. He himself expressly took care to lead the way to that decisive crisis of avowal before Caiaphas. That *before Caiaphas* the great decision followed, St John sufficiently signifies to his readers in ver. 24; in order that he may then, in ver. 28, be able to proceed *from Caiaphas* into the Gentile Prætorium. Thus the *beginning* of the examination which he plainly describes is only preparatory, corresponds altogether with the position of Annas and all the circumstances. They bound Jesus and led Him away; we might have expected to read—into *prison*. Oh no! The hour of darkness must be used, there must be this same night some appearance of justice done, that they may be able to approach Pilate early enough for the confirmation of the sentence. All is wakeful, intense, ready, eager—but a perfect session of the Sanhedrim cannot be arranged at once, notwithstanding that certain high priests and elders were present with the multitude. According to Matt. xxvi. 57, Mark xiv. 53, Luke xxii. 54, they led Jesus from Gethsemane at once to Caiaphas, to the house of the high priest—though there is some difference between the *καὶ συνέρχονται* of Mark and the *ὅπου συνήχθησαν* of Matt. And St John's "to Annas *first*"[1] is quite consistent with this, if we regard the two high priests as occupying different wings of the same palace. It was partly to pay court to the influential personage, who, though he held not the office, exercised the power; and

[1] We must not therefore, with Olshausen, assume a change of the place in the Synoptics, which St John gently corrected. All is in perfect order and harmony.

partly, as one may well suppose, to give him the joy of beholding bound him whom he hated. "All this might, indeed, have been concerted between Caiaphas and Annas, so that the latter should make a beginning, while the official sitting was prepared for. Annas would, first, indulge his curiosity, and so far Christ stands before him almost like Paul before Agrippa, Acts xxv. 22. But only *almost*, for Agrippa would *hear*, but Annas only *asks* for mockery and humiliation. He would, secondly, have his pleasure in seeing Jesus bound—though not to put it so strongly as Pfenninger does, with his contrast of Simeon—"Then I should be willing to die, if I could only see him with abased head and bound hands standing before me!" He would, finally, —and this is most plainly set before our eyes—under the guise of a private colloquy preliminarily *sound* the man, against whom they never felt themselves confident and bold, in order to see how he would comport Himself, and in what way they might best proceed with Him. He questions Him "probably to extract from Him some expressions which might afterwards be used as testimony or matter of charge." So says Ebrard, and we agree with him without any *probably*. His questions were not so violent and passionate as Pfenninger makes them in the lips of Caiaphas; nor can we admit the connection which Teschendorff sees, who regards the Lord's word in ver. 21 as giving occasion for the bringing forward of the witnesses. We think that this preliminary hearing prepared the way and regulated the questions for that which followed; but not that it was itself a perfect and official examination.[1] They were personal *questions*, coming from this person very much like inquisitorial questions; but they were put under the semblance of a conversation. We are convinced that Jesus would not have thus repelled and personally reproved the high priest before the assembled council. *If* the official judge had applied to Him only *questions*, He would have stood before him ready to give every respectful answer; but they knew this, and *there* began at once with false testimony, He therefore kept silence altogether. We find the most measured difference in the deportment of our Lord throughout the four

[1] Hence no "hall of hearing" as belonging to Annas is necessary, as Lücke supposes.

examinations. Before Caiaphas and the council, where the miserable false witness so carefully sought was brought against Him, He keeps silence, respectfully and with dignity sparing them, until He is adjured. Before Herod and his thoughtless court nothing can move Him from His deep silence. Before Annas, who puts his questions half privately and half officially, He expresses Himself in part with dignified *repulsion*,[1] in part by a convicting counter-question of which He thought him worthy, applying Himself, in this like Paul before Agrippa, to his conscience. Finally, before Pilate, He enters at once graciously, as we shall see, into a removal of misunderstanding, and a testimony for the truth. Now let it be asked, if this will agree with the Lord's speaking in St John before *Caiaphas!*

Thus with equal boldness and gentleness, more properly, as *sublimely* as *humbly*, He speaks, for a pattern to us in all circumstances in which we are subjected to examination and defence. When our *humility* is spoken of, that is itself no other than an humble condescension of the word of God—for is there anything high or lofty in us? Again *Jesus* speaks only in condescension, and in our likeness, of His *meekness*—for can He be other than gentle in mind, even in the midst of His zeal? Has He bitter wrath in His heart? All the meekness of the Lord is fundamentally itself only His deep and absolute humility, in which He renounces His judgment, and gives up His prerogative and *His power*.

Annas asked Jesus of His *disciples* and of His *doctrine*. Probably, as St John relates, in these two words, thus apparently impartial, but in the background malevolent enough. Luthardt rightly terms it a captious and inquisitorial question. About His *work*, whether good or bad, of His deeds and miracles, nothing is said either in mockery or earnest, as in the case of Herod. But the *disciples* are mentioned as His dependents, His followers, His party, His sworn confederates—the *doctrine* is inquired into as novelty, heresy, dangerous misleading error; both together pointing to the two main charges which afterwards were urged —Insurrection against the Roman power, error or blasphemy before the Jewish. Suspicious reference is made to the crowds

[1] Friedlieb wrongly understands His answer to admit the competency of the examination.

which surrounded Him on His entrance into the city; and ironical allusion to the confidential ones who had now fled from Him and left Him alone. Where then are Thy disciples? How many and whom hast Thou now in reality? and what was Thy design with them? Wherefore didst Thou gather these around Thee? For that the disciples are mentioned *first*, before the doctrine, expresses the malevolent character of the questioning plainly enough. But Christ reverses the order, and answers first, as was right, concerning the doctrine. Lampe thinks, however, that the point about the disciples was left out of view; and similarly Bengel: "He replies concerning His doctrine, concerning His disciples there was no need." Some truth there may be in this, as Rambach has explained the Lord's silence upon the former part of the question; "because the lords of the high council were to receive after the ascension an answer of fact as to this point; the disciples would give them enough to do." But we shall see that in ver. 21 there is actually an indirect answer, so much as was now in place, concerning the *assembling of disciples* around Him.

The Lord at the outset replies as in Gethsemane, when He had put to shame the high priests and elders in *their* secret dealing with Him:—He points with dignity to the *publicity* of His cause, which then as now men were too much disposed to regard as a thing of a corner (Acts xxvi. 26), and to vilify with the *vitium clandestinitatis* (as the canonical law says). During three years He had as openly and publicly as might be, taught and lived; many thousands throughout the land had seen Him—and now He must give account as of a secret matter! On παῤῥησίᾳ see what was said on ch. vii. 4. Instead of ἐλάλησα we should probably read λελάληκα, but the difference is only slight. Τῷ κόσμῳ is equivalent to εἰς τὸν κόσμον, ch. viii. 26; it is the language of utmost comprehension—to and for every one without distinction. Here as there the undertone refers to His position with regard to the sinful *world*, to which His sacred Ἐγώ, as the Sent of God, must speak and testify; but this must not be pressed too rigorously, as by Fikenscher—"to the children of this world." It is rather the first description of the universality and publicity of His *speaking*, as belonging to *openly*, παῤῥησίᾳ, like ch. vii. 4. It is with strict propriety that He does not say *to the multi-*

tudes. His preaching to the crowds in the street was the necessary expression of His universal constraint of love, and at the same time of the most public universality of His teaching; but in every ὄχλος (or δῆμος) to which He turns and dedicates His words, He sees only *the world* to which His Father had sent Him. Now first, when He admits that His *speaking* was also a *teaching*, He heightens that former word by mentioning the *school* and the *temple.*[1] Even if we read τῇ συναγωγῇ, it must be understood of the school or synagogue of the place where He might be; but the reading without the article in distinction from *the* temple is more definite in its distributive signification. The *heightening* of His meaning is in this, that He had not only spoken in the open air to any one who was there and would hear (thus τῷ κόσμῳ is of the *place!*),[2] but as a teacher He had not shunned the legitimate and ecclesiastically appointed place. He had used His Israelite prerogative, and had done what was His duty; He was not a preacher in corners, or a separatist; and in this He is an example to His followers, for it is right even in times of decline to honour the ordinances and institutions of God. Πάντοτε is of course not literally to be understood; either, with Glassius, very frequently; or, still better, As often as I was there, as often as I had opportunity, so that the contrast with a timid secrecy is maintained.[3] Finally, in the last clause He describes His cause and His doctrine as properly *national*, for all the *Jews.* There is in the background of both question and answer, though the Lord discreetly puts it not in words, the meaning that the main point of His teaching was the testimony to Himself as the Messiah:—thus where all the Jews as Jews are assembled in their national religion to worship God, there I have testified, that which applies to *all* the Jews, that these *all* should be "My disciples," should acknowledge and should join themselves to Me! Thus is the πάντες, the *all*, perfectly justified, and there is no necessity to qualify it, or rather destroy it, as has been done from the beginning, by the substitution of πάντοθεν or πάντοτε.

[1] Not therefore altogether with Bengel, that παῤῥησίᾳ indicates (with τῷ κόσμῳ) the *kind*, παντότε the *time*, ἐν συναγωγῇ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ the place.

[2] As Nonnus literally accepted it: φιλοπευθεῖ κόσμῳ—αὐταῖς ἐν τριόδοισι.

[3] Lampe less fitly—εὐκαίρως, ἀκαίρως.

This dignified positive declaration is now followed by a *denial*, which does not contradict the well understood meaning and charge of the questioner—now brought to light—until it has been refuted by the undeniable fact of the publicity of His teaching. The *in secret* is here evidently intended as an inculpation. He had certainly spoken to His confidential ones in confidence, but nothing beyond what He had spoken before all the world; He had not two doctrines, an esoteric and an exoteric; but what He had spoken in the ear, He had spoken with a commission to declare it upon the housetops. The inmost mystery, which indeed He had commanded them not to utter before the time, that He was the Messiah—He not only confesses presently afterwards before the Sanhedrim, but all the Jewish world actually knew it, and Annas himself who thus asked knew it. And so the cause and the doctrine of Christ was ever to be "elevated above all suspicions of secret mystery," and his messengers' badge is in all ages that of 2 Cor. iv. 2. We may with Lampe read here in ver. 20 the *criteria* of the true teacher: Confidence, which testifies before the world, persevering continuation of the testimony on all occasions, adherence to the existing divine and human ordinance. But in this last expression our Lord alludes, in His profound manner, whether Annas understood it or not, to two places of the prophet Isaiah. In the former (Isa. xlv. 19), the Lord God himself appeals, before the inhabitants of the earth generally as their and the earth's Creator, and as the God of Israel particularly to the seed of Jacob, to this—*I have not spoken in secret*;[1] in the latter (ch. xlviii. 16), the *Messiah* repeats the same.

Thus this is the first answer, clear as the light which the darkness here resists; and now in the following verse there is the befitting reproof of the foolish questioner, put in the most mild and gracious form. He further gives account in it, who "His disciples" were or should be, and at the same time proceeds to give a test and proof of His *teaching*, παῤῥησίᾳ and πάντοτε—everywhere and with plainness. Or was He now to begin from the commencement, and exhibit the whole substance of His

[1] Whence it is further proved that τῷ κόσμῳ previously, before the Jews were specially referred to, hints at the adaptation of His doctrine to all mankind, entirely as we found in ch. viii. 26.

teaching, from the summons to repentance to the announcement of the kingdom come in Him? He would indeed have had patience for this, if it had been right on this occasion, and if it would have done good; but such as Annas knew all this long since, had often sent spies or heard it themselves. He therefore takes this for granted; He does actually begin at the beginning with Annas, since He proposes to him as the best preaching of repentance for *his* conscience the keen counter-question—*Wherefore* askest thou Me? (*Ἐπερωτᾷν* is more penetrating than St John's previous *ἠρώτησε*, not without bordering on the meaning of *inquisition*.) This was one of those *questions* of Jesus himself, which never fail to pierce the heart! It has a manifold meaning: Knowest thou not, as a "high priest," what all the Jews well know concerning Me? How is it, *what means it*, that thou now first demandest of Me an answer thereupon? According to Grotius: "Ye have already expelled from the synagogues those who believe in Me; ye have decreed to take Me; and have never enquired into My doctrine: do you wish now to know them at length from Myself? What manner of dealing is this?" He thus shows to Annas that He looks through him, and that He will give him no word which he may pervert against Him; thus gently, with concealed severity, only through the light which must put the darkness to shame, He reproves the self-contradiction of their foolish cunning—the questioning of a supposed founder of secret mysteries concerning His doctrine and His adherents!

This last thought is in the direction *whom* He should ask! All *those who have heard what I have said* are therefore as it concerns thee *My disciples*, for they have heard no other words than I have said to My trusted ones:—had they all rightly *heard* they would have been all of them *disciples* to Me. Thus, as in Gethsemane, He continues to save His own, and declines any specific selection. He points the high priest not to His disciples in the narrower sense, but to all the people who had been in His school; but by this demand that the people should be brought into the examination, He rebukes the malicious secrecy which had induced them through fear of the people to send and take Him in the night.

Behold, all these, who have heard Me speak, know well *what*

(ἃ more comprehensive than τί, what kind of things) I have said! By this ἴδε He finally appeals, as B.-Crusius rightly observes, to the "*plain and open nature* of His doctrine," in that no hearer could remain in doubt about it, witnesses enough were everywhere to be found; and also, we would add, to the *impression* of the truth upon all the sincere. Thus there are the *two* witnesses for truth (as Rieger collocates them):—*publicity* in adherence to the school and the temple, to the institutions and places appointed from the beginning; *impressiveness* or *easiness* of *understanding* as it respects the hearers.

He began with ἐλάλησα, ἐδίδαξα; He ends with ἐλάλησα and εἶπον; His answer goes not beyond His *saying* and *teaching*, as the question did not; of His *works* He humbly says nothing. For, as we have seen throughout St John's Gospel, the work has its power of self-demonstration in itself, before the miracle. Thus it is not—Question and summon hither the lepers, the blind, the deaf, the lame, the possessed whom I have healed! Lazarus, whom I raised from the dead! The ἴδε οὗτοι, although it primarily refers to the ἀκηκοότας—behold these who have heard—has special reference to this, that even now such *hearers* were present as witnesses; that their lords of the counsel had only to summon these servants whom they sent after Him, and they would receive the same testimony as that of ch. vii. 46 (now the record of the *I am He!*) Bengel is so far right: οὗτοι points to the multitude present: *or these know.*[1] So Lampe and earlier Cyril.[2]

Survey then now once more the dignity, the clearness, the gentleness, the supremely measured rightness and wisdom of this answer! In the full and perfect consciousness that He was no founder of a sect, deserving inquisition, He began with *I openly*, continued with *I*, and closes, with profound feeling *who* He was, yet not expressing it, with ἃ εἶπον ἐγώ—what *I* have said. But, with the most proper discretion of one arrested and charged, more righteous than Annas with his foolish questioning:—I may not and will not now, My life and doctrine lying before you,

[1] Nonnus has it most strongly: ἠνίδε κύκλῳ οὗτοι πάντες κ. τ. λ.

[2] Only that he (as Klee quotes him) goes too far, and finds in this appeal to the servants present the reason why one of them, to obviate all suspicion of himself upon that point, smote Him on the face!

testify for Myself, or defend Myself—let all be investigated! Let the testimony of all bear witness! If in this there is anything "evasive," there was the utmost propriety in it, as well as the most binding obligation of holy wisdom: He would not before this unhappy man betray either Himself or His disciples into difficulty by any express declarations or disclosures. Let it now be considered whether these answers of Jesus (we shall presently consider that to the servant), are so "inappropriate and spiritless" as to be only, according to the verdict of Prof. Weiss, the work of fiction.

We need not regard this παρεστηκὼς as implying that the officer was an *apparitor* necessarily belonging to the court in which the high priest sat; St John has mentioned no other *officers*, to which the article here might refer back, than those of ver. 12, who had taken Jesus and led Him hither. Thus we may supply—who stood near Jesus—because *when He had thus spoken* immediately precedes. That which happened afterwards to His apostle, befell Jesus himself here. The servant[1] sees his old lord smitten and taken aback by the bold and appropriate answer—he takes advantage of the moment, and will obtain both praise and reward. For he well knows what is permitted to him; the very lowest knew what had been long decreed by the rulers to be done to this Jesus of Nazareth. He *struck* Him[2]—basely in the face! This was the beginning and the signal for all subsequent indignities, as in Micah iv. 14 (comp. Isa. l. 6) it was very remarkably and directly predicted concerning the Messiah, the Judge of Israel. (Vers. 13 and 14 there allude to the history of another prophet Micah, 1 Kings xx. 11, 24; and Josephus employs in relation to 1 Kings xxii. 24, the word ῥαπίζειν. Job. xvi. 10 refers to the shame of being smitten upon

[1] Whom a very improbable tradition declares to have been Malchus! Apart from the improbability in the thing itself, Malchus was a δοῦλος, this man a ὑπηρέτης.

[2] Whether with a staff or with the hand, cannot be determined, since ῥάπισμα and ῥαπίζειν signify both. Hesych. ῥαπίσαι, ῥαβδῷ πλῆξαι ἢ ἀλοῆσαι. But in the N. T. ῥαπίζειν is used of the hand; see Matt. v. 39 John xix. 3, but especially Mark xiv. 65, and Matt. xxvi. 67, with κολαφίζειν. Theophyl. interprets this last of the fist (as 1 Cor. iv. 11; 2 Cor. xii. 7.) Suidas explains ῥαπίσαι of striking the cheek with the hand.

the cheek. In Micah there is בַּשֵּׁבֶט also, as if the Spirit would embrace the scene in which the Judge and King of Israel is with His own sceptre smitten on the face. See also in Sepp the Jewish punishments, which were inflicted for such misdeeds.) This is the end of the three years of His teaching in Israel, confirmed as it was by the signs of God, that now when being bound He opens His mouth to give a decisive answer, appealing in righteousness to all that teaching, a servant can publicly smite Him upon the face! This was the first blow, the first indignity which His sacred body received from the *hands* of sinners. Although He had received from the lips of sinners much that was more grievous and scornful, although even now the denial of Peter was a sorer grief to Him than the blow of this servant—yet is it a great thing, that He on this first striking, which came unexpectedly, continues to be able to *answer*, still more calmly and meekly, without any trace of fear, not to say of wrath, words which have their true and symbolical meaning for us all.

He answered *him*—we must not give up this *αὐτῷ*. That He answers this servant, and in such a manner, is in its profound humility something very different from, and yet in its elevation something infinitely above, that lauded pride in abasement which man may display.[1] There is no wrath, but meekness and humbleness alone, as is obvious in itself. But withal there is earnest freedom of spirit, an open mouth for the truth in love which is not yet to be stopped. Again, *Christ's* freedom of speech is not great in the sense of fearlessness before the threat of man—for how could He fear? The apostle's exhortation out of the prophet, 1 Pet. iii. 14, 15, therefore has so far no application to Him; He might have been tempted, in holy scorn of sinners, altogether to keep silence. But His freedom to speak is *love*, which counts sinners still worthy of His testimony.

Answerest thou the *high priest so?* This was the servant's word, accompanying and justifying the blow. By "*the high priest*" might be meant that Annas was as much high priest as Caiaphas—but this Christ, according to the divine law, does not

[1] Teschendorff makes his Nicodemus write: "Whoever has been in Rome and seen a triumphal procession, may have marked how some have borne their chains with dignity. Whoever should have looked for *such* dignity in Him would have been disappointed!"

acknowledge, and admits but one who with any truth can hold the sacred office. Certainly the *so* refers only to the *form*—that He had neglected respect and reverence in the refusal and counter-question. Rieger remarks that "so it is now with the followers of Christ, when their truth cannot be resisted:—they have been wanting in wisdom in speaking it, they have erred in the form of delivering it—that is, in plain words, they should show more patience with the world and its unrighteousness." That is, they should speak the truth with such sentimental respect and moderation, as would be rather a denial of that truth! The supreme Lord speaks unabashed and confidently to the servant as to the lords, and shows in fact how well He knows without respect of persons to speak to every one as he should be spoken to. Far removed from any self-defence, and with a meekness which His face, withdrawn for a moment through the physical shock, still testified, He does not act in opposition to the letter, but still more expressly in harmony with the spirit of the instruction which He gave to His disciples in Matt. v. 39. He gives us the "authentic interpretation" of it, in opposition to all who would make it mean an unworthy humiliation of self simply, an unloving holding back of the truth and provocation of further sin against us. Sinking to the lowest extreme of His condescension (which is reached in this verse, connected with ch. viii. 46), He puts the case for one moment as if He might have been wrong—but only to deny and refute it. Yea, from the meanest servant He will receive proof and attestation! This is the highest point of that meekness of our Lord, as depicted in St *John's* gospel, beyond which nothing is recorded.[1] The servant did not mean by his *so* that He had spoken untruth; entering into his meaning the Lord speaks only concerning *the manner*, κακῶς—καλῶς, ill or well.[2] Not simply κακὰ κακίαν, רָעָה, evil in itself, although the expression allows an error in the manner to be itself in its kind an *evil*. "By the blow the servant would bear his testimony," says Bengel. The Lord answers him—Neither is thy blow a testimony, nor thy word which *takes for granted* unrighteousness; if I have actually spoken evil, give—

[1] See the Author's Christian and Scriptural Poems—Jesu Sanftmuth nach Johannes, S. 221.

[2] As we remarked in Vol. v., Neander expresses it *evil;* it were better, *unbecomingly, unrighteously.*

I will receive and admit it—better and more real *witness* against Me! This would have required (as Lange says), the proof that Annas was the high priest; but we think that the Lord did not regard this, nor enter so far into the particulars of the matter, as was appropriate in the case of Paul, Acts xxiii. As it respects Him and His never speaking evil, servant and high priest were altogether alike.

But if our Lord and Master shows Himself ready to receive from this servant testimony against Himself, while He receives with such gentleness the blow—what should *we* do? "Think on Him who said this, on him to whom this was said, and the reason why this was said, and these words will with magical divine power cast down all wrath which may rise in thy soul."[1] Be always ready to give account to every man—says St Peter, even though it be the meanest servant! Every man who *demands* of you an account—*παντὶ τῷ αἰτοῦντι ὑμᾶς λόγον*, is to be interpreted as we have explained, Matt. v. 42. The unrighteousness itself demands of me, *asks me*, as I understand it, only for a new evidence of holy righteousness in truth and love. Not —That deserves no answer, *such as this* demands retaliation, punishment, contempt; but—Behold, this slanderer and liar would see how I shall maintain the consistency of my righteous word and walk, whether I shall thus overcome him. Oh! how often do *we* poor sinners harm ourselves and our cause, when people merely try us and will not hear us, when they require of us a patience which is the denial of love and truth, a courtliness which would be forgetfulness of God! How basely do we *speak evil*, just when we speaking the truth answer for ourselves that we are not evil-doers!

But the Lord as the perfect man had never erred in word, whether in its form or substance. He knows this, and this therefore He must add and maintain—*but if well*, which *εἰ δὲ*, *but if*, Bengel rightly says, "has an affirmative force." This unjustifiable striking is itself proof and testimony that the truth has struck, and cannot otherwise be repelled. And now calmly and victoriously He continues in this *speaking well*: the servant receives, like the high priest, both equal before the Judge of

[1] So Chrysos. Hom. i., *περὶ ἀκαταλήπτου*. See Neander's Chrys. i. 211.

Israel, who unweariably judges and teaches, *his* conscience-question—*Why smitest thou Me?* Love repays him thus! This first word of protest against the blow is the only one which we hear; it continues its voice against all the indignities which followed this.[1] And Annas hears in it the question—Wherefore sufferest thou him to smite Me? Wherefore to be bound and seized? Do ye not ever oppose My true testimony by most unrighteous and unworthy violence? Similar, according to its spirit and meaning, is the word at His *last* examination (Lu. xxii. 67, 68), which He no longer regards as official: *If I tell you*, confessing and answering, or asking, as is fit—ye believe not, ye reply not by persevering and malignant violence! Annas has heard enough; He sees whom He has before him, and that any further prosecution of the matter under the guise of conversation would damage himself rather than Jesus; he therefore leaves the answer, the blow, and the counter-answer to themselves, the *witness concerning the evil* still in his ears. He sends the Lord forward *bound* to Caiaphas, that the specious judgment may proceed as prudently and plausibly as may be. Of course, we are not to assume any second "binding."

FIRST PARTIALLY OFFICIAL EXAMINATION. THE CONFESSION UPON THE ADJURATION OF CAIAPHAS.

(Matt. xxvi. 64; Mark xiv. 62.)

As the history of the Passion proceeds, its amazing contrasts become more intensely affecting. Christ is now judged before the holiest judicature upon earth, but condemned by the most fearful perversion of justice and abuse of its forms. The Deliverer of Mankind is in bonds; the Judge of all is attainted; the Prince of glory is treated with the foulest scorn; the Holy One is condemned as a delinquent, the Son of God as a blasphemer, and He who is the resurrection and the life is doomed to die! The

[1] And still sounds out into the consciences of all who only ask like Annas, and strike like his servant. For "Christ still stands before Annas, and the world still strikes Him in the face like his servant." (So Silberschlag.)

type here rises in rebellion against its antitype, the shadow against its substance, and the eternal High Priest is condemned by the so-called high priest of this year. The law is perverted and turned against the grace for which it should only prepare the way; and it becomes the triumph of grace thus to deliver from the curse of the law. Lying bears witness against Truth, and long-suffering truth thus wins its empire and rights. The subject rises against his Lord as a lord, the creature in the name of God against its God—and what do we hear? One sole testimony—I am He! One sole sentence—He is worthy of death! This verily holds good in the counsels of God; but not in the sense of our earthly jurists, who like Caiaphas would offer up one literally instead of all.

Their hypocritical trifling with forms goes heavily at first. This first assembly was through haste imperfectly constituted; but its work is to consummate the judicial murder which had already been firmly decreed. The first feature which is exhibited here presents this judgment to us as the most unrighteous of all places of judgment under the sun, in which wickedness only was found, and iniquity took the place of righteousness. (Eccles. iii. 16.) They did not simply seek witness against Him, but, as St Matthew says, *they sought false witness* against this most innocent One. This was done, it is further added, by the whole council, with the high priests and elders; though it is not to be understood of every individual without exception—for two or three would not be reckoned among so many, and moreover all were not present. For themselves they had no "need" of testimony; for the thousand witnesses for the Divine power of this Jesus, down to Lazarus, whose resurrection was celebrated by the people everywhere, *shall* have no force with them; they themselves pervert in Luke xxiii. 2 the truth of which they were surely conscious: they will to do like their father, the father of lies;—but in order to this some pretext, some semblance of right is necessary! Lies enough there were wherewith to charge Jesus—what had not been reported and believed concerning Him on the part of His enemies hitherto! But now the question is—*to put Him to death;* there must be some apparent justice in the execution of this preconceived and prearranged purpose; and the seeking for this is hard, very hard. There is

everywhere testimony for Him without seeking—but *against* Him? *They found none!* though many false witnesses came forward to their order—yet they found none! Their testimonies would not accord, would not answer the purpose. Many offer to bear witness to His desecration of the Sabbath—but this will not pass, for they cannot touch the miracle by which He had desecrated it. To charge Him with having denounced them, the leaders of the people, as hypocrites, fools, and blind, was still more questionable:—who knew what He might have to say to them, thus charged, even now! Or His breaking of the traditions and ordinances of the Pharisees:—but this might have secured protection from the Sadducees, and divided the council,—as was afterwards the case. Absolute lies would not gain their end with the people; there must be some truth mingled with them. According to the law of Moses it was essential that the witnesses should agree together; and it was hard to secure this with the clumsy witnesses, one outdoing the other, whom they were obliged, without previous schooling, to admit. Mark, vers. 55 and 59, evidently means only the lack of agreement. Erasmus has indeed corrected the *non convenientia* of the Vulg. into *non satis idonea*, that is, not pertinent to the condemnation of death. Grotius thinks that this meaning alone suits vers. 59, and van Ess boldly translates, "not sufficient"—but ἴσος can scarcely mean *appropriate, fitted to anything*. The lack of uniformity is intimated by Matt. in the mention of the *two* witnesses who came forward, when we add to it the fact mentioned in St. Mark's different statement of it, that even *their* witness was not *uniform*. *At the last* there are found *two* witnesses, only just as many as were absolutely necessary (for the τινές in Mark does not necessarily mean many), and they bring forward a word heard two years before! Many members of the council had heard that when it was spoken; and had, as Matt. xxvii. 40 shows, well understood it subsequently. It is now falsified and perverted into blasphemy against the temple *of God*, although Jesus at the time (as also not many days past) had shown His zeal for the honour of the temple. The scornful οὗτος in Matt. is well expressed by the English, this fellow![1] The two accounts show their discrepancy when

[1] Understand—What *may* this large speaker do now?

compared :—according to the one it was, I *will;* according to the other, I *can,* destroy the temple : similarly, again, in one,—the temple of God; but in the other there are the additions of *made with hands and not made with hands.*[1] Enough : as Ahab's Jezebel hired two knaves against Naboth, so these rulers and high priests allied themselves, in order to keep possession of the vineyard of God, with a wretched pair who in their boldness were not cunning enough to agree in their testimony.[2] Thus Ps. lv. 10 has still its fulfilment. Hear only the lies of the world—they agree not together. Listen to a fallen theology—its testimonies contradict each other, and thereby give testimony themselves *for* Christ. To him who has this before his eyes, and still goes on in his folly, the true witness Himself becomes *dumb.*

They could not succeed in alleging against Jesus even the appearance of evil. Confused and at the same time daring, the high priest speaks to Him, as if this charge demanded an account. The whole question is not *one,* as Luther puts it following the Vulg., but the second τί is a separate interrogation. Nevertheless, it is not as Erasmus translates, in Matt. *cur* isti adversum te testimonium dicunt? in Mark, *quid* isti adversum te dicunt testimonia? (That is, Do they then witness in vain? Not, that thou shouldst give answer?). But as the former clause is spoken with the presentiment that He who stands in sublime tranquillity *will* keep silence, so the second will if possible break this silence by suggesting—*What heavy blasphemy* do they allege against thee, dost thou not hear that?

The Lord keeps silence; and though we cannot always bring His eloquent *silence* within the range of our exposition of His *words,* yet here we must do so, where speaking and silence interchangeably pass into each other; for otherwise we could not understand His *words.* The slightest word of reply would have

[1] Is not this in its perversion an actually false testimony? Sepp's is a very wretched "scientific criticism," when he makes this an argument against the apostolical origin of the first gospel—How could an apostle state that to be false testimony, when Christ, according to John, had actually so spoken!

[2] As Pape in his poem *Christus,* S. 167, represents it: "And so they undid their own lying work by contradictions. One would know best, and it was *his* word that should secure the downfall of the Great One."

given the whole matter another turn, not in harmony with propriety and His appointed course. Either His pure and unimpeached position would have been disturbed by occasion given through His words for new perversions and charges; or, since we cannot suppose Him so to have spoken, the judge would have been ashamed and amazed, and set Him free! Yes, verily, *that* stood every moment in the power of His word—but on that very account He keeps silence. Hiller's remark, otherwise excellent, says too little here, "the truth must not contend with every lie!" That sacred dignity is very subordinate, which, however, was to be observed in opposition to such frivolities, the truth of which no man in the assembly believed. We may say, indeed, on the one hand, that He kept silence because they had *not* understood Him, and, on the other, that He kept silence because they *did* understand Him, and best because He kept silence. But the two reasons which remove this silence to an infinite distance from all self-willed or proud refusal to speak, lie still deeper. First, He is silent out of respect to Israel's highest judicature, that He might not dishonour it; thus silent as a child before an unrighteous father. And, then, in obedient submission to His heavenly Father's judgment, that He might not defend Himself. "The love of life makes many common people eloquent before their judges; the desire to die for us stops the mouth of Jesus, like a lamb before his shearers." (Gossner.)

His silence speaks powerfully to their consciences, and is the best preparation for the word which He will say, when the right time for speaking is come. Caiaphas is at first wrathful that he cannot fasten upon this wiser one, as he thinks, any single circumstance; he soon becomes anxious lest this dignified demeanour of the Lord, who stands, keeps silence, and bears witness by all the power of His personal presence, should at last move some hearts even in the council, and their voices should be heard crying loudly *for* Him. For in himself there stirs some such sudden and unexpected impulse: the Lord's silence presses upon him the critical point which he cannot evade, and cries to him—Here, between us, there is something more than all this in question! And during this pause, possibly not very brief, there was to the whole assembly, and especially to him, the president and leading spirit, one last appeal of mercy at the extremity of

its limits of forbearance, one last gracious summons to submit to the judgment of the truth of God. But let us think for a moment what would have been the consequence, if these sinners had been moved by His silence, lost their consistency, and turned to repentance! This has become impossible, and the man therefore entangles himself in his own iniquity.[1] The conclusion is presently taken: the trifling with this individual charge is given up as unsuccessful; and the great central question involved in the whole must in plain earnestness be brought forward—to make *it* the matter of final and most daring mockery and contradiction. Many methods have been adopted to exhibit the connection and transition between the first question, Answerest thou nothing? and the second, which so suddenly breaks out with, Tell us, art thou the Christ the Son of God? If any such is necessary, Lange's is the best: "The thought clung to his mind that Jesus had declared in a mysterious manner that He would rebuild the temple, that by these words as well as others He had declared Himself to be the *Messiah*, and that too in the highest sense, as the Son of God. Thus he passed at once from that false witness by a single leap to this most formal and solemn impeachment."[1] But it is not necessary, nor is it sufficient, to trace any such transition; for this intervening thought would itself be no other than a disguise, concealing the true application which he was constrained to make to his own conscience. Caiaphas feels something kingly, yea Divine, in the silence of Him who is thus accused, which his mind cannot resist; he must be conscious that the Lord will not before his judgment enter into any other question than whether they would or would not acknowledge Him:—there remains nothing to him, therefore, but to make the necessity appear to be his own determination, and, though he is vanquished, to maintain the fearful conflict. At this decisive crisis, when Israel's rejection of the Messiah must take its most final and official form, there is

[1] With this agrees the notice of Sepp (which, however, probably led Lange to the opinion), that the Jews expected their Messiah to build an entirely new and much more glorious temple. Indeed, such men as Caiaphas knew so much that they would much more profoundly understand the *Messianic* element in the word of Jesus concerning the temple.

mingled a certain yielding on the part of the baffled inquisitor with the putting forth of new daring.

St Mark speaks only of the high-priest's "asking again," and gives the decisive question alone; but St Matthew gives us the full *formula of adjuration*. This was the method among the Israelites of proffering and accepting the oath; the appeal to God (and the formula of curse as the penalty of lying—which, however, was not ventured on now) was made on the one side, and the answer made thereupon was received, without any repetition of the oath being regarded as necessary on the part of the respondent. (See the great passage, Lev. v. 1, which is to be understood thus, though Luther has not clearly translated it; and compare Numb. v. 19—22; 1 Kings, xxii. 16; Prov. xxix. 24.) I adjure thee by the *living God* (in whose office I stand, under whose power we all are, before whom also thou standest, who knoweth the truth and judgeth between us and thee), that thou tell *us*, this holy sanhedrim now here as before God, the truth! Thus does He avow, bearing testimony against himself in this most awful abuse of the name of God, that he *knows* this God as a *living* God who will not be mocked! He testifies of His truth, even while he is aiming to get the victory by a lie; of His power and majesty, while he is pushing his opposition to the uttermost! Still more: although, as we have often shown, in the general consciousness of the people *Christ* and *Son of God* were by no means identical, yet learned scribes like this Caiaphas, who was constrained here to admit it, knew very well the unity of the two. They knew that the anointed King of the second psalm was the begotten Son of God, in whom, as in God Himself, men were to put their trust; they had been convinced and confessed, Matt. xxii. 42, that the King-Priest of the 110th Psalm was the eternal and supreme Lord of David; Hence here, where the *form* of knowledge and truth (μόρφωσις, Rom. ii. 20), is extorted from the conscience, the twofold expression is given in one most correctly, just as in Lu. xxii. 67, 70, they follow each other,[1] and still more solemnly

[1] Olshausen improperly reduces the question to, "art thou that Son of God whom thou givest thyself out to be?" and thinks that this would involve a blasphemy, which the mere declaration that He was the Messiah would not. We may say with v. Gerlach, "certainly Caiaphas did not intend the very same by this expression which had been ex-

in St Mark, where the adjuring tone is somewhat more full—Son of the *Blessed*, as the Rabbins used הַבָּרוּךְ הוּא for God, comp. Ps. xl. 17.

I adjure *Thee!* Thus does a mortal in the dust speak in the presence and before the throne of the living God—notwithstanding he sits as a judge—to Him who will presently Himself sit on the right hand of the majesty on high. Thus does a sinful rebel against the grace and truth of God—notwithstanding he is called high priest—speak to the Holy One of Israel, the true and faithful witness, who is Himself one with the living God. And if this man, Jesus of Nazareth, who now stands before him, is the Christ, the Son of God—what then? Will he cast himself at His feet, and supplicate with adoring penitence the forgiveness of all past opposition? Oh no, then and for that very reason He is to be rejected, condemned, and put to death! Caiaphas *would* only say—whether thou *givest thyself out to be such;* but because He *knows* that this would be a lie in his lips, he has not at this heart-revealing crisis the power to give expression to this, however much he might wish it. The living God lays a spell upon his tongue, so that he must speak more truly than he meant to speak; he is constrained, while preparing for the last and consummate denial of it, to confess the truth from his inmost conscience. There is not, as afterwards Jno. xix. 21, any artful distinction; but it is literal and earnest—*Art* thou? (which St Matt. also has held fast). This is still the great question for our own day, and it must be put before His face, however much it may be suppressed or avoided by specious and hypocritical polemics. It is here as Daub expresses it: Caiaphas asks not in order to ask further, to give truth its honour; but with the design to make the decisive answer the decisive enormity, that the respondent may be at once condemned; and therefore he was himself the blasphemer. But we too often forget to take further into account the actual conviction of this same Caiaphas *that Jesus was* what He had formerly said of Himself, and that He would thus adjured

pressed in the *Christ.*" Indeed, he used it in the same sense as Jesus had assented to; yet the conjunction of *Christ* and *Son of God* in one person means not merely "according to thy assertion,"—but rests upon a knowledge that in the Scripture the Messiah is actually also the Son of God.

say it openly:—upon this foundation was the frightful scheme erected, to complete the rejection of Him who was thus most internally known and acknowledged.[1] *Εἰ σὺ εἶ*—by this *σύ* means Caiaphas not merely the man who had dared to arrogate to Himself sonship and equality with God, or the bound one who would be a deliverer; for then it would have run—*εἰ σὺ λέγεις* or *ποιεῖς σεαυτόν* as in Jno. x. 33. But the undertone of malignity conjoins with the invoking *εἶ* the rejecting *σύ*; since it means: *Thou, such an one* as we cannot at all tolerate—a Messiah, who would deliver from *sins*, and not from the Romans—a Son of God, who in the gentleness and humility of holiness desirest our hearts for the heavenly kingdom.[2]

When they would proclaim Him a Messiah-King of an earthly kingdom, Jesus withdrew far from them. When the devil put to Him the question, Art thou the Son of God? He entered not into the question, but worshipped as man the only God. But here where Caiaphas understands the question almost better than Satan did then, He answers and confesses, He surrenders Himself to the cross and the crown of thorns. That which He had formerly forbidden His disciples literally to proclaim, in order to obviate misunderstanding and offence, He now Himself testifies with the utmost plainness, *now* when the consequence will be His *death!* "Now first was His great mystery entirely safe from the measureless chialiastic ambition which had threatened it." He looks through the meaning of the questioner, contemplates

[1] Pfenninger puts the dilemma very simply and clearly. "Either Caiaphas holds it possible that Jesus is the Messiah, and then he cannot call the answer blasphemy; or he really regards it as a blasphemy that Jesus gives Himself out to be such, and then he ought not to adjure Him by the living God to answer."

[2] And this is the question now among the degenerate Jews, who have in the present day advanced from the idea of the secular Messiah, to a sublimated notion of "emancipation." As Dr Goldscheider exhorted his people recently to subscribe their declaration, "that we hope for no other Messiah than our freedom, that the idea of the Messiah in Judaism and that of our final deliverance from oppression, are identical; and that all who share not these views have not seized the true spirit of Judaism." And so low has Christendom sunk, that such an unqualified assertion finds acceptance, though it not only declares all Christians to have failed to catch the spirit of Judaism, but Jesus also to have erred, for He shared no such views, but declared Himself *to be* the Messiah.

all the consequences of His affirmation; but on that very account He keeps silence no longer. As an obedient Israelite He must respond to the adjuration of the ruling power:—under the law to the last, even when it is perverted against Him. But He knew the counsel of His Father, also, as to this hour which had now come; and therefore He gives Himself up the more readily by His—*I am He!* This "I am He," is self-sacrificing as it was before in the garden. But in this same word the sum, as the goal and end, of His prophetic office is involved.

St Mark gives correctly the fundamental meaning, Ἐγώ εἰμι, I am; but St Matthew's Σὺ εἶπας, Thou hast said, is the more correctly literal reply. This is in this place infinitely more than the mere customary formula of affirmation which occurs both among the Greeks and the Rabbis. In the words which followed "that thou *tell* us" Caiaphas had already expressed what they *knew* concerning Him, but had determined not to confess; and thus Christ also means—Thou hast already declared and avowed it, thou knowest it well, without any need of My now *telling* you for the first time!—Thus its meaning was precisely the same as before to Judas. It is further a proof that Caiaphas *now* intended both expressions, *Christ* and *Son of God* in their alone scriptural sense; for the affirmation avows itself in the same meaning as the question.[1] "They know not what they do." There were some whose *knowledge* placed them beyond the limits of this intercession upon the cross—from Jno. iii. 2 down to Matt. xxi. 38, xxii. 16. Probably this was the case with most in the Sanhedrim; at least it was so in the case of Caiaphas, hence the singular in Jno. xix. 11. And there are to this day,—they are now, indeed, more really such than ever,—conscious enemies and deniers of Christ, whose questioning He returns into their own consciences with the same *Thou hast said.*

Accepting this judicial adjuration, and thus swearing by the living God, Jesus testifies not only that He is the Messiah of Israelitish prophecy, but that therewith and therein He is the true Son of God, in the same "metaphysical" sense as He had elsewhere asserted it, in conformity with Scripture. As He there

[1] The interpretation, "Thou sayest it, *not I*" as a mental reservation at this point, when the confession brings after it death! is one of the most abject specimens of exposition to which unbelief has given birth.

stands bound before the Sanhedrim, as He afterwards hangs upon the cross, the declaration, "This Jesus is the Christ, this Son of man the Son of God!" is folly to the carnal reason, a contradiction to all the Jewish expectation concerning the Messiah, *crux* and *σκάνδαλον* to all deistical notions of Gentile wisdom and natural knowledge of God. But it is not contrary to the prophetic word, which is only fulfilled and consummate in its acknowledgment; nor is it contrary to the inmost prophecy of man's deepest feeling in the reason and conscience, which does not find the "living God" again but through *Jesus Christ*. History, finally, since His crucifixion, is the progressive demonstration of the power and the glory of Him who was thus humbled.

A reference *to this* was a necessary part of the *witness* for this crisis, if not of the *confession* as such. For the sake of this Sanhedrim itself, partly for the few who were still susceptible, and partly in the superabundance of His patience and love for all the rest, the Lord will soften the harsh contradiction between His claim and His present condition, "that he, bound as he was, was the King of Israel, and Son of the Blessed?"—by pointing to the following future of His manifestation and glory; and this would further elevate the mere *yea* of His confession into a penetrating testimony to their souls. Further, for all who should afterwards hear this word spoken by Caiaphas, He adds to the, "Thou hast said!" something more—*And, moreover, I say also unto you*, or, *This much more I have also to say to you!* Thus we must understand the *πλὴν* as less adversative than continuous, being a strengthening *moreover, furthermore, in addition, eninvero*. Drüseke refers to Jno. xiii. 30, 31, as a parallel crisis, preaching that Christ was in these words glorified: and we *may* say, in a certain sense, that in the *ἀπάρτι*, henceforth, the *ἄρτι*, now, is also included—for *us* believers the glory beams forth in the sublime crisis of this self-surrender. Yet for unbelievers and His enemies, to whom the word was first spoken, it was not intended in St John's sense, but *distinguishes* the *subsequent* exaltation from the present humiliation—as the words evidently show. "He saw now coming the extremity of His shame and reproach; *therefore* He knew so assuredly that *now* would begin (through the victory into which that would turn) His triumph."

He does not go on to speak with *I* or *Me*, but objectively, as

if elevated above Himself, concerning the *Son of man*, who is now before their eyes. This is the necessary complement of the subject of the predicate *Son of God;* and it expresses His humility in the midst of His dignity. It is at the same time the conclusive and authentic interpretation of this name, which He had given to Himself from the beginning out of Daniel; for He points to Dan. vii. 13, 14, and Ps. cx. in their combination, taking the words for these scribes out of the Scriptures. In connection with the oath put to Him He refers to the oath of God in the psalm, in the same psalm by which He had just smitten their consciences. Ye shall see Me *sitting*, as I now stand before you while ye sit in judgment upon Me. At the right hand of *power* —contrast with His present weakness—a description of the Almighty God Himself, corresponding with the *Blessed*, as the Rabbins frequently use in the same sense הגבורה.[1] The expression here deviates from the merely sensible figure of sitting on the right hand, and points to the thought which underlies it: hence the Evangelists, entering into this, put τὰ δεξιὰ for יְמִין, comp. Mar. xvi. 5. As we have said, in the sublimity of this word, He sits as it were already in judgment upon the throne of the glory of God; but He means now more than that. He who *sitteth* will also *come*, and, by the prerogative which is God's alone in Scripture, but that of the Son of man in Daniel, upon and with the clouds of heaven (Matt. ἐπὶ—Mar. μετά.) Neander rightly remarks, "These words give evidence that Christ referred to His coming, His coming in the clouds, *not only* as a description of His future personal coming again (as visible), but also to indicate His spiritual historical manifestation of Himself in the government of the world." In the same sense as Daniel St John speaks, Rev. i. 7, of the manifestation of the kingdom, power, and dominion ever increasing throughout human history, which is given unto Him. Hence ἀπάρτι, in Luke afterwards ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν. And they *did* see it, these to whom this *ye shall see* was first spoken, as all His rejectors down to this day: —it began with the signs upon Golgotha, it has continued from

[1] Only in Lu. xxii. 69 does τοῦ θεοῦ stand expressed; but the Vulg. (though not in the *Cod. Amiatinus*) gives it also in Matthew and Mark.

Pentecost downwards, in an already visible coming of the Son of man in His kingdom. (Matt. xvi. 28; Mar. ix. 1.) His prophecy has not been brought to nought. But, on the other hand, if we would *see* this aright we must not overlook that all this preliminary coming of Him who still sits above, is but the typical prophecy and the preparing pledge of His last visible coming. The two mutually illustrate and confirm each other: only by the faith which waits for the promise of the final return can we *understand* the coming of the Lord in history; only by the acknowledgment of this His coming in history, manifest as it is to the eyes of even His enemies, can we maintain our expectation and waiting for the Son of God from heaven.

Pfenninger has very excellently illustrated by four positions of his "impartial" Zephonias, the first impression of the word of Jesus; and has explained at the same time how it was that the sublime word did not hinder, and was not intended to hinder, the course of the condemning sentence. First, "I never in my life saw enthusiast so calm, deceiver speak so truly as He spoke this." But then: "and yet there never was folly so foolish (so contradictory to ordinary experience) as what He said." Again, very naturally: "as it respects the condemnation of death, there was nothing which could induce my own *reason* to hinder the judgment; our laws must have their respect paid to them!"[1] Finally: "Either he dies, and then He was not the Messiah, but a deceiver; or he is not a deceiver, but the Messiah, and then he will not die."

The Apostle, 1 Tim. vi. 13, terms *this* confession[2] of Christ, in contrat with Peter's denial, *the good confession* in a preeminent and absolute sense; and it is a type and pattern for us, who must confess Him even as He confessed Himself. It is a *good* confession, first, in its humble obedience in righteousness before God and man, and is to be imitated by us in gentleness and fear; secondly, in its public testimony to the truth, as according to Scripture, and we also have to seal our confession by the sure

[1] Only a Joseph or Nicodemus (of which afterwards) refused to agree, because they have faith already in their reason and in their conscience.

[2] Not, as is generally understood, that given afterwards *before* Pilate. The ἐπὶ Ποντίου Πιλάτου is only meant as in the Apostles' creed.

word; thirdly, in His willingness to suffer, without the maintenance of any personal defence, without threatening or returning injury for injury. This last is to us, also, in our degree for an example; yet the apostle (Acts xxiii. 3) might in rebuke and threatening prophesy—this, however, became not the Lord when He surrendered Himself to death for the world. Certainly, His word concerning His own future sitting and coming, addressed to those who sat before Him, does appear in a certain sense to be what Lange calls "an appeal from their tribunal to the judicial throne of God, as a summons to appear before His own judgment seat when He should return to judge the world." But He does not utter this expressly; we may indeed say, with the Berl. Bible, that He speaks this as a ground of faith for their future hope. As in Matt. lxxi. 16 He breaks off the scriptural saying, and leaves unexpressed the destruction of the enemies—so is it here, and this puts its perfection on his *good* and resplendent confession. Think of "His being silent after such a majestic word of thunder! I will come in the clouds of heaven! and yet not one word of woe then to you! at that moment He feels in Himself power and authority which no man, no creature, ever felt—and is dumb nevertheless, as a lamb!"[1]

He is *silent* again, stands and waits for His condemnation. What should now take place if He were truly judged according to the law? The immediate question was—How provest thou this? And He had proved it, the signs and testimonies were before them; but we may be bold enough to assume that if now one more sign had been *officially* required of Him, He would, He must have given it! But this judicial assembly will not touch that point; they had not observed the righteous forms from the beginning, had appointed Him no בַּעַל רִיב, or advocate of any kind. In the first crisis of his *question* Caiaphas had been half overcome, and had been constrained to this form of question against his will; but now after the answer he takes courage in the malice of his wickedness, and brings the matter abruptly at once to the sentence of condemnation—this is the *second* great crisis in the scene, and the most awful. By a sudden dramatic stroke he urges

[1] So Wizenmann, in Pfenninger's Samml. iv. 2, 166.

the assembly to their vote, without investigation or examination of evidence, and thus he drowns at the same time the clamour of his own conscience. Not as a "preconcerted ceremony," as Lange says (for the whole matter was not so carefully prearranged), but by the inspiration of Satan, doubtless, he rent his clothes,[1] as if in horror of the blasphemy—instead of putting them off before the majesty of the eternal High Priest at the right hand of God! And thereby (as Jerome said) the typical high priesthood was rent asunder; and soon would the veil also be rent from the top to the bottom, with the destruction of the temple, when the body of Christ was broken. *He hath spoken blasphemy!* So cries he in consummate hypocrisy, as in Jno. xix. 7. But he thereby himself blasphemes, and sins against the Holy Ghost.[2] If Jesus was not the Son of God, then was Caiaphas right. But Caiaphas well knew who was right and who was wrong; he therefore urges the precipitate *pre*-judgment, instead of going on to the proper question—Is this confession of Jesus blasphemy or truth?[3] And again—What further need have we of witnesses? betrays his guilty conscience, before he magisterially decrees—Ye all are earwitnesses! And the Assembly understood him—the last hypocritical word, as if the possibility of doubt was assumed, *What think ye?* is followed by the voice not of the majority, but of all, *condemning him to die.* Thus does Israel condemn his Messiah, rebellious man his God.

[1] Τὰ ἱμάτια instead of the singular, as frequently. This was not contrary to the law of Lev. xxi. 10; for that referred either (but improbably) only to the sacred vestments at the time of sacrifice, or (more properly) only to lamentation for the dead. We see in 1 Macc. xi. 71, and in several passages of Scripture, that high priests rent their garments; indeed Sepp (III, 474) tells us that it was prescribed to them actually that they should rend them from *below* upwards.

[2] Six high priests are recorded in Scripture as having sinned (Aaron, Eli, Abiathar, Uriah, or Ahaz, Seraiah in the time of Jeremiah, Joshua, Zech. iii.), but Caiaphas the seventh surpassed them all. So Jean d'Espagne.

[3] The parallel passages, Jno. xix. 7, and x. 33, sufficiently refute the strange and obstinate opinion which such half-orthodox divines as Lutz maintain, that *Son of God* is here equivalent only to *Christ*, and that Jesus was called a blasphemer not on that account, but on account of "the appearing in the clouds, and sitting on the right hand!" Lu. xxii. 69, 70 is quoted for this, but in reality testifies the very reverse.

But in the wonderful counsels of grace above, the guilt of all sinners and their doom is laid upon the Redeemer.

THE SECOND OFFICIAL AND COMPLETE EXAMINATION IN THE MORNING.

(Luke xxii. 67—70.)

After the first condemnation to death the assembly broke up in wild triumph; and the most daring began at once with the mockery, spitting, and other indignities which were continued by their servants. The Evangelists speak of these things, but draw a veil over the worst scenes (which preachers on the Passion should not expatiate upon), only giving some few as an example. Meanwhile it is broad day; and they once more take Him before a full council, as St Luke plainly records. Luke xxii. 66 is, indeed, not absolutely one and the same with Matt. xxvii. 1 and Mark xv. 1; for their *συμβούλιον λαμβάνειν* or *ποιεῖν*, the taking counsel, would rather indicate the continuation of their secret deliberations, issuing in the result that He must be at once led before Pilate; yet even these parallels hint at a renewed assembly in more complete form, before which a renewed examination would itself be probable enough. Further, the indignities (which strictly agree in the—Prophesy, who is it that smote thee?) took place, according to Matthew and Mark, *after* the examination, according to Luke *before* it; unless therefore we assume these to have been repeated, or assume one or other account to be incorrect, the examinations cannot be made identical. Grotius, who maintains this last, took *συνήχθη* in Luke for *ἦν συναγόμενον*; but the supposition of only one examination is encumbered by still greater difficulties: the words of our Lord in St Luke, especially, when closely and penetratingly considered,[1] cannot by any means be interwoven or connected with the sublime answer in the other two Evangelists. If we suppose the answer in Luke, vers. 67, 68, to have preceded

[1] And, alas, we too often find in Harmonistic arguments that the true exegesis of the *words*, which should be presupposed, is wanting.

(Grotius and Olshausen) there must be inexactness in the whole, for St Luke represents it as immediately following the question, Art thou the Christ? which would then be introduced too early. And this would altogether disturb the profound psychological and historical truth of the transition from silence to the confession demanded upon oath, as we have expounded it. It would confuse the whole, also, to regard the question and response as having begun again in the same examination from the very beginning; as the endeavours of Braune and others, who interweave the whole according to their own skill, plainly show.[1] There is no need of any "softening," for the "rather harsh absolute silence" of Christ to the first question of the high priest, as Olshausen thinks; to regard Luke, vers. 67, 68, as such a softening down, hurts the sense and robs it of its energy and force.[2] If the two accounts must be identified, the words of St Luke must necessarily be taken as not strictly historical and exact. For a mere "mixing up" of things which occurred at one time and occurred again at another, is too much at variance with the strict historical tone of the whole.

We hold with Rambach, Bengel, Hess, Pfenninger, v. Gerlach, Dräseke, Lange,[3] that after day-break there was the first formal and complete assembling of the council, and that then occurred what St Luke here narrates. The expressions in Luke, ver. 36, plainly show this. (Certainly, the *ἀνήγαγον*, the true reading instead of *ἀπήγαγον*, is not to be understood of the *Conclave Gazith* or any other locality on the temple mountain; for, as Bynæus observed, John xviii. 28 is decisive against this,

[1] First the solemn question of adjuration—then a pause (as if *that* would not be answered *immediately!*)—now the *tell us* repeated by some impatient ones, and the preliminary interjection of Jesus, Luke vers. 67, 68—(*before* the oath!)—*finally once again*, ver. 70. This is strange, at least!

[2] Besides that it would not be *true*—If I *tell* you, ye believe it not!

[3] He refers to the fact that in the first, imperfect examination according to Mark, ver. 64, *all* consented to the judgment of death; that therefore the dissent of Joseph, Luke xxiii. 51, requires a second and complete examination. But the *πάντες* is generally not to be taken so rigorously, for see the same in Luke ver. 70. B.-Crusius (on John xviii. 13) declares himself for a second examination according to St Luke.

declaring that Jesus was led to the prætorium by Caiaphas). They are troubled lest the first assembly, deficient in number, should not have sufficient validity; probably also the ordinance which we find in Sanhedr. cap. iv. § 1, and Sohar p. 56 held good, that all דיני נפשות should be begun and ended ביום, in the regular day (see Lightfoot Horæ, ad Matt. xxvii. 1), indeed that capital condemnation should not be pronounced on the same day as the examination. (Carpz. Apparat. p. 578). Be this last as it may, the repetition of a second and more secure examination was necessary in order to the utmost appearance of formality; and it would afford a further opportunity of ascertaining whether anything could be extracted from Jesus more suitable for a charge before Pilate—as will be seen.[1] There is evidently in the answer of Christ, Lu. ver. 67, an appeal to something which had already passed, to what He had *told* them before. This very thing is enough to show that St Luke passes over a first examination, which he takes for granted; if this which our Lord had told them had been said in an earlier part of the same examination, St Luke's beginning his narrative in the middle would be unaccountable.

The first address runs not as the Vulg. has incorrectly translated—*If* thou art the Christ, tell us; but the εἰ is a simple question of itself, *num.* "We *ask* thee most solemnly, and once more over and above all former questioning."[2] *Now*, as Lange rightly sees, the *political* significance of the crime is alone brought into prominence in the *Christ;* the *Son of God*, which the vehemence of the moment had extorted from Caiaphas, is at first prudently left out of sight—though in ver. 70 they bring it forward, being urged by their zeal against His "sitting at the right hand." Thus everything has an unforced explanation, in harmony with the mind of the people as it vibrated between cunning and fanaticism. The Lord alone remains self-possessed and tranquil, even while altering His demeanour. He *speaks* now

[1] The disciples could not watch one hour with Jesus—His enemies wake to their earnest work the whole night. See here man's strength to evil, his weakness to good.

[2] "As it were superfluously—probably also for the sake of the members who had come in since." So Drüseke very truly; they should and would all of them hear it themselves from His lips.

once more, as a testimony that He did not keep silence on the former occasion through any contempt, and fulfilling on His part the obligations of justice. But His justice is most characteristically in direct opposition to this hypocritical judicial process. They would make the legality of their sentence all the more firm through a complete assembly in broad day—but to Him they have lost their character as builders through their rejection of the corner stone; their office has no more validity in His eyes, since they have termed His testimony a blaspheming God, and have condemned His innocence. The high-priestly garment is torn. Therefore He *now* speaks to them as to private persons, just as to Annas; He humbles Himself so low as to lament in sorrow over their unrighteousness, in which one thing only stands firm—not to believe, not to let Him go! Compare the complaint of the prophet Jer. xxxviii. 15. Is not all this now plain and intelligible?

Ver. 67 refers primarily at any rate to the previous examination, and is expressed with the highest and most marvellous gentleness—after the deeper experience of suffering through their mockery; for when He told them, they blasphemed that it was blasphemy, truly because they would not believe it. But the word is *then* a general glance back upon his whole official teaching from the outset, during which He had so often told them in vain by word and work what they now asked. "If ye believe not My whole life which has hitherto said Yea, to what end is it to say it again now?" Thus might we refer the clause to the present—If I told you now once more; but yet we cannot but feel that something must have preceded, which gives the expression its present appropriate form.

Ver. 68 is so interpreted as if the Lord by an unseemly prejudgment only asserted—If I now wished to ask you, ye *would* not answer me. This is involved in the meaning, but not so that He from the beginning declined the interrogation permitted; the presupposition in this aoristical sentence is founded upon antecedent facts. Thus it is not as the Vulg. translates—*Si autem et interrogavero, non respondebitis mihi*, as before, *non credetis*. (Instead of which another reading has *creditis*.) But the second clause continues the allusion, before remarked upon, to all that had taken place *before* this night of judgment, and presses it upon

their minds by ἐὰν δὲ καὶ ἐρωτήσω[1] how often many of themselves had left unanswered His penetrating and demonstrating questions, and therefore how certainly nothing was to be expected from such a course repeated now. As it regards Annas, we may remember the Lord's conversation with him, in which the only answer was His being struck; but the Lord especially reminds them of the public questions of these last days, such as Matt. xxi. 25 (when they had come to Him in a *half* official manner), Matt. xxii. 45, &c. We may supplement with Brandt's Bible, But I ask on Mine own part, *wherefore ye do not* believe My saying—and thus He gives it to be understood that it was for Him, in reality, to examine and judge them. What benignity, to descend to this position in relation to them, after the fearful judgment of the night! That ye would *let Me go*, acquit Me[2]—this was not to be thought of. Thus He testifies that He knew full well their foregone conclusion and decree; and therefore the futility of all questioning and examination.

Vers. 69, 70. He *nevertheless* repeats the former word, that they might have no excuse; that they might not think Him to have uttered the same words on the former occasion through any fanatical elevation. This was the last time on which He called Himself Son of man. He who had been smitten and spat upon adheres to His confession; after as before these indignities He cries, that He will sit at the right hand of God! This changes now their previous determination; they break loose upon Him with mockery (not believing, as He had said), and bring forward the loftier predicate, before suppressed: And *art* thou then—that is, *Willest* thou actually to be the Son of God? (Literally: *Thou* poor man, vain in thy imagining, assertest thyself to be —!) And He concludes, in His unweariable patience and equanimity, with His repeated *I am*, now even strengthened (as before by the *thou hast said*) by a comprehensive *ye say it* which looks round upon all: your repeated question recoils upon your own consciences, ye have no other response to give, ye are as assuredly convinced in your own minds as ye are determined

[1] Which καὶ is certainly genuine, or at any rate consistent with the sense.

[2] For neither are these concluding words to be given up.

to hold the truth in unbelief! The ὅτι does not belong to λέγετε as if citing; but (as in Jno. xix. 37) introduces the new testimony and confession of our Lord himself, exhibits His incontrovertible *being* such as the *reason* of their perfectly foolish questioning, denying, and mockery; and this had the same force as an affirmation.

Thus, to make one more remark,[1] He has severally answered the *two* questions in their present separation, whether He was the Christ and whether He was the Son of God. Touching the first, cunningly advanced alone, He had given a repelling and indirect answer; the second, which, however, was the decisive one, He once more answered, for the honour of the Father in the Son, by a similar benevolently uttered, filial, and plain—I am He! The *finale*, ver. 71, runs, Thou holdest to this—we hold also to our former words. In which conclusive repetition of *what further need have we of witnesses?* there is to be observed, with all its malignity, a certain angry vexation and embarrassment.

FIRST COLLOQUY WITH PILATE.

(Matt. xxvii. 11; Mark xv. 2; Luke xxiii. 3; Jno. xviii. 34—37.)

Bound again, more straitly now that in open day He is to go through the streets, Jesus is, as He had foretold, delivered up to the *Gentiles*. This was indeed a main element, according to the counsel of God, in the everywhere significant process of the Passion. And Jesus *stood* before the governor:—though bound and charged He stood firmly, and with dignity, plainly speaking whether by silence or by testimony what He had to say to the representative of this world's power; so that he, at once a religious and philosophical indifferentist, could not without effort deem it a ridiculous thing that this man, this Jew—should be a *King!* Even King of the Jews, and at the same time of all the True in all the world (what a contrast!) in a sense which even the proud Gentile cannot but ponder and feel! So that, in fine, that which these Jews and high priests had desired in their

[1] Bernh. Jakobi, Predigten i. 193, 194.

cunning to keep too much in the background—that He was the *Son of God*—breaks out in the presentiment of this Pilate as a voice and a power from *another* world, even before the word enforced from the Jews gave him expression with which to clothe it—*Πόθεν εἶ σύ*; *Whence art Thou?*

How grandly, with what inexhaustible depth of truth, not only for the then historical relation of the Jewish and heathen world to each other, but for all to this day who stand like Pilate before Christ while Christ seems to stand before them for examination and rejection,—how historically and poetically in his perfect representation, with what a union of simplicity and art, does this Jewish fisherman John, who has hitherto described only the conflict of the Light of the world with the Jews, give once more by a few strokes of his pencil the first testimony of Christ *to the Gentile!* But it is not John, it is the Holy Spirit, who directs his pen, that gives us these genuine, by every one who is of the truth recognised as genuine, *acts of Pilate*—the true *acta Pilati*, in opposition to those which well-meaning Christians for the honour of their Saviour, or His enemies in contempt of Him, invented and gave forth as such.

Pontius Pilate, the sixth governor of Judæa from the time when these were appointed, is here entitled *ἡγεμών*, though this was more than his real dignity. He was only *ἐπίτροπος*, *Procurator*; in his exceptional case *Procurator cum potestate*, with judicial jurisdiction. He resided when he came to Jerusalem, at the feasts more especially, in the former palace of Herod, which was now his *Prætorium*. Thither repair the whole multitude of them (Lu.) early in the morning with Jesus; their object being now to obtain a confirmation, or definitive pronunciation of the sentence of death, as swiftly as possible, because of the feast-day.[1] They do not enter the Roman Prætorium, the

[1] Lampe thinks that "from Caiaphas," which, however, refers only to the house or locality, indicates that Caiaphas himself for dignity's sake had remained behind; but this is improbable, and contradicts the synoptical report. And it is very doubtful whether "*they themselves* went not in" suggests the contrast that *Jesus* was sent forward as the herald of their coming! There is nothing in the text to warrant Krummacher's view that they thrust Jesus bound within the portal; we rather read in ver. 33 plainly enough, that Pilate then first called Jesus and received Him into his presence.

most hateful house of the Gentiles in Jerusalem; they allege with highest hypocrisy the passover as their reason, avoiding in the midst of their impure works the contamination which entering a house out of which the leaven had not been cast would occasion; not setting their foot on the place where all their desires have gone before them. Pilate comes out to them, not "awakened by the tumult," but on their proper summons: either this was due to their customs, and might at any time be required of him, or, which is more probable, his good nature or curiosity might induce him to be thus ready, though ordinarily he was careless and tolerant on such matters.[1] The fact that this was the time of passover, and that the whole order assembled, intimated to him at once that this was some important matter—"some arrested culprit who must *die* before the feast." It is doubtful, however, whether this supposition was really in his thoughts, and only dissembled in the question—What *accusation* bring *ye* (with such strange zeal) against *this man*?[2] Scarcely did He already mean, as Luther's marginal note runs, "It is marvellous that ye can have anything to say against a man so celebrated for goodness." For, even if he knew anything about the "person" and cause of Jesus,[3] he probably knew nothing of Jesus by sight. Rather we may regard "against this man" as expressing the simple and unbiassed impression which this person now brought before him made upon his mind; he knows nothing as yet more than he sees. Weak and prostrate as He was, after His conflict and seizure, there is something innocent and even exalted in His aspect;—it is the first movement in Pilate of the appeal, ch. xix. 5, and the question, ch. xix. 9—as if he intuitively thought, "Never have I had before me for judgment and condemnation such a man as this!"

The Jews understood the question in some such way, and

[1] Not "the proud Roman bends"—as if this were the first token of that cowardice which was the fundamental trait in his character!

[2] This is still, and must ever be, the first and last and most impressive question to all enemies of the Lord!

[3] Which can hardly be denied; but it is not probable that he already knew of "the designs of the priests against Jesus"—*because* he granted the cohort for the seizure of Jesus, as is generally said. This last is not necessarily to be assumed.

therefore they oppose his doubt with—If he were not a malefactor, we would not have brought him unto thee now! Thou seest that we are all here, the matter is as important as it is pressing—Make brief work and ratify the condemnation already pronounced. We ask no more than this slight and becoming act of complaisance. We come not so much to make a charge; we come as judges, and as such infallible: thou seest who are before thee! *We*, the whole sacred Sanhedrim—and wouldst thou enter upon a new investigation of the matter? Thus would they impose their own mind upon him, determining for him beforehand; but the wrong and the pride of this, which is too often made prominent alone,[1] is dexterously softened by the courtly intimation—We would not bring *to thee* an unfounded charge, in demanding of thee (for such is our purport) a sentence of death. "We trifle not with the governor of the land"—as Fikenscher well expresses it. But they had not rightly calculated this time. Their specious sigh over the iniquity—He is an evil-doer! their affronting demand—Enter into no enquiry! find no acceptance with Pilate. Though much is said of the injustice of Pilate (perhaps through Jewish hatred too much), and Philo in particular says that he often condemned people unheard, yet on this occasion he is not so unjust, or he is restrained by the council and guidance of God from putting confidence in this lofty assemblage:—the points of accusation must become public in a proper judicial process, in which the civil and merely human innocence of "the Son of God" must be fully vindicated. We regard it as only natural that the Roman does not at once place himself at the discretion of the Jews; and regard this as a most characteristic mark of truth in the history. According to Josephus the respect paid to the high priest's office and position had sunk to a very low point; Pilate had often had occasion to mark the party hatred of these rulers of the Jews (Matt. xxvii. 18), so that the assurances of this venerable body were of very little value in his own eyes! Their words might very easily be inverted—If we had not been malefactors, we should not have delivered this innocent one unto thee.

[1] Krummacher exaggerates this point, when he speaks of the foaming pride of their words, &c.

But Pilate retains his moderation and his place, and gives them only the taunting answer which is recorded in Jno. ver. 31. Although he marks—for the *delivered unto thee* would make it plain—that it is a question of death, he seems hard of apprehension, and takes the word malefactor, κακοποιός[1] in a less rigorous sense (comp. 1 Pet. ii. 12, 14; iii. 16), and ironically (as if they had deferred to him more than was necessary), concedes to them that they may take Him and punish Him according to their law.[2] They feel the point, but put up with the taunt in order to accomplish their purpose; they humble themselves to the most submissive confession—Thou knowest well that we *may not* put any one to death![3]

And now we must certainly interpose the first specific accusation of Lu. xxiii. 2, as distinguished from a subsequent one after the confession of Jesus, which is referred to in Matt. xxvii. 12, Mark xv. 3—5, and coincides with Lu. xxiii. 5. The judges now come forward because they must, as complainants. There is no Tertullus (Acts xxiv. 1), to speak for them, they themselves

[1] Or, according to a reading preferred by many, κακὸν ποιῶν—which, however, does not approve itself to us, for we naturally expect a definite and customary term.

[2] We at least cannot otherwise understand this first declaration of Pilate. When Krummacher finds in this the contemptible conduct of the man, who contrary to justice gave up the Redeemer to death, his pitiable attempt to evade, and so forth, we regard his view as altogether unpsychological and inexact. Souchon (Passionspredigten) puts it in a more acceptable form, though different from ours, when he calls "the word an ironical question: 'Am I to execute your judgment? If ye examine alone, then condemn alone, *if ye can!*'"

[3] This word, extorted from their bitter anger, is so plain that it decides the question as to the right of the Jews of that day to execute a capital sentence. The Fathers denied this through ignorance upon the point of history, and therefore expounded the words in a forced and unsatisfactory way. That, even if the Jews in *questions of their religion* had the independent power of execution, they had reasons in the case of Jesus for not assuming it before the people, is a matter apart; this οὐδένα, *no man*, is plain, and agrees, as with the Gemara (where the loss of criminal jurisdiction is unchronologically referred to the common date for many things—forty years before the destruction of the temple), so also with the Roman law, which required in every *province* that a sentence of death should be at any rate confirmed. Whatever may be said on the other side may be easily explained.

are now the *false witnesses.* They betray that they have *fore-judged* Him (which in a political question was not their province), when their strong *we have found* puts forth the lying declaration—All has been *investigated* already, we have the proofs! Of the three points of accusation, the first is half true, the third quite true in its right sense, the consummate lie is interposed in the middle, in order that out of the whole a confused false witness may arise. The perverting the nation, διαστρέφοντα τὸ ἔθνος, (comp. Ex. v. 4; Numb. xxxii. 7; but especially 1 Kings xviii. 17, Sept.), had a political sound, according with Pilate's late experience of the Galileans; but the truth (which the reading ἔθνος ἡμῶν, *our nation*, seems to betray), was that this Jesus turned away the people *from them.* "He who so seized upon the people by his discourses, that we cannot get a hearing; who feeds them, with bread in the wilderness, while we must shut up our granaries; who drives devils out of them which have no regard for us."[1] He says that he is *Christ a king*—certainly quite *true*, when rightly understood. But the daring lie, the contradiction of which they had heard to their confusion from His own lips, comes in the middle, in the clause which puts an evil appearance upon the *perverting the nation*, and would find its confirmation in the truth of the third point, giving His *being a king* a political perversion![2] Verily, these liars lie well, but yet there is here as ever a certain folly in their lying. For the "*forbidding* to give tribute to Cæsar" had either passed into actual overt act (as the first charge hinted), but then Pilate would have long known this without any "we have found" *of theirs;* or else it was only a *saying* or *teaching* on His part—but then it would not be very dangerous in itself, and moreover *their own guilt* as well as His, as the Roman well knew. The points on which they are altogether silent, are well exhibited and commented upon by Tobler: "They say nothing of the entry into Jerusalem, which, however, might have been most speciously ob-

[1] So Tobler in his ingenious and profound Rhapsodien über Pont. Pilatus, Pfenninger's Samml. Alas not continued throughout the whole.

[2] As it were a *consequence:* if He had not said it, yet *to Him* as a king the tribute must be paid!

jected before such as Pilate was;[1] they keep silence about the cleansing of the temple, which yet was the strangest thing in the life of the Saviour; they say nothing of the destruction of the temple, the ambiguity of which had been one cause of their own condemnation of Him. But especially are they cunning enough to suppress the Woe! Woe! which He had denounced upon them; and most cunning of all to conceal all His wonderful works, concerning which it might probably occur to them that Pilate would not altogether adopt their explanation of Beelzebub's aid."

But what they do say seems suspicious to the wary Roman, who knows the relations of his office; he knows that there must be something else behind. "Pilate knew too much about the Jewish expectations to suppose that the Sanhedrim would hate and persecute one who would free them from the Roman authority." (Pfenninger.) "He despises their simulation of good citizens, for on this head he knows them too well." (Dräseke.) And the man, whom he sees before him, this man *who said that he was Christ a king?* Pilate not only knew the Jewish hope in the Messiah, but He doubtless knew also concerning Jesus, who for some time had been partly celebrated, partly opposed, as the Messiah, whose entire public life had fallen within his own period of office, whose last *entrance* had probably (though only probably) suggested it to his mind to inquire further into the matter if the matter proceeded further. Thus Pilate *now* becomes aware that he has "Jesus" before him, who was reported to have denounced, and so wonderfully taught, and more than taught, these hypocrites.

The reconciliation of St John and the Synoptics might almost be left undecided. The first three have collectively only one question of Pilate to Jesus, whether He were *the King of the Jews*, and only one *Thou sayest it* as the answer. Is this the same with Jno. ver. 37, so that the Synoptic tradition extracted this affirmation from the entire colloquy, and gives it as the sum of the whole? Or did such a first question and answer, isolated and alone, take place in the presence of the whole assembly before the Governor

[1] Tobler says, though not so correctly—This must have appeared to Pilate most suspicious. But it must be remembered that some degree of pomp was tolerated at such a festivity.

summoned Jesus apart by Himself? (Bengel: Pilato statim respondet). On the one hand the former seems an inexact style of narration, since the *thou sayest* of St John, as taken in the connection of the whole, has a *different* meaning; and the sum of the colloquy as reported by him concerning the kingdom and concerning the truth, does not resolve itself into—He acknowledged Himself at once as *King of the Jews*. On the other hand, this simple unmodified avowal, as given in the Synoptics, before Pilate, appears to be scarcely befitting or simply true, the less so as the Lord himself, according to St John, acknowledges the necessity of obviating all ambiguity or misunderstanding. We should agree with Neander: "To such a question Jesus *could* not answer simply *thou sayest*, as the Synoptics relate, for in the sense in which the Roman meant this, He had not, and would not give Himself out to be a king of the Jews; nor would Pilate after *such* declaration have pronounced Him to be innocent." The Berlenb. Bible strives to solve the difficulty by saying, "The King of the Jews meant not a *temporal* king, but a king according to the Jewish sense—according to *Israelite theology*, a king as promised in the prophets"—but we must reject this substitution of the true Israelite theology for the Jewish notions of the day, upon which the Jews and Pilate were well agreed, as involving an untenable "mental reservation;" for the objection might be at once urged, that Christ used an ambiguous expression, He understanding it spiritually but Pilate in a temporal sense. He who can resolve to explain the Synoptics in this manner by St John may do so, but we cannot. The inexactness in their record would then border on untruthfulness; they knew, writing in the light of the Holy Spirit, as well as we, that a mere affirmative would be ambiguous and untrue; nevertheless they so write that without St John no one could understand them otherwise. We think that the case stands thus. It has not been observed that in St John's account, taken alone, the Lord's words have the *appearance* as if He *only* "spiritualized" His *Messianic dignity*, which was here in question, and thus in part denied it. But that assuredly might not be; it was incumbent upon Him, in spite of all misunderstanding and false opinion, *to avow Himself to these Jews in opposition to the Gentiles* as *their* actual *King*. This, therefore, He did at the outset, with a first public Σὺ λέγεις

(which is not altogether the same with Σὺ εἶπας, as we have before expounded *this*;) the Synoptics know or write only of this, and not of the secret conversation which then followed. It is not to be supposed that Pilate would at once take Jesus into private without any question addressed to Him; but the first marvellous answer which he received would at the same time be the reason why he should ask the Man more confidentially the very same question. The first *apparently* ambiguous and untruthful *affirmation* of the Lord is justified without any "mental reservation:"—first, inasmuch as there was in reality *something* true in the Messianic hope of an external freedom (if they had not themselves rendered it vain for this time!)—and, next, by the *tone and expression*, in which this "Thou speakest right!" distinguished as it is from a simple and pure yea, was spoken by this bound one, and by which the misunderstanding was entirely obviated. In *this* yea of *this man* there lay at the same time—I am He, but not as a rebel against Cæsar, not so as that I shrink from thy investigation! For one who is guilty does not thus concisely admit at once the main point of his accusation—excepting in *pride*, but that is infinitely far from the tone and expression here.[1] In a most strange and impressive manner *passion* and *calmness* are opposed here before Pilate, so that he suspects some peculiar and specific mystery to be hidden under this mysterious Yes; therefore he says in his soul—That I must hear for myself, from him alone and in secret! Hess goes too far when he says that "Pilate perceived by His silence that He would speak to him alone." For it was no silence, but an affirmation, which by its supreme tranquillity provoked to the uttermost the desire of this Gentile to inquire into and examine this "King of the Jews."

Thus Pilate leaves the accusing judges with their *we have found* standing without, because they dare not enter,—but his doing so is a deep mortification! Lange thinks that he went into the judgment-hall with a selection of the Jews, who had agreed to renounce the observance of the paschal ceremonial that day,

[1] Berlenb. Bible: "Pilate marks that something is behind, and thinks—If I had nothing worse to fear than this man, I should sit secure enough."

under the reservation that they would celebrate the little passover. There is no trace of this in St John's narrative, which in ver. 38 says expressly—He went out again unto the Jews. There might have been Roman attendants; but even they were necessary as an explanation of St John's knowledge of what passed. (The Lord himself might have narrated these things during the forty days.) With a graciousness towards the accused one which stands in contrast with his leaving the Jews without, He *calls* Him to himself within and permits Him to *speak* confidently before him as a judge. This was certainly no judicial examination in the strict form (for publicity, or at any rate the presence of complainants and witnesses would be necessary for that), but a conversation, as with Annas; hence Jesus here as there, and still more closely, speaks with a direct and personal application.[1] Had the Lord now begun to speak for Himself with dignity concerning His own life and His deeds, the wickedness and falsehood of his enemies—He might have found a ready hearing and obtained His freedom! But no, of this He thinks not once. He remains *in statu confessionis* as the King of the Jews, and thinks only of pressing the truth upon this Gentile's heart at this critical hour now come—doing down to the last that for which He was born, and in doing which He dies—Testifying for His own person only as for the truth.

The question repeated in ver. 33 by Pilate is a good beginning, considered as a question so put; especially as a confidentially and graciously *repeated* question. Not as it has been said, altogether misunderstanding the words, "spoken mockingly in the spirit of lofty conceit"—*Art thou then* this King of the Jews?[2] There was but the slightest possible tincture of this; the "*Art thou so?*" meant earnestly, *Thou wouldst, Thou willest* actually *to be* such? Thou sayest still, as I have heard with wonder, that thou art, though bound and delivered up, *Christ a*

[1] In another and more general sense it was indeed an *examination;* and therefore Drüseke's striking words are true, when he calls the examination of Annas an *idle*, that of Caiaphas a *wicked*, and that of Pilate an *extorted*, examination. Instead of this last it were better to say, a necessitated and friendly examination.

[2] Luthardt also finds only a tone of mockery, depreciation, and even scorn, in the *thou* which begins the sentence.

King—?[1] The whole process rested now upon this Yes or No; let us hear the remarkable answer of our Lord, which *now* for the first time says literally neither Yes nor No.

The accusers had not said literally *the King of the Jews*, but *Christ a king*, in order that they might not bring before the Romans, by the use of the strongest expression, one who would be represented as a Messiah aiming to rule over a liberated people. But Pilate naturally at once fills up and completes the expression. What shall the Lord reply now, when Pilate thus throws himself into the question, with a very different posture of mind from that which asked the first short and concise question? He must continue to avow Himself as the Messiah, yet in such a manner that the "king," in the sense of those Jews in Jno. vi. 15, should be altogether declined and given up. A mere Yea was not the simple truth which Pilate here asked about; a simple No, on the other hand, would have denied "the hope of Israel" (Acts xxviii. 20) before the Gentile. The meaning of the word was now the question; the only thing therefore that He could say with truth and wisdom, in order to give occasion for further development, was the counter-question which we read—Speakest thou this thing of thyself, or did others tell it thee of Me? Many very erroneously regard this question as showing that our Lord had not heard the accusation which the Jews had brought.[2] The position of *or did others tell it thee* in the second place in the sentence opposes this view of the dilemma. And, further, the dilemma is not so stated as that Jesus would answer in one only of two cases, as Fikenscher *e.g.* explains it: "*Dost thou thyself believe it* (of which nothing however is said!)—then it is either contradictory to reason, for thou canst not allege against Me anything insurrectionary, and as a worldly king, I do not, as thou knowest, stand before thee; or, it is given to thee of God (as a presentiment and earnest question), and then I will answer thee:—but if thou only repeatest what My opponents

[1] Krummacher, on the other hand, finds in the undertone of the question a soft and well-wishing question—Is it not true that thou dost not look so high as to be a king?—The reader must choose between these two interpreters!

[2] Put in the strongest manner by Dräseke, who makes Him say—"*Is it that* of which they accuse Me?"

have said to thee, *I have nothing to say in reply.*" This is certainly incorrect, for Pilate, at once retreating from his good beginning, asserts that he says what the Jews have told him, and yet the Lord does answer him even after hearing that, though He would rather have heard the other. The whole means generally at first: What dost thou really understand in this great decisive question? What is thy notion of this *King?* Knowest thou anything about the hope of the Jews in their Christ, and *what* knowest thou? Thus, with Lange, "Is the expression of thy accusation thine own expression in thine own meaning, or the expression of My accusers?" When we look closer, the former, *of thyself* (ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ, var. read. ἀπὸ σεαυτοῦ) has a *twofold* possible presupposition in it. Not, indeed, as van Ess translates, "Art thou brought to that question of thyself?" for that was not to be supposed, and is contradicted by the nature of the case. But the *best* supposable case was, as Klee says, "Wouldst thou for thyself know in good earnest?" that is, whether I am what thou sayest, what these say, what I also say, and in what sense I do say it? Such was the case in the heart of Pilate for one brief moment, and this it was which our Lord seized upon in His word; but He knows very well beforehand that Pilate will not remain faithful to that first feeling, and therefore so orders His testing question that its first clause penetrates deeper at once, and says—Hast thou thyself, not now as *man*, but as the *governor* of these Jews, who can tolerate no king over them, discerned and come to the knowledge by any facts of My making Myself a King?[1] But because this was not the case, and Pilate retreats from any earnest inquiry, the *second* point of the dilemma alone remains, which Christ knows that Pilate *will* affirm—He thus speaks and acts, because the Jews have told him!

Thus does He now, on His own part, take the friendly judge into examination. Because He will not, and may not be condemned through any *ambiguity* of the word "king," as it had been thrust forward in the wicked accusation, He begins to prepare the way for distinguishing its true meaning, while He lays hold on the conscience of Pilate, already somewhat touched; *leads him*

[1] As Ebrard interprets, coinciding literally with Rambach.

into himself, and delivers him from all mere foreign suggestion. A judge, a man who has to do with truth in such a remarkable and mysterious case, must not simply give heed to others.[1]

Here we see the first taint upon Pilate's sincerity of spirit; he escapes from the penetrating point of this question, and holds the truth in unrighteousness. He evades it and retreats;[2] speaks as it were in a lofty tone of alienation from these Jews, and from their king who would now touch his heart; his first question has almost a scornful tone—*Am I a Jew?*[3] As if I should with a personal interest ask after their king, their messiah—or learn from a Jewish Rabbi! Thus was it everywhere then in the Gentile world. Only the better sort of inquiring spirits stumbled not at what was an offence in these Jews; but they in their devotion to the God of this people were more sincere than this people itself. Wherefore had not Pilate long ago, out of sincere *humanity*, instituted inquiries, and made his observation of this Jesus, what kind of *man* He was? It is not probable that, as Tobler says, "only distant reports had forced their way into his private cabinet of state, into that place where the great men of the world think they have all things under their eye, but in which the most beautiful, the most important things of humanity are often concealed from them, simply because they do not come forth." The Roman was no such *modern* statesman as this. "Not unacquainted with Jesus' manner of life," as Hase admits, and his whole demeanour testifies, he was *not* "ignorant of the Jewish expectations of a Messiah," as the same Hase nevertheless contends. But he *wills* not to know what he knows, and retreats when Jesus comes too near. He must be brought back to *himself*, but the result is, I am—*no Jew!* What then? Oh, if he

[1] "Oh if Pilate had only left his conscience free and disburthened it, he would not have been so easily carried away! How many thousands since his time have been carried away who have not allowed themselves to distinguish between what their own conviction and experience teach them, and what they have adopted untested from the declarations of others!" Rieger.

[2] Krummacher: "With a vehemence which very plainly shows that he has something within to struggle against."

[3] Comp. Acts xvi. 21, and Bengel's note there: Hodienum *Romanitas* Paulo (Christo) repugnat. But there is more than one kind of *Romanitas* which scorns the Jew.

had been a Jew, a genuine and sincere one such as Nathanael, who asks not *whence art thou?* when salvation comes, and the truth bears witness to itself! But he is a worldly wise heathen, who counts the worship of the gods fit for the stupid people, but will not receive what the wise had taught, from their presentiments, of the unknown God; and thus has no religion but the slight so-called virtue and righteousness which in his case was of no great value. And withal he is proud, for he is a Roman. He is a statesman, a servant of the *empire*, of that kingdom which admitted the rights of no other, and was not "celestial," like the Chinese, but of the entire *Orbis terrarum*. He is thus from below, a ruler in the plenary authority which extends over all, not excepting Him who came from above and now speaks to him—He is consequently the *judge* of this king of the Jews. Thus he wilfully loses himself, the man, who was divinely touched and attracted by the Godman; and in his second question seems almost to assume again the person of the judge, asking with official air—What hast thou *done?* The Romans are concerned with what is *done;* not with dreams, as the Jews are—nor even with wisdom, like the subjugated Greeks. Somewhat offended by the bold counter-question, and with the first rising of that proud feeling which afterwards expresses itself in chap. xix. 10, he now seems to say—There must be matter of moment in this. But there is something of grace, and a continuance of his condescension, in the words which precede—Thy people and the high priests delivered thee unto me. This means, *Thy* people, thou marvellous king, will not have thee; the holy rulers and representatives of thy people make it thy offence that thou wouldst be their king—"else I should know nothing about thee." Speak then, for I will still hear—What does this "king of the Jews" mean with them and with thee?[1] Thus the *three* questions of Pilate refer to the three points of accusation:—the first to the *title of king;* the second now to the disturbance of the people and the exciting them against Cæsar, connected as one; the third after-

[1] Pilate's saying has been understood, "In what sense this expression is used among the Jews, I trouble myself not!" The truth is just the reverse, since he is vexed at this Jewish matter, in which he is now to judge, and vindicate the Roman rights as to what has been "done."

wards, chap. xix. 9, to the subsequently introduced fundamental question—the "Son of God."

According to strict right the Lord might have once more kept silence; but, because the feeling of Pilate's heart is, as formerly in the case of Nicodemus, somewhat better than his words, the merciful and gracious Lord answers him again, and applies to him a still stricter test, whether He wills to and will *hear*. He does not, indeed, give any direct answer to the proper question, what He had *done;* still less does He begin to narrate His *deeds*, those incontrovertible works which had provoked the lying contradiction of wickedness to charge Him with crime. But He gives directly the negative answer—I have done nothing politically evil or blameworthy, for I am not *such* a king; and, moreover, gives positive declaration that He nevertheless has a *kingdom*. *Now* follow both together, the No and the Yea for the first question whether He was a King; and that which was once said to the Pharisees, Luke xvii. 20, 21, the Gentile also must hear in the form in which *he* could best apprehend it. Three times in succession, in heightened emphasis, does the Lord in His bonds speak of *His kingdom!* And this means infinitely more than Drüseke has misconceived it, "a kingdom is most certainly *My desire!*"[1] *My* kingdom—thus He begins, thus He continues, in royal style and tone; thus does He avow Himself to be a King who already has a kingdom, who inalienably retains it, and will more and more reveal and impress its power. Βασιλεία may, indeed, as B.-Crusius remarks, signify government or "ruling;" this, however, is only included, the fundamental meaning is, My kingly dignity and kingly power with its proper *domain*:—all that pertains to a king who has not merely the empty name, but *is* an actual king. This and nothing but this must Christ necessarily testify in His humiliation before the power of this world. The Gentile universal dominion, centred in Rome and represented by Pilate, must know that there is a *Power* among men high above its domain, where it assumes to have absolute sway. And this power rules in the world with superior authority *because* it is *not of this*

[1] Here one might say, as Frederic William IV. reminded one who too confidentially forgot the right expression, and said, "if your Majesty would wish," &c.—"Majesty does not wish."

world. Thus there is another world than *this*:—not merely "a different world from that of Roman action," for this is far from exhausting the meaning of this significant saying; but a heaven above the earth, a Divine and Spiritual world. The Lord tells the Gentile as plainly as it might be said to him in connection with the denial of *his* entire jurisdiction, that which "kingdom of God" and "kingdom of heaven" signified among the Jews. That was the *wonder* addressed to faith! A domain of power independent of and above the earthly dominion of the world, which however entering into and seizing this, gains and maintains the victory! Indeed, as Daub (Jud. Isch.) in other words expounds it, the natural mind of man, disbelieving the purely heavenly truth, would sooner behold in Mohammed the prophet of the one God, because he wins for himself and his followers the power of this world; but Christ asserts the purely spiritual power of the *truth* in the presence of the highest earthly power, without using His own or His servants' hands to take from this world's dominion a penny of its tribute. The judicial and ruling power upon earth has still a conscience, in which the first and irrepressible question is heard, as may be seen among the Romans—what is *right?* By this that power involuntarily recognizes a higher power above itself, a *θεῖον*, which is altogether independent of man's caprice and all external things. It was not publicly said to the Roman Procurators, as to the judges in Israel—Take heed what ye do: for ye judge not for man, but for the Lord, who is with you in the judgment, (2 Chron. xix. 6; Deut. i. 17.) Yet they knew, as well as the Cæsars who sent them to minister justice in their provinces, that there is a higher Power above the highest. (Eccles. v. 7). It is to this fundamental feeling of *right*, and consequent *obligation* and duty, that our Lord appeals, when He bears testimony to another kingdom, which according to its nature and kind is derived from another world. Daub (Jud. Isch. i. 228) puts the case that Jesus had said—I am come by my teaching and acts to speak concerning *duty;* and Pilate had replied in mockery or doubt—But what is duty? He remarks that that would have been the observation of a conscienceless, trifling, and unworthy fool. But we say, looking forward to the close of this colloquy, was it otherwise here? Should not the word concerning the *kingdom*, ver. 36, have

taught the conscience of Pilate to understand what the *truth* of ver. 37 was? For, "he who says, what is truth? soon comes to say, what is right?"[1] These two are one at that point where the law, which the heathen also have, leads the way to the Gospel.

My kingdom is *not* of this world, where violence and unrighteousness bear external rule, where the powers and the means of this world can at most attain to nothing beyond the *semblance* of right and of truth. By this the Lord frees Himself from all participation in the vain opinions and expectations which the Jews derived from the prophecies of the Messiah; just as He had thoroughly renounced them when enduring the mockery of the servants over His powerlessness. He had not forbidden to give tribute; He had declined to be a judge or divider among brethren: nor has the world anything of the kind to fear from His disciples.[2] But He does therewith assert, and that in the most positive way, that he has nevertheless a kingdom; and testifies concerning Himself and His disciples (the subjects and servants of His kingdom) *the same thing* exoterically, in this first witness to the heathen world, which he had uttered esoterically, ch. xvii. 14—16 in the mystery of His Prayer. This renunciation is by no means to be put in opposition to the true prophecies of the kingdom of the Son of man, to whom *already* all power is given, and whose kingdom *finally* will bring all other power to nought: it is very far from renouncing the world, and all external, earthly manifestation and confirmation of His heavenly power. It does not, as superficial expositors dream here and ver. 37, refer the kingdom of Christ to the invisible region of the heart: had He not said already before Caiaphas—From this time forth ye shall *see* Him coming in His power? The observation of von Gerlach is good, that a purely internal dominion which did not control and subordinate to itself the external, would be no true kingdom, and would have none of the reality of dominion.

In order to bring nearer home to Pilate this marvellous idea —which he passed by, but might have apprehended if he would— of a kingdom which was not of this world, the Lord adds a word

[1] Dietz Evang.-Predigten, S. 333.

[2] As, according to Eusebius, the relatives of Jesus answered Domitian—"that His kingdom was not secular or earthly, but heavenly and angelic."

the design of which was to say—The proof that I speak the truth, *stands before thee* in My person, which even in bonds produces this influence upon thee. Behold, I say unto thee, whether thou believe it or not—I, the King, am bound by My own free will! If My kingdom were of this world, I should not stand,—with this majesty and calmness which thou art constrained to feel in the word "*My kingdom*"—before thee without defence, and be thus accused unto death! Then would My servants fight, that I should not to delivered unto the Jews! Let it be observed, first, that the Lord must *now* alas renounce these Jews, and place Himself, though their King, in opposition to them as His enemies, and even as having power over Him:—This is the supplementary answer to Pilate's ironical expression, "thy people," which admits that this people, alas, hate and reject their King. But what is the meaning of παραδοθῶ, *be delivered?* Was He not already in the power of the Jews, delivered up to them by the traitor; and ought it not to have been said—that I should not be further delivered up *unto thee?* Many understand the words—Then would My servants have fought, that I should not have been delivered up; then it would not have come to this, they should not have brought Me unto thee. Now if ἠγωνίζοντο would bear this meaning, the ἵνα μὴ παραδοθῶ would not, especially if it be compared with ch. xix. 16, where the Evangelist probably speaks according to the very words of Christ. We say, therefore, with Lücke, that "Jesus was not yet (in the sense here meant) delivered to the Jews;" and hold to the translation—*decertarent*, they *would* fight. Bengel says convincingly: "that I should not be delivered—this was done by Pilate, ver. 31." The Lord speaks by anticipation, warning the conscience of the unjust Pilate, though He knew it to be in vain, against that which would take place. He at the same time time graciously indicates the Jews, and not Pilate who delivered Him unto them, to be the proper originators and agents of his impending death.

Further, who are the ὑπηρέται, the servants of whom He speaks? For, indeed, to a *king* and a *kingdom* there must belong, not merely subjects, but agents to maintain its authority, *fighters*.[1]

[1] Hence, following the ordinary exposition of this word, Luther finds in it a confirmation of the righteousness of war; see Kahler's dritten Luth. Katechismus, S. 420.

His poor and weak disciples have been supposed to be meant, but the notion that they might fight for Him is altogether inappropriate, even if they are hypothetically referred to: if He would not speak about them when questioned by Annas, wherefore would He begin to speak about them to Pilate without any necessity?[1] It has been said that servants of this world must be meant, as the kingdom spoken of is here assumed to be such. Consequently—The host of My dependents, who hailed my entry into the city, would have gone further at My will—then should I have had another and more powerful body at my disposal, and all these Jews together might have been made my dependents! But all this is inappropriate, especially the latter, because in the same clause He places Himself in opposition to these Jews, who will not have Him even as their king, and only as *enemies* desire to have Him. The thought of Roos is a strange one:—"He might indeed have been able to bring together a great multitude out of Galilee, Trachonitis, Ituræa, and Peræa—against those Jewish enemies in Jerusalem!" We think that these ὑπηρέται must have a specific meaning, and that they must belong to *His person*, as such being distinguished from the subjects whom He seeks. In the *second* clause the *if it were of this world* is not to be taken in its strictest and fullest sense; but merely means, with reference to the inference which was to be drawn—If I went forth to a kingdom after the manner of the kingdoms of this world. And then it is very plain—If that were My will, *My* servants would stand ready to protect Me, and to seize the world for Me. Can we not understand now what He means? They are, like Himself, *ministers who are not* of *this world*—(Bengel)—whose warfare would be therefore all the more effectual and victorious. They are the legions of angels,[2] of whom He thinks, recalling the word which He had spoken when He was taken. Nor must we, with Lampe, unite the two, the holy angels and His disciples: they are the angels alone. If it be said that this would have been language unintelligible to Pilate, the objection is not true; for to such a power and dignity as that

[1] *In this* we assent to Weisse, that the disciples would have been (not, *were*) here very inappropriately termed "servants."

[2] As Kleuker says, Mensch. Vers. ueber den Sohn Gottes. S. 234. And Luthardt is glad in this instance to agree with our exposition.

of which the Lord here speaks to the Gentile, such supernatural ministering agencies belong, and the heathen notions had much that was analogous. It is, in fact, perfectly appropriate that the Lord should direct Pilate's thoughts, by such a mysterious expression, to higher and more mighty contending agencies. Yet He speaks this word concerning the help of His servants in the same spirit of humble condescension as we observed in Matt. xxvi. 53; for He, strictly speaking, needed no foreign assistance at all. The fundamental meaning, however, is intelligible and plain—Thou seest that I defend not Myself, it is otherwise than thus with My kingdom! And while He thus speaks He is Himself fighting that good fight of patience which alone became Him; and thus He founds and wins for Himself His kingdom in this world.

Finally, He repeats in the third clause, and with the greatest patience, knowing well how hard it will be to Pilate, the same truth, *My kingdom—not of this world.* At the close, however, He changes the expression into ἐντεῦθεν—from hence—as it were like a heavenly being looking down upon the earth and its kingdoms; so that with this we may connect the commencing internal preparation for the question of the Gentile—*whence art thou?* (Fikenscher's narrow interpretation is very unworthy—"Here among the Jews and Gentiles I found not My kingdom; *here* there are none of its members." It is, moreover, untrue, for the Lord is not speaking of *where* but *whence* His kingdom is; and it is His will to found His kingdom wherever He testifies of it). It is another question, whether *now* refers to time, and leaves room for a future in which it would be otherwise with the Lord's kingdom than *it was then.* The Romish exposition, which seizes upon the *nunc autem* of the Vulg. in order to support by it the claim of the subsequent external secular Catholicism to be the kingdom of Christ, needs no refutation from us; but the *now* has been pressed with a good evangelical intention, by those who have not, however, perceived the true force of the clause. Krummacher maintains that the little word "*now*" points evidently to a time in which the kingdom of our Lord would assume a quite different position upon earth from the present; but we ask according to the *context*—Will it be actually a *different* one from that which the Lord described as being "not of this world?"

Looking closely at the word, a kingdom *of this world, ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου τούτου*, that is, just *ἐντεῦθεν, thence*, it will never be; such a *tacit opposition* as that maintained, therefore, is impossible. Thus the *νῦν* is here, as often, a *jam vero* or *atqui;* as Bengel says, an adversative particle, not referring to time—*but.* According to B.-Crusius, "But now, as it stands"—more plainly, Thou seest by My standing before thee, without the fighting of My servants, of what kind My kingdom is! It was a demonstration to the eyes, which evermore goes on, in that the mighty power of His kingdom approves itself *in* the world of which it is not. Indeed, the corner stone was rejected, but thereby became the head of the corner: this is the marvel before our eyes. Indeed, the rejection and external powerlessness still continues; but the stone cut out without hands smites the image of earthly monarchies upon its feet; and it becomes the great mountain which alone filleth the earth. (Dan. ii.) For, if the kingdoms of the world become the kingdom of our Lord and His Christ, the world ceases to be *this* world, and is the *world to come* become present. But that will finally prove it to be *not from hence,* as having overcome all that is *hence.*

This goes beyond Pilate's understanding and ideas; not beyond his power of comprehension as such, if he had willed, but beyond his will to understand. Another world? A kingdom and a power from thence, yet present *here;* in the person of this king before his eyes who refers to invisible ministers, and yet *not from hence?* No fighting with his enemies, who are still his people, but entire surrender to them; and withal the uninterrupted power and dignity of a king in his kingdom? A *regnum in regno* that must be tolerated and acknowledged? This man —even in such a sense nevertheless a *king?* This word, though the Lord had not expressly used it, clings to him; and his question, besides being the wondering question of a doubting man who would know more, retains the word as being of most concernment to him in his judicial capacity. (Thus it relaxed for a moment the former question—What hast thou *done?*) But it must not be understood as they interpret it, who, misunderstanding the thought and feeling of Pilate at the present crisis, regard it as attributing to Jesus the assumption of the kingly *title!* Could such a thought have been entertained with regard to this

merely "anointed" king, who, moreover, would not that any kingdom should be fought for? Nor is the common opinion right, which the poet Pape expresses—"The Roman laughs, and will not spare his wit." Nor that of Luthardt (who seems generally to misunderstand and depreciate Pilate), who says, "Jesus had not impressed His character on the Roman; He was still no more than an object of ridicule." Nor, again, that of Teschendorff, who would mingle something of warning with the mockery,—"Beware of this incautious word; it may be thy ruin!"[1] But the question, while it may have some very slight admixture of mockery, is in its predominant feeling *earnest;* otherwise, as Olshausen remarks, the earnestness of the Lord's answer would have been inappropriate. "His spirit was touched, the being of Christ impresses itself upon him." He therefore says, in only a half question—Thou art indeed *thus* a king! *Οὐκοῦν* is a deduction, not a mere *οὐκουν*. In this the momentary feeling expresses itself—Thou seemest to be, and speakest like, one who is a king from above, as if there were in truth such another world!

It is only when we thus understand it, that we can seize rightly the sense in which the answer *here* once more runs—*Σὺ λέγεις*:[2] not, as was said before, quite identical with *Σὺ εἶπας*, and yet in a good sense closely bordering upon it. Thou thyself feelest something in it to be acknowledged and confessed, since thou thus returnest to the question. The *ὅτι* which is connected with it is no more than in Lu. xxii. 70 dependent upon the *λέγειν*—Thou sayest it thyself that I am a king; but the testifying *I am*, carried on by the new *Ἐγώ*, is the assertion of Christ himself.[3] Still stronger than in Lu. xxii. 70, this *ὅτι* is essentially the reason for the *saying*, which is approved of. Lucke agrees in this with Stephanus and Beza—Thou sayest it, *for* I am a

[1] Sepp's opinion is the most perverted of all—that Pilate regarded the answer as an evasion, Jesus not arrogating the dominion of the "world," like the Romans, but only that of the Jews!—as if the Romans could tolerate even that, or as if *κόσμος* would be thus understood by a Roman!

[2] This reason for our view Luthardt leaves unconsidered.

[3] The passage is quite disturbed if we suppose with Tholuck that St John added *that I am a king* only for explanation. Heinsius and Gataker made the *Sayest* a question—that is, the Lord repels it!

king! And this is not merely "justification of the affirmative" in purely logical connection, but a bringing forward of the *enforced acknowledgment* from its background in the question—I know it well, thou dost not really ask, thy very question affirms it unto thyself, thou hast a presentiment and feeling of it, *because I am* a king! We might, indeed, finally, give to the word of Jesus the strong emphasis which Richter expresses—"A king *I am*—there is essentially no true *king* or ruler beside Me."

And now the Lord begins to make a more direct application of His words to the spirit of His hearer, thus made attentive; He gives him the plainest and most sublime testimony in that first declaration and announcement which the whole Gentile world, and, indeed, natural humanity generally, must hear. He no longer abides in the negative, which the former words had held fast—A worldly king I am not; but adds to it now the plainest positive assertion. It is necessary, however, that He should speak so as a heathen may understand. He therefore does not proceed at once with the kingdom of God, or call Himself the Son of the Living God, or Him who was to come according to Israelitish prophecy:—although apostolical preaching afterwards, resting upon the fact of the resurrection and accompanied with the Holy Spirit, commenced its appeal, with perfect propriety, by the announcement to the Gentile world of the only God, and His Son come into the world. But here, in opposition to the full offence of the humiliation, powerlessness, and rejection by His people of the king of the Jews, the Lord appeals in His word to the most internal feeling of a heathen coming to Him susceptible of good; and speaks only at first, though in that comprehending all else, of the *truth*. He does not appeal as yet to the need of *salvation* for sinful humanity—which, however, while the law and the prophets awakened a sense of it more fully, slumbered in the unconscious souls of all the heathen—and therefore say, extending already the Messianic preaching to all the world, *salvation cometh of the Jews*. But, instead of this, He assumes more elementarily man's practical need for his mind and thought, that which is most immediately felt and acknowledged: *Truth—cometh from above*. Thus does His condescending wisdom and love lay hold on that one thing in this poor Pilate by which he might be laid hold on, had he been willing. The word concerning the *kingdom* was

spoken to the statesman and Roman; the word concerning the *truth* follows for the educated philosopher in the statesman, for the "Greek," inasmuch as the Greek element of investigation and questioning after wisdom (1 Cor. i. 22) was at that time blended with the Roman, and even presented the fundamental character of the Gentile world prepared for the gospel:—hence, although the power and dominion were with the Romans, the Gentiles in the New Testament are called not Romans but Greeks.[1] Consequently, the Lord lays hold of the *man*, the seeking and inquiring man, in Pilate, when he testifies and sets before him a Truth, which is such unconditionally, the only sure and all-answering truth.

But this truth, if it is to be given back to a world sunk in delusion and doubt, can come to it only through a *person*, and one who has all the truth in Himself, who therefore can stand *as a king* before every man, and command the homage to Himself of all "truth," or all that may yet remain in man of the truth. In the personal consciousness is the contradiction of fantasy or doubt; in one personal consciousness, therefore, must the possession of present, certain truth come forward, and testifying to itself communicate the truth. That which every philosopher, who deems himself to have found the *final* great conclusion and presents himself with his doctrine, assumes to be—a Messiah of knowledge, a king in the kingdom of thought—that Christ truly *is*, and *in this* consists the beginning of His Messianic dignity and power over us as "Master of instruction;" only that we have to mark *what* He teaches, and how *His* "truth" is altogether and from its first principles practical and redeeming, *the truth concerning salvation.*

The reduplicated Ἐγώ, the second being a continuous resumption of the first, is a very characteristic point in the present saying, and we must not lose either of them by any various reading: *I* am a king—*I* witness to the truth! Thus now already,—while Christ stands bound before Pilate, and declares beforehand that He will be delivered to the Jews to be put to

[1] Lange finds in ver. 34 the general thought that the Romans, with all their might and energy, yet in their religion, philosophy, and poetry heard only what others "told them."

death, and will surrender Himself without the defence of His heavenly servants—*now already*, before He sits at the right hand of God, He hath the kingdom and is King. For even when He sits upon the throne of His power, He will send forth his servants equipped from above to fight for no other kingdom than that which consists of subjects who have been vanquished by the truth in the freedom of their spirits. Grotius on Matt.: "When Jesus here confesses Himself to be a king, it seems to me that He cannot deny that His kingdom in some way had *already commenced*, when He began to teach the truth; for thus does He interpret the kingdom in St John." In the "*I am*" of His person, sanctified of the Father and sent into the world, the three offices, the gradual unfolding of which followed after, were already from the beginning included in one. Not till the end of the days will it be said in all its fulness—The Lord is king, all things are subject to Him; it was not till His ascension that He went up to the throne and assumed His kingdom (Lu. xix. 12); —but He is already in the *prophetic office* more than a prophet, the *King* born to be a Ruler, and already beginning to rule. In this sense (which does not exclude all that follows from it, but rather presupposes all the rest *as* following from it) the Lord strictly *connects His Kingly dignity* with His prophetic authority, desiring *now at the first* only an acknowledgment of the truth. He even recommends, as much as possible, His prophetic office to the heathen philosophy of the natural man (who is not already an Israelite) by adopting in his language the seeming abstraction ἀλήθεια, *truth*, which, however, for us includes the entire fulness of the living God and His salvation. For the Romans, the people of action, inquired, in common with the Greeks, to whose doctrines the conquerors submitted, after truth. The philosopher in man—according to the best and highest significance of that beautiful word—can only *seek* the truth, with a longing *love* for what he cannot find: it is the original instinct, which still remains in man, and yearns for its gratification in its original reality. But Christ gives man the truth, or bears *witness* for the truth. He does not seek it in the fellowship of the great spirits of men; He does not, like Socrates, teach the common people about it; He does not, like Plato, utter presentiments and poetry concerning it; but He *testifies* in the absolute sense, as He de-

clared, ch. iii. 11, in opposition to Nicodemus, and as the Baptist, ch. iii. 32, pointing to Jesus confirmed His words.

Thus while He was born and came into the world for the redemption of mankind, He was born and came into the world *for this purpose*, that He should bear witness to the truth. As an announcer of the truth, He is already "a *born* King, no pretender or usurper of a throne;" His dignity and authority was His original heritage from above and from eternity, in the highest sense of the words: for office and person are one in Him. If this *birth* of a woman placed Him ἐν ὁμοιώματι on a level with other erring, seeking, failing, sinful men,—so that the question of doubt might be uttered, But how comest thou to be the sole son of Adam who can confront us with such an assertion concerning thyself?—we find the profound and necessary counterpart declared in His testimony, *And come into the world.* The being born and the coming into the world are by no means one and the same, as if Christ spoke only in the common phrase,—*improper*, if strictly considered,—which terms origination in the world a *coming* into it.[1] There is, moreover, no other distinction which will satisfy the words: they must be left in their simple truth. *Not* that which understands "the permanent continuance in the world" after the first "crisis of birth"—for could that be spoken of with ἐλήλυθα, I came? Nor "the public manifestation, the ἀνάδειξις"—for the antithesis of *another* world in the former saying is still retained here. Least of all does Lange's interpretation satisfy the words—"Born to this end alone, and to this end alone *elected* or sent; thus a king in the whole right as well of birth as of election and destination." For a right of election can be referred to Christ's kingly dignity only in as far as the *Father* sends, appoints, and anoints Him; but to a heathen who knows not God, He cannot say—*Sent* into the world: He therefore adheres to the simple "*come*," and plainly declares Himself thereby to have been a personality of Divine origin, pre-existent before His human birth. Compare what has been already said

[1] In *our* way of speaking—"coming into the world"—there seems to be an indistinct vague apprehension of a pre-existent I, the origination of, which out of nothing we are slow to receive, because utterly unable to apprehend. Still more plainly is it heard in the people's "*jung werden.*"

upon Jno. xvi. 28, which is the authentic real-parallel of this expression. See further ch. viii. 42, 23, 58, iii. 31, xvii. 5, 24. *Born* as *man*, as thou seest Me standing before thee, a man; *come*, as at the same time more than man, from that *other* world of which My kingdom is, and of which, consequently, as thou mayest conclude, My person also is! Here we have then the foundation of the *whence* of Pilate's last question. Moreover, the having come from the invisible world of reality and certainty must be regarded as a necessary condition in order to the testifying of the truth; hence the second εἰς τοῦτο, to this end, with a stronger emphasis in its repetition.

That all men who are simply born into the world err from the truth is a plain fact of experience; and it is equally certain that the *word* "truth" still extant among men, testifies of a reality which men are seeking. Thus it is to be remarked, as Kleuker writes, that "Jesus calls himself the king of truth, in the sense in which all men are liars"—that is, He convicts us of our apostasy from the living God, of our fall from communion with heaven; and *hence* He guides our falseness, opposing Himself to us as come from above with the truth.[1] He does not say here expressly, as finally to His disciples, *I am* the truth; but we must not, therefore, assume with B.-Crusius: "He does not represent Himself as the *Ruler*, but rather the Truth; Himself being its representative and *Deputy!*" His express and emphatically repeated words—βασιλεύς εἰμι ἐγώ, ἐγὼ γεγέννημαι, ἐλήλυθα—declare what is the reality, that He *bears personally in Himself* that truth to which He testifies, and consequently that He is identical with it. For He would rule by making the truth supreme; and the kingdom, in which the truth is made known,

[1] Kleuker said further, what we may still read: "Thus, when humanity is presented as born of the white foam of philosophy, like a Venus clad in the vestment of Platonic virtue, and its character is dishonoured and desecrated into a lie—its sentimentality takes umbrage, and demands that at least such a spirit of evil should not be otherwise cast out than by a sacrifice to the graces. *And yet* this philosophical humanity, despite all its preciousness, and all the delicacy of its taste, would, through the remains of womanly shame, be constrained to confess that she—in a thousandfold sense a consecrated priestess of the truth—is nevertheless, in the anointed eye of the King of the Jews, and in the enlightened understanding of the Hellenist philosopher, no other than a *liar*."

is *His* kingdom. He does not say *bear witness to truth*, but, with a fine distinction, *to the truth*—τῇ—so that He places the truth in its highest objectivity, as it were in the place of the living God, and as if above Himself; but He at the same time arrogates for His own personality, which He adduces as the *ground* of the confident μαρτυρεῖν, such a unity with this truth, that every one who is so disposed, may understand it perfectly in the same meaning as all that He elsewhere, especially in St John, testifies *for Himself* and *of Himself*.

There is another world—that was the testimony of the former words. There is a *truth*, which is *the* truth simply, excluding all that contradicts it—this He testifies now. And also that there was a truth of God for man's salvation extant in Israel, to which it was His office to bear witness. (But not of itself *the* truth in its entireness, Jesus *only* bearing witness to that truth, as Krummacher too strongly expresses it.) We know of course that He means *saving truth* in order to man's happiness, and no such system of dogmatics as abides in cold and moonlight elevation, leaving poor man below still bound in misery and contradiction with himself, and thus an actual lie to himself. And this word [illegible] attests it, inasmuch as it is indeed His will to rule, to work in the hearts of His subjects obedience to the truth in order to the obtaining of a kingdom within them. Thus it is with perfect propriety, and for the present time very appropriately, that Tholuck[1] makes *this* kingly word rebuke another word of a king, which, however ill-conceived originally, has been still worse perverted, viz. "that *every man* is able to get happiness in *his own* fashion. This is the truth, witnesses Christ, that I am the redeeming, restoring King of humanity, who point the way and give the life; *all other* is the lie, *against* which I bear witness.[2] This is the

[1] Four sermons on the tendencies of the age. Halle 1845.

[2] The Jews had a suggestive fancy that in אֱמֶת, the first, middle, and last letter of the alphabet testified of God, who is the beginning, middle, and end. To *understand* this is better than to ridicule it by saying—Are we then Jews? I would fain, in a Christian-Jewish manner, add my tribute to this, and say: The metrical books אֱמֶת, teach us that the *beginning* of truth and wisdom is found in the way of Job, the process of its knowledge in the *Proverbs* of wisdom, while the end and goal of all is the *Psalms of praise*.

truth in which we (according to ch. xvii. 17, 19) are sanctified, through him who has sanctified Himself for us. His word has this extension even here; but now He cannot at once utter it so fully and plainly; He goes not beyond the word appropriate to the beginning of all—Bear witness unto the truth. Compare the words in the *royal Psalm*, Ps. xlv. 5.

First of all—that we may now return from the breadth and depth of the word for the whole *world* and humanity (for the truth must be testified ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, to Jews and Gentiles alike), to the first apprehension of its meaning in Pilate's case—first of all, the Lord thereby told him, as an answer to his question brought in afterwards—"*This* is what I have *done*, this is my offence; judge thou whether it be a crime or a merit. I have borne witness to the truth, as I was born for this cause, and for this cause have come; *therefore* also the Jews hate me, and bring their charge against me, hypocrites and unjust as thou knowest them well to be. Then give thou also, as a judge, in the name of the Roman βασιλεὺς or καῖσαρ, honour to truth and right!" When the Lord designated speaking (and acting) for the truth as *kingly*—"His answer paid honour to all the kings of the earth, as He thus placed Himself by their side." (So does Daub beautifully and penetratingly expound it). For is not that their highest, their most proper and true vocation? As Lange similarly says: "Every king is, according to the idea of the term, a born and called *witness*, that is, he was the first historical witness and champion for the idea of his kingdom." But this does not altogether touch the point which Daub had in view,—the equal obligation of all kings to bear witness to that one rightful truth, and truthful right, which He represents who is the King of kings, and by which it is His will to bring all kingdoms into subjection to His sway, and make all who rule upon earth ministers of His kingdom. Wisd. vi. 1—4; Prov. viii. 14—16. Let this more fundamentally explain the word above—I am a *king!*

The Lord, further, says to Pilate, indirectly at least—"I do not deny or conceal it, it is the truth that I am a king; I tell thee the pure truth as to the sense in which I am such; I avow and witness before thee the whole counsel and mystery of My person, born and come into the world, and of My whole course of life and action: all this I can no more deny than I can deny

Myself. I stand now before thee, openly and truly, that which I *am!* Shouldst thou be willing with false kindness to open for Me a way of evasion and escape—I am not such an one as could adopt it!" What dignity, what majestic serenity in the personal Truth, come down from above, which stands here bound before the judge!

Finally, let it be carefully noted that the Lord does not by any means term Himself a "king of *the truth*," and His kingdom a "kingdom *of truth*," in that superficial, adjective sense which is so common in human language concerning it;—but He uses the word, so to speak, in its strict *substantive* meaning. Again, we may say, if we rightly understand what we say, that the goal and end of the completed and absolute supremacy of His kingdom is the supremacy of truth unto righteousness; but if even this be taken in its superficial meaning, it becomes an untruth. It is not that "the end of His mission is the spreading the truth among men;" but, to sanctify and perfect men in themselves and thus in the truth of their humanity, that is, in their renewed fellowship with God. Not that "His kingdom exists *only* in the spread of the truth;" but this first spreading of the truth, which He here calls bearing testimony to it, is *only* the beginning in order to the establishment of the actual *kingdom*. Neander is much more correct: "the witness to the truth is defined to be the means for the establishment of His kingdom." It is *almost* like the humble reply of the Baptist to the *What sayest thou of thyself?*—I am the voice of one crying in the wilderness; but here the Lord speaks more as a king in the humility of that truth, which, while it asserts its rightful supremacy as truth, will rule only where it is acknowledged—I testify, I speak; these are My weapons, this is My power, and this is what I have done![1]

But let not this be despised, for it is the highest and most important of all authority! Can the truth more royally reign than by its testimony? Is there any king more real than he who rules by the sceptre of his lips? If in the domain of falsehood and unrighteousness there is yet "a power in words" which is above all power of arms—how great must be the power of words

[1] Compare Hoffmann's similar correct exposition, Schriftbeweis ii. 111.

in the lips of the incarnate Word Himself, how great the victorious authority of the self-attesting eternal Truth! *Here* is obedience and rule, and nowhere else. In all the empires of this world there is constraint and delusion, continual conflict of contradiction; but where hearts and consciences obey in the obedience of truth, there is true *empire*, and its king has true *obedience*. Not that even this King can constrain the obedience of *all*; for the power of untruth is great in humanity, and manifests itself in many to the highest extent of contradiction, which He now bears with patiently, but will one day condemn. Nevertheless He says—*Every man* that is of the truth heareth My voice! be he who he may, by whatever name known, Jew or Gentile, king or poor man. This He now speaks to the heart and conscience of *Pilate*, for the time is come when he might hear; the hour in which an influence and a testimony comes to him from above which he might obey if he would. By no means is it as Bengel misapprehends—"Jesus appeals from the blindness of Pilate to the susceptibility of believers;" but as Olshausen better apprehends the love of the condescending Redeemer (which is quite consistent with the consciousness that it is in vain): "This word was evidently intended to attract Pilate himself, and to induce him to avow himself a subject of Christ as a friend of truth." *Of the truth* is only another expression for *of God*, ch. viii. 47, so that we may refer here to all that was said there and upon ch. x. 27.[1] The condition on the part of men could not be wanting here, being in this as in all essential. He who with conscientious sincerity *desires* and *seeks* the right truth for his inmost need, that is, for his help against delusion and sin, the living truth which is unto righteousness, is so far already *of* the truth, and will consequently with a willing spirit obediently hear its voice and follow it. Tholuck: "he is a thoroughly and absolutely sincere man against himself." And Lutz. (Bib. Dog. S. 193) very truly says: "it is His kingdom, which he *gathers together* by means of the testimony which He bears to it; it is a kingdom of truth, without political, external force, *out of*

[1] But not already "*a being born* of the truth," as Ficker wrongly apprehends the expression in one of his otherwise beautiful five sermons on the Doubters of the New Testament. The first, predominating love to truth is far from being the full living and standing in truth.

the element of most internal *sincerity of the mind's bias toward God;* a kingdom of that highest truth, bywhich man lays hold of God himself." For, in reality, the seeking and laying hold of God is alone truth in man. And as certainly as man was created after God and for God, and is still capable of being brought back to Him, so certainly *is there* such a "truth" in us, which goes out toward that "truth" which Jesus now bears witness to and brings. Then it is twofold and yet but one, because it is one in its ultimate principle. A man who sincerely seeks and learns is indeed already a subject of the truth, and is prepared to be drawn to Christ; even as all the sheep which He already has as the Shepherd, know Him when they hear His voice. But the sincerity of a sinful man will begin with the feeling and consciousness of *sin*, as may be seen in Cornelius; *alas, Pilate here becomes the counterpart and opposite of Cornelius.* The sincere came then, and for a while longer, through Israel, without being offended at Judaism, to Christ; they come now through Christ to Israel. All these are simply voluntary and *free* subjects, other than such the heavenly and true King desireth not; but, glancing at these through all the world and through all time, He speaks now before Pilate, at once with sublime resignation and all-comprehensive extension of His authority—"Askest thou for My subjects? Every soul, which voluntarily and of the truth hearkens to *My* truth, is My subject; there are *few* of them, and yet *everywhere many*,—as thou wilt receive it."

We may now be permitted to consider a little more deeply the result or rather the resultlessness of this witness to Pilate, and mark the word by which he replied to it; for that word must be studied as, indirectly at least, assisting our proper estimate of the word of Jesus. Pilate was not of the truth, to hear this voice and to receive this testimony! Although his secret feeling of Divine things and the truth was afterwards again impressed by the Son of God, in the veiled lowliness of the *Ecce Homo*, yet his second rejection of the truth was already prepared for and decided in his first rejection. *What is truth?* This is his question; did he put it "after having kept silence and pondered a

while?" This seems to us scarcely probable; but it is possible, and that would then, alas, only aggravate his guilt. Everything depends on the spirit in which we put this question. There are some who would do no more than ask: their delight is to seek, everlastingly to seek and never to find! Who (according to the well-known avowal of Lessing) would reject the right hand with the truth offered in it, and ask rather the left hand with the joy of seeking and for ever straining after the truth.[1] There are those who make for themselves a truth in the stead of that which is genuine, and then either indolently repose upon it, or angrily quarrel about it. There are those who vainly imagine that they have found it, or vainly deny that there is any truth to be found; and others, again, who, with the greatest folly of all, leave its existence, or non-existence, an undecided question in their own minds. There are those, finally, who seek and ask with such intense earnestness, that, sooner or later, the answer cannot escape them. To these last Pilate certainly did not belong—to which class then are we to assign him? "Concerning his philosophico-judicial humour, nothing is canonically decided"—we must admit with Kleuker, yet we may freely state our own opinion under correction.

And, first, it is certainly true that he did not ask in earnest; not "with intent to wait for and receive an answer," or to be able to apprehend better that which he had received;[2] for he does not give time for any reply at all. *And when he had said this*, writes St John, he went out again to the Jews. Thus his seeming question was not so much an actual *question* as an exclamation, self-answering, and ending the matter. "The question was thrown out as anything but a question"—says Lange. Thus we cannot attribute to this questioner even

[1] We read literally in Lessing, "with doubt and the urgent impulse toward truth, though with the danger of for ever going astray!"

[2] This, however, was the opinion of many of the Fathers, and followed by Erasmus, Grotius, &c. Immediately after putting the question, it struck his mind how much time was necessary for the reply;—hence he sought first to set Jesus free, that he might afterwards hear Him further! Grotius says—"He asked *by the way*, but not to press then the inquiry;" and Lampe, "with singular instability he immediately changed his mind." But such change of mind in two successive moments is altogether unimaginable.

"curiosity," that perilous and yet ofttimes useful succedaneum of a desire to know. His abrupt breaking off is itself the "holding the truth in unrighteousness" (Rom. i. 18):—for otherwise he would have thought more deeply and fixedly of the profound solemnity of this universal question for every man, and would have awaited the answer, which had already been offered, as supplying the need of his soul; he would have been smitten and held fast by the internal consciousness of his own uncertainty in the presence of this confident one, and of his own guilt in the presence of this innocent one; he would at least have brought, instead of this vague and desultory no-question, his own best and deepest questions of conscience, as the Samaritan woman had done. Yea, then would Christ have given answer—and what an answer[1] would the world have received from His lips—an answer of which it was not worthy:—a root and centre word, inconceivable and unsearchable by us, uniting in a new light all that the entire Scriptures now testify in answer!

We think that Pilate did not ask his question as a *philosopher*, strictly so called, who had without satisfaction investigated all existing systems. Indeed, it would not necessarily follow, even in that case, that he would be willing "to occupy his mind about the system of Jesus in addition to all the rest;" for Jesus was a *Jew*, and, moreover, he who has been disappointed a hundred times would be rather disinclined to hear for the hundred and first time. But such a view of the Procurator's mental education is itself historically improbable. Certainly he did not throw out the rejecting question as a man "washed with all waters" in theory and practice, in system and life. Thus not as an absolute doubter, as is sometimes said, or as a systematic sceptic; for as such he would have said still more proudly and decidedly, either at once or in addition to his question, There is *no* truth![2] That

[1] Far above all human thoughts, according to which Tauler thought that *one* could not better answer such a question than by—*truth is truth.*

[2] Pilate is "too feeble to believe in truth, and too feeble altogether to deny it," as Tholuck says. Luthardt's expressions are certainly too strong: "This trait of scornful contempt of everything which might appear like enthusiasm, indicates a man jaded and worn out." This better suits Herod than Pilate, though not strictly applicable even to him.

is, indeed, the fundamental meaning of his word, but still it is not spoken altogether in that style. Further, we are scarcely justified in attributing to the unhappy Pilate, as a historical personage, anything like conscious mockery, as if he heedlessly said —"Forsooth, thou speakest of truth!" He does not seem to speak in the "common and frivolous spirit of such mockers," at a crisis which had certainly been preceded by a moment of deep impression: there is a certain undeniable tone of *sorrow* to be discerned in his abrupt breaking off. It is not Pilate's *will* to mock of set purpose; and yet it resolves itself into that, because he does not yield himself to the earnestness of the question—and in that lay his sin! The poet Pape so understands it when he says, "The Roman feels himself moved and pressed by conscience; but he mocks back his heart's best feelings." For notwithstanding the weight of meaning which is attached to the word *truth* by this questioner, who, seeking no reply, recoils as it were from his own question, there is yet in the question itself "evidence of a certain latent contempt of the truth in his heart," and indeed contrary to the truth of his heart. His instant astonishment echoes the great word which he had heard, and puts it again in the form of a question; but the next feeling gives it an ironical tone—*What is it?* Ficker's arrangement of the whole in the sermon before alluded to is in the main right: "This question of Pilate is by no means evidence of a heart which would seek the truth; nor of a heart which, tired of seeking, despairs of truth altogether; but of a heart which is generally indifferent about it, and therefore, even before the face of Truth in Christ, *closes itself* against it." That he does not, like Christ, speak of "*the* truth" is very characteristic and natural; for that would be already admitting too much, and with such an admission his rejection of it would not be consistent. The comprehensive and specific Article in "being of *the* truth" presupposes of itself something which was wanting to Pilate; the same Article in "holding *the* truth in unrighteousness" is only the revealing explanation of the Judge and Searcher of hearts, who brings to light and stamps that which men wilfully conceal from themselves: see Rom. ii. 16. The natural man knows and mentions only *truths*, God's word and revelation knows of only one, the truth; in this central Singular lies the point of decision be-

tween the hearing and not hearing. He who confesses to one objective and real "truth," which is not to be created by himself, is so far *on* his way to *the* truth; *the truth* is, properly speaking, never contended against, doubted of, or attacked by those who are sincere and in earnest, but sought even in the midst of greatest errors which have its semblance: it may indeed be *hated, scorned,* and *persecuted,* but it is by those who well know what they do.

The τί ἐστιν is not to be interpreted, with Grotius, *cujus generis, of what kind,*—as if the question had this force: of what kind of truth speakest thou then, of philosophical, moral, religious, political, or the like? Oh no, it is a negativing no-question, which has *there is none* for its secret meaning; but as such it is capable of a manifold further interpretation or development. Let us attempt this, taking as our basis the masterly note of Meyer, which briefly sums up the whole, and needs but to be made somewhat more complete. First, *generally:* who has explored *what* truth is, and found it, so as to be able to say like thee "*the* truth?" No man! Thou speakest as of a certain thing—I must alas add, There lies the *question* itself! "Truth is an empty word"—Neander explains; but it is also a great word, and seems to have great attraction for man, for ever exciting his pursuit in vain! What (after so many failures) dost thou understand by the word? But this, though the first impulse of Pilate's abrupt mind, and containing some slight admixture of good feeling, is not all, for in that case the questioner would have tarried for an answer, even in mere curiosity. The question despatches the matter in another way—To what end is all this? What is truth *for the practice, for the life?* Thus, Of what worth is it? Who cares for it? Who will hear it? And then, quite rightly, of what use and service is it? *Here* enters in the suppression of conscience as influencing the practice, the denial of the most internal impulse of his spirit toward life; and in this he thinks himself wiser than any one who should stand out a *witness for the truth,* and whom he would only commiserate (Prov. xxvi. 16). Luther: "Oh, if thou wilt meddle with truth simply, thou art lost." It is as if he said: I now understand why thou dost not succeed with thy people—how wretched may be thy lot through such fanaticism! And then adds, as it were,

with some touch of compassion: But I at least will do thee no harm on that account! For almost one and the same with this is the application which now follows—What is truth as it regards the kingdom of action? that is, What *political* import has it? Bengel well says (though it is but a partial interpretation of the saying itself), "Pilate thinks that the mention of truth does not square with the word concerning the *kingdom*. He can connect a kingdom with *power*, but not with truth." He will not know or acknowledge the power of truth to make free, nor its supremacy over the lie of authority; he therefore signifies that dealing with truth simply is *as foolish as it is harmless*. Hence the expression of wonder "that Jesus should speak so strongly of a mere kingdom of truth" (as Hess says); and at the same time of a kind of contempt which acquits one who is complained against *merely* on account of "truth."

This leads us, consequently, to the third critical point in the matter—What signifies truth *here in this judgment?* Thou appearest to me to be such a king as the Stoics mean—The wise man is the only king! or, more strongly put in Lange's style: "Now, the kingdom of truth is an etherial and shadowy fairy-realm; he who will be king there, rules over an innocent other-world of pious fantasy—and can do no harm to the Roman eagles!" But because this Jesus has, nevertheless, been brought before him for judgment with so much ado, there mingles with this feeling of indifference in his mind something of vexation on account of the perplexity of the case; as if he should say—I am not appointed governor for such matters as these! This may explain in some sense the "anger" with which, according to Lange, he throws out the question; for what passed before could scarcely have excited it. This displeasure, finally, is heightened in a *fourth* meaning of the question, which must not be omitted: we must close the swift succession of the thoughts which expressed themselves in it by connecting with the primary question, What is truth *generally*—What is truth *in thy lips thou King of the Jews?* Your Jewish truth—am I then a Jew?—with all your contention about it, shall never move my mind. If our philosophers and the Greeks have never found it—shall this salvation forsooth come at last from you? This last may be regarded as finally turning the scale, and leading Pilate to dis-

miss the subject; but it is certainly not the only thought which was in his mind when he put a question which, with all it folly, was so full of importance. All that we have been mentioning passed, though it may be half unconsciously, through his mind when he uttered it.

Thus then he speaks, to sum up all, as a man in reality indifferent to the truth, or who decides finally to be so now. Thus *truth*, that great, engrossing, empty word, is of no more value to him than the God of the Jews and their Messiah. He is not a Jew—alas, also, not one who seeketh after God in the sense of Rom. ii. 29—but a true exemplar of a heathen, as heathens then for the most part were; and, so far, their representative at this point of history. "Not in a great affirmation, but in a great denial, saw Pilate the end of the way in which the seeking world had gone." (Luthardt.)

Thus scepticism had become, as we well know, almost universally the end of philosophy; and moral indifference in life the end of the long struggle in the case of the multitude; especially of the educated, to whom Pilate certainly belonged. "He says it with the air of a *man of this world*, who, shortsighted and laughing, condemns the cause of earnest reality." (Klopstock.) So multitudes of the great men of the world, and of the lesser children of the world too, echo this condemnation, and think it lifts them to the highest elevation of the spirit of the age; they boast themselves one after another in their new paths of investigation and in the results of their individual judgment—for truth has become a very familiar thing, readily enough talked of by all. And here stands Pilate and his saying, not merely in history but in the *Scripture*, a prophetic and warning and condemning type of all such heathens in the midst of Christendom. But their rejecting indifference, now after centuries have seen the coming of the Son of man in His kingdom, and the Crucified stands before them as He did not before Pilate,—in the manifest mystery of godliness, the pillar and ground of the truth,—is thrice inexcusable. And so far this *What is truth* says to the reader of the Bible much more than Pilate meant to say or could have thought.[1]

[1] We cannot refrain from inserting, for the sake of some into whose hands this book may fall, the following remarks of Tobler: "And

After all that we have said, the question of Pilate, which waits for no answer, is and must ever be no other than a self-contradiction. For, first, there *is* actually a truth, which he cannot question away, *in the questioner*, as was afterwards impressively shown in the case of Pilate himself.[1] Secondly, there *is* a truth *before him* in the person of Christ, whom he cannot condemn. That *this man* stands there before him in this world and speaking concerning another, is at first undeniably certain; that Pilate has been constrained to put more faith in Him, in the point of His innocence, than in the whole dignified Sanhedrim, which had found him guilty, is again a truth, by the help of which much more might have been reached. (Lange: "By the words, I find no fault in him—he uttered a *great truth!*") And the very amazement which still continues in his heart, not to be washed away from it, the fear of this half-righteous and half unrighteous judge at the cry of the rabble, high and low, which will take "the blood of this Just One" upon themselves, is only a foil of the dark background which makes the righteousness of this true and only Just One shine all the more brightly:—but *out of that* follows *everything*, if thou wilt think aright; and the anagrammatic echo of the question, Quid est veritas?—Est vir qui adest! is really to be derived from the elements of the question as put *in the presence of Christ*. If "this man" is only a man, born and come into the world like all the rest—then, indeed,

thou, philosophical spirit, who canst not or wilt not believe this history, to whom, however, at least, the eternal chain of influence and results must be worthy of respect:—think with astonishment that even thou, with all thy freedom and independence, art swallowed up in a sea of results which have followed from the fact that two thousand years ago, in a despised corner of the earth, a despised Rabbi of a despicable nation was executed as a slave; and that thou on his account art surrounded with relations so different from what they otherwise would have been. Bow down before Fate with thy pure philosophical spirit; but if thou wouldst be a true philosopher, look a little behind the veil and see if there be nothing in the history, and especially in the *central person* of it, which marked him out for such a wide-spread and deep influence upon the human race, and so to speak justifies it!"—The history now says—*This* is truth! *He* is truth! And wilt thou say—Am I then a *Christian?*

[1] Thus Dräseke's saying—"Pilate has in him no truth," is not altogether true, though it is generally supposed to be implied in the word.

his testimony is presumption, delusion, self-deception, lie, fanaticism, or whatever else it may be termed, only not truth. But *then* further, *everything* is delusion and lie, even the truth in the breast of man, the conscience and sentiment of God in the Gentile, as well as the entire revelation and prophecy of Israel:—as the *consistent* denial of Christ by Feuerbach and his party begins to prove—by the dogmatism of conscious falsehood, Thus we have found![1]

Those who are morally sincere in the practical part of life come sooner or later, more speedily or more slowly, more decidedly or more waveringly, in some way or other to the Saviour of the world upon the cross. This is most sure, for He has said it: Every one that is of the truth heareth My voice. It is the same with the sincere in science and philosophy. For these take their conscience with them into their theory, science, and philosophy; they therefore say neither τί ἐστι nor εὕρηκα; they put not themselves in the place of Christ, as if they had the truth already, nor in the place of Pilate, as if they needed and would have it not; but they are not satisfied and ready with their reply until they verily have *Christ Himself.* To the *end* of their speculation, to the great *question* of sincere earnestness about concealed truth and the living God, Christ attaches the *beginning* of His testimony—*I am come to bear witness;* and on this the middle and the end hangs—*I am He. Then* does faith boldly confront a world which crucifies Christ with the question—What is your lie with all its specious seeming? It testifies itself to me concerning the truth!

[1] In this reference to the personally self-evidencing Truth there lies also our defence against the perversion which may be seen, *e.g.* in Julius (Ueber die Hebung des kirchlichen Lebens, S. 28, 29), who would have us not turn away too hastily and proudly from the word of the *experienced* Roman! His question fairly represents that aspect of truth according to which it is essentially *mutation*, movement, and life. He who is called to judge concerning the truth should never forget this essential mark of it, that it is in the world only as mutable, and for ever exposed to doubt—and so forth. Still worse further on (S. 233), where he says that a "faculty" which assumes the charge of an already decided truth, is already fallen from the truth into hypocrisy; for truth is the goal, *only* the goal, and must never be more! This gives us in perfection the Pilate-religion of our own times *in opposition to Christ!*

What is the power of all the kingdoms of the world? It must fall down before the feet of my King, who hath *not* worshipped Satan!

But the Pilates of the present day *ask*, and when the answer is plain before them, they turn away and say—What is it? Like the *fools*, of whom the wisdom of the Son of Sirach writes (Ecclus. xxii. 8): "He that telleth a tale to a fool, speaketh to one in a slumber; when he hath told his tale, he will say, what is the matter, τί ἐστιν;" With all their apparent Roman manhood, they are like "silly women laden with sins—*ever learning*, and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth," 2 Tim. iii. 6, 7. They call themselves, and think themselves, philosophers, but when the personal *Sophia* appeals to them they become instead *misosophs*. "They charge truth with being obliged to hide itself in the world. But it is only too certain that it is rather the world which hides itself from the truth; or if it does once ask the just one, What is truth? it rushes away again, like Pilate, and goes out to take counsel with the great ones, the learned and ignorant rabble."[1] Thus, in the presence of Christ, the sincerity of a good heart is turned into lie and guilt, all wisdom into folly, all justice to injustice, and, moreover, the vaunted Roman "justice"—although it is afterward boasted of (It is not the manner of the Romans—Acts xxv. 16)—is here brought to shame, because it would not submit itself to truth.

Pilate now leaves Jesus standing, as he had before left the Jews, and would, though in vain, mediate without partiality by his—I find no fault in him! This was in a high degree offensive to the sacred Sanhedrim; but a still greater indignity, in reality, to Jesus, the King of the Jews, as He was the King of truth—I find, *further*, *nothing* in him, he is an innocent "*king*!" The *Pilate-theology* generally, which half unconsciously and half by enforcement admits the *sinlessness* of Jesus, yet protests against the doctrine that He is lord and king, can find no middle place

[1] So H. Lössel, in the Weihnachtsnüssen, S. 351. We would recommend not only the disquisition upon this word of Pilate, but the entire book and all the books of this ingenious author. There is in the exuberance of this first production of a very highly gifted man much more value than the writer himself, who has now become more practical, attributes to it.

as mediating, but must in justice be given over to those mockers and enemies who helped to crucify Him. For after all Pilate spoke not the simple truth in his complacent "no fault;" he really thereby declared Him to be a fool, who had brought down all this hatred upon his own head by his "king" and "truth," *thereby* at least being in fault. In the midst stood Pilate, "mocked both parties, and directed his ridicule as much against Jesus as against the Jews" (Rambach). "Pilate mocks both—the witness to the Truth, and the haters of the Truth"—as Alford still more pointedly remarks. But history has, like a judgment begun, made of him an ironical monument "of the moral impotence of the proud spirit of the world, as it had been educated and refined among the strong Romans," and placed his name in the confession of faith of the christian world. Thus, *nolens volens*, in spite of his scepticism he has become the stoutest witness of the truth, as Hamann has somewhere said.

As to Jesus all was to be despatched with the word, No fault —but as to *himself*? Alas for the unhappy man, who merely finds *no fault* in Jesus, when he should have found *the truth*, which he might have found if he would! Merely, no fault *in him*—instead of confessing, I find *in myself* something which is mightily moved in the presence of this man, and must put my more earnest question τὶ ἐστι, until I penetrate the secret! Every man must avow, I find fault *in myself*. This is the first truth touching ourselves: he who is of this truth will *find* the innocence of Jesus, and from this everything else. No fault in Jesus —that is a great truth, but only the one, half truth which stands without, confronting thee until the question comes, What shall I then do with Jesus, who is called Christ? Will the cry which follows, let him be crucified! content thee? Oh no, let this truth be responded to by another truth in thy breast, I find fault in myself! and both together will make up *the* full and perfect truth.

SECOND COLLOQUY WITH PILATE.

(Jno. xix. 11.)

We are not now dealing with the entire history of the Passion, yet we must not hasten from one word of our Lord to another without tracing, at least in its broader features, the connection of the narrative. This alone will enable us to set clearly before our eyes the situation of Him who, excepting in these few words, now keeps profound silence. Let the reader, therefore, consult the harmonised table at the beginning of this volume; and his own independent investigation will show him as we proceed in what way we connect the details of the whole.

Pilate said at the first, briefly and summarily, as if the matter ended there: For my own part—and that is the main point—I find no fault in this man whom ye have brought before me. But how much did he deceive himself: how often must he say it over again, that "the political innocence might be established" of this Just One who suffers for the unjust, and yet in vain! For neither of the two objects was to be gained:—on the one hand, no specific guilt was to be proved against Him independently of that *truth* which was written upon His cross by the rejector of the truth in the name of the Jews; on the other hand, He was not to be released from death. Now first begin these aggrieved complainants, themselves inculpated now, to specialise their lies in the most earnest manner (Matt. vers. 12—14; Mar. vers. 3—5, πολλά and πόσα); St Luke, ver. 5, gives prominence to one point in it, that after all the whole was resolved into His *stirring up* the people by *teaching* them only! This remarkable accusation must at all costs be set forth in all its amplitude and force: hence their becoming more fierce (ἐπισχύειν), for everything was now staked upon the game, it had become matter of honour and life to carry through successfully that which they had begun. Jesus retires again into His *silence:* for what He had taught had been heard by Pilate, who desired to hear it no more. Their lies, which brought forward nothing essentially new, are, however, believed by none. For Pilate He had spoken

enough concerning the truth; for these liars and for Himself He has nothing further to say. The highest passion and the most absolute repose once more confronting each other! Pilate gives but little heed to their babbling; but continually turns to Jesus, Hearest thou not? Answerest thou not?—and is constrained by the sublime silence to wonder at the majesty of the Lord's bearing.[1] It might appear to be pride, but only to one who looked not upon Him.

Pilate's embarrassment then takes advantage of the circumstance that Galilee was the scene of all His alleged offences, to send Him to Herod: partly, that he may get rid of the matter, and partly (for the politician has always such bye-ends in view), to put an end to an unpleasant relation between them, by this act of honour.[2] Christ was to stand, in the counsel of God, before every authority; as before the ecclesiastical tribunal, so also before each of the civil courts, to which He was in different relations subject. But this of itself shows Pilate's defection from justice, and his surrender of the guiltless: deluding himself with the thought that he would keep himself free, he sends Him to another—let *him* do with him what he will! Then begins a fresh vehemence on the part of the accusers, if they by any means may prevail on the weak Herod, with whom they are not however in good repute, to do anything; new and increasing curiosity on the part of all the people; and new indignities for the Lord. This Idumæan, Sadducee Herod, neither Jew nor Gentile, a dead sinner with an extinguished conscience, drowned in his lusts—would see a sign, and asks all kinds of ribald questions. Shall Jesus give any answer, and begin to preach to him? He keeps silence, and atones by this sacred continuous silence for the sins of our tongues. Herod, thought worthy of no single word, is lax and without wrath—for *this* Baptist raised from the dead has taken away all his fear—and finds

[1] For no one is wont to keep silence, when his life is at stake, especially after having once begun to speak:—this remark of Bengel does not altogether suffice for the θαυμάζειν λιάν.

[2] Probably, as Roos remarks, some interference of Pilate with the jurisdiction of Herod had led to their difference; and this sending of Jesus would be reparation.

Jesus worthy of no sentence: he scorns and mocks Him, in common with all his attendants, who agree with him in his ridicule. Yet in one thing he manifests some cunning, and anticipates in his royal dignity the Roman's mockery of the King of the Jews. The gorgeous apparel is the beginning of the *ridicule of the King* which the servants of the Gentiles so fearfully practised afterwards, corresponding with the Jews' *ridicule of the Christ.*

Pilate receives Christ again—and what can he do with Him?[1] The remarkable paschal custom—a token, also, how this people, so gladly begging off those who made insurrection, stood related to the Romans!—appears to him a fortunate coincidence on this occasion. He places before the people, now assembled in great numbers, a thoroughly notorious malefactor, between whom and Jesus their choice was to be made; thinking that their choice would assuredly be in favour of the latter. This was his second vain attempt to save the innocent: he *would* set Him free, but there was no will for the decisive sentence and act. And in this he had already yielded so far as to acknowledge their charges, and place Jesus among malefactors, even by the side of a most infamous one. (According to Lu. ver. 16 he also promises a "chastisement" before he releases Him!) He falls deeper and deeper; and it has already become very plain that *Caiaphas* and Pilate, also, *must* be made friends in common against this Jesus. Sinners of all kinds remain on one side, where guilt is, together: the malignant and the wavering, the strong and the weak, the zealous and the indifferent, the exalted, too, and the common mass, the leaders and the led. Even the people must desire the death of this Just One, for He by no means has the favour and following of the multitude, as the high priests had complained; they themselves use all their influence to prove it otherwise, and like wolves give the cry to their sheep, until the clamour against the Good Shepherd gets the full ascendency over the justice of the Gentile, who also has a law. Pilate has made another mistake: he has already put the matter out of his own hands, and committed it to the voices of the multitude! The

[1] St John in vers. 38, 39, passes over much that intervened, and compresses the whole, just as we found in ch. xiii. 22: the *first* declaration of innocence he combines with the *second* (Lu. vers. 14, 15), and connects with it at once what took place after the second.

warning of the dream comes too late, since the judge sits upon the judgment seat no longer as a judge. *Barabbas'* release is demanded! And Jesus? He, as from the beginning, suffers Himself to be led away as a lamb, to be judged, mocked, ill-treated, placed before and offered to the people, rejected; and waits for the end which He knows full well, but which is long delayed, until the thoughts of man and the counsel of God are perfectly brought to light.

To this point belongs, as we think (though the arguments cannot be entered upon here), the washing of his hands, and Pilate's *first* judgment. He says, I do it not, while he nevertheless does it. His voluntary baptism of water[1] does not even cleanse his hands before the people. But their word to Judas —See thou to it! is fearfully given back to the high priests— See *ye* to it! They still more fearfully accept this; and the whole mass of the misled people join them in invoking upon themselves and their children the blood of the Just One. And now comes the *scourging*, the first act in the crucifixion, which had become necessary through his juxtaposition with Barabbas. In connection with this was the horrible mockery of the rude Gentile servants, to whom it was pleasure to have for once a king of the Jews put into their hands, but in whose mock crowning the counsel of God exhibits to the reverence of all the world in a most sublime and affecting figure, the King glorified through shame.

Even Pilate feels something of this and would fain recede; although he had already given his decision and delivered Him up, what was done might, he thought, be enough, and the actual crucifixion be averted.[2] The Ecce Homo has an inexhaustible meaning, and Lavater might well write a book upon it alone; for this great word goes far beyond its seeming sense as he used it. In this Ἴδε ὁ ἄνθρωπος not only is fulfilled Isa. liii. 3—to which vers. 4—6 also belong—but *man* actually stands before us in his

[1] Hardly adopted by Pilate "as intelligible to the Jews" because prescribed in Deut. xxi. 6—9 (as Alford thinks)—but founded on the custom even among the Gentiles of washing the hands from guilt.

[2] We doubt whether he himself contributed to the crowning with thorns, in order through the ridiculous to lead them to sympathy; for it is psychologically more correct to suppose that this purpose was prompted in himself first by the aspect of the Lord's sorrow.

misery, pointing to his guilt, and at the same time to his elevation through the person of the Godman. Pilate's thought, indeed, has no share in this. Jno. xix. 4 means obviously: Behold, even thus treated and clothed, He remains without confession and without fault, in his lofty and patient innocence;—and with this is connected the meaning which the governor expresses in his next words, in his "hypocritical political Ecce Homo," as Hamann calls it. *Behold, behold* at least all who yet have human feeling—Is this man a king? an insurgent? a man to be feared as dangerous? How innocent—and how miserable! Is it not enough? (May not the Hosanna turn now at least to compassion?) Thus the martyr-form of Christ awakes humanity once more even in this heathen; yet his reckoning upon the humanity of the enraged people is only politic; and, moreover, since the judge only *asks* in the name of innocence, and maintains the right in this unworthy way, after so much injustice already done, it is no other than *hypocritical*. Just on that account this third attempt to set Jesus free cannot succeed, his crooked way cannot lead to the end proposed; the purple and the crown ruin all with the Jews. But Jesus stands before them in perfect silence, in perfect patience: Is it my death which ye desire? and He knows well that they desire it. "In vain the heathen man of the world preaches humanity to the Jewish hierarchs"—they are bent upon the Roman *cross* for their king! *Crucify! Crucify!* Thus is it more correctly in St John without the *Him*—as if they would scarcely allow Him the last remaining name, ὁ ἄνθρωπος, which Pilate had given Him, or would not take "the man" into their lips.

The half-righteous judge angrily and vexedly replies to this unexpected consistency of hatred by a consistent refusal, which, however, with all its passion is only feeble: (Then) take *ye* him and *crucify* him! A second Λάβετε after that first in ch. xviii. 31; but with a different sense has involved, and more nearly approaching the παραδιδόναι τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις, the delivering up to the Jews. Instead of coming forward with sincerity and energy—I revoke my enforced word, the blood of this Just One shall fall neither upon you nor upon me! I take him altogether out of your hands! and then using the band of soldiers prepared for such a purpose (as in Acts xxiii. 27). He says—Crucify *ye* him,

without my judicial confirmation, if ye are willing to take the responsibility upon yourselves before Cæsar! It is impossible to be certain whether or not this was intended to say peremptorily, I cannot be a party to this! and at the same time to impress upon their minds the unlawfulness of their own putting Him to death. It might, indeed, have been Pilate's meaning to intimate —I will permit you to do it, I will overlook a tumultuous and illegal execution; but ye must not expect from me any official part in it, or wait for any judgment and co-operation of mine! Then the word would be analogous with Matt. xxvii. 24.[1]

The Jews, meanwhile, cannot put any confidence in such connivance on the part of the Procurator, generally so zealous of his power and prerogative; and, moreover, it would be extremely perilous to themselves. They think they fully understand the meaning of that word: *Crucify*—if ye can and dare! They hold Pilate fast with keen tenacity: Yea, we can and we will take the responsibility; but *thou also* must be a party, thou must judicially confirm what we do, thou must pronounce him *guilty*, and of *that crime* of which we have found him guilty. *For* we have a law, which certainly brings death upon him—*ὀφείλει ἀποθανεῖν*. Thus they are finally forced to declare plainly the proper religious accusation which was the real point of importance in their own council, after the simple *Christ a king* has been fully repelled and contradicted and dismissed. *We* have a law: one specific and plain ordinance in *our* law generally![2] The Roman Governor was supposed conventionally to respect their law and their religion; but there was at best much that was illusory and unreal in that respect, and hence they appeal to it only in their last extremity. Thus the law is turned against the gospel, as in a very deep universal sense it ever is. Behold here the false *end* of the law, which should lead to Christ, in its pharisaical perversion against Christ! The mirror of ini-

[1] This interpretation was referred to in the first edition, as here, only as being possible. It was not maintained absolutely, or argued for, as might have been supposed from Luthardt's objections.

[2] Thus the reading *κατὰ τὸν νόμον ἡμῶν* as an extension of the single *νόμος*, subsequently brought in for the sake of impressing Pilate, is well grounded; and we would not omit it with Lachmann, Lücke, &c. The omission was obviously the result of *τὸν νόμον* being mistaken for *τοῦτον*.

quity becomes itself a veil of iniquity; and they who themselves keep not the law, put Christ to death through the law—Him, who had given it to them, and who had in the same book testified His coming, and who alone had said:—The law is within mine heart, Ps. xl. They say to Pilate: This "man," as thou hast called him, has *made* himself the Son of God;—thus do they persistently return to ch. x. 33, instead of perceiving in their hearts that the Son of God had by His voluntary renunciation of His prerogative made Himself such a man. Thus King of the Jews and Son of God were not the same in their signification, although their scribes knew that the expressions designated the same person of the coming one in the prophets:—Olshausen rightly deduces this inference from our passage. This new turn given to the charge is by no means, as Lücke thinks, a "changed expression merely." Nor is the mediating note of B.-Crusius sufficient; "They used the word certainly not in the mere Messianic meaning, for then the matter would remain the same; but yet only in a higher meaning than that in which they *ordinarily* applied the formula." There is no trace of this latter in the history, and it is refuted throughout the entire gospel of St John. As a *blasphemer*, who assumed to himself equality with God and the Divine nature, and blasphemously appropriated as man the name of God, he should die according to Lev. xxiv. 16. This is the specific *law* which they refer to; that which meets the case of false prophets in Deut. xiii. 5; xviii. 20, is applied consequentially to the liar in the highest degree, the false "son of God." We must note, also, what Rambach observes, though most overlook it: "Hereby they became betrayers, at the same time, of the most holy mystery of their Divine teaching, which they expose to the contempt of a Gentile judge, who understood nothing about it."

This, at least, *they* must have taken for granted, and could not know that this Pilate would nevertheless have in some degree an ear to hear this mysterious word. The myths about sons of the gods had, indeed, lost all credence in the educated Gentile world,[1] so that the preaching concerning the Son of God had to

[1] Only in some Lycaonian corners, Acts xiv. 11, were the people so heathenishly full of faith.

apprehend but little admixture and taint from them;—yet there was some point of connexion even in Pilate for such a word. "It was the boldness of this assertion, so foreign to the spirit of the age, which was so startling."[1] Pilate hears for the first time this great and daring word; and as a dignity arrogated by this marvellous man now standing before him! The *υἱὸν θεοῦ* (according to the better reading), the same to the Jews as *τοῦ θεοῦ*, lays hold of him by its indefiniteness; he has some knowledge (remembering the dreams of his childhood, as Krummacher says) of the sons of the gods in the legends; he cannot but think of them, and the omen of his dream had made him susceptible to any such impressions. The doubter and mocker, who generally cared for none of these things; the Roman, who knew well, but despised the Jews and their religion of one *θεὸς*—is obliged now, on the ground of his Gentile thoughts, to form some indistinct conception of this kingly Jew being in some way a *υἱὸς θεοῦ!* He had hitherto despised the God of the Jews and the Jews alike; from his pagan religion he had gone over to philosophy, and had found nothing there;[2]—but that which speaks in the presentiment of conscience, when *Christ* stands before us, is truth, and he cannot altogether escape from that response. "Through the manifestation of essential truth his hollow sceptical system was overturned; the reality of the Divine seized him by its indwelling power, while he in his supposition denied its reality" (Olshausen.) When Pilate heard this—*μᾶλλον ἐφοβήθη*, he feared the *more*. This *μᾶλλον* Bengel interprets by *potius:* Contrary to the expectation of the Jews he *feared* rather than assented to them. But this does not go as deep as we must understand the word; for his awe before the "Son of God" could not have thus suddenly fallen upon him through the influence of a single word, as has been very unpsychologically supposed. Thus the more common interpretation is right: he feared still *more* than he had done; for from the beginning, since ch. xviii. 29, there had been ever increasing in Pilate's mind a certain dread in the presence of Christ. The *ἐφοβήθη* certainly does not mean a mere "embarrassment" (as van Ess translates!)

[1] J. G. Müller, vom Glauben der Christen. i. 378.

[2] Pilate was not an insignificant man. As such he would not have been sent to the province of Judæa.

—or a new "concern which he felt that this new accusation would prevent him from saving Jesus" (as Semler expounds); or, finally, *mere* "fear of taking a wrong step in this matter" (as Fikenscher expresses himself). Least of all is it fear *of the Jews* that is intended; not even as Tholuck qualifies it; "*hitherto* the subject of his concern had been, lest he should go wrong with the Jewish rulers (of which his conduct from the beginning gives no trace!); but *now* something uncommon in Jesus, suddenly flashing on his consciousness through this lofty name, strengthens his fear." Oh no, we hold that the μᾶλλον points to the person of Jesus alone as the object of his *fear* from the beginning. Even in the *Ecce Homo*, and now especially when it is said that he called himself the Son of God, He assumed the appearance to Pilate, not of a blasphemer, scarcely of an enthusiast, but actually of one who was indeed a man that had come into the world differently from other men! He had seen many malefactors—but never such an one as this. Nor does this Personality affect him distressingly, as the *fearing* has been pressed to mean, but rather with a kind of attraction mingled with the awe which it impressed; else he would not have trusted himself so confidentially with Jesus in secret. Pilate's tone of mind was not, as many erroneously assume to the great injury of the whole, that of a purely heathenish imagination or *superstition*,[1] but rather, as Rieger well expresses it, "the beginning of that which Ps. ii. 10—12 commends to all rulers and princes."

This must teach us to understand the great question—*Πόθεν εἶ σύ*, *Whence* art thou? which opens the conversation, and without understanding which aright, neither the silent nor the uttered answer of Jesus can be understood. There is no question here about his earthly derivation (he had already sent Him to Herod as a Galilæan!), nor any more precise inquiry of what parents he was born; the presentient *Whence*, to which an ἄνωθεν—from above—afterwards corresponds, is meant as in chap. vii. 28. Pilate in truth puts now the deepest and best question which he

[1] Dräseke gives it this erroneous application in his excellent sermon: "Can *a man without truth* secure himself against the intrusion of an imagination, haunting his dark hours like a spirit, which he mocks at in the daylight?" No, Pilate was not altogether without truth, and this was his *bright* hour.

could put,—a better question than any before. Better than the first, Art thou the king of the Jews as these Jews say?—for it is not now simply the saying of the Jews concerning the "Son of God" which prompts him; he speaks it of himself as well. Better than that other, What hast thou *done?*—for he now asks more profoundly and fundamentally about His *Being*, and its origin. Better than, What is truth?—now, what, *who*, whence *art thou?* Once more to obviate misconception, it is not by any means "only the question of superstition and *curiosity*" (according to Neander)—or so put as if he would question away the first good influence of the *fear*.[1] But it is plainly seen here that Pilate still belonged to that class of men to which the saying (improper enough when made universal) applies: "No man can withstand the truth who has received it even into a corner of his consciousness; it will work in him even against his will." (Vorländer, Wissenschaft der Erkenntniss, S. vi.) Let this *Whence art thou* be combined with *Behold the man:* Art thou then a man, or in truth a higher being? Thus this questioning sprang from a heart and conscience suddenly and deeply touched, and powerfully awakened; it is the *genuine heart-question* of the understanding in the presence of Christ, whereas before the understanding had asked without the heart. The great, great question, "Who was Christ?" the penetrating point of which a Strauss must first wilfully break off, the piercing, living force of which an unbeliever must first destroy, before he can reason away the "Son of God." Christ's person in itself impresses Pilate more than all the miracles which he had not seen; that is the *triumph* of the truth which is in Him! It is His *suffering form* which still enforces from many a Pilate this *Whence art thou?* but we say again that out of this one truth—This sufferer

[1] So thinks Fikenscher, with some injustice to Pilate, with all his inconsistency: "It is often seen that men who already have within them the rebuking impression of Divine influence, by closer and more subtil discussions make to themselves matter of doubt, and thus counterwork the direct impression." Pilate certainly had no such design as this, though the result came to the same thing; he was not simply "a man who would not believe, and whose questioning, therefore, had no end; having nothing new in view, and asking again about that which had been explained to him." Verily, there was something *new* and which it was very needful to *question* about!

is from above—if we deal earnestly with this answer as it already lies in the question, follows everything else, all Christian theology and *its* morality for us.

But Jesus *gave him no answer*—and though this may surprise even us, His silence has its perfect justification. For, first, the "answered,"[1] following immediately afterward in ver. 11, shows that the preceding silence was not an arbitrary determination to say no more, but pondered in Christ's wisdom. With *us*, when we would patiently suffer in silence, there may be some such arbitrary purpose of our own; or, to put a better construction upon it, we *cannot* actually speak and at the same time suffer in patience, for we have inwardly too much to do with our own spirits, in order to maintain our proper posture of mind. But Christ is in His profoundest humanity elevated above this human imperfection; in His lips (as we shall hear from the cross) the word of God is never bound. But wherefore does He make no reply to that most weighty and well-meaning question of Pilate? It would now have been easy to give His testimony, and to make this judge an humble learner! So might we think, but the case was very different. Ebrard writes: "The circumstance that a heathen would sit in judgment upon matters of revealed religion was unsuitable and contrary to the law; the Sanhedrim was the only competent court for such an investigation; therefore Jesus, who would never slight or surrender the legitimate rights of the covenant people, answered Pilate nothing, but, when He broke His silence again, reminded him that he possessed as the governor no other power than that which God committed to him through Cæsar, and therefore that with this religious question he had nothing to do!" What shall we say *to this*? Apart from the marvellous exegesis of ver. 11 which will be afterwards refuted, even the first point is altogether wrong, through the error which a superficial spirit of interpretation has introduced of always adhering to the *external* sense. It is altogether forgotten that in ch. xviii. Jesus did enter into these questions with this heathen; "King of the Jews" belonged to revealed religion; the kingdom not of this world and the witnessing for the

[1] Correctly *without* αὐτῷ, that the contrast may be made evident: But now He *answered!*

truth were altogether Jewish matters, and bring before the heathen the mysteries of the theocracy and prophecy. Why does He not now similarly enter into them? Further, does the *questioning* Pilate really intend to *judge* upon these things, and, moreover, *as a heathen?* Does his question mean nothing beyond "a son of the gods"—and not rather in its indefinite expression the indefinite but real *θεῖον* in Jesus which appealed to him?[1] And now, once more, it was not a judicial investigation at all, but a conversation; the *religious accusation* of the Jews as such, and *their* phrase *Son of God* (for Pilate asks not again, *art thou then the Son of God?*) is not concerned, but the *religious desire* of the personal Pilate as expressed in his *whence art thou!* The Roman did not (as Lange, too, says) invade the prerogative of the theocratic judge, and thus transgress his jurisdiction. Oh, no, the presentiment of his fear and awe before Jesus, whom he was to crucify because He called Himself the Son of God, was most perfectly competent to put the direct question, on the reply to which all depended, to Him who was a witness of the truth. The Saviour acknowledges this right and competency everywhere in all: wherever a soul seeks Him He is graciously to be found, all is yea and answer in Him (2 Cor. i. 19), not nay nor silence; but He commends Himself in the highest sense to every *man's* conscience (2 Cor. iv. 2), without asking whether Gentile or Jew. Then why does He keep silence here? For four reasons united: on the one hand, in affirmation and by pointing to what had already been said; on the other, for his righteous reproof and also to spare him. Let us explain ourselves as briefly as possible. First, is not silence an answer? In truth, there was spoken an absolute *Thou sayest it* without the words themselves, as if He would say, Let it not be a question with thee! The answer lies already in thy question, in which thou hast been constrained to utter thy presentiment of a *whence* that is higher than humanity; My voice, the voice of Truth speaketh now in thee, I will not interrupt it, as I do not contradict it. Assuredly, if Jesus had not been conscious

[1] B.-Crusius is also wrong: "Jesus kept silence here because a heathen idea of the son of God was in question." But who tells us this? Was not *that* notion which thought so earnestly of the word itself, instead of identifying it with the Messiah, the heathen idea?

of a Divine Sonship, "the love of truth would have enforced from Him the confession, I come like every other mortal from a human father!" (Hess.) Thus His silence is a good confession, "itself testifies to His Divine origin," as Lücke also says—is affirmative in this form, and no other was immediately necessary:—not necessary in the face of the peculiar question which anticipated the answer; and, further, not necessary because of what had preceded, the first conversation and testimony. His keeping silence had pointed to what had gone before, as if He had said, Have I not told thee already, that I have come into the world bringing with Me the truth and that power from above which is above all; and that therefore I am Myself personally from above, from that other world? (Comp. chap. viii. 23.) But now we must turn to the other side. For Jesus was not so rigorously severe as never to repeat His words for our weakness: this we have often seen, and must ask why He did not repeat them now, and give a plainer answer to the plainer and more urgent question. Why does He not confirm by positive words the presentiment of this questioning seeker, as He is wont so willingly to do? It was indeed difficult to answer plainly for this Gentile—but was it impossible to Christ? He might well have chosen now, as He often did in such critical cases (to use Luthardt's words) "an enigmatical saying" which would have had in it the true point. It must not be said that every answer would have been "to this polytheist governor unintelligible or liable to be misunderstood;" for in this *Whence* it was not polytheism which spoke, and Christ could indeed have given reply clear enough to suffice at least for a beginning—that is *if* Pilate had been entirely in earnest, and his steadfastness could have been relied on. But it is time now to modify, if not to retract, the favourable admissions which we have made concerning him. Pilate was *as a Gentile* perfectly competent to receive an answer; but he was in himself not *worthy* of it, because he was not *capable* of hearing it in full and holding it fast, and that again because he was not *willing*. By that abruptly ending *What is truth?* he had scorned away the answer in deep unbelief. Thus for his *befitting rebuke* it was said, When I spoke to thee concerning the truth, wherefore didst thou not believe me? (Chap. viii. 46.) Finally, the Lord knew that he still would not believe, and therefore kept

merciful silence, to *spare* him the increase of guilt. Very true is the plain word of the Berl. Bible: "Pilate would not learn the A B C first, but would here climb at once into heaven. My good Pilate, thou must learn first the first principle! *Whence art thou?* Thou hast not been faithful in the first point, and I cannot answer thee *to this*."

Let us now make application of this typical scene to all that reproduces it in the present day. To him who knows and marks, and yet asks again with only partial earnestness or with none at all, who has heard and yet has not heard—Jesus *keeps silence*. Pilate, in contradiction with himself, had regarded this lofty one as being complacent enough in his present danger of death, even after He had been the first time left alone, to answer any questions which he might see fit to put to Him. And in this he erred: the lowly lofty One retains, with all his gentleness, His inalienable *dignity*, and answers most impressively by manifesting that. The King of truth will submit to no trifling; the Son of God will undergo no capricious examination. Hast thou rejected His witness—then humble thyself to the dust for that, before thou darest to come back and ask new questions. Mark by the *fear* which is in thee Who He is, and Whence He is; and that thou must come and ask, if thou come at all, *of the truth?* "Hearken when the truth speaks; and question not, when it is silent!" (Gossner.) Yea, let us with our heart and with all our soul, give heed, when this King of truth *speaketh*—and not ask further, or be offended, when He keepeth silence, for *then* speaketh He mostly loudly within us!

But Pilate *takes it ill*, and his teachableness is suddenly gone. Just now he stood in beautiful submission under Jesus; but when the lofty One in the righteousness of truth fixes his soul by silence, he does not remain faithful to the good influence. His proud authoritative I—instead of the smitten inner man—rises high again above the Son of God! *Unto me* speakest thou not? Lampe rightly calls this "an objurgating reproof plainly at variance with his preceding fear."[1] Thou mayest keep silence before the soldiers, before the Jews, and before Herod;—but

[1] But the expression which he used with regard to the mere "superstition of the feeling, is too strong: "So quickly had the brute fear of Pilate vanished."

before me also? What lack of respect is this! Knowest thou not in whose presence thou standest? "Does not this make thee guilty, though otherwise innocent?" (Berl. Bib.) The silence of Jesus "wounded his *official consciousness*, for his cowardice had rendered him sensitive; and mortified his *official* pride, for by his vapid unjudicial words he had humbled himself before the Jews whom he hated." (Braune.) It is not the heart and conscience of the man which speaks *now;* but the haughty official consciousness, altogether untheocratic, of the Gentile:—un-Roman indeed, if Rome was the symbol of justice; genuinely Roman, if power (ῥώμη) was everything. As in Stilling's Heimweh (ii. 381) M. de Bellefond[1] to Eugenius: "I must demand respect from you; for know you not that you are in my power?"—so here the indescribably foolish word of Pilate to Christ, tenfold foolish after the previous question,—*Knowest thou* not, that I have *power* to crucify thee, and have power to release thee? It is quite truly and sincerely that he speaks plainly now of his appeal to his simple power, for he is the representative of (impotent) *power* in the history of the Passion; speaking in the name of all those against whom the prudential wisdom of the Son of Sirach warns in the Apocrypha, Ecclus. ix. 13—"Keep thee far from the man that *hath power* to kill." But his words are pre-eminently unjudicial, and disgraceful to Roman justice, when he declares that a judicial murder is in the power of his hand—בְּכוֹחַ יָדִי[2]—for "such power every street robber possessed over the most excellent of men," as Eugenius, above-quoted, replies. Observe it well: he *knows* that he has the power, and therefore testifies against himself; so that he is condemned out of his own mouth when it is afterwards said—*ἐπέκρινε, παρέδωκε*. Nevertheless, this artless assertion of his subjective conviction is at the same time a lie, a perfect contradiction to the state of the actual case generally, as well as to the secret power over him and within him which his *whence art thou* had been constrained to confess. Thus, first, his *having power* generally, for the crucifixion or re-

[1] According to the key, the literary spirit of fashion, a pedant in everything.

[2] As the Assyrian says, Isa. x. 13 comp. Gen. xxxi. 29, Laban: לְאֵל יָדִי

lease of this *Jesus*, is nothing more than the vain imagination of the foolish man—that even that which cometh from above is yet in his own power. See here an example, how poor man fancies that he can use his freedom, as at his own arbitrary discretion, to the result which he would wish, because God rules with *patience!* Secondly, his power to *crucify*[1] is a contradiction to his judicial function, to which he nevertheless refers the whole. It is boldly said, as if a Procurator was appointed and set up to place might in the place of right: and this wicked *quidproquo*, so common among men, is alas disguised through the ambiguity of the term *ἐξουσία*, which means as well power as righteous prerogative. Is he not a minister of justice, and his responsibility so much the greater because, in the imperfection of human things, the *ἐξουσία* of right may be placed only in the *ἐξουσία* of his own personal determination, his prerogative left in the keeping of his power? If he actually has the power to release, is it in his power to crucify, and say—I *can do it!* And that when his conscience so plainly speaks, as his words betray and testify against him? A wicked *alternative* is this in the mouth of a judge, where arbitrariness glories in its might! If Jesus was innocent, he had no judicial power to crucify Him; if guilty, he had no judicial power to release Him. That was the only right alternative. A conscientious judge says conversely—I can do *nothing* against right, against truth (2 Cor. xiii. 8); and would rather set free the guilty, whose guilt is obscurely proved, than give up to death the certainly guiltless. There is a *power of right*, from which no man should recede; and of that (as said above) the heathen *knows*, who indeed *has a power*. To this refers that word of David, something analogous to which at least is found in every human breast: God hath spoken once; twice have I heard this; that power belongeth unto God—power is God's alone! (Ps. lxii. 11.) Thus, as Rambach preaches: "He who knows and feels what a perilous matter is earthly power and authority, will be slow to

[1] The *σταυρῶσαι* must come first in the clause, not the *ἀπολῦσαι* as Lücke thinks more proper. For he does not speak "with a waxing feeling of his power," but as one injured, speaking at once of that power in threatening. Luthardt defends the other arrangement, because then the word of grace comes first; but it is obvious that the word of terror bursts forth first—Thy crucifixion depends on a word from me!

'boast of it when he has it." God had come to Pilate's help in the dream of his wife; He had thus from without as well as from above cried to his inmost heart—*Sin not against* this righteous one: nevertheless he can here boast that it is in his power to be unjust. But his vain assumption, finally, that he has power to *release*, is a contradiction in itself and a mere delusion—for, as the event shows, He is constrained to crucify. And, although his hasty expression (as Hess remarks) seems to let slip the secret confession that he would rather release than destroy Jesus"—yet he *has no power* to do it, as we may see in vers. 12, 13. Long before and repeatedly he had said—No fault in him, and therewith the accused should have been set free; but there is, opposed to the Divine power of justice in his conscience, another *power of the world*, before which he *knows not* what to do with Jesus, vainly washes himself clean, and being overpowered delivers Him up. "The cultivated Roman was strangely wrought upon by all these mighty influences. First, his wonder and even fear in the presence of this man—then the message of his wife—then the mad multitude, the threatening of the rulers about the friendship of Cæsar:—verily, a man who has nothing but cultivation, even if he had the whole land at his command, *must* lose his head!" (Lössel.) "Repeatedly to declare the accused innocent, and yet to treat him as the vilest malefactor and execute him as a slave—was incontrovertibly no other than to place the most unbridled caprice in the place of law, and, instead of the right which has lawful might, distrustfully and in fear of the highest power, that of Cæsar, to allow its course to the most lying semblance of that right in lawless violence." (Daub.) "Pilate makes great show of his power against Jesus (the poor man in whom he had just suspected a Son of God!); but against the Jews, who should have felt his power, he is a very coward." (Berl. Bibel.) Thus is he fettered, having bound himself; for the judicial question, what to do with Jesus, he had already surrendered to the outcry of the people and the malice of his enemies, putting his foolish answer to them in the place of a judicial decree.

It was necessary that we should thus carefully examine all this, in order to understand the critical point at which Jesus, for His Father's honour and Pilate's good, once more speaks; break-

ing once more His long silence by a word which we may term, in a confined sense, the last "testimony" before His crucifixion. (The word to the daughters of Jerusalem has another meaning.) And *how* does He speak? Truly, had He not been the Holy One, the temptation would have occurred to mock Pilate's boasting impotence, and to dash to pieces his lying assertion of power—I *know* far more, far better, how the case is with thee! Or, to punish him by reflecting back his threat—I have power over thee! But how does He restrain Himself! Instead of that, there is first an admission of the truth in his error—Yea, thou *hast* power, but under a quite different condition and restriction, of a very different kind, from what thou thinkest. Thou *wouldst have* none, were it not given thee—*from above.*

It is obvious at once that in this ἄνωθεν we have the kernel of the reply; and, consequently, that it refers to *above* in the highest and only sense in which it can be appropriate here. He who cannot see this without argument, is as inaccessible as Pilate himself to light and truth. We leave those who are so disposed to agree with Semler and Bolten in their interpretation: The *high* Sanhedrim hath given thee the power over Me, by giving Me into your hands!! However boldly this exposition appeals to the following clause, it is utterly and hopelessly insipid. We would not say quite as much of that other view of Usteri, which refers it to the higher power of the Roman Cæsar, who might have occurred at once to an unbeliever, when Jesus thus speaks—but only to one who had not conceived of that other *whence*, of which Pilate had been deeply thinking. Certainly the application which this gives to our Lord's words is almost equally meagre—How evil it is, that to the poor deputy of so high a sway such arbitrary "power" should be entrusted! Lücke gives his soft answer thus: "at such a moment we cannot well conceive our Lord to cast any blame upon the existing constitution of things;" and he is right in as far as the power, as and because given by Cæsar, would not be arbitrary, but strictly legitimate in the earthly sense, if we go not beyond this world. But we would speak more strongly: The Lord's answer, apart from the reference to subjective guilt in Pilate's misuse of his power which is contained in the following clause, denies in the first clause that Pilate has independent power to do with Him

what he would—it by no means admits or complains that He is given up to the arbitrary caprice of a man. For this would be a most unaccountable contradiction to the general fundamental principles of Divine government and providence, and to our Lord's own constant testimony to His Father's counsel in His death:—at this critical time, especially, altogether incomprehensible. Let us hear Rud. Matthäi, who, in an excellent book on the question here involved (The power and the dignity of a Prince), says concerning our Lord's word to Pilate: "Let us not think that *from above* means *from Rome!* That would be subordinating above to below, and reducing the Redeemer of the world to a Roman citizen. To speak thus without meaning, without instruction (that is, without proper answer), would be altogether unworthy of Christ. Christ is elevated to heaven, the eternal God is His horizon and the scope of all His thoughts; to behold and to point to Him is the necessity of His every pulse, in order that men may be turned away from their idolatry and from themselves; but this is not consistent with His speaking of Rome as the source of Pilate's authority. He would then have reminded Pilate of Rome in a manner quite contrary to His own design. It was His purpose to denounce the cowardly presumption which was in him (ver. 10), because he thought too much of his Roman power, and too little of the Almightiness of God." Let us now observe that in this heavenly *from above* there is (as so often in Christ's discourses) a supplementary answer, afterwards brought in, to the *whence* as to His origin, which He had left unanswered before. Grotius says with unusual point, "Thence forsooth from whence I came!" Not of this world, as I said before: from that other world, concerning which I know and speak, it comes that thou hast power, as thou thinkest, generally and specifically over Me. Christ stands now *below;* therefore He says *above*, as man concerning God, as the Son concerning the Father. Yet He avoids in His care and dignity, now as before, saying to this Gentile expressly θεός (or at this time πατήρ), nor does He utter the word *heaven;* for He would give no occasion to blasphemy, but rather as much as possible connect His words with the dawning consciousness of Pilate's presentiment. He therefore condescends to the seeming indefiniteness of the ἄνωθεν, from above, just as

Pilate's feeling would apprehend it. Thus in ch. xviii. 37 He spoke, with similar abstract and philosophic language, only of *truth*, yet meaning the right truth. And in all dealing with the commencing conviction of heathens we should closely imitate His example. How measured, and restrained, and full of luminous clearness, are His thoughts and words, never enthusiastic, but always in harmony with the actual reality of every circumstance; and this too, down to the last, amid all the confusion of Gentiles and Jews!

But the Lord declares two things here: He speaks first of the power of Pilate generally, and not till then of his present power over His own person. We must lay a strong emphasis upon *οὐδεμίαν*, "*no* power," and hear in it,—Thou wouldst have *generally* no power, that is, against Me, or, as thou sayest, to crucify Me. Lücke indeed (and Luthardt too) protests against this first and general sense, which the church in its preaching and teaching has always held fast: "Jesus speaks not here of the power of Pilate absolutely; and therefore He declares His fate to be in this man's hands for life or death, as a thing *δεδομενόν*, —not the *ἐξουσία* to be *δεδομένη*." But this strangely overlooks the fact that the particular clause—Thy power now extends over Me—must *presuppose* the more general one, Thou *hast* the power as governor. Pilate had appealed to his office in general, from which this particular power flowed; and the answer naturally corresponds with that. The *ἦν δεδομένον* in the Neuter has no force against this; because it brings into strong prominence the *being given from above* alone, and with a comprehensive hint—In everything which a man has, or can have, there is involved a *δεδομένον*; everything is *given*, and so consequently thy *power*.[1] Lampe, whom Lücke treats so lightly and throws aside, has correctly brought out the steps of the meaning: "He concedes to Pilate, *first—power*. He acknowledged the authority of the human court; because His kingdom was not of this earth, destroying human magistracy. Nor did He dispute the power of Pilate and the Romans over the Jews. *Secondly*, He exalts that power, as *given from above*. This is the Christian doctrine,

[1] And we can appropriate de Wette's expression, that thereby the idea of the *ἐξουσία* passes into the more indefinite sense.

that all power is of God. *Thirdly*, He acknowledges that that extended over *Himself*, since all things touching Him were done by a Divine decree." This last is indeed the chief point, to which our Lord presses onward; but it is necessarily and naturally as *based* upon, or mediated by, the former and more general truth: for the counsel of God gave Pilate, as the present judge in the land, the jurisdiction over Jesus and the power to judge Him.[1] If we have taken a right view of the pretension of Pilate, as already exhibited, we must be prepared to admit that the answer would not touch the heart of the question—on account of which the Lord's silence was broken—if it did not administer some preliminary lessons touching the arbitrary perversion of official authority generally.[2] Consequently, the word is spoken not for Pilate alone, but for all who bear rule in the world; and the *recognition* of existing authority, just as in Matt. xxii. 21, precedes the instruction, both *admonitory* and *encouraging*, which is based upon the conceded "given from above." Christ standing before Cæsar would have asserted the same "from above," and would have in the same way bowed before it. He does not hold the Gentile judge incompetent to pronounce sentence upon His life, whether he was righteous or unrighteous; and in this His submission is the direct opposite of the rebellion of the Jews, who cast from them their Divinely justified king as a pretender. "What Jesus says to Pilate is an actual acknowledgment of his judicial function. And He acts as an accused person standing before his judge; not holding up to Pilate his unrighteousness and the terrors of coming judgment,[3] as He would have done if He had had to do with him simply as a prophet dealing with such an unrighteous man." (Hess.) Suffice, that Christianity derives from these two words of its Lord (here and Matt. xxii. 21) its entire and impregnable theory of the Divine right of the powers that be: as St Paul develops it in Rom. xiii., but as the

[1] Teschendorff: "That thou hast power over Me, is a consequence of the official authority which God hath given thee."

[2] Roos says of Pilate: "He would not learn religion, but only do his duty; his example, however, teaches us that man cannot do the duty of his office well without religion."

[3] St Paul so dealt with Felix, only because he desired to hear *privately* of his faith in Christ.

spirit of the age now utterly rejects it. The doctrine now runs, breaking down the Divine principle of all right and ordinance, that all authority and dignity of rulers flows from the sovereignty of the people, and thus from below—alas, from *below* indeed! (Jno. viii. 23.) Nevertheless, God without doubt remains in the authority of His kingdom supreme as "the only *potentate*" and "King of kings" (1 Tim. vi. 15) in a twofold sense: as He who *gives* or *distributes* to rulers their authority for justice; and who also *gives* or *permits* their authority for injustice. This latter, however, not one step otherwise than or beyond what His hand and counsel hath decreed; so that the authority remains with God, as He in His time *will show* at the *appearing* of our Lord Jesus Christ. Meanwhile there is no danger to the theory and practice of obedience and patience, in which this our Lord is our forerunner: for if they even take our life away, as it is permitted them to do, the kingdom and the authority of truth is evermore with the good confession, which cannot be bound with those who are in fetters, and cannot be crucified with the crucified.

All this *general* truth is now concentrated in the words which follow—spoken not indeed merely for the present occasion, but, in their typical demonstrative force, for all occasions of the arbitrary misuse of power—Thou shouldst have no power over or against *Me!* This κατ' ἐμοῦ is to be taken, as it has been remarked, *with the utmost emphasis*. *Over* Me and *against* Me are here united in one; but the latter is prominent, as the reply to the bold "power to crucify thee." That Pilate the governor has power *over* Jesus of Nazareth, his subject in common with all the Jews, follows from the power "given from above" in his appointment; but that, abusing this power, he can condemn and give Him up to crucifixion, proceeds from the most absolute counsel of God.[1] Therefore it is said, with this specific refer-

[1] "Pilate was thus the man who had been chosen to be the judge of our Lord. Such a character as his was fitted for this work: a man who withstands long enough for full light to be thrown upon the business, but who then lets it proceed; a man who interposes continual questions, but is too impotent to follow the course of justice; a man who at least had none of the abject passions of the Jewish rulers, and who had no interest against Him. He was a Roman, and so belonging to a nation which Providence had used in earthly things to pour the whole world into a new mould. He was

ence: Without that thou wouldst have, because no right, therefore no power, *against* Me, who have done nothing worthy of death; and still more, against *Me*, the king of truth and righteousness, the Son of God come down from above! Because, however, this was "given from above," the Lord says at the same time, as if it was self-understood—*Under this*, not under thee and *thy* power, as thou thinkest, I *bow* and am submissive. And in this He is our pattern: "The pious man looks, like Christ, not at him who exercises the power over him, but ever at Him who permits to him the power which he exercises." (Gossner).

The conclusion would now be: *Therefore* I suffered meekly, as thou seest and wilt see, all this power perverted against Me, and all this *sin* committed by thee and My enemies in the violation of right, and in the absence of authority—and let not Myself be overcome and turned aside by all this *sin*. But *this* conclusion was left to be self-understood in the first clause, which has recognised and submitted to the authority, while denouncing the sin of its perversion; with the highest dignity and humility combined, the Lord speaks no further of Himself, but of others; and utters a quite different διὰ τοῦτο, the meaning of which, so much contested, we shall enter upon presently. First, let us observe the parallel between this word, this δεδομένον and the ὡρισμένον of Lu. xxii. 22; and note that God's counsel does not abolish the *guilt* of the men who execute it. Moreover, let it be marked that in the midst of His self-surrender to be judged as a malefactor, the Lord is still the supreme Judge. Those who have power now, have, alas, sin also; yea, we all *have sin*—and He, who alone has no sin, speaks most plainly and judicially concerning this. And He speaks with truth and righteousness which recognizes the degrees and stages of that sin. He knows

no imaginary sovereign, but the deputy of an absent lord and a higher power; which makes it all the more easy to feel (or rather symbolises it) that he does not speak in his own name. And, finally, I gather from the questions he puts, as well as from the character of our Lord's replies, that he had not an inferior kind of soul, but on the whole possessed something of the Roman manhood, integrity of character, and decision." So Tobler:—we would add, just as much of these qualities as Rome herself then had, the representative of the *power of this world*, which he again represents.

not, nor does the entire Scripture (Lu. xii. 48; Matt. x. 15, &c.), that false doctrine of the Stoics, pressing a sound principle too far, which makes all sins equal and alike:—there are *degrees* of guilt, and specifically here where sin reaches its highest manifestation,—degrees of guilt towards Jesus. He *weighs this out* with the sublimest repose; and graciously attributes to Pilate, who had just now spoken so severely to Him, a lesser sin than that of one who knew more than he.[1] Is not this blessing instead of cursing? Is not this at the same time the most penetrating and perfect answer he could receive: I *know* not merely thy *power*, how far it goes and how far not, but I know also thy *sin!*

But what, in this connection, is the specific meaning of διὰ τοῦτο? It might *seem* as if the whole of the preceding clause is regarded as being the reason; hence Lücke (with whom Alford agrees) earnestly maintains that every exposition of the διὰ τοῦτο is incorrect which does not set out from this, that in the δεδομένον ἄνωθεν lies the reason why Pilate was the less, and the Jews the more, guilty. But we cannot see the force of this, and hold that in the "given from above" there cannot lie any guilt, and that none could result from it, less or greater; consequently the inference drawn in "therefore" does not rest upon the main idea of the preceding proposition, but upon an *unexpressed intermediate thought* which it presupposes. Lücke says that Pilate's guilt was less, because he was simply the instrument of a higher power in the council. But that cannot be admitted: we would simply ask, were not the Jews also in their acts "the instruments of a higher counsel above?" Did not Caiaphas *prophecy*, as previously in the "*expedient*," so afterwards in the decree of death which was valid before God? Does not the Lord say of Judas himself, that he was only the instrument of the Divine counsel?[2] Euthymius (with Chrysostom and Theophylact)

[1] If He then held the balances—how will it be on the throne of judgment? But then it will be otherwise! The greatest sin is now too great for forgiveness, only in the thought of the Cain who so declares it—but then the smallest sin will be great enough for condemnation.

[2] Thus there is a fundamental error in the exposition of Cocceius, which I ampe, passing over this *nexum difficilem* with unusual superficiality, adopts—viz., that Christ had declared by the same words that this power, to put Him to death, had *not* been given to the Jews!

would understand it: Because thou, Pilate, as thou sayest thyself, hast power to release Me, and dost not release Me, therefore thou art not free from sin, though thy sin is the less. Thus the conclusion would result in a direct proposition: Therefore *thou hast sin*—to which the fitting qualification was then appended. But this is not admissible, for the Lord's κατ' ἐμοῦ had spoken of Pilate's power to *crucify* Him; the conclusion does not speak of *sin* generally (which was to be understood of itself), or of guilt as nevertheless remaining, but expressly of the difference of degree. This difference therefore is the thing deduced in the "therefore." We must not make it mean: *Therefore*, because it is a thing δεδομένον and "decreed," it might appear that thou art excused; *but, nevertheless*, it is not so (which would make the "therefore" a "not therefore," a "notwithstanding.") Nor as follows: Therefore hast thou sin, *although*, if the distinction be strictly made, a less sin than theirs. All these are forced expedients, quite inappropriate in the interpretation of this simple saying. What then is the unexpressed *intermediate thought*, from which the "therefore" arises? It is very obvious to our understanding: Thou hast asked Me, *Knowest thou not?* Behold, I say unto thee that which I do know, and very differently from thyself, concerning thy "having power,"—that *thou knowest not!* Is not this most certainly the *foundation* of the whole answer? Because I know, as I have spoken, therefore I suffer thy power; because thou knowest it *not*, therefore thou dost exercise it (guiltily, notwithstanding the Divine decree) against Me. The Lord, adjusting His words with supreme dignity, does not offend him by giving back his own word, and saying expressly, "*thou knowest not;*" but it was what Pilate must have inferred and felt at once—Thou art one who art ignorant as to the ground and limit of thy authority, especially as to the counsel of God concerning My person. It of course is to be understood that Pilate, like every other man, is ignorant only through the fault of his own evil will; that he has sin is a fact which is silently admitted; but the Lord who judges him, weighing out to him merciful right, makes prominent his ignor-

Assuredly, not given as an official ἐξουσιά, but given them as a δεδομένον generally, an ἐξουσιά in the widest sense.

ance, as, equally with his power, an actual fact. Bengel gave this interpretation of the διὰ τοῦτο—"Because thou hast plainly not known Me:" but we would make it more complete—Because thou hast plainly not known Me, nor thy power, nor what has been given thee "from above." Thus the saying of Christ resolves itself into the fundamental idea of that other Lu. xii. 47, 48 (to which Matt. x. 15 is only a parallel), for the degree of guilt must in the end be one with the degree of knowledge. Thus He at once includes Pilate within the scope of His subsequent intercession—They know not what they do!

But even thou art about to *sin* in thy impotent power, of which thou so foolishly boastest; I know well that thou wilt not retain the power to set Me free, and that thou wilt not finally be "innocent" of the *blood of the Just One.* And even thy sin is essentially *great* and not little, though by reason of thy ignorance it is the lesser sin. In His careful respect for the official personage, whom He was thought to have undervalued, the Lord does not directly express the fact that Pilate *had sin*, even the lesser sin; but He places first the counterpart and other side of the matter—*He that delivered* Me unto thee hath *greater* sin; nor does He add to this—*than thou.* Whom, then, are we to understand by this παραδιδούς (or, according to another reading, παραδούς)? This is a new question for exposition, in the answer to which it has gone widely astray. Many have thought of Judas, as (naturally and pardonably) Daub, and Niemeyer in his Characteristics.[1] But the Lord would scarcely think of him now, without any direct occasion; his case was despatched and his judgment sealed; so that it is quite inappropriate to suppose him referred to here, especially in a word spoken to Pilate, who probably knew nothing about this betraying disciple. Nor did Judas in any sense deliver Christ to Pilate; "he that delivered Me *to thee*" points plainly back to ch. xviii. 35, so that the person meant must be sought among the people and the high priests. Finally, Judas had not the greater, but the *greatest* sin; if he had been intended, as thus put in opposition to Pilate, why in this contrast of extremes was there no word of those who

[1] Hence his parallel between Judas and Pilate, in which Pilate comes out too good and gentle.

stood between, and who were there before the hall of judgment as the accusers who had *then* delivered Jesus to Pilate? The word spoken to Pilate would pass unintelligibly and most abruptly to a depth beyond his thoughts, instead of taking hold of present circumstances. Grotius was disposed to embrace together all in one:—Judas especially, in the second place the senate, and in the third the people. But Judas is too distantly referred to to be "especially" the object, and the senate and people of the Jews would have been referred to in the plural. Lücke understands a reference to the Jews "collectively," with the ancients (Euthym. τῶν παραδόντων), and most in the present day. Lampe, too, would combine all: "The *deliverers up* sinned in *common* (as it were in one mystical person); not only Judas, but the legislature of the Jews, the whole Sanhedrim *acting as one* person, and *especially* Caiaphas, *by whose authority all things were done*:"—and this last approaches nearer the truth. The *acting as one person* is indeed true; but on that very account this person can be viewed only as represented by that one *by whose authority* all acted. The *singular* produces here, as put in comparison with *Pilate*, the decisive impression that *person* must stand against person;[1] and that person, too, one who was *well-known in his wickedness to Pilate*, so that he might see the propriety of the Lord's judgment. He consequently can be no other than *Caiaphas*, he in whose ἐξουσία all things on the side of the Jews originated and were accomplished; just as all things depended on Pilate, on the side of the Gentiles. Bengel: "This was Caiaphas. Pilate, when he heard a certain mention of the Son of God, feared; Caiaphas, when he heard Jesus Himself calling Himself the Son of God, termed Him a blasphemer, and decreed His death." Caiaphas knew of the power of the living God, and that he himself was only His servant; Caiaphas knew the Scripture, and from it the counsel of God, knew not merely the meaning of "the Son of God," but also (almost entirely at least) that Jesus *was He*:—with all this the ignorance of Pilate stands in contrast. Caiaphas took the

[1] As Nonnus has correctly used ἀνήρ, rejecting all collective meaning.

initiative in the whole matter (which lies in the παραδιδούς), and seizes it *in his own wicked will;* Pilate was drawn by circumstances operating upon his feebleness into guilt. Pilate had not from the beginning a malignant will: in his case the appointment of the overruling God comes rather into prominence, as in that of Caiaphas his own essential wickedness.

Thus we have here in the most appropriate place—what we might have expected, and would otherwise indeed have found wanting—a further judicial utterance concerning the *second* person, after Judas, among the sinners who rose against Jesus; concerning this "high priest," whose character, here held up to him as a mirror of *greater* sin, could not possibly have been unknown to Pilate. Thus the Lord by anticipation speaks in the same gracious judicial tone in which His apostles afterwards, Acts iii. 13, speak of the governor who would willingly have released Jesus. Braune, however, puts this too strongly, and even incorrectly: "Jesus here spoke a word which should *pacify* the conscience of Pilate—others might have sought to alarm it by threatenings." But this much is true: "the calm gentleness of Jesus had already alarmed his conscience to the utmost"—as the sequel in ver. 12 shows. And B.-Crusius is right in saying: "The first (thou wouldst have no power, &c.) strikes down his pride; the second encourages him by the same consideration"—that is, generally, by showing him that a higher δεδομένον of which he was unconscious ruled over the whole matter; and, in particular, by holding out to him in the distance the forgiveness of his lesser sin. We remarked before that Jesus intentionally forbore to speak to the heathen directly of *God*; and now we must note that He does not spare the word *sin*. For even the heathen in their ignorance knew what sin was; and by that knowledge they might be apprehended on behalf of God. But how *gently*, how *graciously*[1] does He speak of the relatively ignorant sin of the heathen as the lesser sin, as human sin generally; while the wickedness of those who knew in Israel borders already, as the greater sin, on the greatest—the

[1] "There is in this expression a certain token of love to the person of Pilate, which, coming from Him, whom he was conscious of condemning unjustly, appeared to Pilate all the more exalted." (Tholuck.)

Satanic sin in Judas.[1] Having this last as it were in His thought (for Caiaphas is a second Judas) He names the representative of opposing Judaism, in opposition to the representative of blind heathenism, the παραδιδούς; He does, indeed, at the same time, designate two numerous classes of sinners (with many gradations in each), but He refers primarily to the two individual persons. *I am now delivered up* to thee—thus He stands, and on this He rests, before Pilate—*to thee* a proud impotent man, who wilt really have no further *power* than to become the instrument of *Caiaphas*, and thus wilt *deliver Me up again to the Jews*, My sentence of death being ratified. (Ch. xviii. 36). He does not, however, expressly utter this last; He leaves it in the background as the lesser sin of weakness, which he measures and defines now before its accomplishment.

Pfenninger makes Pilate, pondering this answer, say: "a God in bonds could not speak more nobly!" Quite true—not more nobly in combined dignity and gentleness; but we doubt whether the governor received so deep an impression—he thought of nothing beyond the release of this man, as in Acts xxvi. 31, 32. Offended he certainly is not, and that of itself says something in his favour. Here belongs, according to our Harmony (the investigation of which we leave, as said before, to the reader) Lu. xxiii. 22—25 as the parallel passage; we cannot place this *before* the choice of Barabbas, and the first sentence accompanied by the washing of the hands.[2] St John, ver. 12, says, ἐκ τούτου he sought opportunity to release him—but this cannot be merely in the sense of time, *from now onwards*. For he had been quite earnest about this before; indeed more so than now. (Lücke: "he appeared to John previously to have rather trifled with the matter"—is quite unjustifiable!) Thus it is *on that account*, as the Syr. מִתְּל הָדָא. Lampe and Klee assent to this; Augustine, indeed, corrected the Vulg. *exinde* by *propter hoc*; B.-Cru-

[1] The *ecclesiastical* rulers in Christendom have retained, in their opposition to Jesus, the Caiaphas-rank, as in relation to the Pilates.

[2] Ἐπικρίνειν, *superjudicare*, as Bengel might say, βεβαιοῦν τὸ κριθέν—does not refer to the desire of the Jews, for an ἄτιημα is not a κριθέν, but to the earlier judgment which he would retract. It says now, He confirmed conclusively the first sentence—not without a laconic addition of the Evangelist, He *decreed* that their *requirement* should take effect!

sius points to ch. vi. 66, and here as well as there, combines the two—From that time *and* on that account.[1] He endeavoured from this saying onward, moved by it anew to release him:—but he *only* endeavoured, he did not deliver it as the sentence of right, by his personal authority. The *fourth* and the last, still *weaker* attempt of the feeble man to deliver Him! (The three previous attempts were in connection with Herod, Barabbas, and *Ecce Homo*. Lu. ver. 22 reckons differently, not regarding the sending to Herod as a declaration of innocence in order to His release). The matter must be ended: enough has been done, I pronounce Him free—but how fearfully did Pilate now finally miscalculate! The Jews return to the "king" instead of the "Son of God;" and declare, We will go further to Rome, and complain of thyself! Now first have they touched the point where Pilate was most susceptible; and as sinners generally are quick to find out this in each other, and these sharpsighted hypocrites especially knew the selfishness of their political rulers, it is almost a wonder that they did not resort to this expedient before. But God's counsel had held them back, purposely that all might proceed as it had. They now suddenly bethink themselves that Pilate would in the end inculpate himself before Cæsar, and know very well that "Pilate was not the man to sacrifice his own interest to the defence of injured innocence." A Procurator was very lightly degraded by the capricious Tiberius. "If the thought had been suggested to Cæsar's suspicious mind that a strange people were more faithful to him than his own servants —what punishment would he have devised for these!" (Drāseke). Whether or not the title "*amicus Cesaris*" was given to all the higher officials of the empire, or by way of distinction to some, and possessed by Pilate, it was doubtless with a keen and significant allusion to it that they now denied Pilate's fidelity to Cæsar, if he should let *this man* go free. *Whoever* should make himself a king within the Roman empire opposes himself (ἀντιλέγειν, as Lu. ii. 34) to Cæsar. The position was incontrovertibly true, but its false application to this Jesus must have its own force, as they knew it would: they ironically hint as the

[1] But B.-Crusius very incorrectly interprets the ζητεῖν as if *here* first the sending to Herod might have taken place!

consequence that whoever releases and does not punish such an one, is also an enemy of Cæsar, and that they would in their devotion denounce both alike!

Τοῦτον τὸν λόγον says St John, ver. 13 as in ver. 8,[1] and means to say—the word concerning *Cæsar* outweighed the word concerning the *Son of God!* And it suggested to Pilate—Better that this man should die, than that I should lose the government of the land. Thus he first sacrifices the guiltless to *his own* selfishness, and then afterwards to the clamour of the enemies. Had he been hitherto upright in his government, and had he been now strong in the confidence of right, he would have had nothing to fear from Cæsar; but there were many doubtful things in the past, and many cases in which he had subjected himself to similar threatenings of denunciation, as the learned may find in Philo and Josephus. At a later period he failed to escape his fate, and was deposed. For this time he saves himself; and *again* (after the first time, Matt. xxvii. 19) sits upon the judgment seat, to decree the execution of injustice. Thus miserably ends his anxious running to and fro, his going in and out, which had been but the external symbol of his vacillation between Jesus and the Jews, of his internal conflict and surrender to the power of sin. The result of his entire conduct, mixed up of *weakness* and *haughtiness* (in which the haughtiness from beginning to end ruined all) is, that the *weakness* remained alone at last. "In order to conceal old abominations, he must decide upon committing a new one. Now justly chastised for old and new acts of wantonness, he stands before us in all his impotence. In fact, he will not let the lost game be utterly lost; the sport with the *king of the Jews* comes again, as it were in its last convulsive efforts, down to the superscription on the cross." So Dräseke profoundly interprets, and gives at the same time the most correct signification of vers. 14 and 15. It has indeed been thought that by this repetition of the "king" he would remind the Lord's former friends of their Hosanna, and

[1] The reading *τῶν λόγων τούτων*, sanctioned by Griesb., Schott, Lachm., Tisch., and the Vulg. *hos sermones*, takes away a very fine point. We cannot understand Luthardt's view that these decisive *τῳ* words or declarations, out of many spoken at the same time, especially touched Pilate.

encourage them to clamour for His release; but this needs no refutation, after the whole statement of the case. Similarly with the interpretation of Grotius: "He reproaches them that they had been so foolish as to desire such a man for their king." Thus is it *mockery*, but only of the Jews, who indeed would be glad to have a king, but could bring forward in opposition to Cæsar no better a king than this.[1] Or, as v. Gerlach says, "does he seek to avenge himself throughout on the Jews, mocking them in every way?" We cannot think that he consciously and deliberately does this. When he acts thus foolishly as it respects his object to release, adding "Behold your king," to his former "Behold the man," and asking further, "Shall I crucify your king?" he seems to return back, half unconsciously, to the abject trifling which had been all to no purpose;[2] but, strictly speaking, he knows no longer what he does and says, he shifts round with his σταυρώσω, which, put as a question, recoils upon *himself* with almost the mocking echo of an Indicative. His "irresolute unrest" is painted with the highest historical truth in the narrative, down to the final παρέδωκε and ἐπέκρινε.

Then rings out, after the first *crucify*, the wild cry, *Away* with! Away with! as in Luke xxiii. 18, Away with *him!* which in Acts xxii. 22, and how many times since, has been echoed against both the Head and His members.[3] Then the Jews abase themselves as in thoughtful requital, We have no king but Cæsar! In the background there might be, as Hezel supplies it—"That is if he

[1] Lampe: "This much is certain, that the irony did not touch Christ, but only the Jews."

[2] Luthardt has misunderstood my meaning, as if I attributed to Pilate "something like a weak opposition still." Pfenninger rightly expressed my view of this last word of Pilate, when he said: "He speaks once more with a mixture of compassion, fear, and mockery, which it is hard to define." But it is psychologically reconcilable with all that preceded.

[3] All history cries, involuntarily prophesying with Pilate and confirming the testimony of Scripture and the Church, Behold, this is your *King! Sin* everywhere cries, where it would reign and remain —*Away with him!* But the crucifixion is persistently held up, and the warning sounds forth for many—Shall I, will ye crucify your king? Ah, that they would give up their hypocrisy, which puts Cæsar or *state* forward—to serve the *Devil!* But, at the same time, releases in triumph the false Jesus Barabbas, the seditious one and murderer.

is not mighty enough and willing to make us free"—but this they say not. The saying of the Talmud, standing there in proud impotence, though well-grounded in itself—Israel has no king but God—they blasphemously and hypocritically subvert. They thereby, rejecting the true Messiah, finally, formally, and solemnly renounce all their Messianic hopes; they testify against themselves, utter their own condemnation, and once more (as in Matt. xxvii. 25) invoke their own judgment by the hands of these Romans. Lampe very suggestively compares Judg. ix. 14, where the trees call upon the bramble to be their king, and out of the shadow of the bramble came forth the fire which devoured the cedars of Lebanon.

TO THE DAUGHTERS OF JERUSALEM.

(Luke xxiii. 28—31.)

Our Lord's going forth without the gate in reproach (Heb. xiii. 11—13) is now the counterpart of His entrance a few days before: now also the cry is that He is the *king* of the Jews—while He dies with two other malefactors! Is this most gentle Sufferer of the most unheard of wrong—a revolter against Cæsar? Yes, that was His alleged and current crime; but the name which Pilate recognises, and which the Jews reject, remains unaltered as the symbol of His honour in the midst of His reproach—The King of the Jews! And He bore *His* cross; He the first and the only one who bore it with perfect consciousness and perfect freedom of heart: not as the typical Isaac bore the wood for the burnt-offering; not as Simon the Cyrenian, or even Simon Peter. Properly speaking *our* cross:—love takes it up, and obedience bears it as His own. His garments were taken from Him, but we find nothing in Matt. xxvii. 31; Mark xv. 20 of a removal of the crown of thorns: that was left to mark Him out as the "king."[1] Worn down and exhausted—not in spirit, but in body and soul—by all that had befallen since the

[1] As, according to the legend, Christ was condemned to be crucified with the *mock tokens* of *kingly dignity*.

evening before, He begins to fail under the burden before the time: but the Jews, who nevertheless have such a law as Ex. xxiii. 5, have no sympathy with their king; the Gentiles, who have now full freedom to mock and pour indignity upon this kingdom, have no sympathy with this Messiah! No man will take hold of His cross: nevertheless, in order that the crucifixion may not be delayed, and to spare Him for greater sufferings, they constrain, by magisterial right of pressing, a stranger coming in an opposite direction to the crowd to bear the full weight of the cross. Nowhere is there compassion in all the multitude; acclamation, rather, and merriment. At length, one voice of humanity breaks forth: only women indeed, but yet women who mourn over and bewail Him[1]—so loudly, that their smiting upon their breasts and their lamentations drown for a moment the tumult of the mob. Whether or not the Talmudical ordinance, that there was to be no loud bewailing at an execution, was in existence,—feeling here burst through all, and what could not be suppressed must have its course. They were not, however, the women-disciples from Galilee (Lu. ver. 49), but women from the city, belonging to the crowd. Neither St Luke's statement, nor the ensuing word of our Lord, justifies us in regarding these weeping women as believing dependents, or in assuming that their feeling was anything more than the human impulse of woman's stronger sensibility to such scenes of suffering.[2] Thus it was not, as Hess thinks, "the outburst of nobler feeling, which displayed itself most unambiguously in thus bewailing Him whose condemnation was the cause of so much joy to the rulers and the rest of the people." Nor does Lange exhibit it rightly: "Now already began the first breathings of another mind to be felt; these were the early signs of the future courage of the cross." Nor does the language of Jesus warrant the exposition which Hiller gives: "*Partly* out of common sympathy and pity, for tender natures are ever ready to mourn over the wretched; *partly*, through the special love of attracting

[1] The first καὶ before ἐκόπτοντο is certainly to be struck out.

[2] Cries such as Pfenninger imagines—"Alas, thou good and divine man! Thou didst easily carry away our infirmities and sicknesses—and now sinkest under thine own cross!—Is there no pity? Is there no compassion for such a man as this?" are not historically true.

grace, moving those whose faith in Jesus was now in the fire, and to whom He was deeply precious." We must always maintain that these women did not weep with conscious sorrow over the unrighteousness or sin of what was done. All was kindly meant, indeed, on their part, according to the impulse of blind nature in the womanly feeling, not easily excited to wrath:—thus Braune adds the interesting observation, that "the sacred narrative has no record of any woman's enmity against the Redeemer."[1]. Yet they felt on the whole and collectively only that which was *human*. They mourn over *Him*, indeed, especially, as St Luke remarks; and therefore their feeling is not precisely the same as any other malefactor's melancholy execution would have excited: but there is no proper perception of His innocence, and the guilt of His enemies, in their minds. "Their sympathy was not better than Simon Peter's enforced and violent help"—Braune admits, but then adds: "he, however, hastened to carry his feeling into action. Did these women do the same? *Sympathy* often disappears more speedily than its tears dry up."

Nevertheless, as this voice of human compassion—which is perfectly in keeping with the historical truth of the whole narrative, that voice being never wanting amid the utmost horrors—is almost a refreshment to ourselves while we read, so must it have been acceptable to Jesus. It goes to His heart; He hears it and is once more moved to break His silence. He speaks one word, and *that* of itself is His acknowledgment. Otherwise, however, *what* He speaks rigorously repels their weeping. Thus He rewards them by the most fitting word which He could utter to them; and this *correction* is His *thanks*.

Jesus *turned* unto them, turned backward to them as they followed. The eyes of love, which had been sunk in deep sorrow because sinners rejected His love, He now lifts up: He stands still, and all, constrained by secret power, stand ready to hear His words. He begins to speak—Ye daughters of Jerusalem: and *all* are silent and hear! "Gentle as was the tone of His voice, the words which He spoke have an earnest and almost severe

[1] Souchon: "It was reserved for our time, in which hell, conscious of the coming judgment, lets loose all its Furies, to exhibit the new horror of even women lifting up their feet against Him." But compare Acts xiii. 50 with xvii. 12.

tone; not like gratitude for their sympathy and their tears, but rather like a reproof." (Bern. Jakobi). Yes indeed, His words are calmly solemn: we would add, keenly penetrating. The men had thought—What matter is it that the *women* weep? He counts these women worthy of a word, which he had denied before king Herod! But what He says is for them and for all—the last *preaching of repentance* on his way of death, His last word of public teaching. For us also it was spoken; and His words should be preached to Christian people, especially on the Palm Sunday before Good Friday, that a genuine Hosanna may prepare the way for the King who enters as the Man of sorrows. It is, as the Berl. Bible wellmeaningly says, and with partial truth, "a preaching of the law in the midst of the passion; for the law is not to be dismissed from the history of the atonement." More correctly it is *the passion-sermon of Christ Himself* in its *first part*, which the Seven Words on the cross complete by a second; it is *telling* the Daughters of Zion in the best sense *how* she should first of all receive her *King*. It is at the same time the text for the typical symbol of Simon the Cyrenian, with which St Luke connects it; and we may primarily embrace them thus:—The Lord does not at first demand our *sympathy*, but our *suffering together with Him!*

We exhibit thus our general arrangement, which, like the word itself, points through the historical meaning to that which is of universal application. The theme is—The true signification of the *suffering* of Jesus as it regarded Jerusalem *rejecting* Him, consisting in this, that not Jesus but Jerusalem falls into the *judgment* which alone should be mourned over. First: the general turning of their thoughts from Himself to Jerusalem, ver. 28. Secondly: The nearer exhibition of the judgment impending over Jerusalem; ver. 29 in itself, yet with reference *backward* to what should precede—then in ver. 30, with typical prophetical reference *forward* to the final judgment upon all who should reject Him. Thirdly, in ver. 31, the full explanation, giving the ground of the whole: *the difference between the judgment of grace and that of wrath*, spoken not without a glance back to the Baptist's *first* preaching of repentance.

Ver. 28. Ye daughters *of Jerusalem*—this still remains a term of honour, here as in Matt. xxiii. 37, where Jerusalem is rebuked

and condemned. *Daughters* of Jerusalem—His first word is a prophetical expression, in which He regards these women as representatives, not merely of Jerusalem, but of the whole land around the mother city. (Daughters like *children*, Matt. xxiii). Read the whole prophecy Isa. chs. ii. and iii., especially ch. ii. 10, 19, 21, iii. 16—24; and compare further ch. xxxii. 9. Weep not for *Me*—He thus recognises and acknowledges that their tears refer to Himself, and so far their slight degree of spiritual knowledge; for He does not say—Weep not for *us* three malefactors! But weep for *yourselves;* that is not at once—for your coming judgment; nor is it—for your own people; but literally and strictly—for *yourselves*, for that which is now on you and in you most properly your own, that is, *your sin*—that ye may not have to despair in your own judgment! Tears plentiful were shed that day in secret, as by Peter; but these were not *such* tears. Tears on account of sin are the Saviour's joy! "The same lips, whose gracious breath had dried so many tears, now cries on the way to the cross: *Weep*—for yourselves and your children!" (Dräseke). It is the only time in all His life that He commands those who hear Him to weep.

The *weeping* over suffering is the first step to true and wholesome sensibility and emotion:—over our own suffering and then in sympathy over others' as our own. And the excitement of such emotion in regard to the passion of our Lord is humanly true and therefore good—why else is the Man of Sorrows depicted before our eyes in all the lineaments of His grief? We should, indeed, rejoice whenever a hard heart is even thus moved by His woes: but that is no more than the mere commencement, out of which very much more must spring. The Lord forbids not *weeping;* for taking up the word He commands at once—*weep ye!* but He would give this excited emotion its proper direction, and its right object. The tears of mere sympathy are of no avail. Of *mere* sympathy? Is then sympathy, that beautiful impulse of otherwise selfish man, not right? Should we not weep with those that weep; and is not such weeping an expression of love, the source of many virtues? Yes verily; the sympathy which understands aright, and goes to the deep foundation of the reason for its exercise. But mere natural sympathy is neither serviceable nor salutary; it is involuntary, and therefore

an impulse of pure nature, without value or power. Through our fleshly effeminacy it often leads us, on the one hand, to a weak sympathy with injustice; and, on the other, to all the greater hardness of heart, if we suppress our feeling and thrust away from us its object. "The natural man can weep the tears of sympathy without any change whatever being produced in his heart. Such softness and good nature may consist with *sin* in all its thousand forms; even vanity and worldliness has tears of sympathy to shed; the slave of fleshly lusts may be moved to tears, and then go the same hour and serve his sin." (Jakobi.)

Thus, from the heart to mourn over *sin*, which is the people's ruin, and to recognise it as the cause of all evil, according to Lam. iii. 39—41, is the *second* stage: then first do we weep the real tears of truth. The transition to this is in our own proper feeling for self, by which we are apprehended when He, for whom we weep, says to us—Yea, there is much here for thee to weep over, but *on thine own account!* Thus the Lord, according to the remark of Grotius, "regards the general tendency of men, who weep more for their own than for others' calamity." Such penitent suffering for sin should be excited within us by every personal calamity, as the type and beginning of its future condemnation, Jer. ii. 19. But this, alas, seldom takes place, because our false egoism, disturbed and provoked but not broken by calamity, hinders our deeper reflection upon what conduces to our peace and what leads to destruction. Then should *sin* become more plain to our eyes, if possible, in the sufferings *of others!* Where there exists a higher necessity of suffering, our knowledge of that should rule our sympathy and make it fruitful. See, this sinner suffers his punishment—Think of thine own sin! This is the voice which we should hear at every execution whether of human or Divine justice upon others. But, finally, it is our Lord's will that even His guiltless suffering for the world's sin should preach to us the sin of the world and our own; for he who learns not to weep over his sin, will one day fall into that condemnation, which will abide for ever as properly and alone to be mourned. But the recognition of sin as the cause of Christ's suffering also, leads first to the profoundest, most thorough weeping over the *suffering* which *we* have inflicted

on eternal *love*, in order to the perfecting of our repentance;[1] and then, immediately, in most living transition, to *joy* over those redeeming sufferings which have obtained eternal glory—to that word of triumph: *weep not*, He hath overcome! We do not merely mourn, we do not always mourn; to us also sorrow is the way to joy, as suffering was to Him the way to glory. For, does not the same suffering of the Just One manifest to us the highest love in order to our forgiveness and salvation? In truth, the cross of Christ does not merely preach to us the condemnation and punishment of sin, but also the blessed glad tidings of grace. If the Lord's word to the daughters of Jerusalem does not include this as yet, but ends with the threatening of judgment, yet it would save through threatening, lead to joy through repentance, excite the true tears to dry them again. The whole saying, especially its first words—Weep *not* for Me, *but weep* for yourselves—is spoken for all mankind out of the depths of the fundamental thoughts which we have developed. He himself had only wept over Jerusalem when He entered it; and His farewell words coincide with those of ch. xix. 42—44, almost repeating them. He has nothing else in His thoughts but the salvation or the ruin of His people, of mankind; *of that* alone He speaks here; He forgets and renounces Himself in His profoundest personal sorrow; and will have sin alone bewailed, on account of its inevitable doom.

Christ's suffering is not to be mourned over on its own account; and our suffering with and in Christ, while it begins with weeping, brings joy in the end. Only the suffering of those who are condemned out of Christ, the misery of the rejected rejectors, is essentially matter of weeping:—that is for Him and for us; to the rejectors themselves there is despair without tears, rather than salutary weeping! The *passion of Christ* is no tragic spectacle to move men's hearts; the history of His sufferings is not recorded to excite human and sentimental feeling. Such meditations on the passion are not really such at at all, though whole books are full of them. Christ is infinitely

[1] Comp. Schöberlein in Stud. u. Kr. 1847. i., especially S. 30: "He is grieved at heart, not merely for having insulted the Divine *majesty*, but at the same time for having brought the Divine *love* to suffering."

exalted above our weeping on His account; and wills not thus to be mourned over. "Who can worthily bewail Him?"[1] But He does not reject this commiseration for the reason that harsh dogmatics sometimes assign, "because He regards Himself in His present condition as one for whom sympathy is unbefitting, and as being unworthy of it on account of the curse and wrath of God resting upon Him." For if He himself weeps over the doom of the damned, how can we speak so hardly of the wrath of God? But because the counsel of God leads Him to victory and glory, there is no need for weeping on His account. But much on our own; so that we, weeping for ourselves, may be partakers with Him of His victory in the only way in which we can share it. Only when the "For us" penetrates our hearts, can we experience the passion-sorrow and engage in passion-meditations; and know the grief of Lu. ver. 48 afterwards, as the preparation for the Pentecost. But the lamentation of the daughters of Jerusalem had not this meaning; therefore St Luke writes only ἐκόπτοντο here, and adds not τὰ στήθη, or εἰς τὰ στήθη ἑαυτῶν.[2] They know Him in some general sense as relatively guiltless; but they know Him not as the absolutely just, as the Holy One of God, who is offered up, and offers up Himself:—had there been more of that in their tears, they would have wept in still and solemn silence; entering into themselves they would have mourned without any κόπτεσθαι of excited feeling, which nevertheless was no smiting of their own breasts. At most they thought: "Alas, the innocent one! who can convict him of sin? He has told our rulers the truth, and they therefore crucify him." But that truth itself, which He had told not merely the rulers, but themselves also, they knew not. They know not themselves, and what in themselves was to be mourned over; they know not the sin of Jerusalem and God's people in such a manner as to see their own sin in it. The first thing—to know Himself—He requires not as yet at the beginning, that will be preached afterwards. But the second—to know *themselves*—He really makes the *first*, and requires it rightly from every one. No one, indeed, at least no dweller in Jerusalem

[1] Hagerbach's Gedichte i. S. 25.

[2] As in the Heb. N. T. it incorrectly stands: מְחוֹקָפוֹת עַל לִבֵּיהֶן

could honestly regard Him as a malefactor, or as such as He now appeared; but every conscience might and should have discerned and felt his own sin in the fearful sin of the multitude rejecting Him. Oh that many in our day would think of this! For to know Jesus (as a supposed Redeemer) without knowing ourselves, is a melancholy delusion of carnal security: to know ourselves without knowing Jesus—can only lead to despair! Most assuredly the glorified Lord needs no more any lamentation of ours; but we need to lament over ourselves that He may enter into us, and in order to that our first need is that *repentance* which He here preaches at the end, as He had begun by preaching it. What the Baptist had said to the unfruitful trees, He now says to the dry.

But that repentance which He, as the Suffering Saviour, preaches and works, is nevertheless (as is here hinted in undertone) something different from that first still selfish weeping on account of wrath and punishment—"since it makes the *sympathising sorrow of Divine love* in some sense its own," as Schöberlein profoundly and yet simply says. And that first *sympathy* with Jesus should be in us elevated and glorified into a truly intelligent entering into His *sympathy of sorrow* with us.

For yourselves *and for your children*—He adds, not without sad remembrance of the people's word, Matt. xxvii. 25. He thereby indicates already the (not mentioned but easily understood) *sin* which should be bewailed, as one which *would be propagated* from generation to generation, and the judgment therefore as one which would burst upon mothers and children alike.

Ver. 29. *For*—the judgment will infallibly come! Thus the Lord testifies by His prophetic *behold*. The *intervening thought* in this connection is obviously the presupposition that space will be given, between now and that judgment, for the repentance of all who would escape that judgment. It is true that the Lord in ver. 28 requires them to weep for the *judgment* which would surely and swiftly follow the sin; and His words would appear to go on—Do ye ask Me what there is then in yourselves which is so much to be bewailed? Behold, I foretell to you that which I already behold, the impending destruction. This is the application to their own anxiety for self, which weeps most readily over its own misery. But when we look more closely, there is a

change in His meaning:—He who weeps in anticipation over the condemnation of his sin, impending and pointed out beforehand, already weeps with penitent faith in God's righteousness and truth, over *sin*, over *himself* in the true sense, and thus *escapes* the judgment.* Or when this, as in the present case, is to come externally upon a whole land and people, and therefore to befall the penitent also with the rest, he will be delivered from the *wrath* of the judgment, it will not be to him a judicial and wrathful condemnation, it will not be the doom of despair. All this is involved in the Lord's words, if we understand them in their simple and easily intelligible application to the case in hand. Hence it is now only "they shall say," and in ver. 30, "they will begin to say:"—by no means, *Ye* shall say or make answer. For with those who receive the exhortation to weep *now*, it will be more tolerable, although they might be involved in the general tribulation; they shall find a far better refuge and covering. Bengel very incorrectly supplements the ἐροῦσι—"They will say, *i.e. your children;*" as if just *these* would then curse their mothers, and thereby their own birth and being. We cannot see whence and to what end he makes this restriction. But neither must we extend the distinction between those who will "say" then and those who weep now, to signify that their weeping *for Jesus* was already a security against the judgment in their own case, as being the token of their real repentance and better feeling.[1] No, the Lord does not in the following "they shall say" speak *merely* of His *enemies* in contradistinction to those who were now weeping; for in that case there would be no meaning in the first words—Weep for *yourselves;* and the "For" would simply tell them to weep for their people and their land. He could not *then* have blamed and rejected their weeping for *Him*, that being their salvation from wrath and from judgment. Oh no, it is the very point of the severity of His words, that this mere weeping for Him and not for themselves

[1] This is the interpretation of Hess: "The days will come in which *they, who now rejoice in My anguish*, will say, &c. He does not say —*ye*, who bewail Me; but—*they*, who scorn Me instead of showing sympathy." Hence He means "their rulers, teachers, and priests, whom He *does not name;* against whom, however, He thinks it needful to warn them"—as so perilously affecting mothers *and children!*

would not by any means save the weepers; that it is idle and useless in itself, unless it leads to deeper repentance. Thus these mourners themselves remain included in the *threatening*, on the supposition that they learn not to weep for themselves; while they are excepted from it, if they go on to repentance. They are, on the supposition of their penitence, at once included in the external tribulation which would befall Jerusalem, and excluded from the despair which would seize upon others in that tribulation. It is to intimate these two things that the word is thus indefinite. The judgment is threatened as impending and near,—that their repentance might be awakened; yet it is not immediately and expressly denounced against these persons,—to give them room for repentance. Thus alone is the ἐρούσι rightly understood: it is not merely "it shall be said;" still less a contrast of other persons who should say; nor is it a decisive ἐρεῖτε, ye shall say yourselves.

When the Lord by the prophetic "the days are coming"—הִנֵּה יָמִים בָּאִים—repeats, as it were, the prophecy of the Entry, ch. xix. 43, He continues it by dwelling on the last word—and *your children!* It is thereby indicated that these children then adult (or those afterwards born of the present *daughters* of Jerusalem), and with them at least many of their *mothers*, will live to the days of that judgment, and, moreover, the word affectingly paints the misery of the mothers especially as having those children. At such a time of distress the rule of prosperous days is reversed. In these the unfruitful are bewailed, the mothers are congratulated; but then it will be said (otherwise than the usual language)—Woe unto them that are with child, and to them that give suck, in those days. (Ch. xxi. 23). The Lord in this proverbial expression alludes to Hos. ix. 14; where in vers. 11—13 and again ver. 16, such destruction is denounced against the children in which fruitful Ephraim gloried as "beloved fruit" (מַחֲמַדֵּי בִטְנָם), so that it would be rather to be wished that God had given them "miscarrying wombs and dry breasts." He includes, at the same time, with the misery of the generation grown up in the interval (as we have shown upon Lu. xix), the frightful literal fulfilment of the ancient prophecies and types, in the horrible cruelty of the foe upon the *little children* who would

then be in existence. His words, finally, are uttered in that mother-feeling, with which He would have gathered the children of Jerusalem under His wings; intentionally exciting and moving the womanly and motherly sensibility, even while He is pointing this excited *sensibility* to its proper object and ground. Not that the mothers are selected as representing "the *loving* souls among His people," for whom such bitter tribulation was in store, this being interpreted of more than natural and human love; but He does indeed touch this human feeling, in order to *excite* its keenest emotion,[1] in that point where as sympathy and *compassion* it makes the fruit of the body one with self. Again, and it is to be observed as expressing his own personal feeling and its sparing tenderness, He does not positively say, *Woe* to the mothers who have children! but, *Blessed* will be those who have not. Pfenninger very beautifully represents a woman as reminding Mary afterwards, when this account was read, of what had been spoken in Lu. xi. 27, 28; whereupon Mary exhorts them, "Then keep, ye daughters of Jerusalem, the word which He said to you!" But the *men* who were around must also hear the word, and understand that judgment and sin should be bewailed on their own account and on account of their *children*, upon whom both pass over:—a very touching and powerful reflection for all preaching of repentance! The Lord did not, as Rambach says, lift up His voice as a trumpet when He uttered this prediction of judgment; but His words were loud enough for the hearing of all the silent multitude around.

He spoke expressly and primarily of the judgment of *Jerusalem* and Israel; yet He contemplates and refers to that which was shadowed out in this historical type—the judgment of all the impenitent and of all unbelievers in common, down to the last. How could He have withheld, at such a crisis, such an enlargement of His circle of vision? His word is not merely the voice of a Cassandra; He does not speak thus only as a "friend of his country," but as the Saviour of the world, as is more

[1] It is one of those few passages in which Jesus speaks expressly to the sensibilities—wherefore else the mention of the womb which bare and the breasts which gave suck! And it is so here, obviously because He speaks to weeping women, and because He would use and give a better application to the feeling which He moved.

plainly shown in the ensuing words. As He bears with his cross the sins of all the world, so does he behold not His people's misery, sin, and punishment alone, but the condemnation of all the condemned together.

Ver. 30. The same persons do not continue to speak, as the ἄρξονται proves; but this new word is the universal answer to the preceding, which fearfully *surpasses* it—Verily, *unblessed* are we! All of us, whether we bemoan our children, or only ourselves! To mark the highest degree of this misery, where despair begins, there is once more a scriptural, proverbial, and figurative saying—the calling upon the mountains and hills for protection within them; and that *in vain*, as is self-understood. The word is taken from a passage in the same prophet Hosea, in which Samaria was doomed even as Jerusalem, become like her, is doomed now. We read in ch. x. 8, And they shall say to the mountains, *Cover us;* and to the hills, *Fall on us;* and with this is connected the echo of Isa. ii. 10, 19, 21—the humbling of the proud daughters of Zion following in ch. iii. Thus we see once more *the Scripture* spread open, in its concert and harmony of passages from many parts, before the Lord's eyes, and in the midst, too, of His sufferings! In that Scripture He had ever had His being; in its words, become now supremely and essentially His own, He thought and felt down to the last! But it is remarkable, as we have just seen, that the Lord inverts the order of words of Hosea, and makes as it were an anti-climax out of them; the Old Testament word being deepened into a meaning which, however, perfectly corresponds with it in spirit. The doomed first wish for utter destruction under the mountains; and then, forasmuch as this is vain, they desire, in terror before the majesty of the Judge, to *hide themselves* under the hills! The Lord ends with this "*hide;*" He does not continue the words of Isaiah; for it is self-understood—*before whom.* It required, if the whole truth were spoken down to its final fulfilment, that He should name *Himself* as this Judge who should *come.* Yea, verily, He is the future Judge even on the way of Redemption, and that He *must* condemn so many who will not be redeemed, in His deep sorrow on sorrow. Therefore He breaks off, and in His grief does not expressly say that before *Him* such terror will seize all who then and thereafter should cry—*Away* with him!

But the Holy Ghost in Rev. vi. 16 most significantly brings to mind *this* word of the Saviour's threatening on His way of sorrow, and completes it:—Cover us from the face of Him who sitteth upon the throne, and from the (now aroused) *wrath* of the (once patiently for us suffering) *Lamb!* Such terror and amazement has the refuge of tears no longer; it is infinitely worse than that salutary weeping which is now commanded in order to escape from future howling and gnashing of teeth. Then will they *begin* their terror—then at last—but the better *beginning* of repentance they would never enter upon while it availed! Therefore their terror will be only the beginning, the torment of eternity to ensue will cease no more! This is the inmost meaning for the final consummation of judgment, which is only foreshadowed by the doom of Jerusalem. *Then* first, but too late—Oh that they had in a former time voluntarily humbled themselves before the majesty of their God! The historical and actual specific fulfilment of the figure, when, according to Josephus, the inhabitants of Jerusalem fled for refuge to subterraneous passages and sewers, and literally were hidden under the hills of their city, is the least thing: the meaning of the word reaches much further. Bengel: "Men have often been concealed in mountains. *Great terror!* when that which is horrible in itself is desired as a place of safety." But this is the terror of despair. The sinner falling into the condemnation of wrath mourns not merely over the children, to whom with life he has given sin, the others whom he has involved with his doom, but before all things curses his own life and being:—he would, as far as in him lay, rather exist no longer, as Rev. ix. 6 further explains the word. But it will then be told them, that those who seek death shall not find it; that they may desire to die, but death will flee from them. They are preserved and spared for the greater terror—Oh that we could be delivered from a sight of *His countenance!* And the prayer to the rocks, to cold and dead nature, is in vain; for (as Baxter somewhere says) "thou hast made the Lord of the hills thine enemy; His voice, and not thine, they will obey!" Oh that thou hadst, while there was yet time, called upon *Him* to save and hide thee from the coming wrath!

Ver. 31. This future judgment of wrath is now as a warning shown forth even in connection with the present judgment of

mercy which proceeds upon *Jesus in His sufferings;* for that which is common to both is the judgment, the righteous severity of God against *sin!* Yet the connection is exhibited only in such a manner that we must draw the inference from the one to the other by a *how much more,* making plain the great *distinction* between them at the same time.[1] We find in this conclusive utterance our Lord's own decisive protest *against* that identity, assumed in a certain theology, between the full wrath of God and His own sufferings; and *for* the position, which should need no argument to establish it, that he who sinks into despair and damnation through his own sin endures a different suffering from that which the Redeemer endured, and which we share with Him for our sanctification and life.

But before we deduce this from the simple word before us, we must do the great Bengel the honour to set aside his strange misinterpretation, which has been followed by only a few. He understood by the dry wood or tree, old, feeble, and *unfruitful* people, in opposition to those who were yet young and vigorous —appealing to Isa. lvi. 3; Ezek. xxxi. 3. He received all in the external, literal sense; and supposed ver. 31 to be a continuation of ver. 30, expressing the amazement of those whom this misery should befall. If the enemy thus deals with the young, as we see—what have we aged to expect? In the German New Testament he defines the matter very simply: in ver. 30 the *barren,* who were counted happy, *reply,* and then in ver. 31 liken themselves to a dry tree, as the fruitful to a green. For "when Jerusalem fell, the aged and useless would find less mercy from the Romans than the young and the strong." Apart from the questionableness of this last remark,[2] the whole exposition (which some might be ready to embrace, in order to escape from ours)

[1] Not as Krummacher despatches this word, so unfavourable to his doctrine of substitution: "That which passes upon Him must be of the same nature with that which is threatened against the ungodly." Perfectly and entirely the same it certainly is *not*—that is as clear as day in the very progression and conclusion of the sentence.

[2] For one cannot see why the old should endure *greater* cruelty. Hiller, who always follows Bengel, only brings out—"Those who pierce the young and vigorous with the sword, will not spare the old." Compare Deut. xxviii. 50; Lam. v. 12; Isa. xlvii. 6; but also Isa. xiii. 16—18.

has nothing less than the whole saying against it. After the word of amazement, ver. 30—manifestly the *last* which mortal could speak—it seems in the highest degree inappropriate to represent these despairing souls as beginning again with the feeble conclusion—For how will it be with us! And equally so to represent the Lord as having *closed* His words with such an expression of the wretched, so definitely describing the *judgment* of Jerusalem! We expect, and should then find strangely lacking, something said about *His own present sufferings*—for they were the subject now. Though they were not to weep over His sufferings, yet they should rightly contemplate and understand them; nor could some reference to this be wanting here. But the first and most immediate influence by which Christ's sufferings arouse us to repentance, is just this, that they point out to us a *suffering on account of sin;* and teach us to conclude how awful must be the wrath of judgment unto eternal condemnation, if the judgment of saving suffering, purchasing grace and redemption, and absolutely necessary to our salvation, is so severe! This remains the necessary conclusion, without which the whole saying would lack its appropriate close. This penetrates at last the whole depth of His meaning, as He connects the predicted condemnation with the lamentation which was before His eyes, in such a manner as the case required. On the other hand, how superficial and feeble would be the termination of the discourse according to Bengel's interpretation.[1]

We have in the Old and New Testaments clear real-parallels for the meaning of this saying, Jer. xlix. 12; Prov. xi. 31; and 1 Peter iv. 17, 18; in which last passage the sufferings of Christians with and in Christ, consequently the sufferings of Christ Himself, appear to be regarded as a commencing judgment. It is generally acknowledged that the Lord by the green tree signifies Himself, and by ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν—if they do these things—refers to the sufferings which the women wept over. The connection of the present figure with the former words is very slight, merely that which the unfruitfulness and fruitfulness might sug-

[1] Ξύλον like עֵץ also equivalent to tree—ὑγρῷ is in the Vulg. *viridi*, comp. רָטֹב Job. viii. 16.

gest. He refers once more to passages of Scripture, combined together; but it is probable that He thought of the *cross*, the dry tree of the curse, when He chose the expression. See what was said in Ezek. xvii. 24, with another application, concerning the drying up of the seemingly green tree, but the making of the seemingly dry tree to flourish, in a type which manifestly points to the judgment of the enemies and the kingdom of Christ. This will make it plain that the Lord here calls Himself the condemned dry tree, that is, the *Righteous One* suffering on account of sin the judgment of God, while those others are the *unrighteous* who deserve to be plucked up by the roots. (Jude ver. 12.) That, further, is the plain interpretation of Ezek. xx. 47, where the fire burns up without distinction all trees, green and dry;[1] that is, according to chap. xxi. 3 the righteous and the ungodly are cut off alike. V. Gerlach embraces this full meaning: "If the green and fruitbearing trees are rooted up, it is a sign that all trees are to be destroyed; and thus, most certainly and above all, the dry trees. When in the hidden purposes of the Divine counsel of salvation, the pious are cut off, it is a sign of fearful judgment and doom for the ungodly." But it is of importance to look more closely at this. The reason of the Divine plan is not so entirely a hidden one: *suffering* takes place assuredly only on account of *sin*. Even those who are relatively righteous and devout go not through their course without the fellowship of suffering. But, finally, in the application to the sufferings of Christ, who is the Righteous One, and who is alone by person and nature the green tree, we should not adopt the ordinary style of speaking and say (with v. Gerlach): "The accomplishment of the Divine *punishment* of sin in the person of the *guiltless* (this is even juridically impossible! this *summa injuria* in order to maintain *summum jus!*) is a sign beforehand that God will leave *no* sin unpunished." The question, rather, would arise as to why any sin was to be punished after all had been already punished in the one. The τί indicates not merely a contrast with the ταῦτα as to degree; but rather that *what* will take place upon the dry tree is something altogether different, which we may conclude *a minori ad majus*,

[1] Or "the rod of my son, it despiseth every tree," as chap. xxi. should be translated.

from what did take place upon the green tree. Theophylact's paraphrase is a good one: "If they do these things in Me, fruitful, always green, undying through the Divinity—what will they do to you, fruitless and robbed of all life-giving righteousness?"

Only thus does the entire discourse find its appropriate close, in the final words which give the fundamental reason of all. What is it in all *suffering*, whether of the righteous or the unrighteous, which is, properly speaking, lamentable, and to be mourned over? Nothing but *sin*, of which it is either the wages or the atonement. For there is a *judgment* of sin, and that, *finally*, a permanent, eternal *judgment of wrath*. That ye may escape from this, mourn ye sinners over yourselves! Behold in the judgment of grace which falls upon the Just One on account of sin, a hortatory warning of that infinitely heavier judgment of wrath! The judgment of grace begins and is fulfilled first in Jesus and His people; and in this sense judgment, as St Peter rightly interprets the external symbol, Jer. xxv. 29, Ezek. ix. 6, begins in the house of God, yea, on His own beloved Son. (For, believers are included with Christ in τὸ ὑγρὸν ξύλον—the definite article is not to be omitted from the text—and must enter into the fellowship of His sufferings. As it is wrong to say that He really and fully bore what should have been our punishment, so it is also wrong to say that this is now imputed to us *only* as the suffering of another.) But the judgment of wrath, which brings final and eternal despair without salvation or refuge, will fall upon those who persevered in unbelief. What an awful reality is sin! What will remain for those who would not be reconciled and saved, *seeing that* their reconciliation and salvation in and through Christ could not take place otherwise than by such sufferings on His part! *This* alone is the right and salutary contemplation of Christ's sorrow and passion; it is this which He points to, instead of an unintelligent and sentimental lamentation over it. "*God's wrath is heavier to bear than Christ's cross*"—is an excellent word, by which Rieger abolishes his own dogmatic system.[1] Indeed, the sin of the crucifixion

[1] The perfect opposite of Bengel's perfectly incorrect position:—"The punishment of Christ was heavier than that of any Jew when the city was taken:"—but it should also run, "than that of any condemned soul, when the world is destroyed!!" This, however, is contradicted by ver. 31, rightly understood.

was atoned for through the cross itself, had repentance followed. Jerusalem was not destroyed because it crucified Jesus, but because it *rejected* Him; that is, because it persisted in that rejection, and would not receive the apostolical preaching, Acts ii. 23—38; iii. 17—19, &c.

"If *they do* such things in Me," the Lord says—not "*if ye do*" to the women, as Hess observes; but it does not follow, as he thinks, that He distinguishes His enemies and crucifiers from these sympathising and better-minded women. That the sin of these women, too, is regarded as part of the guilt which brought upon Him His woe, was already assumed, as we have seen, in the "weep for *yourselves!*" He might have plainly said—If such sorrow comes upon Me *through you*, what anguish will one day come upon you *through Me!* But He does not say so, for on the one hand He veils now in the way of suffering His future judicial dignity; and, on the other, it would have been a not yet intelligible anticipation of the future passion-preaching of the Holy Ghost, if He had thus early told these daughters of Jerusalem, in the midst of their wailings, that *they* also joined to crucify Him! The indefinite ποιοῦσιν—*if they do*—corresponds with the γένηται, and the meaning so far is that *both* (what the Jews now do and what the Romans will do to the Jews) were not the act of men, but the counsel and the judgment of God. Yet it is not without design that "*they do*" is used the first time, since there is in it (what is suggested to be deeply pondered) an unrighteous ποιεῖν, a deed of wickedness; and none should conclude from this rooting up of the good tree, although fruitful in the works of God,—Consequently, he also an evildoer! But, rather—If God permits and orders such suffering for the righteous, what shall *be*, what must *befall*, finally and fully to the unrighteous! In this latter, the reference to the execution by human hands[1] falls entirely away; because the word already penetrates beyond the Romans to the fire of the last judgment.

If the women and the men who first heard and pondered this saying were moved in their hearts to ask, *Why* is it permitted that this should be done to the green tree? the very first word from the cross, interpreted by the Spirit of God in their con-

[1] Which is made prominent by the reading in the Vulg. *quid facient*.

sciences, and apostolical preaching most fully afterwards, would unfold to them the answer, and deduce from the *grace* revealed in the sufferings of Christ the piercing conclusion :—*What* must come upon all at last who persevere in rejecting this grace! And we ourselves may think further—What will come upon the branches which had been partakers once of grace, and then became dry and withered again! These the Lord includes, without any distinction, in the dry tree fit for eternal fire.

And after He had spoken these mighty words—words which preached repentance, predicted judgment, exhibited a possible salvation from a misery which was yet inevitable, measured out grace and wrath, pointing from His redeeming sufferings to future eternal anguish—He turned round again, and the procession went onward to Golgotha, where "these things" which they do must have their full accomplishment, more awfully and more perfectly than the sympathising women could imagine to themselves.

FIRST WORD FROM THE CROSS.

(Lu. xxiii. 34.)

We are now come to GOLGOTHA. Oh that all our readers were such as already sing, or are learning to sing, with the poet of the Brethren—"Through all times, through eternities, has my spirit restless wandered; but nothing seized my whole heart, until I came to Golgotha—to God be all the praise!" Every one, whose heart has been thus seized, knows full well that there is nothing else within the discovery of man's seeking mind whether in time or eternity, which can absolutely bring the heart, full of sin and longing, to God, that it may in Him be renewed and restored to man again. Wander whither thou wilt, with thy feet or in thy spirit, thou must at last come to the *place of a skull*, consecrated to death and judgment, pointing to the Jerusalem at hand. But here is not only heard the word from Sinai, The wages of sin is death!—but the gift of grace in eternal life is victoriously glorified on the cross, which is lifted up in the scene of judgment. Out of the profoundest depth of ruin breaks forth

in its most glorious exhibition the love of God in Christ Jesus; he who embraces that love by faith can praise God who hath given to him also this victory. The superscription in the three theological tongues bears witness for all the languages of the earth, concerning the King of the Jews as the Saviour of the world.[1] All, even the most shameful circumstances of His crucifixion, fulfil the *prophetic word*, and become most convincing arguments in the preaching of the gospel. But the *historical writing* of the Holy Ghost celebrates in this most sacred narrative its triumph over all that can ever come to pass in time or the ages of eternity.[2]

The saying written in Isa. liii. 12 is now fulfilled: He is reckoned among the transgressors, in order to bear the sin of many. But that all might be fulfilled, or rather that its fulfilment might be made manifest, *He utters that which was there predicted* in His intercession for the transgressors. This is His first word; for His rejection of the stupefying drink was most probably accom-

[1] We may say this, inasmuch as the ἑβραϊστί, the idiom of the people at the time, represented the Hebrew tongue, as in the Eli-invocation of Jesus. Strictly speaking, the *sacred* language is wanting by the side of the *official* and the *learned* languages; but in this it was shown that *all* the tongues of people and commerce were to be anew sanctified for this king.

[2] We cannot resist quoting an anecdote which Hess received from an eye and ear witness. "In one of those soirées of Baron d'Holbach, where the most celebrated infidels of the age were in the habit of assembling, great entertainment was afforded by the witty way in which the pretended absurdities, stupidities, and follies of all kinds which abound in the sacred writings were descanted upon. The philosopher Diderot, who had himself taken no part in the conversation, put an abrupt end to it by suddenly saying: 'Gentlemen, I know no men in France, or elsewhere, who can speak or write with more talent or more art. Nevertheless, in spite of all the evil we have spoken, and doubtless with reason enough, of this book [de ce diable de livre] I defy you, with all your power, to compose a narrative which shall be as simple but at the same time as sublime and as touching as the recital of the passion and death of Jesus Christ, which shall produce the same effect, and make so strong a sensation, felt so generally by all, and the influence of which shall continue the same after so many ages.' This unexpected apostrophe astonished all who heard it, and was followed by a long silence."—After this note, we would beg every one, whom it is needful thus to beg, to read through the entire history of the Passion, before our exposition of the words from the cross.

panied only by a gesture which declined it. The custom, mentioned by Sepp, of closing the mouths of malefactors, a custom of rare and most extreme barbarity, was probably not yet in existence; or, if it was, they could not put it into practice, because the world was yet to hear some further words of His mouth. They *crucified* Him—St Luke records this first, so that after the Lord had meekly undergone this, He speaks His first word from the cross, and *probably* while the nails were being driven. The never-ceasing intercession of His pleading heart becomes here an uttered expression and testimony. Let us approach, and reverently seek to understand it. What a word is this!

There is no resistance here! He defends not Himself; and although He might have said—Remove hence! Fall down before Me! He says merely with perfect resignation—What they *do* (*Ποιοῦσι*, probably connecting itself with the *ταῦτα ποιοῦσι* of ver. 31 before). There is nothing of wrath! He threatens not, nor invokes vengeance—Let me see thy vengeance on them! (Jer. xx. 12.) There is nothing of accusation or lament, no invocation of help—Save Me! Nor is there heard the word which we poor sinners are too ready, half in truth and half in pride, to utter—*I forgive* you! although He as the Holy One has the power to forgive as well as to condemn (Jno. viii. 11). Nor in this death for sin not His own is there any place for *Forgive Me!* Asserting His own rights while renouncing them, He thinks to the end not of Himself, like other children of men, but—as in the way with the daughters of Jerusalem—of others; nevertheless, He avails Himself of His prerogative in calling upon His *Father* for others. It is an infinite graciousness of self-denial, and humility of self-concealment, which is blended with the sublimity of this word. Thus He does not now say, I will not complain of you to the Father, I will pray *for you;* but He *prays* at once in most childlike simplicity, as if in so doing He only fulfilled an obligation, like that of the dying sinner, to confess and supplicate for himself. That every trace of personal judging, every tone of the most allowable and necessary thought about Himself, might be taken from the word, He does not even say—what they do *to Me* or *against Me.* He further cries, Forgive *them*, what *they* do:—for "Thy children" He cannot say, although His appeal to the Father does avail even for them. But He specifies whom

He means in no other way than by the gracious presupposition, *For* they know not! He restrains Himself in His most gracious expression from making any such distinction as, Forgive *all those who* do not altogether know; or, Forgive them *if* they know not what they do[1]:—although, as we shall see, this awful distinction remains in the background.

His "intercession" is infinitely more than any such intercession as is possible and appropriate to sinful men generally, and specifically quite different from it. For He utters His word not merely as a request, like others; but with the same consciousness which had been formerly expressed—Father, I know that Thou always hearest Me. His intercession has this for its ground, though in meekness it is not expressed—Father, *I will* that Thou forgive them. "Father!" By this He confirms to us once more, in the most humble and yet the sublimest manner, His own avowal that He is still *the Son* of God, and abides such upon the cross and in His atoning death. It is not as merely a holy man, but strictly as the incarnate Son, that He appeals to God by the name of Father; but the expression of His prayer immediately follows—being strictly connected with it—which speaks of *forgiveness* as its great object.

When we examine and analyse it, this first word from the cross discloses to us three things. First, the *perfect love* of the holy Son of man, maintained and approved even unto death: for the cry which went up to God has for its *presupposition* that He as man retains nothing but forgiveness and love. His whole life was an expression of such love; His death set upon it the last seal. So meekly and humbly does He die in the hands of His tormentors, that it seems to Him needless to speak of forgiveness on His own part. But, secondly, when we penetrate deeper, the word points us to *atoning love*—and that, too, of the *Father* himself, as it is revealed through the *Son*, who thus knoweth, and thus appealeth to, Him. With God there is forgiveness, that man may fear Him in order to love Him. No man can—even in that sense in which Scripture condescendingly uses the

[1] Indeed, just as little *can* He say—Even if they know it; forgive even those who sin without ignorance. Least of all could the word include the author of all this sin, and say of Satan, Forgive *him!*

word for men—forgive until He is forgiven; otherwise his unjustified "I forgive!" is both untruth and sin together in one. Thus Christ, now hanging upon the cross in the likeness of sinners, though He does not of course pray first for any forgiveness for Himself, yet keeps silence as to any forgiveness on His own part, referring that to the Father above. Once more, however, this God who reconciles the world unto Himself, not imputing to it its sin, is no other than the God who is in Christ, the Father of this Son. The Father, that is, who *through Him* then wills to be and *will be* our Father also; by no means is such *already in Himself.* Consequently, that is not indeed expressed which is implied in itself, *My* Father—for that Father-love which is now free to all is appealed to; but neither does He say —Forgive *Thy children!* In this supplicatory appeal of the Son, which is heard and granted at once, the voice of eternal love itself utters its promise—I will forgive. But only through that propitiation, in which the Just interposes for the unjust. Consequently, finally, and in the third place, this word exhibits together and at once, as well the *ground* as the *limit of forgiveness and reconciliation* for the sins of the world.

Its *ground* is and must ever be this intercession of the Son, who in the appearance of like condemnation can yet say "*Father.*" While His blood is being poured out, the testimony thus given beforehand declares—For you, for the forgiveness of sins! Thus, we have here in the beginning of the proper sufferings of death, the sufferings of redemption, a testimony concerning their cause, their design, and their fruit—Therefore, to this end I suffer what they do! For He Himself "knoweth what He doeth" in this His suffering fulfilment of all! "The saddest lamentations in the passion-psalms turn constantly to exultation in the blessed results which would follow, in the life which so many miserable souls would derive from them; and we may therefore say that *the Lord Jesus sweetened His bitter crucifixion to His own thoughts* by his testimony to the blessedness which would follow His passion." (Rieger). He who hangs as a king naked upon the cross, does thereby not merely testify that "one may be a king and not have a thread of the trappings of this world"—but this naked One alone covers our shame (Gen. iii. 21). Thus the

type and the interpreting word are brought directly together; and hence St Luke adds in the same verse—And they parted His raiment.

But how *far* extends this atoning word, which then and now restrains wrath against evildoers? Who are the evildoers for whom it was spoken and avails? The word says with designed indefiniteness no more than "*them*," in order to make room for every one who *will* and who *can* include himself. He does not say, My *enemies*—but He means in the widest sense all who are guilty by participation in what was done to Him. First of all, most assuredly, the executioners *who crucify Him*, as the connection in St Luke teaches us; the four soldiers who execute the deed. One might indeed be tempted to say (with v. Gerlach): "This intercession was not offered for the soldiers who nailed Him to the cross; they were not directly guilty of their act, doing it simply in obedience"—as their duty. But this is only a misleading fallacy, for they were otherwise *sinners*; moreover, their obedient, undoubting performance of their duty was done not without a sinful pleasure in doing it, or at all events was closely connected with their general condition as sinners, included in that common sin of the world, to which the Lord now ascribes His crucifixion. The word applies primarily to them, inasfar as in them was embodied the general fact—They crucified Him. Once more, as so often elsewhere, the Lord seizes the immediate and concrete exhibition, but means while He does so all that is exhibited and symbolised in it. He says, Forgive My crucifiers, and means all sinners as His enemies; as far as possible all men, in opposition to whom He stands before God as the Holy One, even *while* He becomes their Brother in all things, in their misery and their ignominy, and as the alone guiltless makes Himself the representative of *their* guilt. Here prays He *for the world* (John xvii. 9), and even this intercession continues in heaven. (Heb. vii. 25). But not only for the world, as opposed to His disciples. Peter, who denied Him, is included, with that which He did toward the fulfilment of the griefs of his denied Master; even John and Mary too, with the *doing* of their *hearts* in sinful infirmity, as the Lord sees through them. Even the murderers, between whom He hangs as numbered with the transgressors, are included with all that they have done and all

they have to do, inasmuch as here the whole world with its sin is regarded as the cause of the death of Christ upon the cross. Are *the high priests and rulers* also included, who condemned Him, delivered Him to Pilate, and raged for His crucifixion with the most furious zeal of malignity? Certainly many among them; all, indeed, of whom Caiaphas had already given in John xi. 50, a prophetically true testimony—Ye know not! But far indeed is the word from availing for *him*, this ringleader of the counsel and of the act. They are greatly in error who say that "the Lord had his real murderers especially in His thoughts in this prayer, and petitioned expressly for the terrible men who urged on His condemnation with devilish malice." Oh no, we cannot give any such specific interpretation to the word thus spoken in widest generality, and yet (as we shall see) expressing its own restriction; we can no more refer it especially to the judges and accusers than to the soldiers who executed their will. The Lord does not indeed *say now* what we have found expressed in the Σὺ εἶπας—*thou hast said*—to Judas and Caiaphas; it is not His *will* to exclude and except those who *knew*, but He commits all to Him who judgeth righteously. He closes His word, however, in such a manner, that it prays for the forgiveness of those sins only which were capable of forgiveness: not for the sin unto death, 1 John v. 16.

What they *do*—this expression, uttered in the present between the past and the future, embraces assuredly all sin of all sinners, which is seized in its central manifestation in the crucifixion of the Son of God: thus, as Langer[1] preaches, the sins which preceded this intercession, and the sins which followed it. The intercession looks back upon all that had brought them to the point of crucifying Him, and forward to all that would thereafter be done in continuation of that act. "The word of this intercession stretches out two arms; the one, to atone for all the sins which had gone before, the other, to atone for all the sins which should follow." This is certainly true; but we farther ask—Is *all*, can *all*, be forgiven which *all* do, have done or will do? and must answer *no;* for the intercessory word, while it gives us the ground of this reconciliation, gives us its *limit* likewise.

[1] Sermons on the Seven Words of Christ on the Cross. Halle, 1842.

The first and proper *objective ground* of all possible, and therefore actual reconciliation was unexpressed and only *intimated* in the appeal to the *Father*; if we bring it into completeness, it is, —*For I*, the Son, supplicate for them on the same cross, on which I am pierced for their sin! But then at once comes out the *limit* of this reconciliation; since a *subjective condition* and consequently a *restriction*, which supposes something different, is expressed *as* the ground. Thus the intercession veils, as much as might be, and gently passes by, the excluded; yet the "*for*" which is the ground of forgiveness, has plainly enough the force of a conditional "*if*." All are meant, concerning whom the all-knowing Son can say, because He knoweth it—that they *know not* what they do. "That does not signify that their ignorance would *deserve* grace; but the reason is derived from their miserable condition." So speaks the Berl. Bible rightly, but not the whole truth; the whole truth would be: *for* it is yet *possible* that forgiveness should be extended to them. *This* alone is the inmost meaning of the reason assigned in the *For*, which has a restricting *If* as its undertone. Indeed the most gracious word of the widest πάρεσις and most ready ἄφεσις, which we have here, does not expressly *name* their ἁμαρτάνειν or ἁμαρτία (as Stephen, Acts vii. 59)—nevertheless *sin* is intended in the word, because *forgiveness*. This word of our Lord, which is so unintelligently and wilfully perverted, is very far from sanctioning that superficial conscience-condemned theory, so ignorant both of *grace* and sin, which derives sin so-called from not knowing simply, and makes it one with ignorance. How often do we hear in various tones the effeminate wail and empty hope of such words as these: "Alas, poor mortals, if they only knew and understood, they would not sin;" that is, *they do not sin!* Then doctrine would be sufficient for their deliverance, and their reconciliation with God would consist only in the removal of their error! Oh no, in this pregnant τί (they know not *what*, how great evil they do) the doing is defined to be sinning.[1] The

[1] The usual and well-intended remarks upon our Lord's gentle and gracious apology and excuse, do not apprehend the matter in all its force and precision; for they seize *at once* upon the Lord's *excusing* words, instead of first penetrating the whole saying in its depths, and then being amazed at the apology which is so wonderfully found in the depths of human sin itself.

erring sheep (Isa. liii. 6, which passage might well be in our Lord's thought) are at the same time, and notwithstanding, no other than lost, voluntarily and knowingly rebellious, children of their heavenly Father.

The slightest actual *sin* is not committed without a knowledge that we transgress in will; else it would be no sin, and nothing would be *done* that required to be *forgiven.* For all *forgiveness* prayed for as yet possible, presupposes two things—a conscious *guilt,* and also an *error* connected with it. Guilt as such lies always in the evil will; in mere error there is nothing to forgive, it is to be pitied and helped; but every moral error has in it guilt, and is rendered guilty by previous sin. Nevertheless, there is on the other hand in every sin which may be forgiven a *not knowing;* from the first "deceiving" of the serpent *down to that limit* where consummate sin finally ends in perfectly conscious wickedness. Such was the condition of all those who were embraced originally in this intercession, from the most unknowing and yet not guiltless soldiers, up to those who had the knowledge in Israel; whose sin was not without blindness, but this blindness again the judicial consequence of their sin; so that Langer may well say, "almost greater than this act of horror (the crucifixion of our Lord) was the guilt out of which it had sprung." Even for the whole people of Israel, who, invoking blood-guiltiness upon themselves, in a sense "*prayed against* their forgiveness"[1]—the words of Jno. xv. 22—25 avail. But the greater part knew not the essential *what* of their act; they knew it not in its profoundest, fullest meaning. Many brought the sacrifice of fools, and thought they did God service; but knew not the evil which they did, because they knew neither the Father nor Christ. (Eccles. v. 1; Jno. xvi. 3.) Almost all knew the innocent man, the Holy One approved of God by signs and wonders; but only a few *knew* that He *was* Christ the Son of the living God. In fact this last is the great point in the not knowing *what* they do; for the Lord's concealed meaning is—They knew not *to whom* they do this! Is it not so even in our own day with many whom we should regard as exhibiting the full conscious and malignant

[1] In the words of Langer's sermons on the Seven Words—excellent in themselves, though with too Moravian a colouring.

contradiction of perfect wickedness, but in whom the Searcher of hearts sees something different? He sees error, and therefore room for an offered, and afterwards received forgiveness, here in the most awful outburst of human sin, before which our thoughts are lost in amazement. "Dreadful, that they know not what they do! Incomprehensible, that they know it not! Yet they really know it not. This judgment of the dying Lord sprang not from His sparing them, but from His knowledge." So Dräseke, and Rambach is not merely more plain but more profound: "In this the Son of God exhibited a *master-stroke* of His love; for He makes that which might have been matter of accusation (for their ignorance was unjustifiable) matter of *excuse*." The *law* of God knows nothing of the plea—I knew it not; but His *grace* judgeth otherwise. Christ on the cross knows that these blinded sinners themselves pray not for forgiveness; therefore He prays in His compassion for them; places Himself in their persons, and speaks on their behalf, that they may be encouraged to come to the "Father" through Him. Augustine: "Mercy prayed, that misery might pray; the Physician prayed, that the sick might pray; Judge, willing to be merciful, prayed, that the guilty might plead to be spared."

Wide, very wide, does this appealing intercession, with its gracious excuse, extend its arms over all sinners, and all sins in which error may yet be alleged. We may further say with Lange: "It availed for the individuals who were guilty *in proportion as* they in fact did not know what they did." But we should be in error if we continued, as he does: "no man, however, could altogether know. For how could sin be clearly conscious of itself?" This double position, which denies the possibility of any such actual and full knowledge, and therefore denies the existence of any such as could be excluded from the intercession, not merely in the actual history of the text, but generally and unconditionally, is *false;* for it misapprehends the abysmal nature of sin, the error of which must finally, unless kept back, end in the abyss (by the *fire* sufficiently enlightened); and contradicts the Scripture, especially all that we have discovered in it (vol. ii.) concerning the unpardonable sin. It may be enough to refer to our exposition there. The Lord would not have added His οὐ γὰρ οἴδασι, *they know not, if that were under-*

stood of itself touching all sin, and if there were not, beyond their limit, an οἴδασι to be attributed to others who were not included in this αὐτοῖς. There is a sin unto death, for which no prayer is to be offered; this was committed by Judas at least, probably by Caiaphas and others, and may have been committed oftentimes since, where the knowing has been directly within the spirit's reach. Compare also what we have said upon Lu. xxii. 53 (in this volume) concerning the judgment upon this question in the Acts; and understand by that the similar limitation in 1 Cor. ii. 8. The sin of *man*, deceived by the serpent, may as such be called that of ignorance, and find a sacrifice; hence the expression in Heb. ix. 7. The sin of the *devil* knows well what its aim is and what it does. Finally, those who have become altogether the devil's among men, equally know; they are therefore, and must ever be, his portion.

Finally, we must not overlook what is intimated by this ignorance admitted in the first word from the cross:—that on that account a salutary knowledge, and confession of *repentance*, still remains possible; that *this* is doubtless presupposed as the condition of forgiveness; yea, for many here referred to, is in a certain sense foredeclared and prophesied. Otherwise, this intercession of grace would supplicate forgiveness generally and unconditionally, in direct contradiction to the whole of Scripture, which everywhere demands the strictest repentance of every, the least, sin, in order to its being forgiven. See simply Lu. xxiv. 47. Out of repentance alone rises faith; but *repentance and faith* are everywhere inseparable and indispensable, where forgiveness is to be enjoyed. The apostolical preaching has no other law; were it otherwise, that preaching would be as it were useless after this redeeming intercession! That is a miserable perversion of this sacred word which regards the petition for forgiveness, obviously presupposing the conditions of that forgiveness, as an unconditional *assurance* and bestowment of it. The Lord is merciful, but He says—Acknowledge thine iniquity! (Jer. iii. 13.) When the sinner's eyes are opened (Acts xxvi. 18) to see his former sin, *then* he knows *what* he has done, but now ceases to do, otherwise than he had ever known before; then first repentance speaks with a new and full perception of the word—I have *sinned*. This knowledge, however, becomes the further knowledge—I have

crucified Thee, my Lord and my God; I have made Thee to serve and wearied Thee! (Isa. xliii. 24). Thus the fulfilment of the "*forgive them*" lies in the *future*; when they attain to a penitent knowledge, who now know not what they do. Their present not knowing makes their future forgiveness possible, *because* there is yet possible an opening of their eyes unto conversion; and *as long as* such a future is before them as possible, the intercession of Jesus avails and exerts its influence.[1] The same supplication therefore cries at the same time to the Father—Bring them to this knowledge! Give them space, and give them motive to repent! But, again, as is obvious—If they may receive it. (2 Tim. ii. 25, 26). The calling to mind this word concerning a forgiveness even then prepared, was helpful to the *repentance* of many even then, and certainly of many under subsequent apostolical preaching; for it was instrumental in producing trust, and confidence in that grace which had regarded the ignorance in the sin which they had hitherto committed. But without such confidence the first beginnings of repentance are not possible. This saving turn to God often take place long afterwards; and therefore the "Forgive them!" extends far into futurity, through many judgments which precede the last. Yet there remains a limit, and a final judgment of wrath; as Luther, correctly enough at least as to the main point, preaches: "The simple meaning is that the Lord intends to point out *two sorts of sin*, and we should make the distinction. All sins have the sacrifice and intercession of Christ between them and God, and God will not impute them, *if* they are (known and) acknowledged, and the sinner's faith rests upon the High Priest, with His sacrifice and intercession upon the cross. But *those sins* which fight against grace and will not know that they are such, such as those of the thief on the left hand and the blasphemers of the high priests, are not included in this intercession of Christ. There is a great difference between the sin which man acknowledges to be sin (how great sin it *has been*) and the

[1] Jesus acknowledges in them a certain ignorance, as "something which might make them capable of Divine forgiveness, if it should afterwards give place to a knowledge of the truth." So Christian Weiss, in the *Bibelstunden*—with all its tendency to Rationalism, well worth a reading.

sin which man will not know (wilfully refuses, though he knows it to be such, to acknowledge it in penitence)." Thus, how loudly does the Lord here call upon the sinner to seek the true knowledge of repentance; and at the same time what a *warning* is contained in His encouraging word! For there is no such thing as standing still in a career of sin; a man does not become more and more *ignorant* of what he does, and therefore more and more worthy of compassion. The tendency of continuance in the works of sin is to make the *knowledge* of it more clear, until, repentance becoming ever more difficult, the point is at last reached of the unpardonable—They know what they do!

Meanwhile let us who have knowledge, penitence, and faith, make the Lord's word our example, in praying for those who know not what they do. His word denounces for ever all that Christian Pharisaism which would uncharitably condemn and pass by others in their sin. It is true that we have the saying of 1 Jno. v. 16; but it is not expressly said there—If any man see his brother sin a sin which is unto death. For we may indeed see with increasing clearness our own sin; but very seldom *can we see*—what the Searcher of hearts on the cross would not, as it were, see, and omitted to speak of—that this man or that knows fully what he does. Stephen makes the *last* word of the cross his first *dying* word—that is now obtained for us as our privilege; but he also makes the *first* word of Jesus on the cross his own *last* word in *death*—and that is thereby commended to our imitation.

SECOND WORD FROM THE CROSS.

(Lu. xxiii. 43.)

What was the influence of the first word of the crucified upon the sinners who heard it, and for what did it pave the way? It wrought, probably, repentance in some; in still more it distantly prepared for it; but the greatest part, and among them many who were afterwards converted, were for the present only moved to more excited energy of evil in word and act. The internal history of the hearts around Golgotha remains hidden

from us; but their external course of conduct is recorded in a manner so impressive as to furnish more for our exposition than it can ever penetrate and interpret. According to the connection of the narrative in St Luke, that mockery now follows, which led to the railing blasphemy of the one malefactor, and the prayer of the other. The promise to this latter of entrance into Paradise is therefore obviously the second word on the cross.[1] Rambach[2] says of this order in the words: "The first was a word of intercession, the second a word of promise. The first prays for a term of repentance and grace: the second throws open the door of grace to a great sinner. The first has for its end justification, the second glorification; the first has to do with the kingdom of grace, the second with the kingdom of glory. In the first our Lord executed His highpriestly function, in an intercession founded upon His sacrificial death; in the second He anticipates His kingly office and act, and at the very moment when His kingly office was subjected to most supreme contempt." But, in order to understand the answer given to the thief, we must first study carefully his request; and that again will require us to expound the scene of mockery which gave rise to it.

And the people stood beholding. This mere contemplation involved a perilous stillness, which, to the consciences of the rulers, the real enemies and crucifiers of Christ, was insupportable:—for much worse might arise out of it. Then began these *rulers* their mockery, to clear the stifling air, and deafen the voice which was stirring even in themselves. The ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ, *also with them*, Matt. xxvii. 41 and Mark xv. 31, does not refer simply to the time, but intimates an entire forgetfulness and throwing aside of their dignity on the part of these great ones; and St Luke also in ver. 35 plainly records that the rulers began the mockery; for, "with them" is rightly expounded by Bengel with reference to vers. 33, 34—"with those who had crucified Him." It points us partly to the mockery in the hall of judgment, and partly to the railing spirit and words of the soldiers who had just accomplished the act; and tells us

[1] The opinion that the saying to Mary and John was the second will be afterwards refuted more fully.

[2] Thoughts upon the last Seven Words, &c.

that even the *rulers* reduced themselves to a level with the lowest and meanest of the Gentiles—and that they also crucified Christ, at least with their words. (Heb. vi. 6). There is a holy derision in the mouth of God, and of Christ, and of holy men, which unites the purest truth with the keenest love; but the mockery of the ungodly against truth and love is fearfully godless, and all the more fearful here as being the first effect and answer which the intercessory word upon the cross produces. "The highest love prays above on the cross for those who stand below; and while that prayer is being uttered (properly, after its utterance), those for whom that intercession is urged, are speaking and acting nothing but hatred." (Langer.) That was "the crucifixion of the sacred *soul* of Jesus"—according to the title which Rambach gives his sermon upon it: these were the nails which went through His heart.

The mockery of the rulers, and presently afterwards of the people, was given vent to partly as a needful protest against and suppression of any favourable feeling toward Jesus, and still more as a protest against the first mockery of the Gentiles as directed against this "King of the Jews:"—for they could contradict this only by joining in it.[1] Thus the malignity of Gentiles and Jews, though mutually contradicting, is united in its outburst against the Man upon the cross. "Have we not long ago said that he was a deceiver?" Thus their words begin, and then continue—"Behold, also, how he is brought to confusion as the pretended Messiah!" He had in the sublimest and most affecting manner directed their thoughts away from Himself to their own state, and to the guilt of their own deed which yet might be forgiven; but they will hear nothing of themselves, or of their own forgiveness; all their thought is against Him, and they continue what they have begun. All cry at once, *Save thyself!* and go still further, *If thou be* the Son of God—just as in the first temptation of Satan, which now recurs in its perfect consummation. One after the other ventures to bring forward his own keen railery; even *passing by* with wagging of head and

1 "They would now, in defiance of the superscription, make it plain to all that they had nothing in common with the crucified one." (Lange.)

blasphemy, no longer standing still as before! The first daring word addressed to the Lord himself (with an *Ah, Οὐά*, Mark xv. 29) came doubtless from among the rulers; for it brings forward again the charge concerning the temple, but at the same time *betrays* in its passion an almost correct understanding of its true meaning. (Build then the temple again—*it is in the way of being destroyed now!*) The same rulers who had first decreed—He is not Christ, as he said, and *therefore* he must die! now say in their mockery—He dies and *therefore* he is not Christ! "This is the helper of all men"—with a tone as if throwing doubt upon all His miracles; this at least was the design, but in the confusion of their tongues it runs as an enforced acknowledgment—He saved others! and so not only His love but His perfect faith is extorted from their admission—He trusted in God! Taken together these are, as J. G. Müller expresses it, "their testimony to His pure devotion and unselfish charity to man." He must come down from the cross to save *himself*:—thus speaks *selfishness* which knows of nothing but take care of *thyself* (Aide *toi*-même); and thus speaks *unbelief*, *Take care* of thyself (Aide-*toi* même) if thou canst! They know not now what they *say*; they know not that He had ascended the cross, in order to save others with an eternal salvation. But that even the high priests and scribes mock His admitted "trust in God" as now put to confusion, betrays the inmost wickedness of their hearts, for thus they really blaspheme God himself in Christ.[1] Finally, when they, according to Matt. xxvii. 43 (either ignorantly, or in their customary manner of perverting holy words into proverbs), speak in the language of Ps. xxii., this their mockery becomes a witness to truth, in His favour, and against their own sin.

Thus, Gentiles and Jews, rulers and common people, those who were standing there and such as passed by, all join in derision—and with them even those murderers who were also crucified, at least one of them. What Matt. calls ὀνειδίζειν, Lu. βλασφημεῖν, must have been, according to these emphatic expressions, no less than *mockery* too. Thus it was not, as Krummacher thinks, that the reviling thief might have made a despairing attempt to touch the Lord's honour, thinking of the

[1] As Lange S. 1563 excellently deduces.

possibility that He might yet save Himself and them, if He only would! Oh no, *this one* had received no such influence from the Man by his side, and the meaning of his word is altogether different. Nor was it "in the intoxication of frenzy," after having received the stupefying draught (as Teschendorff supposes), but, more correctly, it was partly in the "madness of anguish,"[1] and partly through the excitement of the mockery raging around, which he would imitate. It is with a side-glance of wretched vanity upon the multitude (I can mock too!)—using the tongue which alone is now in his power—without any emotion of penitence, but with a shameful joy that this insurgent against the powers of the world is now also like himself—that he utters his cry, Save thyself *and us!* Thou wert one of us—Canst thou do anything now for us? We hold with thee still, and are thy first dependents! What intensity of wickedness! What depth of shame for Jesus Himself!

The daring man had thought to excite general derision, and thus to perform a great exploit—but it is otherwise. He had been bold to speak in the name of his crucified companion, as well as his own—Save thyself and *us!* But before any one has time to laugh, this other crucified one protests with all his might against any such fellowship with those who fear not God.[2] One malefactor begins to preach to the other! Still more, a fellow-crucified begins to bear witness to the honour, dignity, and power of the crucified Just One. In the midst of the mockery of

[1] Friedlieb terms it too gently—"displeasure at his pain."

[2] Was he a *Gentile*, in opposition to the Jew who had spoken of "Christ?" An anonymous writer (Die Evangelien, ihr Geist u. s. w. Leipzig, 1845) finds in his words and those of Zaccheus the purest Greek in all the gospels! Bengel regarded him as a Gentile, but incorrectly. For this malefactor on the cross, and the Roman centurion afterwards, represent together the confessors from the Jewish and Gentile world; the former, especially, the remnant of the Jews saved in the impending judgment. The Lord would scarcely have spoken of *Paradise* to a Gentile. Bengel's ingenuity hides a double error. When he says, "He alludes not to the promises given to the Father, but the original Paradise," we must reply that the Gentile could not have known anything about that. When he goes on, "Nor is there any obstacle in his speaking of the one God, for faith in *Christ* infers faith in *one God*"—we cannot admit this. Rambach more correctly remarks that both belonged to the seditious Jews mentioned in Mark xv. 7. But we shall meet this question again.

blackest hell, a lightning flash of faith and confession to the truth breaks forth; and it is as a peal of thunder to all hearts and consciences around. "One who was cast out from the society of men was the first and only one who was penetrated by the truth and glory of Jesus, and bore a free and artless testimony in His behalf." So speaks the observer Nicodemus in Teschendorff, and adds, "Such a testimony of one dying in deep anguish through his own sin is not to be despised." Let us observe, once more, the most wonderful mingling of honour and indignity, of confessing truth and mocking lie: one crucified with Him is the only one who now confesses that Jesus is king—but what power has the honour paid to Truth in *such* a confession as this! Luther preached thus upon it: "This is a comfortable symbol and example for all Christendom, how that God will never let faith in Christ and the confession of His name go down. If the disciples as a body, and those who were otherwise related to Jesus, confess not and lose their faith, deny Him in fear, are offended, and forsake Him—a malefactor or murderer must come forward to confess Him, to preach Him to others, and teach all men who He is, and what consolation all may find in Him."

Long had the penitent hanging upon the cross kept silence, while hearing the general mockery; his indignation was not expressed until his companion included him in the "us." He was then compelled to rebuke him by a word which came from his deepest soul: Dost not thou—even thou not yet—fear *God?* The οὐδέ condemns at the same time all the rest; the inference from his words was, Hast thou not yet *learned* it (like me) upon thy cross? The ὅτι is not to be taken simply for *quamvis*, in favour of which probably Acts i. 17, though not Jno. viii. 45, may be compared; but it is to be filled up thus—Dost thou not fear God, *as thou oughtest to do, since*—? (Bengel: *because*—seeing that this should be a reason for fearing Him). Then follows his beautiful confession (of which we shall say more) in which he first places himself on a level with the rebuked malefactor by "we," that he may then set over against the daring "*save us*" of his fellow a better word, spoken to his conscience and soul; and then vindicate the Righteous One from the appearance of *the same condemnation;* and then, finally, speak to Jesus otherwise and more becomingly on his own behalf. He thinks of him-

self at last; not till he had rebuked his companion, and acknowledged the Just One.

But now, too, what a contrast between this petition and that derision! Arndt[1] concisely marks it thus: "Unbelief mocks, faith prays." The *remember me* is really a word of prayer; as in Nehem. xiii. 14, 22, 31, v. 19, and often in the Psalms spoken to God, besides Ps. xxv. 7, which has been referred to. It is *not merely* parallel with the request of Joseph, Gen. xl. 14, comp. Ecclus. xxxvii. 6; or used in the sense in which among the Jews survivors commended themselves to the intercession of the departing for admission into Paradise—though the incorrigible arch-Catholic Sepp finds here the doctrine of the intercession of the saints! But the κύριε, *Lord*, in connection with the *kingdom*, gives full evidence that the thief thought more highly than this concerning Jesus. This *remember me* includes, first and before all, a supplication for a *forgiveness* to be obtained from God His Father for him; and is as such connected with the intercession of Jesus, which here will be followed by its first anticipatory fruit. But then, still bolder, he continues, not indeed to say it openly but to hint it, that he himself would fain after his forgiveness enter *into the kingdom* of this Divine Ruler—Remember me as thy subject! "The firm conviction of the dying man as to the immortality of his soul," on which Niemeyer lays such stress, is the least thing, and is self-understood. His faith presses far beyond this! Luther's translation is, alas, very incorrect and misleading; its meaning being—When thou comest *into thy kingdom:* he follows the Vulg., and many persist in maintaining that ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ is to be explained as εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν. Oh no, this is not the meaning, even as understood, with de Wette and Neander, "to found and establish thy kingdom upon earth." But as he sees Jesus patiently *dying* upon the cross, he means by the *coming* a *coming again;* and that, in opposition to His present lowliness, *with His power and glory.* Thus it is—In Thy self-manifesting kingly power, as King. (Comp. Matt. xvi. 28). Not, certainly, as Allioli's note runs:—When thou comest into Thy heavenly kingdom, to God thy Father; or, as the sometimes unexegetical poet Knapp (Christl. Ged. iv. 290)

[1] The Seven Words, &c. Halle, 1842.

sings: "When thou ascendest to *thy heaven*, to take thy kingdom there." What kind of king of the Jews He is *not*—that He is not a king in the carnal sense of Jewish expectation—is made plain to the malefactor, and to all the world, by the crucifixion; but he is not, like the other,[1] offended at this; he understands, what Pilate would not understand, that He is nevertheless a King; and that He will in His time reveal His heavenly, spiritual kingdom upon earth, as a kingdom coming with His own person. Thus he declares firmly His knowledge and conviction—He can and will save both Himself and others! He puts his confidence in this dying One, whose last garment is taken from Him, and whose kingdom visible among men is now given up finally, that He will nevertheless appear as a King in His glory. Thus he reads—"with Divine clear-sightedness in this deepest night" (Krummacher)—the superscription aright, as if he had heard the confessions made before Caiaphas and Pilate; with astounding faith, in the face of the whole mocking world,[2] he looks forward into the kingdom of this crucified One by his side who was scorned by all men; and becomes an apostle of His honour, while His own apostles are oppressed in silent despondency. To such farseeing clearness of spiritual apprehension can fundamental penitence purge the eyes!

To all that had preceded—*hearing* all, however, as we now see—the Lord had kept silence; but He cannot keep silence now, He must *speak* once more! Not like any feeble son of man, involved in himself and thinking only of his own pain, does He hang upon the cross; but His open love and sympathy are ready for all, even the most fearful expressions, which these sinners, whom He redeems, cause Him to hear. Probably He cannot see these two criminals, cannot direct His glance to this last, without adding to His own agony by movement upon the cross. But that He forgets, and turns with an impulse of joy, as well as He can, to the soul that speaks to Him—thus making the nails more firm. (Pfenninger.) How *could* He keep silence, He, whose heart never received supplication in vain? "Hatred is silent,

[1] Who *probably*, as Lange says, though without direct support from the text, had hoped in Jesus as the Jewish Messiah.

[2] "This thief would fill a conspicuous place in a list of the triumphs of faith supplementary to Heb. xi." Alford.

and *His love* has the last word." Still more, it is not merely in His love to the miserable, but in His *joy* over this word of penitence and faith, that He gives answer. "No strengthening angel from heaven could have been more welcome"—says Arndt with deep feeling. That He can already assure and impart to this first-born the fruit of His now accomplished redemption, is (as the commencement of Jno. xii. 32) His last human joy and first full Saviour-joy upon the earth, in which *He himself* has the foretaste of Paradise in the midst of the ὁμοίωμα τοῦ κρίματος. He therefore begins with His sacred *Amen*, as in former days; and Pfenninger touchingly remarks that this would in a moment recall to the disciples, in the midst of their sorrow, His former "Verily, verily, I say unto you." "In this word," says Lange, with equal beauty, "all is *certainty*: the trust in the reality of the penitence of the thief; his merciful acceptance; the assurance of his continuing to live; the promise of His future union with Jesus; the instant fulfilment of all his wishes on the same day; the pledge of his elevation to heaven." To the last expression "heaven" we shall find some objection presently; but the first point, the trust in the earnestness (as to his repentance and as to his faith) of the thief, must have its counterpart in this, that Christ first by His "verily" strengthened the faith of this believer into perfection.[1]

Let it be observed how definitely the Lord replies to *all* that he said, and gives assurance in each case of more than was asked for; promising abundantly more than even this bold petitioner could ask or conceive. For—"He directs His words in His sympathy to the sore conflict of faith which this poor sinner had *still before him*; for he makes everything more definite than his humble request had ventured to do." (Rieger.) The appeal cried—*Lord!* therefore He says, *Verily* I, this Lord, say unto thee. *Remember me*—this also is surpassed—Thou shalt *be with Me!* instead of the mere remembrance, perfect fellowship and communion is promised. *When Thou one day* shalt come in Thy kingdom:—in opposition to this indefinite futurity, we hear—*To-day!* This last declaration also surpasses the request, since

[1] As Ramoach (Seven Words) says that "He must strengthen by His *verily* the soul which, with all its first strong faith, still needed the *strong consolation.*"

it places a condition of blessed satisfaction for the malefactor in the place of the kingly authority of Jesus; yet there is on the other hand something in the *to-day* which corrects and restricts the indistinct notion of his petition:—Not at once into the *kingdom*, but first into *Paradise*.[1] For up to this time the Lord's clear glance into all the relations and stages of the way which He himself would go, and on which He would lead His people, had not yet been obscured, as it afterwards was in the final darkness of His soul.

The word concerning *Paradise*, and that concerning the *forgiveness of sins*, are closely connected; though the connection does not exhibit itself in the expression. As the prayer did not first expressly ask forgiveness, while yet this lay in the background of the supplication, so the assurance of the corresponding answer leaves it unexpressed (though the intercession for all sinners coming to repentance had just preceded), but thereby gives the fullest promise of a presupposed pardon. "All who are cast out of the Paradise lost, are attracted by the inscription over the way—Forgiveness of sins. He who can make this word his own, is on the way to Paradise." So Langer, and again: "Without forgiveness of sins Paradise would be hell. *Through* the forgiveness of sins—were that possible there—hell would be Paradise. Therefore, the Redeemer's word, To-day thou shalt be with Me in Paradise, is only another form of the consolation—Be of good cheer, my son, thy sins be forgiven thee!"

The Berlenb. Bible says: "Here we must not play with the shell, but go to the kernel." We add: The kernel of the word is, first, the plain declaration—Thou shalt *be with Me!* But, secondly, the sweet kernel of the word "paradise"—which, with the to-day, has always been a hard nut to expositors—is the promise of *blessedness*. The Lord obviously chooses this expression, in order, both for the thief *and for Himself*, to place in opposition to their present anguish the thought of *rest* and *joy*; graciously promising the *peace* after and as springing out of the present condemnation. But then the expression points still further back and further forward: it says much more than merely

[1] Pfenninger represents the mockers as perverting this: "He says nothing about His kingdom—it is the safest way to give the promise of Abraham's bosom—no man can go there to see if he attained it."

—"with the blessed." The confession of the sufferer, "We receive the due reward of our deeds," sounds in the thought of Christ as the universal cry of sinful humanity, with which, therefore, He includes this specific sinner. It was natural and necessary that in the contemplations of His soul He should fix His thoughts upon the loss of Paradise by the whole race of evil-doers; and upon the tree of the curse remember the tree of life. Proceeding from this He utters His new and independent word: how far His language is connected with *Jewish ideas and expressions* customary at that time, is a question which concerns only the *shell* of the ripe and bursting word within, which, however, is itself not to be taken as the kernel! So far back as Ezek. xxviii. 13, xxxi. 8, 9 (and even by hints yet earlier, Isa. li. 3, comp. lviii. 11) we have the beginning in canonical scripture of the profound phraseology which, referring back to the primitive בְּעֵדֶן and בְּנֵי־אֱלֹהִים, speaks of a state of innocence and delight generally, which it was very easy to assign to the blessed as their restored place; comp. ii. Esdras vii. 53, viii. 52. In the Talmud, Paradise is now a place in heaven where souls are gathered together, and now a place where some are caught up in trance (see Buxt. Lex. s.v. פַּרְדֵּס); then, again, it is the region of Hades appointed to the righteous, as Gehenna to the wicked. This last is found expressly in *Chagiga* fol. 15. 1; hence Lutz (Bibl. Dogm. S. 413) correctly maintains that the Jewish eschatology provided a twofold intermediate state—Paradise and Gehenna. From this arose formulas of good wishing as to a happy death—May his soul be taken to the garden of Eden, may he have his portion in Paradise, &c.; see Grotius on Lu. xxiii. 43. The manifold and, for the most part, vapid teachings of the later Jews concerning Paradise, may be found in Eisenmenger Th. ii. Kap. v.; comp. also Th. i. 868-871. But how much of this was current in the time of Jesus is very uncertain; and hence we cannot admit at once what Friedlieb says, that Jesus in his word to the malefactor presupposed this predominant view. In the New Testament writings, not only does Rev. ii. 7 (comp. xxii. 2) confirm the truth of a restoration of "Paradise," but, according to 2 Cor. xii. 4, St Paul was caught up to a Paradise, which is made equivalent in ver. 2 to the "third heaven." This is obvi-

ously to be understood on the principle that *now*, after the completed victory of Christ, the true and perfect Paradise can only be *above*; although there may be a lower Paradise for many as a stage of transition. For (as Olshausen rightly remarks) the Jews themselves divided Paradise into the upper and the *under*. Comp. Eisenmenger ii. 296 ff. and 318, as also Sepp iii. 625, 633.

To enter more at large into the whole obscure doctrine of Hades, and to extract the truth thereof from the mists and perversions which surround it, would carry us too far: we therefore content ourselves with remarking that Christ, before his resurrection, can mean by the *to-day* of his promise only a lower Paradise, the "region of joy in Hades;" and therefore that Lutz (S. 412) is right in asserting an "intermediate state" to be here established. And the two things are quite consistent: on the one hand a certain adherence to the current ideas and language, and on the other a new meaning in the significant word which is not to be explained according to Jewish opinions. In one point of view, Grotius is quite right: "It is not to be doubted that Christ spoke in a manner which would be understood by the thief," and by the *Jews* who already knew something of a Paradise. In another point of view, it is still more certain that on His lips and at this time this important word would receive another and more perfect meaning, as well for all who should afterwards appropriate it, as for him who received it first. It was not without design, that our Lord in the parable of Lazarus spoke only of "Abraham's bosom," and not as the Jews did, proleptically, of "Paradise;" for "it was not till the manifestation of Christ that that resting-place of the faithful dead became *in truth* an abode of the blessed, and changed into Paradise" (Arndt). Now first was *Paradise* opened by the second Adam (as Chrysostom preached), *the new Paradise founded*, as Lange says, (only that the latter, with his "church of spirits" and "spirit congregation" idealises too much, invades the prerogative of heaven, and leads us away from the obvious sense of the words, as it respects Jesus and the malefactor). Certainly, as "Paradise lost" is a term which expresses and combines all the misery of man, and all his hopes and longings, as they first look

backward to what has been forfeited; so we may say (with Langer) that "the promise of Paradise is the greatest which could be given," that is, the most comprehensive; for all that has been lost, and that has been sighed for with infinite longing, is to be restored to us in glorified form," and so far the established *kingdom* of the consummation, the new earth, as described in Rev. xx., is actually the final, most real, and more than restored *Paradise:* consequently this reply to the supplication does most profoundly and internally *surpass it.* But with this is quite consistent the truth and reality of a condition and place, the rest and joy of which the Lord promises to the penitent *before* His "It is finished!" and for a to-day preceding His resurrection and ascension. Even the entrance at the first into this *lower* Paradise, the type and earnest of the *higher*, as of the last, is a transcendently great blessing for this *malefactor*, whose faith, apprehending the "Father forgive them!" had secured His justification, so that nothing needed to be said first about that.

The *to-day*, belonging to a time before the Resurrection, does not merely prove that the soul may be and will be consciously without the body in a particular place, but much more may be deduced from it. It is by no means right to paraphrase the word as Braune does, making it signify the day which begins with the evening of death and ends with the morning of the resurrection; or to regard Jesus as meaning simply eternity, which is no other than an absolute present! The simple *to-day* is the rather to be taken in its simple literalness, because it was intended to correspond with, while it surpassed, the hope expressed in the indefinite *when*. But, taking into view the whole doctrine of the descent into hell, as elsewhere taught, we cannot suppress a question of surprise. Was then Christ that day, at first and *immediately* after His dying, in Paradise? Was He "in heavenly places," from which He then descended into the kingdom of the dead?"[1] Most assuredly not, for in 1 Pet. iii. 18, 19, the descent is placed first; and in John xx. 17 the ascent into

[1] As Richter's Hausbibel, ignorant on these points, asserts. Compare the still more unintelligible note of Allioli: "in Paradise, that is, *in heaven*, for as the thief died after Christ, heaven was probably already opened."

heaven has not yet taken place. Christiane Käpplinger misses her way in this particular, when she writes:[1] "The Spirit of Jesus on the cross went forth into the consecrated place of preparation for the saints in Paradise; not only however for this, but also for the abode of unbelievers and the afflicted souls of men, did the *energies* of His Divine Spirit avail." This sounds as if the going into Paradise had been the first thing in His own case, as in that of the saints before (through His grace); and, moreover, as if His going to the *prison* consisted simply in "influence." The word upon the cross does indeed seem to say so, but it only seems to mean this. While indeed an immediate transition into Paradise is promised to the thief, and must be promised to him in order that he may not be below other believers who had entered before, this does not necessarily intimate that Christ went the same way at once. It would then have been—To-day shalt thou enter into Paradise with Me. But Christ, as the vicarious Redeemer, even of the apostates, continued necessarily in His own person the humiliation of death down to the *lowest* regions of death and judgment, in order to conquer there, and thence to ascend again victorious. The note of Meyer, the great authority on this question, must maintain its propriety: "In the abode of joy in Hades, whether the soul of Jesus *after* its descent into the prison ascended, and remained till the resurrection." Compare the invaluable though too much neglected little treatise of Meyer on "Hades," (Frankf. 1810)—where in S. 46 the opinion, originating in ignorance, that Christ first entered Paradise with the malefactor and then went to Gehenna, is called an *entirely perverted history*, which contradicts alike reason and the doctrine of the apostle. Lange also so understands it as to say, "Christ's death was necessarily and essentially a triumphal course through the waiting underworld into Paradise:"—only that he does not regard the first Paradise as still belonging to the underworld, and then first by Christ's victory elevated into heaven. The notion that the Paradise meant by Christ was heaven must assume without any good reason that the Jewish thief could already understand His meaning. But to investigate all this

[1] Beschreibungen über das Wesen der Gottheit u.s.w. Heilbronn, bei Landherr, 1846 S. 72.

would require us to write a treatise on Hades and the Descent. We content ourselves with remarking that this critical σήμερον,[1] in as far as it certainly means literally "this day" and contains a *bis dat qui cito dat*, will teach us that in those regions beyond, while on the one hand torments may seem protracted to a thousand years and peaceful enjoyment may continue long without weariness, yet on the other hand we may conceive in spiritual occurrences a very swift *measure of time* in relation to the world above. Hence in the space of time, to us very short, *between His own and the malefactor's death*, Christ might perform His great work in the lower parts of the underworld, and yet be in Paradise on the same day.

This *to-day* predicts, at the same time, that although other crucified ones lived longer, the death of the Lord was near, and it promises the like to the malefactor, as the shortening of his sufferings. So far it is a strengthening of the *Verily*, a confirmation of his assurance by declaring its immediate nearness.[2]

But now let us single out and mark carefully the μετ' ἐμοῦ ἔσῃ—*with Me;* and first of all *with Me*, as *through Me*. For without Him there is no fully re-opened Paradise; from Him and His forerunning entrance, in the virtue of His merit, comes all salvation into life, even though, in the case of the Old Testament saints who entered into the place of peace, that salvation may have gone before in time. Similarly, again, true and perfect blessedness consists in nothing but the fellowship of Jesus, in *being with Him*. And thus the promise passes onward beyond the lower into the upper Paradise, and gives us to meditate upon

[1] By many, to extricate themselves from all difficulty, connected with *I say unto thee*, though Christ never used such an expression as—I say unto thee to-day! Olshausen almost ridicules this superficial view, according to which our Lord would tell him, "I to-day say unto thee that thou shalt one day enter Paradise, God will yet save thee!" Notwithstanding, the Evang. Nicodemi (cap. 26) actually reads σήμερον λέγω σοι; and Theophylact mentions, only to reject, such a punctuation in his time.

[2] We find in Seiler that the thief expected Christ to come down from the cross and begin His kingdom at once; and that to take from him this vain hope he was told—We shall both die, and enter the place and conditica of the blessed! Thus this modern "felicity above" is turned into a *protest* against His coming back as King! Still worse has Bahrdt dealt with this "correction" of our Lord.

that which in John xvii. 24 is made prominent as the highest bliss: Thou shalt be *to-day already—and then further* with Me everywhere where I am and shall be! In *this* more plainly than in the *Paradise* lies the transcendency of the assurance, of which we may say—More He could not promise! This is His *remembering us!* *All* sinners crucified with Him, but who call upon Him in faith, He takes with Him, in the way of life which was opened up for Himself, to the fulness of joy. (Psalm xvi. 11). Whether this is to be interpreted with Meyer (Hades S. 81, 82), that we *all*, like Him, must go, although only in passing, through the fearful deep, and that He thus leads His people to Paradise—is very much to be doubted. Some would admit this as it regards the malefactor before us,[1] when the suddenness of his conversion is urged. But it appears clear to us that the word of Christ abolishes the Hades of torment *from this time forward*, from the period of His death and victory, as it respects all the believers of the New Testament; and that He here assures them, in this their first representative, of that instant presence with Christ which afterwards in Phil. i. 23 means still more.[2] And so far Neander's remark is quite correct, that this answer of Christ "contradicted the common Jewish views"—though in a sense probably far beyond what he intended. The sinner is accepted and taken to blessedness "without any further condition, and without the test of perseverance" (as Lange says); and this is the "first manifestation of that limitless glory of grace which now began its dominion in the death of the cross." This word therefore decidedly witnesses (as does the whole Scripture) against any intermediate sleep of the soul; and most decidedly against every Romanist return to the Old Testament position: it allows no place, at least as it regards such penitent

[1] As Meyer elsewhere (Bl. f. höh. Wahrh. ix. 282) expresses himself to the effect that he probably went down with Christ to the lower parts of the earth—that is, thus accompanying the Lord throughout His whole course, and in this sense being with Him (?).

[2] "Thus it is the state of blessedness, *immediately after death*, of those who die in the Lord; Paradise in conscious union and fellowship with Christ." So Bötticher, Leitfaden zur Geschichte des Reiches Gottes, S. 38. It is the super-terrestrial realm of spirits; not anticipating all that the resurrection will bring, but more than is admitted by the one-sided essay in the Evang. Kirchenzeitung 1847, Nr. 61.

believers as this man was, for any still needful purgatory, or intermediate process of purification or instruction. (What truth may be in this as it respects those who had not reached this point, but yet were not ripe for hell—that is, the unbelievers up to that period—is altogether another question).

Thus Golgotha has become an absolving judgment-seat, and the stake of the cross a throne of grace, from which the Dying One promises to the dying paradisaical life. In its *most general* meaning it has this gracious application for us all: and we may cry—Hear, O Israel! Hear, O world! Before the justifying, sanctifying, and glorifying grace of God, one final look of perfect faith is of as much avail as the lifelong evidence and exercise of faith in good works which the same grace might enable others to exhibit. "Only a poor *Remember me!* is all that we can do; he who can utter this aright may be fully assured of the whole blessedness of salvation."[1] And in this sense every deathbed of Christians is the cross of the malefactor, from which he turns his supplicating eye to the cross of his Lord; and every one who dies happy in the Lord is like him who is here finally accepted. Yet we must, in order to a complete exposition, mark now the *specific* application of the whole to that *repentance* of which this malefactor's is the type.

It is not an empty and feeble sigh of final appeal which ever obtains such an answer; this penitent supplicant himself teaches us otherwise, for his was of a very different kind. Even if, with Spener[2] and others, we assume that he thus suddenly and vehemently laid hold of the consolation because grace was offered him now for the first time[3]—even then he would be a warning to all who have wilfully rejected such offers of grace. But that is a very improbable assumption; he exhibits too much knowledge, and witnesses too sound a confession for such a supposition.

[1] In the "Exposition of the speculative part of St John's Gospel by a German mystical Divine," edited by Engelhardt, we read S. 44: "Ah, my soul! when will come the time and the hour that the eternal word of mercy shall say to thee, as to the penitent thief, This day be with me in Paradise!"

[2] Sentences of Scripture, which—are wont to be perverted.

[3] Like the criminal of whom we read that in going to execution he asked for prayer; and hearing the Lord's prayer for the first time, embraced it with all his heart.

But how and to what extent had he been previously prepared for it? Had he already repented in his imprisonment, and then turned his thoughts to the Nazarene whom he had known, but hitherto despised, and whose crucifixion now rendered keener the sting which his conscience had already felt? Possibly, but we cannot tell. It may be that it was the "Father, forgive them!" joined with the superscription on the cross, which first awakened and instructed him; or the words spoken in the way concerning judgment and the dry tree had fixed the first impression upon his heart. But at any rate *his words* teach us this—and it should save his example from being unhappily perverted by any —that he did not suddenly change his mind, after having joined the other malefactor in his blasphemy. This last supposition was indeed advanced by Ambrose, "Probably this thief blasphemed like the other, but was suddenly converted;" and has been defended by Lange.[1] But it may lead to dangerous consequences,[2] and is exegetically unsound. For, first, it is not necessary to assume that (according to Matt. and Mark) both at first reviled Christ, and that then (according to Lu.) one of them came to a better mind; but St Luke expressly records that only one blasphemed, and consequently the undistinguishing language of the two other evangelists must be interpreted accordingly. Secondly, this is confirmed by the character of the rebuke which the penitent uttered; for in the *Οὐδὲ σύ*, as we have seen, he expresses a displeasure which he had felt for some time, but which he had *restrained;* and, moreover, his words contain more than could have originated at the moment. Hence it is time for us now to look steadily at this point, that we may clearly apprehend the conditions under which the gracious word of our Lord was spoken.

[1] "His conscience was awakened, just at the moment of his last endeavour to find rest in his old manner of life!" But such blasphemy was no seeking rest. And, again, "this very last error would hasten his conversion!" But this at such a time is psychologically unimaginable. Nor is there much significance in the distinction between *ὠνείδιζον* as to both, and *ἐβλασφήμει* as to the one.

[2] Zinzendorf: "Had he not blasphemed, who knows if He would have converted him; had he not blasphemed upon the cross, who knows if his hard heart would have been broken!" (Oeff. Gem.-Reden von 1747.)

The malefactor has not only the fear of God and repentance, but the confession of sin and faith—faith of the strongest kind; he exhibits his penitential love and desire, also, and consequently all that the plan of salvation requires. The tokens of the fundamental reality of his late conversion are neither insufficient nor doubtful. Langer's sermon gives full prominence to the *fear* of God as the first condition on which all else might be founded, even where no love had been shown, in a soul at least which was not altogether hardened; as well as to his confession of sin, his unrepining acceptance of his punishment, his susceptibility for the acknowledgment of the righteousness of Him who was crucified near him, and his glimmering hope in a victorious kingdom of grace. But this last is far from acknowledging the strong *faith* and desire which was in his soul. His admission of the *justice of his punishment*, and his most public confession in the face of death—"we receive the righteous award of our deeds"—sprung from the most fundamental repentance, a repentance which was not that of the moment; and it is a pattern confession for all mankind, for *every one* on his cross, in his death! But now we must add the equally strong confession of his bold *faith*, as expressed in a double sentence, which testifies not only the *innocence* but also the *kingly authority* of Christ. His faith penetrates through the semblance of "the same condemnation," and retracts it at once as it regards Christ: he believes in the Crucified One as the Righteous, the Ruler, and the Helper, to whom his whole soul turns![1] We may regard it as certain that it was not the superscription of the cross which told him of the *kingdom* of this Jesus (this would be too direct and immediate); but that

[1] In οὐδὲν ἄτοπον (which indeed, according to Hesych., may be equivalent to πονηρὸν, αἰσχρὸν, comp. Prov. xxx. 20; Job xxvii. 6, xxxiv. 12, Sept.) there lies a specific meaning, as the unwontedness of the word intimates, which may be seen in 2 Thess. iii. 2; it already refers to the "kingdom" of this King of the Jews, and in the mouth of this *insurgent* would have some such significant as Rieger gives it. This crucified man had also been zealous for Jewish freedom; but now he sees "for what a miserable kingdom he had contended—how rash and wretched had been all his way in the world." But, on the other hand, he glories in the Lord Jesus: "This man has not aimed at His kingdom in such a lawless way as we have done in our blindness." It was his protest against His condemnation—His wishing to be king was no ἄλογον, no *ineptia*.

he had in earlier times known concerning Jesus, and "now believed what he had once heard about Him, or from Him." We may doubt whether "he felt and believed the divinity of Christ," as it respects his developed consciousness; but this was implicitly at least involved in his faith, and Bengel's note is correct: "Not even the apostles had such pure views of the kingdom of Christ." His bold and clear faith, as he here avows it, is so great, notwithstanding all that prepared and assisted it, that he may himself, as Spener says, "be reckoned among the *miracles* which occurred during the passion and death of our Lord." Another preaches, "The darkening of the sun, the earthquake, the opening of the graves, the rending of the rocks, were not greater miracles than the strong faith of this malefactor!"[1] Finally, let it not be overlooked, that the first fruit of repentance and faith is seen in the exhibition of charity which precedes; for what but the love of pity to his comrade, in connexion with and in his zeal for the fear and honour of God, inspired his mind with the thought of rebuking him? It is true that no one enters Paradise without holiness, but this malefactor was sanctified too. In truth, this one *good word* weighs as much as many good works before God, if not more; for goodness as well as sin is estimated by Him independently of its acts in continuance. It included all that the most rigorous preaching should desire in order to a happy death: —humble reverence before God, knowledge and confession of sin, expression of faith in redeeming grace and in the Redeemer, the prayer which seeks salvation, zeal to bear witness for the truth, and zealous love in preaching to others. As some one says: "From a robber he becomes a teacher of righteousness!" Thus this forgiven sinner is, as Niemeyer terms him, "one of the most elevated characters in the New Testament." His acceptance was not only a perfect justification by faith alone, but —in opposition to the perversion of this "alone"—it was at the same time a quickly accomplished new birth unto holiness. His *cross* was to him in swift succession—first, a deserved punishment; then a wholesome discipline which taught him with the fear of God[2] all wisdom; and, lastly, the way to salvation and glory.

[1] In the Breslau sermons, already quoted, on the Seven Words.

[2] It is from his own inmost experience that he says, φοβῇ τὸν θεὸν, ὅτι—a fresh reason for giving a causal meaning to ὅτι.

All this will more than sufficiently counteract the perversion of this word of Jesus, and the false hope derived from it by those who are not what this malefactor was. We are all sinners together, like the two by the side of Jesus; we belong to the *we*, of whom the penitent first of all speaks. We cannot indeed be converted too late, as it regards the mercy of the Lord; but we cannot turn too soon, as it regards our sin, which so swiftly hastens to obduration.[1] For *warning* therefore the other thief hangs on the other side; who, with death in his bones, blasphemes, and "rushes to hell because he believes not in hell"—because there is in him no *fear* of the judgment of God. But why is he and does he continue so blind and so hard? Wherefore is this *saving* on the part of *Christ* only matter of mockery, down to the moment when all salvation is shut out? He blasphemes the Lord on the stake of his crimes, just as others do, equally hardened, who lie on their soft deathbeds[2] proclaiming the complacent ἐπράξαμεν of their good works! Or who despond and despair because they can no longer believe, and God's righteous judgment even takes from them the wholesome *cross* upon earth, reserving them for eternal pain! Therefore, as C. Vischer once wrote:[3] "He would be an arrant fool who, because he saw a man fall many fathoms without breaking neck or limb, should straightway imitate him. But such leaps are dubious; the coming down is often woeful, and there is not always a sound getting up again." Yes, verily; and who would stake his soul upon the contingency that one out of a thousand so narrowly escapes the abyss?

Concerning the other malefactor the Lord is silent, and gives his scornful *save* no answer:—this says enough. Did the accepted one speak no word, return no thanksgiving to the Lord? Possibly he did, though it is not recorded; it is indeed probable, as Langer says, "that his grateful heart could find no

[1] "Ours is only the present moment; and while I maintain that no time is too late for repentance, I only assert that at the moment when grace calls us it is never too late (or too soon)." So Theremin in a most excellent sermon upon the Penitent Robber.

[2] Bengel says: "Rare is conversion on a soft bed!"

[3] Christliche Auslegung der sieben letzten Worte Christi. Smalkalden 1579.

word which would suffice for the reply to so great a promise." But it is *not* possible, as Langer[1] further says, "that while this gracious declaration was still vibrating in his ears, the angels of God carried him to the company of the blest." For that would substitute *now* for *to-day;* and then he would have entered Paradise *before* Jesus, instead of entering at the same time *with Him.*

THIRD WORD FROM THE CROSS.

(Jno. xix. 26, 27).

We agree with Ebrard in rejecting the hypothesis of Wieseler (S. u. K. 1840. S. 650), with whom Lange agrees,[2] as groundless and inadequate. Wieseler's argument that Jesus could commend His mother to John only on the ground that John was her nephew, and therefore independently bound to take care of her, is very weak; and we maintain, with Ebrard, that *because* the care of His mother was left to the free love of John's heart in spiritual relationship, the wife of Zebedee cannot have stood in the relation to Jesus of mother's sister. Consequently, we find in John xix. 25 only the three Marys. "That John does not record the presence of his mother is easily accounted for when he is narrating the Lord's gift of another mother; the mention of his bodily mother would have been quite inappropriate." So Ebrard, and Bengel's feeling was equally correct: "John modestly omits his mother, Salome, who however was present." Female love, though in weak vessels, is strongest and most enduring; the women are the last at the cross, and the first at

[1] Like the apocryphal gospel of Nicodemus, which represents him to have died immediately after the promise.

[2] That is, to resolve ver. 25 into two pairs, each connected by καί, and thus referring to *four* persons. His mother's sister would then not be Mary the wife of Klopas, but *Salome*, the mother of John. Luthardt gives good reasons for opposing this view:—that this counting in pairs is not appropriate here, that there must be a reason given for the presence of the wife of Klopas, while the mention of Salome without giving her name is scarcely befitting.

the sepulchre. The oppressed Peter and the other apostles—John excepted—are only isolated spectators, if at all, from afar. Thomas may have seen the prints of the nails, which he afterwards required to see again, subsequently on the dead body. According to Matt. xxvii. 55, Mark xv. 40, Luke xxiii. 49, the remaining friends, and the women, stood for the most part afar off; but John xix. 25 marks a moment when it became possible for those whom he specially named to draw nearer, for, otherwise, the Lord would not have been able to address to them any *confidential* word. That John himself was there is in ver. 26 mentioned by the way, and as a thing of course; it is probable that he had already attached himself especially to the mother of the Lord, to be near as her stay and protection. *Mater dolorosa* is Mary indeed under the cross, as Simeon had predicted; yet she *stood*, with all her grief, in the strength of faith and love; she *could* thus stand near the cross, not far from the crucifying soldiers! She held her spirit under command, as alone became her dignity and her experience. That which first the Fathers, and then the series of Catholic writers, describe or invent of the anguish and despair of the Saviour's mother under the cross—even to fainting and convulsions!—has been amply protested against, and especially by Lampe, who, in his suggestive manner, points to the contrast between her firm contemplation of the dishonour done to the ark of God, and the death-pains of the wife of Phinehas, 1 Sam. iv. 19.

St John in ver. 25 intends to intimate by his εἱστήκεισαν—*had stood*—that these beloved and loving ones had already stood there some time, waiting for at least a token or glance of His observation, though they might conclude in their hearts that they must not hope for a word. Christ had, in truth, as Rambach reminds us, previously cared by His first word for the impenitent, by His second word for the penitent, sinner, before He comes in the third to those related to Him, especially His mother; "from which order of His words we may learn that poor sinners lay nearer the Lord's heart than His personal relatives; and that His great work of saving sinners must first be done, before He could think of the bodily need of His own mother." There is much that is true in this artless meditation; although, when

we look deeper, we must remember that Mary herself with John belonged only to that humanity, for which, according to its need, the first and the second words were spoken.

The ἰδών marks the commencement of our Lord's special observation of the beloved disciples who were waiting in sorrow; there is something unbecoming in the thought that their drawing nearer, now first observed, was the occasion of His speaking. In His supreme collectedness of spirit, and in His undisturbed and unbroken love to them, His glance seeks them out. After He had promised to the thief the consolation of Paradise, He naturally remembers the residue of His disciples who would still remain in the world: should He not care for and comfort them also below? It is especially His mother who now connects His affectionate human spirit with the race of survivors. The burden of the world's redemption with all its increasing horror of sin, lies upon His soul; boundless anticipations, now gradually receding and passing away, of the glory to be obtained (Jno. xvii.) had filled His spirit:—yet He has room still for the exercise of the minutest care! Nor do we err, if (with many in all ages) we regard it in another point of view. He feels that more awful suffering, the last fearful conflict, draws nigh; He would spare His mother, at least, the sight of this, and therefore provides for her earlier departure from the place. (Bengel: The sword had now pierced the soul of Mary enough: He provides that she should not see His severest sufferings, the darkness, abandonment, and death). Thus does He close His earthly life—that He may die alone with His God and Father.[1] The first three of the Seven Words were expressions of love towards others; the last four, after the darkness, refer only to Christ Himself.

The word for Mary is certainly not the second in order, as Ebrard, Lange, Souchon, Harless, and others arrange it. Drüseke strangely expounds:[2] "His heart turns from His murderers; his bruised soul takes refuge, so to speak, with his beloved ones, His mother, and His friends. The transition is made

[1] Lampe is not correct in including all before the παρέδωκε of ver. 30 under the head of "preparation for His death." That in the Evangelist's sense would apply only to the Testament; and all that followed was itself the conflict and victory of death.

[2] Sermons preached in the Cathedral. Magdeburg, 1839.

plain by the very *antithesis*." Even then, however, it remains still true: "nothing but benediction!" Blessing to His murderers, blessing to the malefactor! But that the word to the crucified robber follows immediately after that to the crucifiers, has a more appropriate meaning, and is, as we shall see, required by St Luke's record. Least of all can we justify the supposition (of Neander, for example) that the word of provision for His mother was not spoken till after the Eloi Eloi; there was no more place then for anything of that kind, there remained then only the swift succession of events, through the thirst, the "Finished," to the death. Bengel (in the Harmony) opposes that close connection of "I thirst" with the word to His mother, which has arisen from a misunderstanding of St John's "after this;" he says that this μετὰ τοῦτο must not be referred to the particular words which were spoken, but to the whole crucifixion to which the Scripture pointed. We shall give presently a different interpretation. The fourth Evangelist here introduces supplementary and fragmentary particulars; and presupposes the darkness and the cry of anguish as having taken place at the period alone appropriate to them. According to ver. 35 (as Bengel again remarks) he had returned to the cross,[1] after having led Mary to his home; whence it is to be gathered that she had been led away before the three hours' darkness.

The first and the second word the Lord spoke as the Saviour in his office: He speaks the third primarily as the Son of man, having a mother, and personal obligations to discharge. The word of the Priest and the word of the King are followed by a word of the son and the friend, or, still better, of the Master of the household: for He "remains even unto death most affectionate and gracious in all human relations"—as Dietz preaches.

His mother has naturally a claim to the first word. Yet He addresses her only by γύναι,[2] *woman*, as at the beginning in Cana ch. ii. 4—and as He addresses the Magdalene in ch. xx 13—15. Lange is quite at fault in his interpretation: "*Woman*, tremb-

[1] The only eye witness among the apostles of Christ's death, while all were witnesses of His resurrection.

[2] Which St John would make emphatic, probably by the mere τὴν μητέρα and again τῇ μητρὶ (without αὐτοῦ, according to a reading which this makes more probable).

ling, impotent, dependent nature"—just as he would translate Jno. ii. 4: "Troubled heart of woman!"[1] Altogether different is in its connection *e.g.* in Dio Cassius (why this passage only instead of so many similar?) a *Θάρσει ὦ γύναι*—such a subordinate meaning is applicable neither here nor at Cana. Lange's reference to the encouragement spoken to Mary Magdalene is rather specious than solid; we gather, on the other hand, from Jno. iv. 21 (woman, believe me!) and Lu. xxii. 57, that *γύναι* was the general and honourable mode of addressing such as were otherwise unknown, instead of the name or any other designation. This is the fundamental idea here, as at Cana (to which it in a certain sense refers back): it is a general appellation instead of the name of mother; not otherwise than affectionate, yet having a tone of strangeness, and in some degree repellent. But why does He not now call her mother? It has been said, to spare her; that that word might not still further excite her grief over her son upon the cross. It has been also said, in order not to publish the fact of her being His mother, and thus expose her to hostile observation and treatment. There may be something true in both these suppositions; but the chief reason (which Arndt should not have adduced as merely "probable") is this, that her relation of mother is now finally abolished and given back; her person retreats, she is for the last time regarded as mother, in order to be so no longer. This is involved in the words which follow: Behold thy son! (I am thy son no longer) —as also in the profound and significant crisis of farewell. The earthly relation, which at Cana might not intrude into His office, is now entirely dissolved: the dying Son of God and Saviour of the world, afterwards exalted, has no longer a *mother* according to the flesh. Mary is not even mentioned in connection with the Resurrection,[2] and there is no account of any special appearance of the Lord for her sake; in Acts i. 14, she appears for the last time as belonging to the little company of the disciples and to the church.

Thus we have here once more a testimony against the Romanists'

[1] There was certainly no *trouble* in her mind then, but strong and premature confidence in miraculous help.

[2] But the legends of the middle ages tell us of a first visit paid to her by the Risen Lord, fore-announced, too, by Gabriel!

honour of Mary! They are not at a loss, however, for arguments to defend their doctrine; and (as Allioli forgets not to remark) the "holy fathers" and Augustin, in particular, serve their purpose by maintaining that *all the children of the church* were typified in the apostle John, and that therefore Mary was given as a *mother* to *all* believers! Quesnel on this passage is still more emphatic: "The holy Virgin has, as it were, the church's cause laid upon herself, that she may offer up Jesus Christ crucified upon the cross, and herself with Him. The holy Virgin receives as her children all Christians in the person of Saint John. The mother-title of Mary gives us our right and is our justification in putting all our interests into her hands." But how manifestly is this opposed to the expressly tender and personal reference of this legacy; *this* is assuredly the first and obvious meaning, and *all further interpretation must be in harmony with that!* We say with Arndt: "Is not this a most violent perversion of the words of holy Scripture? Does the Lord intend to say to John, She will take the place of a mother to thee? Does He not rather say, Thou shalt take My place and care for her? John was to be the stay of Mary, and not Mary the stay of John. Jesus does not refer John to Mary, but Mary to John. (Therefore does *this* also come first, and the other is added as its corresponding confirmation). Mary was not to be to the disciple the representative of Jesus, but the disciple was to be to Mary the representative of Jesus. The dependence and need of help was not to be on the side of John, but on that of Mary." As Richter's Family Bible has similarly and more concisely said, "Christ does not refer the caring for His disciples to the offices of Mary, but *conversely*." Another unbiassed interpretation, moreover, according to which Mary does represent in these words the church, we shall find at the close, when we contemplate the prophetic and typical meaning of the Seven Words together.

That John does not receive any direct appellation, any ἑταῖρε, φίλε, ἀδελφέ, or the like, is to be explained at once by the close connection of the sayings as they belong to each other; for him there is nothing repellent or renouncing (as in the γύναι), but a new bond which gives to him as a mother the mother of Jesus. The designation by name was here quite needless. There may be

assumed, too, a certain concealment from those who stood around and heard; so that no one precisely knew to *whom* the word referred. Both looked up to Him, full of expectation; as soon as He observes and looks directly at them, nothing more was necessary than the gentlest and most confidentially spoken word; the *Behold* was uttered with a glance which passed from one to the other. The gracious meaning is well brought out by Fikenscher: "Woman, look up, thy son—is not lost;" behold him in the person of another whom I appoint to that end! G. K. Rieger[1] says, anticipating the universal significance of the word: "He gives to them (the souls which love him beneath the cross) new eyes to *see* with, which are especially keen-sighted under the cross." He *is* henceforth thy son, she *is* henceforth thy mother; this was not expressed, but all the more strongly assured in the *Behold*. It contains a twofold *gift*, by which He, who after the parting of His garments possessed nothing in the world, but was yet infinitely rich in the love which creates love, gladdened the souls of His beloved. In the all-comprehending *Behold thy mother*, everything was self-understood to John (who had indeed already in profound inward love adhered to Mary under the cross[2]) which pertained to the care of her earthly life. To whom, but to the ἐπιστήθιος—the disciple who lay in His bosom—could the Lord have committed His mother? Christ and John—to quote Daub once more—were united in unchanging *confidence;* for in Christ was Divine purity, in John perfect faith. John here calls himself the disciple whom Jesus loved; it might have been said with equal truth—who loved Jesus with peculiar personal attachment, and was to Him as the *brother* among the apostles to whom He should necessarily commit His mother. Or, to speak with Grotius: Peter was φιλόχριστος, John φιλιήσους; hence to the former, as the lover of Christ, the church was committed; to the latter, as the lover of Jesus, His mother was specially commended. But we may regard this office of son to Mary, for which the loving disciple receives a new supply of love, as silently giving him a high place in the church,

[1] Who has a very beautiful sermon on this Testament of love, in his Herzenspostille.

[2] To which, at the same time, the *Behold thy son* spoken to Mary may point!

higher indeed than that of Peter. It is beautifully observed by von Gerlach: "But He placed John in the nearest personal relationship to Himself upon earth" (and, in the sense in which that alone is possible, actually—) "*in His own place*; He thus sealed in death the internal covenant of His heart with him, and breathed into him anew thereby the Spirit of love—that he might hereafter pervade the churches, founded more especially by others, with the sacred fire of the Redeemer's heart.

It might be said that John would of himself have cared for Mary; it might also be said that he would never have assumed that honour to himself beyond the others. But now the impulse of his heart was sanctified by a new grace and gift; his office of honour was made also a gift of honour; and all conflict of love and humility was prevented. This third word of the cross spoken by our Lord Jesus has been rightly termed His human *testament*,[1] and in it He typically performs, to fulfil all human virtue, His filial duty for the last time; thus giving testimony, too, that if He had previously placed His mother in the background, it had not been through any neglect of love:—for if now first John was to be her son, we are assured that Jesus Himself had hitherto Himself discharged the filial office. But in this dying provision for His mother He no longer calls her mother; and we may say that in the first word to Mary there is rather a *taking away*, and not till the second to John is there a proper *giving*. After the reference to *Paradise*, and the assurance which that gave of the certainty and near approach of His own death, Mary must have heard in the appointment of the son who should take His place, nothing but a most sad *farewell*,[2] the final close of His earthly life—after the manner of any other dying man. Yet, He does not take His farewell in words; and the sublime repose, like the heart-piercing propriety, of His appointment, evidences at the same time the Son of God, the Lord and abiding Pro-

[1] Ambrose: Testabatur de cruce Christus, et inter matrem atque discipulum dividebat pietatis officia. Condebat Dominus testamentum; signabat Johannes. (Lib. iii. cp. 24.) Jerome observes, however, that the domestic testament and the public testament in the Supper must be distinguished.

[2] Hence Pfenninger makes Mary say to Mary the wife of Klopas: "He never uttered a more hope-destroying word than this word of consolation!"

tector of His people, in His own power and love. But as to *John*, already now admitted to the confidence of the glorifying death of His Master, the word which he receives contains nothing but invigoration and a most costly gift. Invigoration, as far as he was cast down, through "the feeling of a new and great duty which bound him to life by new bonds" (Lange). That the mother of Jesus was given to him as a *mother*, is an inestimable legacy, and a precious promise. "He himself is thereby provided for," for he knows well that he will now eat with this holy widow as long as God permits, and not, as it were, she with him, like the widow of Zarephath with Elijah. The externalities of the relation, to which the testament refers, are with the highest tenderness of propriety omitted; for *such* hearts the short word was enough to explain all. The *hearts*, the *persons* were commended and given to each other—and that was the essential matter!

The Lord establishes, founds, and blesses here "the spiritual family life of His new kingdom," as some one has not ill expressed it. This new *relationship* in the love of Christ goes far beyond all relationships after the flesh. That John had already and still retained a mother in Salome, is not affected by this; but that he (according to sure tradition) had no wife, may have been regarded in the prevision of the whole.[1] That Mary had other sons subsequently born (in favour of which much contested though simply historical truth we have often declared our opinion) does not so enter into the case here as to make this testament an argument *against* it. Paulinus of Nola (ep. 43) says, "this shows plainly that she had not had, and had not now, any son but Him who was born of her as a virgin; for the Saviour would not have taken such care of her desolate state if He had not been her only son." Venturini, too, thought that this committal of Mary to the care of John would argue against her having other sons. So v. Gerlach: "Thy son in My stead—thus she had no other!" and Olshausen is confident: "This passage is to me decisive on the question, that Mary had no

[1] Jerome (contra Jovinian.): "The virgin mother was commended by the virgin Lord to the virgin disciple John." Comp. Nonnus: Γύναι φιλοπάρθενε μῆτερ, ἠνίδε παρθένον υἱα. More, however, in the text.

bodily sons; the Redeemer would not otherwise have commended His mother, as a solitary widow, to an alien: this would have been a slight to the brethren!" Strange proof! Was it, then, no "slight" to Salome, the bodily mother of John, who, according to Mark xv. 40, comp. Matt. xxvii. 56, stood with the rest under the cross. The children of His mother, to whom the Lord had as yet been unknown and an alien (Ps. lxix. 8), could not possibly, as spiritually alien, take his place, or be to Mary what Jesus had been, even after their conversion; but John was in spirit no *alien*. The whole objection rests too much upon mere external care. This the Lord of course included, but connects it with that inmost spiritual relation of love which could alone satisfy the heart of Mary, and which she would find most abundantly in the fellowship of John's spirit. It is the Lord's purpose in this arrangement, not indeed to neglect His brethren, but to put them to shame as still unbelieving, and refusing to become *such* brethren of Jesus as John was. His word is at the same time the *farewell which he utters to His brethren*, which their unbelief merited, and which urged them, through humiliation, to faith. For in Acts i. 14 we find them among the disciples.[1] But what we afterwards learn of the character of James, at least, a brother of the Lord, shows us that, with all his excellence, he could be no "son," in the inmost meaning of the word, for the heart of Mary.

Thus we may at first learn from this symbolical filial word of Jesus, that we should in dying think of and care for our own with like love and wisdom. Let us learn to make our testament without delay of forgetfulness, without any pretext of higher duties or neglect of other thoughts. Let us observe well that He himself here markedly fulfils unto death and sanctifies anew the commandment, Honour thy father and thy mother! and that He in general confirmed relationships after the flesh, even while He abolishes them and puts a higher in their stead; since He cares most tenderly for His mother, and at the

[1] Hence Braune well says: "Was this a slight put upon the brothers? But they believed not in Him! Should He slight His mother, however? The choice was not difficult. For natural birth avails not in the kingdom of God as spiritual regeneration does."

same time by His own Divine authority takes from His brethren the rights of the son. But all this is far from being the full meaning of His word, which in its significant order in the Seven Words (of which more in the sequel) must approve its universal significance as a *word of the Redeemer.* He can now neither speak nor do anything merely as a human person, as the son of Mary; and even this must be glorified into its full meaning as a Divine-human testament. Thus we may adopt the traditional spiritual interpretation which the church has always given to it: He here, when taking farewell of earthly things, gives His promise, as to His mother so also to all His people, of sufficient provision in all earthly things. While He releases Himself from all earthly relationship, He avows Himself to be in a higher and heavenly manner the Provider for all His disciples. Will not He who pointed the malefactor to Paradise in the other world—thus should our faith argue—provide for us a place in this, as long as we live in it? He who so graciously cared for His mother will assuredly not leave or neglect us! To this in truth belongs what He had before said in Matt. xii. 48—50. Just now, when Mary ceases to be specifically His mother, He becomes a Saviour to *all*, both in this world and the next *remembering* every one of His people. We are therefore perfectly justified in taking His word as a general pledge of sufficient provision for all His own upon earth. We behold in Mary and John, mutually caring and cared for, in all that pertained to the evidence of love and help, "the little flock of God's children, brought together and united under His cross."[1] Thus the Lord establishes from His cross *new* bonds[2]

[1] To symbolise this these two were chosen as "two of the most elect souls which after Him the earth had seen" (Lange). His supposition, however, that "the *house* of John was to form the bond of union for His elect" is altogether too external in its view. The truth lies deeper: the bond of love between Mary and John is the real and secret home and hearth of the church.

[2] *Bonds!* Dräseke, therefore, who makes this word the second, as showing the *fruit* of redemption, finds too little in it when he says: "John is not the son of Mary, nor is Mary the mother of John. But in the Mediator the wall of partition between man and man is done away. In this word we hear the echo of that greater (?) word—Behold, Father in heaven, these are thy children!"

and relationships in the Spirit (Mar. x. 29, 30); He points all who love Him and whom He loves to each other, and thus "once more confirms the great law of love from the cross" (C. H. Rieger). Hence also G. K. Rieger (in the Postille) excellently preaches, on this text, of the constraining love of Christ—how it draws us to Him even upon the cross, how it draws down Him to us under the cross, how it draws believers together through the cross. And the anonymous author of the Breslau sermons: His love—the joy of love to Him—the joy of love to one another.[1] But this must not lead us to forget the *care* in this love, which is its specific point. He *remembers every one*, and provides for his way through the world from which he is not yet taken; and when we think ourselves forsaken we should commend ourselves —and when we cannot provide for others should commend them —to Him. He will care for, He has cared for, He provides for His people by *means* of His people; and is evermore repeating the commendatory word where it is needed, Behold thy son, thy mother, thy brother. To hear and to accept this word should be our highest privilege and honour: not only when it says to us, Behold one who will care for thee; but also when it says, on the other hand, Behold one who is commended to thy care!

From that hour that disciple took her *to himself*, εἰς τὰ ἴδια, that is, manifestly, to his own *home*, to the house which he probably had in Jerusalem. Luthardt is right that this last is not proved by τὰ ἴδια[2]—yet he admits that Jno. xviii. 15 makes it likely that John had a residence in Jerusalem. Mary had not gone again to Nazareth which rejected her son, but had followed Him from place to place; Jesus takes it for granted that she would not return to that home, and confirms her in that purpose. He appoints her her place for the remainder of her life in the church, especially of Jerusalem, with the apostle who had been hitherto most trusted and so far most honoured, and who in the beginning of the Acts always appears with Peter. That ἀπ' ἐκείνης τῆς ὥρας (for which only one codex reads ἡμέρας) is to be

[1] Lange (Christoterpe 1848) goes not beyond this "beautiful life in love," this "bond of soul between men elevated and consecrated to God."

[2] Remarked also by Alford.

taken literally, is manifest from the general exactitude as to time which pervades the entire history of the Passion;[1] and with this it perfectly agrees, that St John in his μετὰ τοῦτο passes at once over the intervening three hours. We cannot admit Luthardt's argument here; but regard it as intimated by the exact "*hour*," as well as by the whole context, that Mary left the place at once, and did not wait till the death of Jesus. At once, understanding the Lord's design, John led away, in filial affectionate love, the mother, whose soul was once more deeply moved by the word of farewell; so that she did not see the increasing agony of her Son, who can be and will be no more her Son. She also understood the sad dismissal from the lips of her Son, who had many times before laid His commands upon His mother for her good,—and she obediently follows her new guide for the sake of Him who committed her to that guidance. Bengel: "Great is the faith of Mary, to be present at the cross; great was her submission, to go away before His death!" But the Lord sees the fulfilment of His testament before His eyes, before the last waves of His death-anguish rolled over His soul.

FOURTH WORD FROM THE CROSS.

(Matt. xxvii. 46; Mark xv. 34).

The *darkness* mentioned with one accord by the first three Evangelists,[2] at the time of full moon, about midday, and lasting three hours, stands in close connection with the words of Jesus, themselves dark, which at length proceeded out of this darkness. To the consideration of those words we now proceed. It must be left to others to investigate, and if possible to decide, whether πᾶσαν or ὅλην τὴν γῆν actually indicates the whole earth then enlightened by the sun (as Lu. xxi. 35)—or the Roman empire—

[1] B.-Crusius arbitrarily asserts that it has no definite meaning at all, and even Langer forces himself to think that the meaning is not that they at once went away, but that it indicates John's immediate resolution and purpose, and that Jesus read this purpose, as the pledge of its accomplishment, in his face.

[2] In Lu. moreover ἐσκοτίσθη ὁ ἥλιος, as Acts ii. 20.

or the Jewish land only (as Lu. iv. 25; Jas. v. 17). This affects not the question; and although the remarkable accounts of the wider extension of this miracle[1] seem to us perfectly unbiassed and trustworthy, yet we count it only folly to contend about them, and content ourselves as interpreters with the assurance of the historically certain sacred text—so that γῆ goes beyond Golgotha or even Jerusalem. In St John these three hours belong to ver. 28.

Up to this time the light of the sun had shone upon this scene of horror and lamentation. The mockers mock, the multitudes stare, the Lord suffers, His sacred head and face given up to contumely on the cross:—all goes on its way, as if nothing were occurring which might move God to interpose. "If God *to-day* gives no sign"—so spoke or silently thought many, with manifold inferences in their minds. And, behold, a sign is given! Not "unmarked" and by slow degrees, but instantaneously the darkness swallows up midday; even as at the birth of Christ the midnight had been illumined. *First of all*—as pointing back to that darkness over Egypt, refusing to give up Israel the Son of God, which was soon followed by destruction—first of all, it was a *warning sign* to all whose hearts were affected, that Israel was now committing a horrible work of darkness which God's sun would no longer shine upon, and by means of which the darkness of doom would come upon them.[2] Let us imagine the impression of this darkness on Golgotha and throughout Jerusalem; let us depict to ourselves the individual details of terror and fear—the stings of conscience, the interrupted lusts, the disturbed midday meals, the derangement of the temple-service, the confu-

[1] The Fathers referred (espec. Origen contra Celsum ii. 33, and Euseb. in the Chronicon, and Tertull. Apol. c. 21) to the testimony of profane history itself, viz., to that of Phlegon of Tralles, a freedman of the emperor Hadrian (to whom, according to Spartian, the writings bearing Phlegon's name ought to be assigned) of an "eclipse of the sun, the greatest of all recorded," and the "great earthquake which was felt in Bithynia." Julius Africanus, also, mentions the same account as from a certain Thallus, the same perhaps whom Euseb. meant.

[2] This signification is maintained in a remarkable dissertation by C. F. Bauer, De divinitus praedictio et cœlitus dato miraculo obscurati solis etc. Wittenb. 1741. He joins Tertull., Lact., Euseb., Cyril., Hieron., Aug., in regarding Amos viii. 9, 10, as predicting it.

sion as to the evening sacrifice, and so forth. Most assuredly all blasphemy and mockery is now silenced; Pfenninger is incorrect here, making Caiaphas cry: "God shows you the darkness into which this deceiver would have plunged your souls, and that darkness now puts him to confusion. Behold, where is now the Sun, the Light of the world!" It is true that the sign was very capable of such blaspheming perversion, in as far as it did really (as we shall see presently) refer itself most directly to the person of Jesus: but it cannot be supposed that any one would dare to entertain such thoughts.[1] Anxious silence reigns over the place of a skull; so should it be, for the Divine sign cried then, as it cries ever, Be silent and think! (Oh that this sacred and awful darkness might seize on all who now read the Passion history!) Not a few, it may be, then *expected* that something more would follow—His coming down from the cross, the revelation of His kingly power, and the destruction of His enemies. But neither *punishment* comes to them nor help to Him: the darkness continues. No man dares to go away; all are laid under a spell; others, rather, are attracted to the place. The very drops of blood are heard falling, and the gentle sighs; all listen to the cross in the middle, passing by the lamentations of the other crucified ones, and the murmuring of the crowd around. Thus we paint the scene to our thoughts; let us then investigate the significance of the sign.

It has a manifold meaning, like the language of God generally; but there is one interpretation which is alone perfect and true, as it is given by Christ himself. We might supplement the warning signification which has been mentioned, and say that here was exhibited the amazement of nature, and, as it were, of God, at the wickedness of the crucifixion: The sun will no longer shine upon the scene. Or it may be put as in the apocryphal account of Dionysius Areopagita, who said in Egypt concerning this darkness—"Either the Divinity Himself is suffering, or sympathises with one who suffers!" Or, as Dräseke expresses himself: "men strip themselves of all feeling, and sympathy passes into inanimate nature, when the Son of God dies."—

[1] There is more probability in Pfenninger's representation of the perversion to which His lamentation, after the return of the sun, might give rise—"Thus is it with all who have forsaken God!"

Indeed this interpretation of the *sympathy* of nature penetrates the reality of the matter, and corresponds with the general character of many similar miracles, which attest the correspondence between the material arrangements of the world and the doings of mankind and the Spirit.[1] We may say, further, that when created nature (the inanimate image of a hidden spiritual world) hides itself in mourning, there is, as it were, a *veil* of sorrow thrown over the scene which now first, from this hour of noon, was going on to its full consummation; the silent sign cries aloud that here is exhibited a *dark mystery* of the Divine counsel. Hitherto they have *seen* the crucified—some with malicious joy, some with profound grief, all with astonishment, none with indifference; but now none shall *see* what remains for Him to suffer, what no mind can conceive. All these thoughts have their truth; but they lead us finally to the only real and true signification of the *darkness*, as it is the sympathising, teaching *symbol and image*, silent but speaking, concealing yet revealing, of the *internal darkening of His soul* which the Lord of nature now undergoes, of His final *abandonment by God*.[2] If at first this sign from God was a consolation to the sympathising hearts below—soon were they conscious that His sufferings had become more terrific and dark! Yes, verily, He *now* passes through the last valley of the shadow of death, amid the darkness of the judgment of God—not, indeed, in the pains of the eternal condemnation of hell, but certainly under the *judgment* of grace.[3] Deeper darkness than could ever overspread the outer world fell upon His soul, when He cried unto His God—Thou hast brought Me unto the dust of death! (Ps. xxii. 15).

Three hours does He thus hang between heaven and earth. Cast out from earth as a curse, and not yet received to blessing in heaven. These were hours the full meaning of which eternity alone will disclose. *How long!* was the language of His spirit

[1] Krummacher, strangely at variance with his ordinary poetical vein, has no toleration for "this poetical view!" Yet as the veil of a more profound truth it is very obvious, and not at all inconsistent with a deeper interpretation.

[2] As the title of J. And. Schmid's dissertation bespeaks: De labore solis, laborante sole justitiæ.

[3] Dräseke suggests another analogy: "He died not gradually; His sun went down at once in high noon."

—*How long!* penetrates for ever the souls of all who are His. Hark, He *speaks*—" becomes the interpreter of this darkness, and tells us what it signifies!" (Berl. Bible.) And we must hear, but only *hear!* The first three words had brought out for our pure consolation the fruits of redemption—Peace, life, love; though the third had in it a tone of farewell and preparation for bitter death. But now the midmost of the Seven Words (Matt. and Mar. record *only* this, and it is the only one which is witnessed by *two* witnesses) takes us into the heart and centre of His passion unto death. *He cried with a loud voice*—with the infinite power of most internal pressure of spirit He cries out into the dark heavens above Him, the plain and intelligible words of lamentation in the Psalm—*My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken Me?!*

It has been said by many from the beginning (down to Krummacher) that when Jesus uttered this cry of anguish, the sun had already begun to shine out again; but we cannot admit this supposition. *Out of* the darkness still present within Him, consequently while the darkness still continued around Him, Jesus uttered His cry—but that cry of itself must bring the light again!

The Evangelists give the original with a translation—the former, indeed, in order to make intelligible the perversion of *Eli* into Elias, but mainly for its own sake, on account of the sacredness and soleness of this word—" as if they were unwilling that a single tone of this lamentation should be lost." We do not read the Hebrew text, but as mixed with the Chaldee, according to the current language of the time; for Jesus appropriates the word to Himself, and it was provided that every one should understand it.[1] Hence שבק instead of עזב, as the Targumist also has it. (The reading *azabtani* in the Vulg., which Luther followed, is a correction it may be of Jerome). The Ἐλωΐ in

[1] Otherwise the sacred *original text* of Scripture was familiar to the Lord. It has been said very truly: It is not to be thought that Christ, if He would speak with foreigners, could not have at once spoken their tongue; and was he not perfectly at home in the Scripture, the true home of His Spirit? To this also we may apply John vii. 15. Nevertheless He was so accustomed to *speak* the Scripture, not as a scribe, with the people and to the people, that He utters it in the same manner in His own most solitary anguish.

Mark was probably Syricized afterwards instead of *Ἠλεί* or *Ἠλί*. The unusual Voc. *Θεέ* in Matthew (Sept. elsewhere also *ὁ θεός*, see however Judg. xvi. 28, xxi. 3; Esra ix. 6), will bring into prominence the specific meaning in this place; as also the putting *μέ* before *ἐγκατέλιπες* (deviating from Sept. and ordinary rule) has the same emphasis for its reason. Finally, we shall speak again about *ἱνατί* or *εἰς τί*, *λάμμα*, *λαμά* or *λημά*, *λεμά*. These, however, are trivialities; it is now above all important that we should bring clearly before our minds the twenty-second Psalm, in the language of which the Lord spoke.

Let this be read, let it be *read entire;* but simply, as by a Christian, who, with a mind under the influence of Calvary, would read himself if possible into the soul of Jesus:—this will do more than all the commentaries of the learned. Justice, however, must be done to these commentaries and their objections; and as I may not refer all my readers to my own commentary (of which I retract nothing essential) I will endeavour as briefly as possible to set the main question before them. It may be assumed as "scientifically" demonstrated now that the psalm as a prophecy does not belong to the so-called directly Messianic psalms, in which (as in Ps. cx. according to the decision of Jesus and His apostles) the prophet consciously speaks of, or introduces as speaking, the future Messiah as a subject distinguished from himself—but to the *typical* psalms.[1] For such delineations of external and internal situations could not be dictated by the Spirit as hanging in the air, without psychological or historical mediation or basis; we admit of no such idea of inspiration or prophecy as would tolerate or require this. But it is by no means to be asserted—as is charged upon typical exegesis by those who misunderstand it—that therefore the contents of the typical word do *not altogether* suit the fulfilment, and consequently that between the expressions which were literally fulfilled much remains applicable to David alone. The matter is in reality (as we once more assert) true in an inverse way. The typical history has indeed traits which do not belong to the *tertium comparationis;* but in contradistinction to this, it is

[1] Just as in opposition Pss. ii. and cx., and Isa. liii. are purely objective prophecies of the Person of the coming One.

the very characteristic of a *prediction*, which proceeds from a type and makes the history of the time its substratum,[1] that it should *approximate* the symbolically imperfect element to the foreseen fulfilment, that it should anticipate, so to speak, and exhibit beforehand the particulars of that fulfilment, and thus *overpass* the historical reference. Thus while it says nothing but what suits the fulfilment, it says also many things which only in that fulfilment unfold the fullest and most proper sense of its letter—*much that has previously only a very preliminary truth.* If we will not admit that the prophetic spirit *foresaw* these things and so ordered the expression that their fulfilment in Christ first actually *fulfilled* them—then assuredly we have not only no mechanical, unmediated inspiration and prophecy, but actually none at all left; then it is all resolved at once into a pre-forming history according to the system of Hofmann.[2] But we think that the Old Testament manifests everywhere a design on the part of the prophetic spirit to pass beyond the situation and consciousness of the prophesier, which both approves and discloses itself in the final coincidence of the fulfilling history. And this, in relation to Psalm xxii., is something very different from the absurd notion that the entire crucifixion, and all its attendant circumstances, had been revealed to David;"—a notion which could only spring from thorough misunderstanding, and is of course to be protested against. It is, however, by no means absurd to say that David, proceeding from his own personal experiences and dispositions, is led by the Holy Spirit, whose language was upon his lips, further onward to a delineation which, on the whole, as also in many particulars, *now first becomes fully true*, πληροῦται. This view, which quite correctly "makes David speak at once and not speak," is by Umbreit's brief protest (S. u. K. 1840. 3. S. 707) very far from being refuted. We should be glad to have one decisive instance

[1] As in a certain degree of historical writing itself, in as far as it has a typical-prophetic reference in its selections and exhibition:—the case, for instance, of Melchizedec.

[2] The more correct formula would then be, Τότε δεύτερον ἐπληρώθη τὸ ἤδη πάλαι πεπληρωμένον—Then became true once more, that which was then already said or done. Thus the "fulfilment" would rather be the recurring *shadow!*

pointed out of the obscurity and confusion with which the figure of the suffering Redeemer is alleged to be invested by our theory; on the other hand, we are prepared almost everywhere to show that the great, full words, taken in their true literality, have only a shadowy suitableness to David, whereas in Christ, as in their *light*, they shine as the purest truth, and prove themselves to have been but the shadow of *this* great body. This would be a "magical necessity to predict the most distant things and the most contingent events," only on the supposition that the prophet's "individual self-consciousness must be *altogether* extinguished while he thus prophecies," which, however, we by no means assert. Apart from the fact, that the individual circumstances here in question are never mere "contingent events," but rather typical-historical incorporations of general ideas, like everything in the history of the Godman, which the Scripture specifies either in narrative or prophecy. We confidently say, therefore, and without violating the laws of thought or of history, the same thing concerning Ps. xxii. which Umbreit himself asserts concerning prophecy as a whole. Does not the sorrowful form of the Sufferer rise before us out of the simplest explanation of the text? And if Umbreit allows Micah's Bethlehem and the ass in Zechariah to have been prophecies literally fulfilled (though in themselves beyond the self-consciousness of both those prophets), why not also the mockery, the parting of the garments, the cleaving of the tongue to the jaws,—yea, finally, the *piercing* of the hands and the feet, like the piercing in Zechariah?

Christ took the *beginning* of the psalm as His cry of lamentation, the *end* of it (as we shall see) for His cry of victory. Ver. 8 was most literally fulfilled in the mouths of the mockers. St John refers, as simply as sublimely, not merely to the parting of the garments, but even to the casting lots, as found in the psalm, ver. 19; yet we do not attribute to him any such "absurd" notion about the individual circumstances as was referred to above, while it cannot be denied that he finds this *as* an individual circumstance really *predicted*. The whole delineation in vers. 12—18 of the psalm is—even apart from the difficulty which modern theology finds in the כאר (by the Masora, however, correctly though in ignorance defended)—so wonderfully reproduced in the scene of Golgotha, that it seems as if we were

reading a history of it written beforehand.[1] Verse 22 is not only realised in its striking expression "Brethren" in John xx. 17; but it is quoted by apostolical authority in Heb. ii. 11, 12, as a direct prediction. These are the salient points which are illustrated and explained in the New Testament; but the whole as such, apart from individual quotations, leads us directly to the Messiah. A Holy One of God is described in conflict and victory, in the deepest anguish and ignominy first, then in the highest honour. In David's life[2] there are many things similar, on which the Holy Spirit in his soul might base the prophecy; but we seek in vain for any single situation in his life which would entirely correspond. (Even 1 Sam. xxiii. 25, 26, which Hofmann points to, will certainly not suffice). For we see a righteous man who, in ver. 1 as in vers. 10, 11, can with perfect right of his own—without any trace of personal sin or guilt—appeal to God as *his* God from his *birth;* who, nevertheless, forsaken by this God as to his feeling and experience, is and remains miserable, finding less acceptance for his prayer than any other mortal praying in faith. Vers. 3—5.[3] A reproach of men, and despised of the people, not only threatened by raging enemies, but internally broken and poured out like water, brought by the dark counsel of God *into the dust of death,* that is, abandoned to certain death, beholding himself already as dying, and his enemies already dividing his garments.[4] Where

[1] Less: "One could almost believe that a Christian had composed the psalm."

[2] To make the psalm, in opposition to the superscription, a psalm of the Captivity—with Umbreit—is very bold; and even were it permissible, it would not fundamentally help the matter.

[3] For this is by no means, as Hengstenberg thinks, "a demonstration, how utterly abnormal such an abandonment *would be,*" a reason for the prayer for help—but in vers. 6—15 the contrast of actual abandonment follows, which by vers. 1—3 preceding would be exhibited all the more strongly and affectingly. From רָחוֹק in ver. 1, down to אֵלַי אַתָּה ver. 10, there is nothing but pure description and complaint, elevated by the contrast included; in ver. 11 there is a gentle אַל־תִּרְחַק; but not till after ver. 18 is there full freedom of supplication.

[4] Even Paulus admits that this parting of the raiment is not true of David, without hyperbole. But there is much more of such hyperbole in the psalm—all simple truth, however, in Christ!

and when did *all this* befall David? As to *him* it was hyperbole, to which the Spirit impelled him, but on Calvary it became the simplest truth. And so also in the second part, where not merely (as Hofmann lowers its meaning) "the concealed sun of the resurrection shines through its clouds," but the victory is as glorious as the conflict was gloomy and dark. The anguish of death is followed (and it is the *answer* to the *why)* by a declaration and glorifying of the name of God, a salvation for all the miserable, far and wide, to the ends of the world, and among all the kindreds of the nations, by means of which the hearts of the comforted live for ever, others lying in the dust of death are lifted up, and the people that shall be born are made partakers of His righteousness:—and all through the full accomplishment of salvation in this One Sufferer, who hath "done this!" What deliverance of David ever had, or ever could have, such results? Are we not involuntarily compelled to think of Isa. liii.? Could David have conceived and uttered all this without an elevation beyond himself, even while lesser analogies in his own history might make him susceptible, and prepare him for such contemplations?

Thus all, as it is here predicted, has indeed its root in the experiences of Old Testament saints, especially David, who was also an anointed of God passing through shame and suffering; and the prophetic word which had its goal in Christ grows up and takes its form, here as everywhere, from the Old Testament, human life in God:—nevertheless it has its full and perfect truth only in Christ. So especially and most properly with regard to the *cry of anguish* in the beginning, which Christ makes His own, and thereby teaches us that He fully discerned Himself in this psalm. Umbreit says correctly that "beyond this there can be no expression of human *distress;*" for it certainly has nothing to do with despair, but, on the contrary, it breathes the supremest faith. To be forsaken of God—does indeed sound dark enough: such language we use either (in another sense) touching consummate wickedness, or (as it is here meant) touching the deepest misery. When mortal man appeals to God, Forsake me not! or at most, Hast thou, canst Thou then have forsaken me?—this speaks of deep distress and anguish. But here is the rigid and actual עֲזַבְתָּנִי, Thou *hast forsaken*, as it

respects the complainant's feeling and experience, because hearing, consolation, help, and strengthening are, notwithstanding all the cries of His soul, far off:—*nevertheless*, and this is the marvellous counterpart, *nevertheless* He speaks of this to His God, speaks to Him with the most confidential and penetrating *Thou!* Even where we read, Thou bringest Me to the dust of death! Yea, He *asks* His God like a son, in the boldness of His complaints, the *why* of His abandonment!

One after another has repeated the thought that Christ had the entire psalm in His view, and consequently also the consolations which occur afterwards;[1] and that it was His purpose to utter and pray through the whole for the encouragement of His soul, as we use hymns and Scripture in our sorrows, but that He could not in His *exhaustion* go beyond the commencement of it.[2] The excellent Braune (who cannot always shake off Schleiermacher) speaks with unpardonable boldness: "After the loudly uttered first words of the psalm He certainly prayed through the whole of it, or the whole was present to His soul." How then in that case could the beginning of it have been a truth in His lips? And how unseemly *such* a use of Scripture now upon the cross! How psychologically inconceivable is the present realising of an entire long psalm in *that* conflict which the soul of the world's Redeemer is now sustaining! We must protest against such views as altogether false, inasmuch as they lose sight of the real fulfilment of that mystery of profound anguish of spirit which the psalm itself predicts. The Lord thinks indeed of that psalm which He had often contemplated before as a prophecy of Himself; He will not, however, pray through the entire psalm for His invigoration; but the Spirit brings to His thought at the crisis to which it belonged the word with which it commences—*in that* He finds His consolation bound up with the expression of anguish, and *needs* no more to pray or lament. Braune—with Schleiermacher and many—lays *too much* emphasis, because a

[1] So Weiss, most simply, in his Bibelstunden: "No agony, no anguish could amaze His faith, or entirely disturb His consciousness of the *nearness of God!*"

[2] Tischendorff, entirely misconceiving and perverting the *victory* won in this word of Christ, says: "Agony returned more fiercely, and His mouth was shut convulsively!!"

one-sided emphasis, upon our Lord's speaking in the words of the psalm; he would prematurely occupy the Lord's mind by the subsequent hope and joy of the psalm, before the word of lamentation was uttered; and thus essentially give up the profound meaning of that word in itself.[1]

Thus much is true: The Divine counsel in Scripture so ordered it that, as the mockery of the blasphemer, so also the *lamentation* of the Sufferer before Israel and the world should be only the *fulfilment* of what was appointed; that His anguish should only precede His victory:—but *that* was a consequence which Jesus at the moment could not and did not think of. Thus much is also true: The word of the Scripture presents to Him at the proper moment the expression at once of dismay and trust, as both were struggling together in Him; and He seizes it as a rod and staff, for to such an end was it written for Him. But that implies that He did not at once contemplate in His mind the whole subsequent consolation of the psalm; for He does not take the Scripture here into His mouth as an objective word, after our own manner, but enters into it wholly, is as it were one with it, and it becomes living in Him, He lives it out. Finally, it is also true that the Lord *could* not thus speak, *could* not mourn over the abandonment of God, out of a feeling absolutely and originally His own, and as using a word self-originated in His own consciousness; it is so far a *strange* word to Him, a word which grew out of the sufferings of humanity before Him, and as a prophecy in these sufferings prepared for Himself for a witness that He now as the Son of Man, "the afflicted, tested Righteous One in the midst of the unrighteous" suffers and laments. If we strive to imagine the Son of God in the flesh now first forming for Himself this cry of profoundest anguish as His own personal word, we shall feel how inappropriate, yea, how impossible it is![2] *But* He did nevertheless perfectly *appropriate*

[1] Equally incorrect is Arndt: "He asks in the introductory word of Ps. xxii., in order to exhibit the whole psalm as fulfilled, and redemption as accomplished." If this was the consciousness and design of Jesus, where would be room for the *abandonment* and the *why?*

[2] So far Theremin is right: "Thus we see that it was not a feeling naturally originating in Himself, but a strange feeling voluntarily taken into His soul, which now pierced Him, and to which He gave

the word of the psalm ; rather, it has such a truth in His heart and upon His lips, as it never had before and never will again have; it perfectly expressed His meaning and His condition. Had it not been so, there would have been no prophecy fulfilled; yea, then *He would not have said it.* He utters it openly, He withholds it not, when it was given to His thought by His God, for all is now the most hidden converse with His God. He thinks of no witness to those without; the loud *cry*,[1] forgetting the crowd around as if it existed not, is the involuntary expression of His inmost feeling. But it was the providential ordinance that all the world should know what was passing in the depths of His soul, and that not otherwise than as it was foretold.

The psalm itself shows us that He who felt Himself forsaken was by no means actually forsaken; and this is proved by the very first word of the prayer, for *he who can speak to God must have God with him.*[2] From this therefore we proceed in our whole exposition. First of all, we hold fast that Christ as the *Son of God* could never be forsaken by His Father; and this is expressly testified in John xvi. 32. Sooner may heaven and earth be torn asunder, the creature be dissolved and separated from its fundamental principle, than the Father be separated from the Son, that is, God from Himself! Only those who forsake God are forsaken of Him. (2 Chron. xii. 5, xv. 2, xxiv. 20). He who laments in this "forsaken *Me*," who feels Himself thus forsaken, is the same Son of Man who said in Gethsemane, Not as I will; that is, as man, by means of the κρύψις of the Divine in Him He is now left to His human weakness. The conflict of Gethsemane is here heightened and fulfilled. There it was the conflict of the human *will*, but still in the clear consciousness of the Spirit triumphing over the flesh; here there appears even a struggle of the human *consciousness*, an actual obscuration of the

utterance." But then he goes on with his gloomy dogmatics about the pains of hell; and this sermon cannot therefore be so entirely commended as that on the malefactor.

[1] What a trial for the malefactor's faith!

[2] "Thus these words express the contradiction between His person and His position, when He entered this hour:—internal fellowship with God and abandonment by God" (Schmieder, das hohep. Geb. S. 28).

light of the spirit in the labouring soul—labouring indeed only through the concealed spirit. There the Lord came to the bounds of *obedience*, there was present a certain not-willing, which, however, retreated before obedience; here the hardest and profoundest temptation drives him to the bounds of *faith*; a certain not-trusting, and thus not-knowing, is present, but firm faith approves and glorifies itself even in this. Adam forsook God, though God had not forsaken him; Christ, feeling Himself forsaken of God, nevertheless leaves not God, and thus becomes—our God-with-us. Assuredly, for a moment (at this extreme end of the three hours, not during the whole of these hours, for in every temptation of our Lord the transition at its limit *must* suddenly come)—in the strictest sense *for a moment* Jesus knew not that for which His Why must ask, *felt* no longer the nearness of His God, whom He therefore calls for in the deepest lamentation. This was, on the one hand, a voluntary severance, caused by love, of the love manifesting itself in time from the eternal love, as Ebrard expressess it;[1] but, on the other hand, it was, at the same time, the demonstration and perfect work of the same love, which must and which will sink entirely into oneness with humanity. Into the doom and judgment of humanity even to death, the wages of sin. In Gethsemane the cup of death was brought near to Him; and the scent, as it were, of its first drops excited in Him the recoil from the full *drinking*, which He tasted beforehand *in spirit*. Here he has fully drunk it, He has actually as God-man in His humanity *tasted* and experienced *death*; He is *seized* by it, though He was not, and could not be holden of it. (Acts ii. 24). He then spoke relatively with composure, in submission to His almighty *Father*; but here He cries as if utterly sinking to His *God*. If we should imagine to ourselves that within Him, in His inmost soul, there was light amid all this obscuration—the word of His lamentation would contradict us!

Only the material substratum of His passion, in the unity and mutual interpenetration of body and soul which was perfect in Him, was the corporeal suffering which Ps. xxii. 14, 15, des-

[1] Compare upon this some excellent remarks in Martensen's Dogmatik § 146.

cribes;—the pouring out of all His strength, the drying up of the sap of life, the fever of wounds, thirst such as all the dying feel, possibly even (for why not even that?) recurring variations of fainting which would swallow up all consciousness. But under all was the suffering of the sacred soul, internally full of the energy of life, which is conscious of death for the sake of sin as the doom of human nature, and which He tastes as essential death invading the most essential life. (He felt again upon what was said of this upon Gethsemane). This was now His real *dying;* the surrender of His Spirit to the Father was already the victory over death. "He felt the death of humanity; humanity came in His heart to the perfect feeling of its own death" —as Lange says.[1] This was, however, not merely the pang of bodily dissolution, but the feeling of the dying soul. Still less was it anything like a declining to die—Must I thus actually die? (as if He at the close might have hoped that this would be removed, as He had prayed in Gethsemane!)—but the absolute and "boundless *alienation*" from it which was in the supremest degree natural to *His* life—Is *this* death? Is it so horrible? Is the light and life of God utterly no longer in it? That is to say, *death*, and *sin*, on account of which death comes, are to His consciousness and feeling thus wholly and inseparably bound up together, as we found it at Gethsemane. "*Sin* is nothing else but separation from God, and now God withdraws indeed His light and Himself; then follows darkness. With the sin, which Christ now bears as the sin-offering, God mingles not His light of grace. This is the fundamental reason of the darkening of the face of mercy." (Berl. Bible). Thus the *horror* of death assails Him, inasmuch as (without positive, personal consciousness of guilt) the death which he accepted for the sin of others is regarded by Him as, and becomes to Him the—being *without God*. What a feeling must this have been to this Holy One, in whom the *consciousness of God* and the *consciousness of life* were, as in the case of no other, one! The saints in the Old Testament describe their relative failing of heart, and darkening

[1] Whose thorough exposition of the *Eli, Eli*, which we can almost entirely agree with, is among the most beautiful parts of his book, and it is an illustrious example that one may all the more profoundly seize the inmost depth of the atoning passion, if juristical satisfaction and representative damnation is given up.

of the (internal) eyes, as the hiding of God's countenance; but Christ is in dying forsaken of God as none else ever was, for he had lived in and with God as none else had ever lived.

A threefold oppression, we may more precisely say, now breaks in upon Him. The wickedness of *human nature* from without, from others—and its weakness in Himself (the higher analogon of 2 Chr. xii. 5) He must endure. Moreover, *Satan* comes upon Him, the king of terrors, the prince of death; speaks to Him lyingly of *wrath* with images for His fantasy which show Him all the kingdoms of hell and their horrors—He *sees* nothing around and before Him but רָעוֹת עַד־אֵין מִסְפָּר (Ps. xl. 12), sufferings and sins inseparably interwoven; for in His sympathy as the Head and centre of humanity He assuredly feels the sins of the world as *if* they were His own. (עֲוֹנוֹתַי in the same passage). Finally, His own heart forsook Him (לִבִּי עֲזָבָנִי) that is, *God Himself*, who is the heart and life of His heart, had *withdrawn Himself*. This is the truth and the reality of the abandonment, concerning which Bengel remarks: "He does not only say that He was delivered by God to the will of men, but also that *from God Himself He suffered something unutterable to us.*" That is, nothing positive[1]—but the negative keeping silence, distance, and obscuration of the Sonship in Him by means of which He could say Father; so that only the humanity remained, and that no longer feels the consolation of God. Thus He who had just comforted the malefactor with the promise of Paradise now "hangs comfortless,"—as the Church sings. Thus there is a half truth in what J. Winckler says,[2] that "it may be regarded as more possible before God that the personally assumed *human nature* of Jesus should be cut off from the *inflowing of the Divine love*, than that the wrath of God should be severed from sin without propitiation." Half true; that is, true in the first clause, for in the second we must, according to the Scripture, substitute *death* for *wrath*. "Heaven

[1] Hence, *not*, Why dost Thou pour thy wrath upon me, Why dost Thou punish and condemn Me, Thy beloved Son? Or, rather without *why*, as that theory would require, and without the *my*—God, thou condemnest me! I sink under Thy wrath!

[2] In Hamburg. See his thoughts on the forsaking of Jesus Christ, as Rambach (Sieben Worte) derives them from his work published in 1689—Das volkommene Alles ausrer Seelen.

hides itself—hell alone remains!" Thus sings Pape, but that *hell* remains, applies (in his meaning), as a symbolical warning pointing to *eternal* darkness (Ecclus. xvii. 21), to the sinners without; in Christ remains the "My God" even though the heavens are hidden. This is *death*, but *the* death in which life remaineth, saves us from death, and obtains for us life again. "As in the beginning of the creation the Lord called the light out of the darkness, so also now He calls the light out of the darkness once more; He calls life out of death."[1]

And now let it be carefully observed that Christ *at the end* of the three anxious hours first sends up to heaven in its full and uttered strength the cry of anguish which ended His anguish,—as the final outbreak of an anguish which had been three hours restrained and secretly gnawing His soul. Although it is the most oppressive moment of supreme abandonment which urges the cry, it is at the same time removed by that cry; then does His heart find room, and light comes back to His eyes. We correctly translate, Why *hast* thou forsaken Me. Bengel: "In the past. At that moment the abandonment ceased, and presently afterwards the whole Passion." On the other hand he is quite wrong when he says, "In the middle and *deepest* abandonment He was silent," for it is the *deepest* abandonment which breaks forth and is lost in the cry of anguish. During three hours of deepening oppression He had *kept silence* before His God—had not murmured—had not complained, even by a Διψῶ—had not cried, Help me!—but had restrained his sorrow and waited and been patient to the uttermost extreme. This patience, and *what* He suffered, this *extremity* must for ever be to our understanding a concealed and impenetrable mystery, *because we have in us no Divine-human experience of sin and death in their connection.* That word עֲזַבְתָּנִי, *forsaken Me*, spoken still in

[1] Salzmann, Blick in das Geheimniss des Rathschlusses Gottes u. s. w. Strassb. 1810. S. 194. He goes on to draw a suggestive parallel in the παλιγγενεσία of the external world. "Hence when the Restorer waged the conflict of death upon the cross, the sun was darkened and the earth quaked, as a symbol of that which will take place at the end of the world when the great Restoration will be consummated." Comp. S. 48. So pregnant and far-reaching are God's signs! Here belongs Ps. viii. 4 (according to Bengel's remark on Matt. xxvii. 45), for the new world has no new and other sun, besides Christ Himself.

the darkness by Christ to God, is itself a dark abyss; "it conceals a depth in which our thoughts are lost." For it is that "perfect contradiction," proceeding from *sin* into consummate *death*, as it first reached actual reality on the cross of reconciliation and solution. "In the height of triumph upon the throne it will be made plain what the Mediator's sorrow was on the edge of the abyss." That was the *price* of redemption! For however dark and gloomy the *lamentation of deepest anguish* may sound to us in this word, these two things are *clear* to us as the light which now again emerged from the darkness;—that this word is not an outbreak of unbelieving despair; and that Christ suffered, as holy, so also *propitiatory* sufferings, in our room and stead, for our sin. We cannot understand this word in any other way; it gives direct assurance to everyone who would not empty it or lay it aside altogether,[1] that Christ, in order to perfect in His person the work, and Himself as the Redeemer, suffered death in a real connection with sinful humanity.

But the first abides also true: He never despaired of His God; consequently He suffered what He suffered "*not* as a punishment (of Himself) in His consciousness, not as a judgment upon *His own* heart." The theology with its meditations, which go so far as to assert this, has always most unwarrantably overlooked the *Eloi, Eloi*, which belongs to and even precedes, the *forsaken Me*—the unmoved and immovable *My* God![2] He trusted in God—this ceases not now, but reaches its perfection. For God was His God from His mother's womb, Ps. xxii. 9, 10 (which Psalm-word as it respects Christ has its deepest meaning in His miraculous and sacred birth, to which He now refers back in His second birth of death). Verily, He did not take His farewell of God when He died; but He in death fulfilled His course and kept the faith! If not—who can think out the consequences of this, as relatively possible in His humanity?

In this *My God* He utters, and He alone in a sole and incomparable sense, the *nevertheless* of the "nevertheless-psalm," Ps.

[1] As, alas, the excellent Langer does in his sermons; passing over this *central* word with a strange exposition, which we will not now stay to cite and refute.

[2] Strangely enough the Pesch. loses this, for we find a mere אֵל; and we could almost accept the supposition of Grotius that it was a corruption of the text through transposition of אֵלִי.

lxxiii. 1—26. The struggle and transition was not, indeed, so easy as Umbreit expresses it: "After the supplicatory invocation had passed, like a breath of the humanity from His Divine lips, He enters into the undisturbed consciousness of His unity with the Father, and perfect rest and peace." But the "My God" belongs, in the unity of the moment of anguish with the peace, itself *at the same time* to the amazement of the lamentation —*My God* hath *forsaken* me! Its *repetition* is at first a repetition of the anguish—as in the psalm originally, according to its then psychological truth. But then it is also, since the fulfilment goes beyond the meaning of the type, a repetition of the *victory*, surpassing the only *once* bewailed abandonment. While He thus *calls upon* His God, He finds His God again! And it *now* becomes manifest that the "forsaking" had not been an objective, indeed not an altogether subjective, abandonment. And so far the whole is "not so much a cry of anguish, as rather a testimony that He had broken through into a freedom, becoming to His mediatorial office." (Rieger). Even in this quaking of the earth, the rock is unmoved. It is, as Lange says, "a marvellous sacred despair, which is one with the supremest trust."

He says with the Psalmist, who from the depths of his own personal experience had a presentiment of the suffering Messiah and typified Him, only *God* and not Father, and this is of great importance. *Never elsewhere* had Christ spoken thus of "His God" alone: comp. Jno. viii. 54, xx. 17. Only *God*, for now the *man* in Him speaketh:—nevertheless *My* God, with a propriety and fulness of meaning which no other could arrogate before or after Him; for the *Holy one* of God speaketh, who experienced this abandonment for the sake of sinners. Assuredly there is a profound reason here why He does not this time dare to utter the Father-name:—but God is not before Him in such fearful wrath as to take from His lips the "*My* God." On the one hand, that is certainly true which Winckler delivers on Ps. xxii. 4—6: "Thus there was as great a difference between His suffering and the greatest suffering of other saints, as there is between a worm and a man;" but, on the other hand, it abides equally true that, trodden in the dust of death as a writhing worm, Christ is still and must ever be Christ. Only the sinless One can in His own person say still in such a depth *My God;*

we only in Him. And that right of humanity before the time of Christ to cry unto God in prayer, which has been appealed to,[1]—that in which Ps. xxii. 5, 6, is admitted,[1] came from that *grace* which was procured here in the fulness of time by Christ. His lamentation, it is in truth the *lament of humanity*, had been uttered a thousand times before He came, probably in the same words; but the prophetic word was already so framed, that with full personal right and in his own power no man can ever utter the אֵלִי, and this expression has its full truth only in Christ.

Consequently Christ does not speak in the person and in the place of condemned sinners in any such sense as the theology of satisfaction teaches,—but teaches without marking how its theory is here refuted. Those who are cast out with the devil into everlasting torment, who cry to the mountains and to the rocks instead of to God, *dare not* and *cannot* cry, My God! He who according to the *summum jus* is at last and finally *abandoned of God* knows well wherefore—and has no prayer remaining, because no God. Yea, if the "*why?*" were possible in hell, it would receive as the perfection of daring the most awful of all answers. Thus it was *not* "the punishment of the damned" which Christ suffered, as the otherwise deep thinker v. Gerlach affirms. It was *not*, as Theremin preaches, "the feeling of entire and decided misery" which this word from the cross expressed; for can he be entirely and definitively miserable who can yet call upon his God? ?[2]—If God so absolutely forsakes the sinner as to leave him to himself as nothing but a sinner, then there remains only despair and severance from God. But since God forsook Christ, and yet forsook Him not, He remains the Man in God, who re-

[1] Lange, S. 1575, borders on this: "The great *why*, which is permitted to the miserable race of man under God's rule." Certainly it is, but only through grace; and it is not permitted to the damned.

[2] It is, moreover, one of those unimaginable things which so often occur in dogmatic systems, that Christ could have endured in a short space, by means of His indwelling Divine power, the whole torment of hell; and as an infinite Person all the wrath of God, for the endurance of which the damned require eternity! This self-contradicting notion also contradicts the testimony of Christ, and must assume, to be intelligible at all, that despair is not of itself an essential element of damnation. And though Luther maintained that "Christ suffered the fear and horror of a tortured *conscience*, and tasted *eternal* wrath"—it is nevertheless a sentence contrary to fact, reason, and Scripture.

tains God for Himself, and recovers Him for us.[1] Here is a greater than Moses, whose countenance *shone* when he came out of the darkness, in the midst of which was God. (Ex. xx. 21, xxxiv. 29).

Thus the *why*, in its only meaning as it regards Christ, is grounded upon the *My*, and such a why Christ alone can ask. Hengstenberg says quite correctly: "*Every one* is justified in asking this *why*, who has a *right* to call God his God, notwithstanding his manifold sins of infirmity"— but whence came, and whence to this day comes, this *right* of a sinner, but from the righteousness imparted by the grace of God, that righteousness which Christ has here in Himself? His *filial* questioning of the government, this awful moment inexplicable to Him, of the God who forsakes Him, and yet is ever with and in Him, forms a remarkable counterpart and contrast, in its infinitely sublimer and fuller truth, with His parents' questioning of their holy child, who had never done anything ἄτοπον—Why hast thou done this unto us? This why is something quite different from a questioning in doubt, Art thou, then, (or no longer) my God? That is an impossibility! His lamentation has nothing to do with any defiance or despair of hell, as if He had been oppressed or swallowed up *of it;* but it is itself the *victory* of prayer, the finding in the seeking, and the question brings its answer at once with it.

Thus wrath—not actual, but represented to Him by Satan—is lost in love, and death in life. "There is no fellowship between God and sin, *but Christ comes between.*" Most beautifully, though not in theological style, Lange says: "In Christ the consciousness of Divinity itself[2] touches the consciousness of death. The heart of God feels the breath of death in that dying heart which is the centre of humanity; but thereby death dies in the heart of God." Now we tremble not; but if we fall into despondency, this is our strength and our consolation, that He also was amazed but did not fall into despair.

[1] "He held firmly to God and retained the Divinity of His life, at the time when in His unity with mankind, and in His human feeling, the feeling of abandonment by God amazed Him." Lange, S. 1638.

[2] For it was this which in the humanity of the Godman could no more lose or give up the "My God" than its own unity with the Father and the Son in the Holy Spirit.

The *Scripture* was His stay and consolation throughout those all-decisive last moments, when the salvation of the world was in the balance; He seized it *as* the prophecied word of Scripture, and by no such unconscious coincidence as the mockers spoke, Psalm xxii. 8. He *now* brings to His mind (not before) the whole psalm, and its exit in glory; hence immediately the "I thirst" in the consciousness of the fulfilment of all Scripture. Why? He had asked. This, according to the meaning of the psalm (where לָמָּה is equivalent to לָמָּה) certainly inquires first into the *reason—Cur? quare? quam ob rem?* and Matt. expresses this with the Sept.[1] in his *ἱνατί*. But St Mark embraces the other side, connected indeed with the former, where he points forward to the *design*, and says *εἰς τί*, as if it had been לָמָּה (to what end); hence the readings *λημά*, *λεμά*, Vulg. *lema* both in Matt. and Mark. In both senses, but pressing on to the latter which discloses the reason in the end, the *answer* of the Father is revealed to Christ, as He Himself declares it in the two following words—In order to *finish* and fulfil that for which Thy soul *thirsteth!* When Christ on Gethsemane was clearly conscious of the other will of His I, He says concerning it—Not as I will! When He upon Calvary cries out the question, Why—He also gives the answer. Thus did His cry in its victorious power rend the veil of the darkness of His anguish. At once *it is light* without and within; and the returning light is the victorious sign of life out of death. Without there is mockery again—thus the sin of humanity reveals itself also in the new light of grace. But to this belongs the following word of our Lord, which will lead us to consider and understand the perversion of the *Eli* into Elias, and the potion given Him to drink.

[1] See in the Sept. Ps. xlii. 5 (comp. ver. 9 *διατί*)—Ps. xliii. 1, xliv. 24, 25, lxxiv. 1, lxxx. 12, &c.—also for עַל-מָה Numb. xxii. 32. Comp. in New Testament Luke xiii. 7. Thus it is to be resolved into *τί ἐστιν, γέγονεν, ἵνα*—not as Buttmann: damit *was?* geschehe.

END OF VOLUME SEVENTH.

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